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Executive Summary 
Countries aspiring towards high economic development these days face, on the one 
hand, the accumulated knowledge of the negative impacts of certain developmental 
trajectories while, on the other hand, the conflicting information as to whether the 
alternative and, in general, more expensive, developmental trajectories are more feasible. 
The ‘mistake optimism’ argument is that avoiding mistakes made by the developed 
countries in their economic growth process will be cheaper for the developing countries 
in the long term. According to this argument, “developing countries should not go 
through the evolutionary process of previous industrialisation, but must rather ‘leap frog’ 
ahead directly from a state of under-development, through to efficient, environmentally 
benign technologies” (SWCC 1990). The ‘mistake pessimism’ argument is that ‘leap 
frogging’ may not always be affordable in the short-term for developing countries, and 
that those countries that have benefited from the dirty technologies have been able to 
accumulate wealth precisely by cutting corners. This has helped them to reach the stage 
of take-off. 
Clearly, the vision of leap-frogging ahead is an attractive vision for developing countries 
like China and India. Some recent experiences are also promising. For example, China 
appears to have successfully de-coupled energy related greenhouse gas emissions from 
its national gross development product (Zhang 1999: 55). There are also indications that 
if the efficiency of generation, transmission, distribution and end-use can be improved, 
the electricity generated could lead to higher industrial output at lower environmental 
pollution. China has thus already taken many measures to increase national productivity 
while reducing the environmental pressure. In a similar vein, recent measures taken in 
the electricity sector in India have also led to reduced emissions. Although this all 
sounds very promising, continuing to de-couple emissions from economic growth will 
remain a critical challenge for China and India, as it is for many of the industrialised 
countries. 
Against this background, this research explores the dilemma for China and India in 
relation to the electricity problem. It argues that the option for these two countries is to 
either adopt a ‘business-as-usual’ approach or to adopt approaches ranging from 
alternative development to industrial transformation. These options are not easy choices. 
At the specific level of electricity generation, the emission reduction options are 
certainly not easy given that the choice between nuclear energy, large hydro and coal-
fired plants appear to be choices that are reminiscent of the proverb ‘between the devil 
and the deep-blue sea’. The alternative energy choices exist, but the critical issue is to 
what extent they can reliably and affordably meet the demands of two such giant 
countries. At the specific level of electricity consumption, a key dilemma is that while on 
the one hand there are several socio-economic reasons to support small-scale production 
units, these units tend to be relatively inefficient, have lower quality products and have 
higher greenhouse gas emissions per unit of production. In relation to technology 
cooperation, there are occasions where although foreign technologies could help to 
increase the efficiency of the plants, they are not economically viable. At the same time, 
there are opposite occasions where despite the availability of local good quality 
resources and appropriate technologies, technologies are imported. Given that 
international pressure to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is gradually 
increasing, these countries will need to consider whether they will adopt a defensive or a 
constructive, proactive role in the international climate change negotiations and in 
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domestic climate change and energy policy. Thus, the overall goal of this project is to 
analyse the feasibility of policy options to modernise the electricity sector in China and 
India and to stimulate the use of such policy options by the relevant agencies. This will 
be done through an integrated approach. The research question is: What are the feasible 
policy and technology options to modernise the electricity sector in China and India 
taking into account the supply and demand for electricity and given the conflict between 
the need for economic growth and the need to anticipate future developments in relation 
to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions?  
This project investigates the way in which the demand and supply side of the electricity 
sector in China and India might develop. It identifies the potential for using technologies 
to modernise electricity generation and end-use sectors. Ultimately the project identifies 
themes in which technology co-operation between developed and developing countries 
can be most fruitful. The underlying philosophy is that such co-operation will be best 
undertaken on the basis of the perceived needs of the key decision makers and stake-
holders in the developing countries. 
Chapter 2 of this report describes our research methodology. The integrated methodol-
ogy used in this research is necessary in order to study the multi-disciplinary and com-
plicated issue of the potential of emission reduction in China and India. The project es-
sentially integrates three methodological approaches, a scenario approach, a bottom-up 
technology approach and an institutional cum stakeholder approach. These approaches 
were combined in an integrated research framework as shown in Figure 1. Following an 
initial appraisal of the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario for the electricity sector for both 
countries, a range of policy and technology options was identified, as well as their poten-
tial and technical, economic and political feasibility. These options were combined and 
compared to the business-as-usual scenario to develop emission reduction scenarios for 
China and India and were tested with stakeholders to identify their feasibility and to as-
sess the potential of using instruments at national and international level to facilitate their 
implementation.  
Chapter 3 analyses the institutional context in China. It concluded that the organisational 
and institutional frameworks relevant for the electricity sector are in a state of structural 
reform though based on short-term perspectives. The organisations are still only partly 
decentralised and there is strong bureaucratic inertia, large vested interests and a lack of 
information and communication. It showed that a large number of policies have been de-
veloped to make the supply and demand sectors more efficient. However, although many 
policies have been developed the administrative rules, the financial climate and the lack 
of financial resources stand in the way of large investments. The reforms towards a mar-
ket economy and the need to deal with local air pollution problems are a driving force 
for energy efficiency improvements. However, the current oversupply in many of the 
sectors and the non-rational electricity prices prohibits large private investments in en-
ergy efficiency improvements, which depend heavily on foreign investments. There are 
only a few foreign investors that want to invest in China under the current setting. Fi-
nally, it argues that local governments do not always support the national government 
policy and are not strong enforcers of such policy. They are afraid of the resulting em-
ployment and social unrest as a result of, for example, closing small, inefficient plants. 
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Figure 1.  The integrated research framework based on the three methodological approaches 
(Chapter 2). 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the institutional context in India and concludes that the 
organisational, institutional, legal, policy and market framework relevant for the 
electricity sector is in a state of structural change. At the same time, the changes are 
being resisted by the people whose livelihoods are affected and are being hampered by 
the constantly changing governments in power in the last decade. This change amidst the 
continuity makes it difficult to predict how soon or fast actual change will be visible in 
the sector. It also shows that a large number of measures have been taken in the energy 
supply side to rationalise the sector, to make it more cost-effective and efficient, which 
will help to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of generation since 1990. 
These measures include new laws such as the Coal Beneficiation Rules in 1996, the 
amendments to the Indian Electricity Act, the establishment of the Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions Ordinance, the Electricity 2000 Bill, the Renewable Energy Bill, policy 
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measures like the liberalisation of generation and distribution, the unbundling of the 
State Electricity Boards and the liberalisation of the investment rules and banking 
regulations. The decision to connect the regional grids will also lead to improvements in 
efficiency of electricity use. There are also a number of measures in the end-use sectors 
which include the liberalisation of the cement, aluminium and iron and steel sectors, the 
de-licensing rules, the modified pricing policy, the establishment of management 
information systems, conservation and environmental guidelines, the possible adoption 
of the Energy Conservation Bill, and the promotion of cogeneration. This indicates 
major structural upheaval in the consuming sector. The increasing desire of large scale 
industry to conform to ISO standards and the pressure from the consumers means that in 
this sector too the efficiency of electricity use is being actively promoted and this will 
have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter also presented some of the key 
concerns in rural electrification and argued that although non-grid renewable electricity 
may be competitive in remote rural areas it may not be affordable. The development of 
the rural areas may lead to an inevitable increase in electricity: the challenge is to find 
affordable ways of developing an environmentally and economically viable source of 
electricity. The driving force for efficiency improvements in India is the process of 
liberalisation and the need to take local and regional pollutants into account. 
Chapter 5 investigates Business-as-Usual (BAU) trends in electricity use and associated 
emissions of air pollutants. To this end, it uses the RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU scenario 
(Boudri et al. 2000a; TERI et al. 1999), and interprets its data in such a way that the sce-
nario can be used as a starting point for the analysis of options to reduce greenhouse 
gases. From our analysis of the BAU scenario for the period 1990-2020, we can draw the 
following conclusions. For China, the BAU scenario assumes a 30% growth of popula-
tion and a 7.5-fold increase in GDP, while total primary energy demand is expected to 
increase by 125%. As a result of this energy-related emissions of CO2 are by 2020 calcu-
lated to be more than twice the 1990 level. Emissions from the power sector contribute 
by about 30% to total greenhouse gas emissions. The total greenhouse gas emissions 
from electricity production are calculated to increase from 510 Mton CO2-equivalents in 
1990 to 1554 Mton CO2-equivalents in 2020. More than 90% of these emissions are CO2 
emissions, while CH4 and N2O contribute less than 10%. Emissions of greenhouse gases 
from the power sector increase by a factor of three, while total electricity production in-
creases by a factor of five, illustrating that total emissions per unit of electricity are ex-
pected to decrease considerably over time.  
For India, the BAU scenario assumes a more than 50% growth of population and a 5.8-
fold increase in GDP, while total primary energy demand is expected to increase by 
150%. As a result of this, energy-related emissions of CO2 are calculated to be more than 
three times the 1990 level by 2020. Emissions from the power sector contribute by about 
40% to total greenhouse gas emissions. The total greenhouse gas emissions from 
electricity production are calculated to increase from 256 Mton CO2-equivalents to 978 
Mton CO2-equivalents. Like for China, more than 90% of these emissions are CO2 
emissions, while CH4 and N2O contribute less than 10%. Emissions of greenhouse gases 
from the power sector increase by a factor of four between 1990 and 2020, while total 
electricity production increases by a factor of five, illustrating that total emissions per 
unit of electricity are expected to decrease considerably over time. 
Chapter 6 examines the Best Practice Technology options in the end-use sectors. In the 
end-use energy efficiency study, we saw that many technical options exist in various 
demand sectors. Generally, it is important to close down plants with old technologies, or 
retrofit them if closure is not possible for institutional reasons, to use the newest 
technologies when capacity addition or new construction takes place, to increase the use 
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of energy efficient lighting and appliances and, to improve electrical motors/pumps and 
increase the share of cogeneration in the cross-cutting sectors. To a limited extent, these 
options are expected to be adopted under the BAU scenario, since both China and India 
have shown significant progress in the period before 2000. Maximum potential energy 
savings on top of the BAU scenario are around 30% for 2020 for both countries. Various 
barriers to implementation exist, such as financial, institutional (including knowledge 
and technology availability), and geographical bottlenecks (see Chapter and 8). 
Chapter 7 analyses the potential effect of a number of strategies to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in 
China and India (see Table 1). From our analysis we may draw the following 
conclusions with respect to emissions of greenhouse gases. For China, we calculated that 
the options analysed may reduce 2020 emissions of air pollutants relative to the BAU 
scenario between 1 and 43%. The options that have the largest potential in reducing 
emissions include end-use efficiency improvement (43% lower than BAU), replacement 
of coal by renewables (23%) and natural gas (11%). Reducing electricity losses during 
transmission and distribution would reduce emissions by 7% and efficiency 
improvement of power plants by 9%. Closing small power plants has a small effect on 
emissions (1%), as does replacement of coal by nuclear power (2%). For increased 
cogeneration we calculate an emission reduction of 2%, but it should be noted that this 
estimate may underestimate the total potential for cogeneration, as discussed in Chapter 
6. For India, the reduction options are calculated to reduce emissions in 2020 relative to 
the BAU scenario by 4 to 45% for greenhouse gases. The options with relatively large 
emission reduction potentials include end-use efficiency improvement (45% lower than 
BAU), replacement of coal by renewables (14%) and natural gas (14%) and efficiency 
improvement of power plants (9%). Emission reductions are also calculated for 
improved transmission and distribution of electricity (6%), and replacing coal by nuclear 
power (6%). Increased cogeneration is calculated to have a moderate effects on 
emissions from the electricity sector (4%) but it should be noted that this estimate may 
underestimate the total potential for cogeneration, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Table 1. The potential to reduce emissions CO2, CH4 and N2O (GHG) and SO2 from the power sec-
tor in China and India in 2020, by selected Best Practice Technology options relative to the 
Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Reduction in 2020 GHG emis-
sions (% relative to BAU) 
Best Practice Technology Option 
China India 
End-use efficiency improvement (EEI) in   
- cement, iron & steel, aluminium industry 4 3 
- other industrial sectors 25 14 
- residential sector 8 12 
- commerce 5 11 
- agriculture 1 5 
Total EEI 43 45 
Replacement of coal by renewables (REN) 23 14 
Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS low, no cogen) 11 14 
Replacement of coal by nuclear power (NUC) 2 6 
Closing Small power plants (CSP) 1 - 
Efficiency improvement in power plants (EFF) 9 9 
Increased use of cogeneration (COG-coal) 2 4 
Reduction of losses during transmission and distribution (T&D) 7 6 
[Note that the effects of the various options cannot be added in a straightforward way.] 
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The options that have the largest technical potential to reduce emissions, are not neces-
sarily viewed by stakeholders as the most promising options for modernising the 
electricity sector, as discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 8 concludes that there is no shortage 
of ideas and policies to deal with the issue of energy policy and efficiency. However, 
there is lack of public support for these ideas (because it is not solicited in China), and 
there is an institutional inertia that makes it difficult for governments and society to 
adapt to the changing circumstances. Table 2 and 3 identify the political and economic 
feasibility of institutional and technological options for slowing the rate of growth of 
greenhouse gas emissions for China and India respectively. These are based on 
interviews and workshops with stakeholders (see Acknowledgements for details). 
Table 2. Identifying the political and economic feasibility of technological and other options to re-
duce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions: China. 
Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
1. Rationalise pricing - System of cross 
subsidies; 
- Variable tariffs for 
different sectors; 
- High prices for ru-
ral households; 
- Industry, commerce 
will support such 
changes because it 
may reduce costs 
and increase profits 
for them; 
- Domestic political 
will; 
- Support from inter-
national commu-
nity; 
- Article 2 of the 
Kyoto Protocol; 
- Support for rational 
pricing combined 
with price support/ 
ration system for 
the poorest sectors 
of society; 
 
2. Improve legitimacy 
of decision-making and 
reduce the implementa-
tion deficit 
- The government 
decentralises and 
centralises out of 
the angst of losing 
control, this does 
not make the role of 
centre and state 
clear; this com-
pounds the problem 
of institutional iner-
tia; 
- The stakeholders 
and provinces are 
not actively in-
volved in the deci-
sion-making proc-
ess; but as China 
liberalises the sup-
port of these stake-
holders is necessary 
for policy and law 
implementation; 
- Vested interests 
want large fossil-
fuel, nuclear and 
hydro projects; but 
there may be latent 
social opposition 
- In principle the 
Government wants 
a peaceful transition 
and does not want 
to shake society by 
sudden changes; 
- Government wants 
large projects and 
no retrofitting espe-
cially because cur-
rent electricity sup-
ply is higher than 
demand; large pro-
jects can be con-
trolled or directed 
by the state; 
- To develop a step-
by-step approach to 
decentralisation in 
which good rela-
tions between the 
centre and state are 
fostered;  
- To develop a step-
by step approach to 
involve stake-
holders and prov-
inces so that tailor-
made, not uniform 
policies for differ-
ent regions can be 
made; 
- To develop a step-
by-step approach to 
monitor and enforce 
legislation; 
- To translate this 
into guidelines for 
CDM projects in 
electricity; 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
3. Improving the transi-
tion from state owned 
to corporatised bodies 
and privatisation 
- The bulk of the 
electricity produc-
ers and distributors 
and large end-users 
were state entities; 
the transition to pri-
vatisation is proving 
difficult;  
- The process of de-
veloping power 
purchase agree-
ments not well de-
veloped; 
- The domestic pri-
vate sector is still in 
a nascent stage and 
has to learn the 
rules of privatisa-
tion; 
- The government is 
also trying to find a 
peaceful and grad-
ual method to en-
courage privatisa-
tion; 
- Companies do not 
have much equity, 
so securing loans is 
difficult especially 
as the financial 
market is also try-
ing to liberalise; 
- Government sup-
port for privatisa-
tion; 
- Growing awareness 
of the risks of fast 
privatisation; 
- Awareness of risks 
of increasing unem-
ployment as a result 
of privatisation; 
- Separate generators 
from distributors ; 
- Create power ‘pur-
chasing pools’ and 
support existing ex-
periments in the 
field;  
- Develop a frame-
work for the priva-
tisation process on 
the basis of the ex-
isting challenges 
faced; 
- Reduce the red tape 
and the need for 
many licenses (sim-
plified investment 
procedures), instead 
encourage transpar-
ency and the public 
and press can moni-
tor developments; 
- Make simple rules 
for loans to starting 
companies 
4. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
a. Cement 
b. Iron and steel 
c. Aluminium 
d. Households and 
commercial 
equipment; 
e. Motors and drives  
4.  
a. Inadequate informa-
tion and high cost 
of technology and 
inputs for small-
scale industry; 
resistance to closure 
from small industry; 
b. capital shortage; dip 
in international 
market; lack of 
scrap; institutional 
inertia; 
c. lack of resources in 
small-scale sector; 
difficulties in cor-
poratisation proc-
ess; 
d. cost of equipment 
to households and 
commerce; 
e. lack of information 
and the price of 
VSD; tendency to 
4. 
a. Technologies avail-
able internationally; 
and large scale sec-
tor supports mod-
ernisation; govern-
ment policy to close 
down small produc-
ers; 
b. Technologies avail-
able nationally and 
internationally; 
Government sup-
port for increasing 
quality of steel and 
not quantity; clo-
sure of small plants; 
c. Government sup-
port for closure of 
small plants; 
d. Technologies and 
products available 
domestically; 
e. -  
4 
For all options: 
- rules for participa-
tion in CDM and 
technology transfer;  
- guidelines to sup-
port small-scale 
projects; plants and 
products via subsi-
dies/ GEF/CDM 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
rewind motors 
rather than buy new 
motors 
6. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
a. Large hydro 
b. Small hydro 
c. Wind 
d. Gas 
e. Nuclear 
f. Biomass 
 
 
a. (Latent) social, en-
vironmental and 
seismic risks;  
b. Technical difficul-
ties; 
c. Cost of wind 
power; difficulty of 
storing wind en-
ergy; difficulties in 
transmitting from 
wind rich to wind 
poor areas; 
d. Location of local 
gas resources; aging 
gas pipes; distance 
from demand; costs 
of generation; 
e. Lack of technology 
and capital; (latent) 
social and environ-
mental risks; 
f. Lack of awareness; 
g. High costs 
a. Strong political 
will; 
b. Technical potential  
c. Large technical po-
tential and political 
will;  
d. International inter-
est and willingness 
to invest in modern 
technologies; 
e. Political will high; 
low risk perception 
of social and envi-
ronmental risks; 
f. Availability of bio-
mass and potential 
g. Some solar pro-
grammes encour-
aged 
 
a. Explore options for 
small hydro in large 
hydro regions in an-
ticipation of major 
potential social 
problems in the fu-
ture; 
b. Develop start subsi-
dies for small hy-
dro; 
c. “ 
d. Explore opportuni-
ties to replace coal 
by available gas 
e. Explore opportuni-
ties (to take into ac-
count nuclear waste 
and risks) 
f. Make focused bio-
mass policies  
For all options: 
- Develop rules for 
inclusion and exclu-
sion for GEF/ CDM 
projects on the basis 
of above discussion; 
g.  Develop start sub-
sidies for solar. 
 
7. Efficiency Im-
provement in coal 
plants (EFF) 
a. Existing plants 
b. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boil-
ers) 
a. Lack of resources in 
the few remaining 
small plants; 
b. Joint venture re-
strictions and lack 
of capital; foreign 
technologies not 
forthcoming, inap-
propriate or expen-
sive; 
a. Political support for 
closing small 
plants; some sup-
port for retrofitting 
large plants as long 
as supply exceeds 
demand 
b. Political support for 
efficient coal tech-
nologies and IGCC. 
- Develop rules for 
CDM and for exist-
ing investments of 
the World Bank, 
ADB and make dif-
ferent baselines for 
the two options; 
8. Increasing 
Cogeneration (COG) 
 
- Difficulty in selling 
to grid, administra-
tive inertia; 
- Lack of knowledge 
in some sectors;  
- Increasing govern-
ment support; 
- Simple rules for 
power purchase 
agreements; 
- Recommendations 
for CDM/ GEF. 
9. Reduction of techni-
cal losses in transmis-
sion and distribution 
(T&D)  
- Lack of capital;  
- A number of remote 
rural areas to be 
connected to the 
grid 
- Technologies avail-
able in domestic 
and international 
market; 
- Political willing-
ness; 
- Recommendations 
for GEF and tech-
nology cooperation; 
- Explore non-central 
grid options; 
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Table 3. Identifying the political and economic feasibility of technological and other options to re-
duce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions: India 
Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
1. Decrease economic 
distribution losses 
(theft): Billing, meter-
ing, and collection 
 
- Loss of bribes for 
the billers, lines-
men, metre readers; 
- Cost of tamper-
proof and/or remote 
control meters;  
- Technology is 
available; 
- Political will is 
visible; 
- Tamper-proof me-
ters to profit mak-
ing local distribu-
tion centres; and/or 
- Remote metering in 
combination with 
demanding ac-
countability from 
the distribution cen-
tres 
2. Rationalise power 
pricing 
- social resistance 
from agriculture 
and households; 
- incentive to in-
crease electricity 
theft; 
- populism policy of 
politicians 
- industry, commerce 
and railways will 
support such 
changes because it 
may reduce costs 
and increase profits 
for them; 
- support from inter-
national commu-
nity; 
- Article 2 of the 
Kyoto Protocol; 
- Support for rational 
pricing combined 
with price support/ 
ration system for 
the poorest sectors 
of society 
- Convince agricul-
ture and households 
that the quality of 
supply will improve 
and they will save 
on voltage stabilis-
ers, diesel genera-
tors, mechanical 
failure and loss of 
income and comfort 
because of power 
shortage.  
3. Improving economic 
efficiency in govern-
ment spending 
- Vested interests 
want large fossil-
fuel and hydro pro-
jects;  
- Foreign investors 
want to promote 
technology transfer 
on the basis of their 
interests 
- Realisation at Plan-
ning Commission 
and Parliamentary 
level that it is 
cheapest to retrofit 
existing plants and 
use the savings for 
state of the art 
plants; 
- Social and political 
support for renew-
ables; 
- To translate this 
into guidelines for 
CDM projects in 
electricity; 
- To demand trans-
parency in making 
and contracts with 
large companies; 
4. Reducing other bot-
tlenecks in investing in 
energy efficient tech-
nologies: improving the 
financial health of the 
SEBs, accountability in 
government, and 
through corporatisa-
tion, privatisation, and 
other means; cheaper 
loans; 
- The electricity 
boards and some 
public sector under-
takings were bank-
rupt and could not 
invest in energy ef-
ficiency and opera-
tion and mainte-
nance; it was diffi-
cult to evaluate 
their value when 
they were priva-
tised; 
- Loss of employ-
- Political will to-
wards privatisation; 
- Growing awareness 
of the risks and 
challenges of priva-
tisation; 
- Liberalisation pro-
vides incentive for 
reducing interest 
rates on loans and 
investing in energy 
efficient technolo-
gies; 
- By developing rules 
for evaluating a 
formally bankrupt 
company and for 
the bidding process; 
or send a dedicated 
team to rebuild the 
organisation on 
commercial terms 
combined with rules 
of accountability; 
- Simplify the power 
purchase rules but 
do not go out of the 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
ment for laid off 
workers; 
- Private companies 
were not interested 
in low revenue sec-
tors (e.g. coal wash-
ing; distribution to 
rural consumers;)  
- Private sector wants 
guarantees that 
electricity is pur-
chased from them 
and Government 
does not want to 
give counter-
guarantees. 
- Loans and technol-
ogy expensive; 
- Power purchase 
agreements diffi-
cult, bureaucratic 
red tape; 
way to get the elec-
tricity; For exam-
ple, wind power in-
vestors should in-
vest in lines to the 
grid and not the 
other way around. 
6. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
a. Cement 
b. Iron and steel 
c. Aluminium 
d. Water pumps 
e. Households and 
commercial 
equipment; 
f. Motors and drives  
6.  
a. Inadequate 
information and 
high cost of 
technology and 
inputs for small-
scale industry; 
b. Current capital 
shortage; dip in in-
ternational market; 
lack of scrap; insti-
tutional inertia; cap-
tive generation; 
c. “ 
d. lack of regular tim-
ing and quality of 
supply; cost of 
technology; subsidy 
on electricity; 
e. costs of equip-
ment; low electric-
ity prices and theft 
f. lack of incentives 
in small-scale units 
and poor quality 
electricity 
6. 
a. expected economic 
growth with in-
creasing demand; 
technologies avail-
able and accessible 
for large-scale sec-
tor; motivates sec-
tor; small-scale sec-
tor facing pressure 
from market; 
b. liberalisation, pri-
vatisation, company 
self-image and ex-
port demand; 
c. “ 
d. farmers want qual-
ity power; 
e. high cost of energy 
to commercial sec-
tor and industry;  
f. - 
  
6. 
- revisit the policies 
for the small-scale 
sectors and encour-
age energy effi-
ciency through in-
centives; 
- rules for participa-
tion in CDM and 
technology transfer;  
- guidelines to sup-
port small-scale 
projects; plants and 
products via subsi-
dies/ GEF/CDM/  
7. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
a. Large hydro 
b. Small hydro 
c. Wind 
d. Gas 
e. Nuclear 
f. Biomass 
a. Social, environ-
mental and seismic 
risks; long gestation 
time 
b. Few entrepreneurs 
willing to take on 
this kind of project; 
lack of political 
a. Huge technical po-
tential available in 
North-East India; 
some political inter-
est; 
b. Potential in the Hi-
malayas; 
c. Political support 
a. Explore options for 
small hydro in large 
hydro regions; 
b. Develop start subsi-
dies for small hy-
dro; 
c. Link subsidies to 
generation not ca-
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
g. Solar 
 
 
support 
c. Subsidies linked to 
generation capacity 
encouraged do-it-
yourself people who 
made mistakes;  
d. Limited domestic 
gas available; high 
cost of imported gas 
and limitations be-
cause of regional 
peace politics; is a 
lock-in technology; 
e. Social and envi-
ronmental risks; 
costs high if waste 
disposal is taken 
into account; is a 
lock-in technology; 
f. Lack of incentives 
g. High costs 
and investors avail-
able; 
d. International inter-
est and willingness 
to invest in modern 
technologies 
e. Politicians argue 
that this may be 
necessary;  
f. Some programmes 
in place 
g. Some programmes 
encouraged through 
policy 
 
pacity and then 
phase out subsidies; 
d. Explore opportuni-
ties to import re-
gionally available 
gas 
e. Examine the safety 
and waste issue 
carefully; 
f. Increase incentives; 
g. Develop start subsi-
dies for solar. 
 
For all options 
7 Develop rules for 
inclusion and exclu-
sion for GEF/ CDM 
projects on the basis 
of above discussion; 
 
 
8. Efficiency Im-
provement in coal 
plants (EFF) 
a. Existing plants 
b. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boil-
ers) 
a. Lack of resources at 
the State Electricity 
Boards and disin-
terest in captive 
power plants; 
b. Lack of capital for 
modern state of the 
art technologies and 
lack of investors; 
poor quality of coal 
a. Political support for 
retrofitting existing 
plants; see point 3 
above; policy on 
power purchase 
agreements; 
b. Political support for 
super critical boilers 
and IGCC. 
- Develop rules for 
CDM and for exist-
ing investments of 
the World Bank, 
ADB and make dif-
ferent baselines for 
the two options; 
9. Increasing Cogene-
ration (COG) 
 
- Lack of support 
through PPAs (see 
point 5); 
- Lack of knowledge 
in some sectors;  
- Lack of payment by 
distribution sector; 
- Increasing govern-
ment support; 
- Support in sugar 
sector 
- Simple rules for 
PPA; and regular 
payments by SEBs;  
- Recommendations 
for CDM/ GEF. 
10. Reduction of tech-
nical losses in trans-
mission and distribu-
tion (T&D)  
- Lack of investment 
and loans expen-
sive;  
- Separate grids 
 
- Technologies avail-
able in domestic 
and international 
market; 
- Political willingness 
to integrate grids 
- Liberalise the bank-
ing sector to reduce 
interest rates (also 
necessary for other 
options); 
- Recommendations 
for GEF and tech-
nology cooperation.  
 
Table 4 combines information from the previous chapters and the stakeholder views to 
indicate the (lack of) gap between the technical feasibility of reducing emissions and the 
priorities of society in reducing emissions.  
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Table 4. Feasibility of options. 
Options Technical  
potential to reduce emis-
sions 
Stakeholder  
priority China 
Stakeholder priority 
India 
Rationalise pricing Indirectly high, since this 
helps to yield savings that 
can be used for reinvesting 
in energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment 
High for government, 
industry and com-
merce 
Improve legitimacy of de-
cision-making and reduce 
the implementation deficit 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing the implementation of 
government policy 
High for stake-
holders; but to be 
implemented step 
by step 
Although important, 
not a key issue from 
this research 
Improving the transition 
from state owned to corpo-
ratised bodies and privati-
sation; improving account-
ability and the financial 
health of utilities 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing accountability and 
profits and increasing re-
sources for investment in 
energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment and industry 
High 
Decrease distribution 
losses from theft 
Indirect high, by increas-
ing the revenues that can 
be reinvested in energy ef-
ficient technologies 
N/A High  
Improve economic effi-
ciency in government 
spending 
Indirect high, by focusing 
resources in an economic 
way on electricity sectors 
N/A; possibly an 
important issue; 
but did not 
emerge as such 
High; hence the need 
to focus on retrofit-
ting 
End-use efficiency im-
provement (EEI) 
Very high Low Low in small scale 
sectors 
Replacement of coal by  
renewables (REN) 
High Large hydro high, 
other  
renewables low 
Large hydro  
controversial, other 
renewables high 
Replacement of coal by 
natural gas (GAS low, no 
cogen) 
High High Low 
Replacement of coal by 
nuclear power (NUC) 
Low For government 
high 
Controversial 
Closing Small power plants 
(CSP) 
Low For government 
high 
Low 
Efficiency improvement in 
power plants (EFF) 
High Low High 
Increased use of cogenera-
tion (COG-coal) 
Low Low Although seen as im-
portant, policies are 
slow 
Reduction of losses during  
transmission and distribu-
tion (T&D) 
Medium Low High 
Note: The technical potential evaluated as high, low, etc. are derived from the quantitative analysis 
done in Chapter 7. 
 
The above table reveals that: 
- For China, the end-use energy efficiency improvement option, the efficiency im-
provement in power plants option and the (technical) losses in transmission and dis-
tribution have very high technical potential to reduce emissions. The government 
may wish to give these options due consideration and see if they cannot be priori-
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tised given their high potential for reducing emissions and their relatively non-
controversial nature.  
- For India, energy efficiency improvement in the end-use sector could benefit from 
greater prioritisation.  
- Since gas is a cleaner source of energy, the government may wish to examine the po-
tential of better social relations with its neighbouring countries. 
Chapter 9 develops four “Best Practice Technology” scenarios for emissions from the 
power sector in 2020. These scenarios illustrate the combined technical potential of se-
lected options to reduce emissions, and vary in their extent to which possible economic 
and political limitations are accounted for. From our analysis, we can draw the following 
conclusions. First, as with many of the developed countries in the world, it is technically 
possible for China and India to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions very substantially 
by adopting a highly energy efficient and renewable energy pathway (scenario BPT4). 
This scenario, however, must be considered unrealistic because it completely ignores the 
practical, economic and political feasibility of reduction options. Given that most devel-
oped countries themselves find such a pathway too expensive for them, it is arguably in-
conceivable that China and India could adopt new technologies to the extent typically as-
sumed in theoretical maximum emission reduction scenarios. Second, our calculations of 
three different scenarios (BPT1, BPT 2 and BPT 3) for emissions in the year 2020 indi-
cate that there are many different strategies for realising relatively large emissions reduc-
tions (to about half the level of the BAU scenario by 2020) for China and India. In each 
strategy we focus on different combinations of policies and we show that in the medium-
term there are several possibilities for achieving emission reductions. Third, one of the 
most promising combinations of policies is reflected in the Mixed Options Scenario 
(BPT 1). This scenario includes reduction options that have a relatively large technical 
potential and are given priority by stakeholders and are in general non-controversial in 
one or the other country. One of the most promising options is energy efficiency im-
provement in the end-use sectors, which is calculated to have a considerable technical 
potential to reduce emissions (see Chapters 6 and 7) and which appears to get an increas-
ing degree of priority in India, but less so in China (see Chapter 8). Fourth, we find that 
even in scenarios reflecting ambitious assumptions on energy efficiency improvement 
and fuel switch, a substantial portion of the electricity in China and India in 2020 is gen-
erated from coal fired power plants. Feasible options for end-use efficiency improvement 
combined with feasible fuel switch options may not be sufficient to avoid building new 
coal-fired plants after the year 2000.  
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Figure 2. Emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O from the power sector in China and India in 2020. Emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O). Results are shown for 1990 and for 2020 
for the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenar-
ios: BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”) 
and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). 
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Chapters 10 and 11 examine the perspectives of the two countries in relation to the cli-
mate change politics and relations and in particular in relation to the flexible mecha-
nisms.  
The report concludes that: 
- Climate change is not a critical priority for China and India as it competes with other 
more urgent issues.  
- As long as the governments do not have a complete statistical picture of their emis-
sions and sinks, and until the transition process stabilises, they are unlikely to wish to 
take on any quantitative commitments under the international climate change regime. 
- However, the measures taken since 1990 are likely to lead to greater electricity effi-
ciency and increased investments in renewables, which in turn would result in the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This shows that both countries are now de-
coupling their emissions from their output. Our study shows that for both countries, 
in fact, the energy (but not necessarily electricity) consumption per tonne of product 
in the end-use sectors has reduced significantly between 1990 and 2000. The Busi-
ness-as-usual (BAU) (2000) scenarios used in this project are also lower than earlier 
versions, indicating that the projections made by researchers about the future had to 
be revised. Although there may be other reasons for these downwards revisions, they 
are in line with the adoption of these policies. Thus although the countries are un-
willing de jure to take on commitments, they are de facto making progress. The driv-
ing forces behind such decoupling are liberalization and the increasing pressure to 
address local pollution. 
- The Business-As-Usual scenario for the electricity sector shows that emissions of 
greenhouse gases from the power sector in China and India are calculated to increase 
by a factor of three to four respectively between 1990 and 2020 in the BAU scenario, 
while total electricity production increases by a factor of five, illustrating that total 
emissions per unit of electricity are expected to decrease considerably over time. 
- The maximum potential energy savings on top of the energy savings already in-
cluded in the BAU scenario is around 30% for the two countries in 2020. This im-
plies a reduction in the rate of growth of demand for electricity which means that a 
total reduction of up to 45% of greenhouse gas and sulphur dioxide emissions rela-
tive to the BAU scenario is possible by making maximum use of the possibilities to 
improve energy efficiency in the end-use sector.  
- We identified a range of options to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 
and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in China and India. Our analy-
sis indicates that the technical potentials of these options to reduce emissions range 
between 1 and 45% relative to the BAU emissions in 2020. Relatively large emission 
reductions were calculated for efficiency improvement (both in the end-use and in 
electricity production sector) and fuel switch to renewables or natural gas. 
- Our analysis of the effect of combinations of reduction technologies in “Best Prac-
tice Technology” scenarios indicates the following: (a) The theoretical maximum po-
tential to reduce emissions by 2020 is very large, but it is unrealistic to assume that 
achieving this potential is feasible. The feasibility of ambituous options could, how-
ever, increase if the developed countries adopted a transition towards highly efficient 
and renewable electricity sectors (away from fossil fuels); (b) There are different 
strategies for China and India that may result in relatively large emission reductions 
(to about half the 2020 BAU level) that are more feasible than the theoretical maxi-
mum potential. Strategies focusing on efficiency improvement may be as effective in 
reducing emissions as strategies focusing on fuel switch. (c) End-use efficiency im-
provement may be one of the most effective ways to reduce emissions in China and 
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India. However, mobilising all organised and unorganised sectors can be challeng-
ing; (d) We envisaged that part of the electricity in China and India used in 2020 is 
from coal fired power plants, because feasible options to reduce coal use are not suf-
ficient to avoid building of new coal-fired power plants. This may be a reason to in-
clude clean coal technologies in climate policy for the coming decades. 
- Although some measures have a high technical potential for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in both countries, these are not seen as particularly feasible by the stake-
holders (see Table 4). For example, end-use efficiency has a very high technical 
emission to reduce emissions but is not given much priority in China and India (es-
pecially in the small-scale sector). Efficiency improvement in power plants and in 
transmission and distribution can also yield results in terms of emission reductions 
but are not seen as important in China.  
- The implementation of policy options depends to a large extent on foreign invest-
ment and help. However, in the last decade both countries have had only partial suc-
cess in accessing foreign assistance and investment and foreign companies claim that 
they have had to cope with bureaucratic problems and political risks. Both countries 
are also not very satisfied with the extent of technology cooperation offered under 
the climate change regime. Thus far very few climate change projects have been de-
veloped in both countries and the experiences are limited though stakeholders have 
not been able to formulate conditions for accepting projects.  
Strategic Issues:  
For the National Governments 
The governments of China and India may wish to take the following strategic issues into 
account, especially if they wish to take a proactive approach in relation to the 
international climate change negotiations and to the enormous pressure on them to 
demonstrate their willingness to participate meaningfully in international negotiations.  
- Public relations: First, if they wish to relieve the pressure on themselves, they may 
want to develop an international public awareness campaign of how much de facto is 
being undertaken within their countries, and to explain why de jure, it is not a re-
sponsible undertaking to accept quantitative commitments during the period of trans-
formation.  
- Stakeholder consultation on industrial transformation: Second, if the govern-
ments wish to proactively carve out a sustainable development trajectory for them-
selves, they may consider engaging in discussions with domestic and foreign experts 
from ENGOs, business, government and international organisations who are willing 
to openly discuss, without being dogmatic about ideological concerns, what steps can 
lead to industrial and institutional transformation that is compatible with financial, 
economic, ecologic and social gain for the society. This means that at an abstract 
level, the governments may wish to revisit the modernisation processes in their coun-
tries and see if that will lead to the changes needed. Our research shows that there are 
significant opportunities for modernisation that can yield a number of side-benefits. 
The best practice technology scenarios indicates that emissions can technically be 
reduced by more than 50% of the BAU scenario. This calls for more active discus-
sion on how feasible these options are and whether the two countries are in a position 
to leap-frog to modern technologies or not and under what conditions. We have 
made an attempt at analysing the key bottlenecks and opportunities for each of these 
options, and broad based social discussions of such options may increase their politi-
cal and practical feasibility. Our research concludes that the end-use options are 
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for the coming twenty years as important as the supply side options. This im-
plies that both governments may need to establish strong, empowered institu-
tional structure to provide sector specific policies, standards and incentives to 
encourage the adoption of appropriate energy efficient technologies. This also 
implies, that both governments may benefit from engaging in and encouraging the 
development of scenarios in relation to the supply and demand side for the future and 
how the countries could develop in relation to different conditions. Such scenarios 
could be based on visions of sustainable development and the way these countries 
perceive themselves in the context of the global environment. They could also be the 
result of back casting from a desirable future to analyse what kinds of steps need to 
be taken now in order to reach the desirable future.  
- Domestic policy: Third, at a more specific level, our analysis shows that if China 
and India would like to accelerate development in the electricity sector, they may 
wish to adopt the following measures:  
§ For China, this includes (a) support for rational pricing system and gradual re-
moval of subsidies coupled with price support for the poorest people; (b) devel-
oping a step-by-step approach to decentralisation, involvement of provinces and 
stakeholders in decision-making to develop tailor made policies for each prov-
ince as opposed to uniform policies with a system for monitoring and enforce-
ment. In relation to increasing the accountability of generators, transmitors and 
distributors, this means that the government needs to (c) separate power genera-
tors from distributors and make simple rules for power purchase agreements; (d) 
develop simple rules for companies experimenting with corporatisation and pri-
vatisation; and encourage transparency so that the press and public can monitor 
developments. In relation to fuel-switch, (e) policies to promote short-term start 
subsidies for small-scale renewables need to be promoted. (f) There is need to 
examine the natural gas alternative in greater detail but taking into account the 
long-term technological lock-in aspects. (g) Taking into account the risk issues 
and the nuclear waste issue, the government may wish to re-examine the feasibil-
ity of nuclear power. (h) It may also be important to explore the potential for 
small hydro in place of large hydro as a way to anticipate and prevent future 
problems with respect to large hydro. (i) The government may wish to prepare a 
list of priority areas for technology cooperation. Our research indicates that 
stakeholders have identified the following technologies as critical in the follow-
ing sectors: cement (pre-calciner, preheater cement plants, roller press and roller 
grinders), iron and steel (improved steel casting), aluminium (pre-baked anodes), 
motors and drives (large-scale high efficiency motors and drives, variable speed 
drives), renewables (wind turbines), gas (modern gas technologies), nuclear (safe 
and advanced technologies),1 biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass gasifica-
tion; combined hybrid systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency improvement in 
coal plants (retrofitting technologies, coal gasification, IGCC, super critical boil-
ers), cogeneration technologies, transmission and distribution and desulphurisa-
tion technologies (technologies for coal washing). A previous list submitted by 
China to the second Conference of the Parties may wish to take these items into 
account.  
§ For India, the range of policy measures includes: (a) Promotion of tamper-proof/ 
remote control power metering along with accountable/ profit making local 
power distribution centres to guarantee collection of accurate electricity dues; (b) 
                                                   
1  This does not mean that this research promotes nuclear technologies; we are merely reflecting 
what the stakeholders communicated to us during the interviews. 
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spport for rational power pricing combined with price support for the poorest in 
society and subsidies for renewable energy; (c) a public relations campaign to 
convince agriculture and households that the price increase in power will be ac-
companied with better quality of services making voltage stabilisers, inverters, 
diesel generators, loss of income and comfort a problem of the past. (d) The gov-
ernment may wish to make guidelines as to when the privatisation process is 
really necessary and economically viable such that it does not lead to a devalua-
tion of government resources, to a concentration of private projects in lucrative 
areas leaving government with the non-economically viable areas, and only 
when it is necessary to improve the functioning of the company. (e) It may also 
be useful to develop policies to ensure that contracts with large investors in criti-
cal areas are subject to public scrutiny so that corruption in contracts is mini-
mised. In the area of fuel-switching, (f) the government may wish to further de-
velop short-term start subsidies for small renewables (in accordance with the 
goals set out in the new renewable energy bill); (g) examine the gas alternative in 
greater detail but taking into account the long-term technological lock-in aspects; 
(h) take into account the risk issues and the nuclear waste issue in revisiting the 
feasibility of nuclear power, (i) explore the potential for small hydro in place of 
large hydro as a way to anticipate and prevent future problems with respect to 
large hydro.  
- Technologies needed: Fourth, if the governments of China and India wish to access 
new and modern technologies, they may wish to develop a menu of choices for the 
projects that need priority in technology transfer accompanied with concessions 
(GEF/CDM/bilateral aid/ technology transfer at concessional terms). Interviewees 
and the research indicate that the following technologies could be of use in the fol-
lowing sectors: cement (technologies for the small-scale sector), iron and steel (im-
proved steel casting, EAF), aluminium, motors and drives (large-scale high effi-
ciency motors and variable speed drives), renewables (wind turbines), gas (modern 
gas technologies), biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass gasification; combined 
hybrid systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency improvement in coal plants (retrofitting 
technologies, IGCC, super critical boilers; high conversion efficiency technologies; 
better combustion technologies for high ash content coal), cogeneration technolo-
gies, transmission and distribution and desulphurisation technologies (technologies 
for coal washing).  
- Encouraging foreign investments: Although both countries are already exploring a 
number of policy options, many of these options may remain merely on paper since 
the resources are limited. If both countries believe that they need financial support 
and investment in order to make the transition to a greenhouse friendly world, they 
can invite foreign investment through a simple legal framework requiring limited li-
cense and a foreign investment code that states that contracts will be honoured as 
long as there is no corruption involved and procedures are followed and a fair system 
of repatriation of funds. They may wish to protect themselves from foreign invest-
ment by (a) examining the foreign debt potential and the capital investment implica-
tions for financing foreign imports as a criteria in advance; (b) preparing a national 
technology cooperation policy so that the technologies bought fit in within the long-
term development plans of the country; (c) scrutinising the costs and benefits for host 
government/investor and allowing public scrutiny of projects, (d) checking the skills 
needed for operating the technology and whether it is available in the country or is 
part of the investment package, (e) checking that the projects are compatible with lo-
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cal resources and customs and (f) checking the degree of maintenance and operation 
needed and whether this is possible under the circumstances.  
- Low stakeholder priority but high technical feasibility options: If both countries 
wish to optimise electricity generation and consumption, they may wish to re-
examine the following relatively non-controversial options for their high GHG emis-
sion reduction potential and also because these options can be relatively cheap. 
China tends to focus on fuel switch rather than on energy efficiency improvement. 
However, efficiency improvement may have a large potential to reduce emissions in 
China. It may be relevant for China to re-consider the importance of the energy effi-
ciency improvement in end-use sectors, energy efficiency improvement in existing 
coal-fired plants and reducing technical losses in transmission and distribution. Our 
calculations indicate that a combination of these three options for China could poten-
tially reduce emission to about 50% of their 2020 BAU level. In India, energy effi-
ciency in existing plants and transmission and distribution are presently being given 
as much political importance as the limited resources permit. There is, however, op-
portunity for a much more focused policy on energy efficiency improvement in end-
use sectors (notably industry), which may potentially reduce emissions by 45% rela-
tive to the BAU level. Some stakeholders seem to focus more on efficiency im-
provement than on fuel switch in India, while the latter may potentially reduce emis-
sions to a considerable extent. Therefore, exploring fuel switch options including the 
potential for gas can offer short-term relief to Indian energy policies. The options for 
importing gas to the mutual satisfaction of India and Bangladesh needs to be more 
actively explored.  
- Criteria for CDM projects: Stakeholders in both countries indicate that the follow-
ing criteria are critical for the acceptance of CDM projects: (a) that the projects are 
joint ventures and/or allow for indigenisation of the technology over time; (b) that 
baselines in relation to retrofit projects are actual baselines and for new plants, the 
best technology available in the country in that sector so that the best and most ap-
propriate technologies are sold via CDM; (c) that the projects should be non-
commercial; (d) that there should be no new local environmental and social impact; 
(e) that the project should be appropriate for the context; and (f) that there should be 
seller or joint seller-buyer liability. To the extent that CDM is permitted for small 
projects and products that are locally available, the credits should be fixed in relation 
to each project or product and should be at lower than normal interest rates. CDM 
could be used to promote any of the technologies listed above. This report thus ad-
vises caution in relation to the development of nuclear and coal powered plants 
within CDM. There are indications that existing technology transfers may be re-
named as CDM projects which will not benefit the host country. It makes more sense 
to use CDM for long-term GHG friendly projects; that do not have negative local 
side effects. This may also reduce the risk of liability from problems in project im-
plementation arising from social unrest. 
- From reactive to proactive negotiating strategy: Finally, if both governments wish 
to take on a proactive role in the international negotiations, they need to develop 
concepts and policies for the implementation of the regime. Our research shows that 
both countries are seriously engaging in structural change and that they are 
attempting at developing long-term sustainable development policies in the energy 
sector. A proactive strategy that would state the specific kinds of assistance needed 
by the countries to make certain energy transitions possible in their countries and in 
specific time-frames could not only indicate the seriousness of the domestic 
governments on the issues, but could also put pressure on the developed world to 
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assist them accordingly. This means a clear identification of the sorts of technologies 
and financial assistance needed, a clear specification of the criteria and conditions 
under which the country is willing to participate in the cooperative process, a clear 
identification of what types of projects need to be supported by the GEF, bilateral 
help, development bank lending and the CDM, and a series of domestic targets and 
timetables within which the foreign assistance can be planned so as to have optimal 
results in the next twelve years. If the ground work done by the Clinton 
administration in at least India is not followed up by the new Bush regime, there is 
an opportunity to further develop the ties with the European Union within the 
framework of the EU-India summit.  
Foreign investors may wish to draw insights for themselves from the above strategic is-
sues, especially those in relation to technologies needed, the role of foreign investments 
and criteria for CDM projects. 
 
For developed country governments:  
First, if the purpose of the developed countries is to encourage China and India to 
seriously take part in the negotiation (rather than assume that they are not implementing 
their obligations to avoid taking measures themselves), they could consider taking 
cognisance of what is actually happening in the countries (i.e. the de facto 
implementation). They may also wish to understand the reasons for defensive strategies 
(i.e. the need to avoid de jure quantitative obligations) and the sustainability dilemmas 
faced by both countries. 
Second, we believe that it would make more sense for the developed countries – the 
USA in particular and for those who implicitly support it - to encourage the development 
of a menu of options by developing countries from which they could adopt some; and 
consider the measures taken from 1990 onwards as a meaningful contribution to the 
climate change discussions. This would make more sense than to try and impose legally 
binding quantitative restrictions linked to incomplete data on existing emissions and 
speculations about the future, which would have very little basis for countries in 
transformation.  
Third, if the developed countries would like the developing countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, this inevitably implies that the developed countries too have 
to adopt drastic measures domestically. This would make the cost of renewable energy 
cheaper and hence affordable for everybody. 
Fourth, if the developed countries would like the developing countries to reduce their 
emissions substantially, this calls for increased cooperation between countries in terms 
of technical and financial assistance.  
Fifth, we would recommend that developed country governments be careful about what 
is exported to developing countries and whether this will lock not just the developing 
country into a technological trajectory, but the world into an emission trajectory. By 
encouraging industry to participate actively in the regime, it is not ruled out that such 
industry will wish to please its share holders in the short-term rather than meet the long-
term environmental goals. This means that the rules for export need to be clearly 
devised. Lessons from the Ozone Layer Protection regime have shown that exports of 
HCFCs, a greenhouse gas, financed by the Global Environment Facility or otherwise, did 
not serve the cause of the environment or the developing countries, although it did 
benefit the exporting companies. The adoption of renewable energy in the developing 
countries is at present less affordable that the adoption of the same path by the developed 
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countries. Large-scale adoption of renewable energy in the first world, coupled by 
restricting the use of the flexible mechanisms to supporting renewable energy and end-
use efficiency could set the ball rolling towards a greenhouse friendly world. However, 
in this the developed countries need to set an example themselves. 
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1. The Asian Dilemma  
Author: Joyeeta Gupta2 
1.1 Background 
The newest scientific data (IPCC 2001) confirms that the climate change problem is a se-
rious challenges to humankind, and that the threat of irreversible climate change may 
bring with it major consequences for all countries. This reconfirms the need for suitable 
action by all countries. Initially, the international community had decided that the devel-
oped countries should lead and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. However, in re-
cent years, many in the developed world argue that this might have very major conse-
quences for their domestic economies, while being ineffective environmentally, if the 
developing countries themselves did not commit themselves to taking some action. In the 
meanwhile, the developing countries face not only the high risk of climate change given 
their lower financial and technical ability to respond to such changes; they are also afraid 
that their opportunities for development may be seriously curtailed. This is especially so, 
since a major cause of the problem is greenhouse gas emissions; and a major source of 
greenhouse gas emissions is the use of fossil fuels for generating energy, including elec-
tricity.  
Against this background, this research explores the dilemma for China and India in 
relation to the electricity problem. It argues that the two countries may either adopt a 
‘business-as-usual’ approach or approaches ranging from alternative development to 
industrial transformation. These options are not easy choices. At the specific level of 
electricity generation, the emission reduction options are not easy given that the choice 
between nuclear energy, large hydro and coal-fired plants are reminiscent of the proverb 
‘between the devil and the deep-blue sea’. The alternative energy choices exist, but the 
critical issue is to what extent these can reliably and affordably meet the demands of two 
such giant countries. At the specific level of electricity consumption, a key dilemma is 
that while, on the one hand, there are several socio-economic reasons to support small-
scale production units, these units tend to be relatively inefficient, have lower quality 
products and have higher greenhouse gas emissions per unit of production. In relation to 
technology cooperation, there are occasions where although foreign technologies could 
help to increase the efficiency of the plants, they are not economically viable. At the 
same time, there are opposite occasions when despite the availability of local good 
quality resources and appropriate technologies, technologies are imported. Given that 
international pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is gradually increasing, these 
countries will need to consider whether they will adopt a defensive or a constructive, 
proactive role in the international climate change negotiations and in domestic climate 
and energy policy. 
The potential environmental consequences of the growth in energy use and of the 
choices made regarding energy sources raises questions regarding the production and 
consumption patterns of countries worldwide. Countries aspiring to significantly 
increase their development face major challenges. They want to “modernise without 
westernising”; but defining this is not easy. They want development without pollution; 
                                                   
2  With comments from the entire team. 
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but operationalising this is not easy. They want to generate electricity without emissions; 
but options appear limited. 
Against this background, this book aims to examine the potential up to the year 2020 for 
modernising the electricity sector in China and India in the context of rapid economic 
growth in these countries and the challenge of climate change. This chapter will first 
briefly introduce the climate change problem and the latest scientific developments in 
the field; and will present a brief history of the climate change negotiations. Against this 
background, it will explain the dilemma for countries like China and India. This is 
followed by a description of the research question, focus and a brief introduction to how 
the book is structured.  
1.2 The climate change problem 
This brings us to a discussion of the problem of climate change. Scientists fear that the 
combustion of fossil fuels world wide, among other reasons, is leading to a growing 
concentration of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and 
nitrogen oxide (N2O) in the atmosphere. These accumulated gases are absorbing heat and 
it is expected that this may lead to the problem of climate change and destabilisation of 
the global climate system (Houghton et al 1996). The recently published report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) clearly states that the atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 have increased by 31 % since 1750, and such a high level of 
concentration has not been experienced in the last 420,000 years and perhaps not in the 
last 20 million years. The concentrations of CH4 have increased by 151% since 1750 and 
such concentrations have not been exceeded in the last 420,000 years. The 
concentrations of N20 have gone up by 17% and these have not been exceeded in the last 
1000 years. Furthermore, there is evidence to show that in the 20th century average 
temperatures have risen by 0.6 + 2 degrees centigrade. Records reveal that the 1990s 
were the warmest decade in 1000 years in the Northern Hemisphere. (For the Southern 
Hemisphere records are not available). Snow cover worldwide has decreased by 10% 
since the 1960s and there is evidence to show that the sea level has risen by 0.1 – 0.2 
metres during the 20th century. Records show increasing rainfall in the mid and high 
latitudes of the Northern hemisphere, while a fall in the low latitudes of the Northern 
Hemisphere with a rise in the frequency and intensity of droughts in parts of Asia and 
Africa. It is further expected that global temperatures may increase from 1.4-5.8 degrees 
Centigrade by 2100. At high latitudes rainfall is expected to increase considerably; at 
low latitudes this may vary from place to place and there is likelihood of greater 
variability in the monsoons. The sea level rise is expected to be between 0.09 to 0.88 
metres by 2100. The report concludes that: “There is new and stronger evidence that 
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities”.  
About three-fourths of the CO2 emissions come from fossil fuel burning and the rest 
from deforestation. More than half of the CH4 emissions come from fossil fuels, cattle, 
wet rice cultivation and landfills (IPCC 2001). Hence, it is imperative to deal with the 
sources of these emissions. However, since energy use and food habits are intrinsically 
linked to human lifestyle and consumption, production and trade patterns and economic 
and political systems; it may not be adequate to only focus on the problem of 
technological solutions, but to look beyond to the institutional approaches to dealing 
with the problem of climate change (see Chapter 2). 
Concerns in relation to this problem led to the first world climate conference in 1979, the 
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988, the second 
World Climate Conference in 1989 and regular scientific conferences since then. 
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Growing scientific concern led to political negotiations that resulted in the adoption of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 (FCCC 1992). 
The ultimate aim of this Convention is to stabilise the global concentrations of 
greenhouse gases at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system. This has implications for all countries. As a first step, the 
Convention calls on the developed countries to take the lead in reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases. The preamble states: “Recognizing that all countries, especially 
developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve sustainable social and 
economic development and that, in order for developing countries to progress towards that 
goal, their energy consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for 
achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in 
general, including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such 
an application economically and socially beneficial.” Other articles in the Convention 
highlight the need to take the ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities of countries into 
account while assigning responsibilities to countries.  
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol on the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(KPFCCC 1997) adopted legally binding commitments for the developed countries and 
they have to reduce their emissions by 5.2% in 2008-2012. In doing so they are 
permitted to trade emissions and undertake joint implementation projects with other 
countries with binding emission related commitments, and to undertake Clean 
Development Mechanism projects in developing countries. Both the Convention and the 
Protocol call on developing countries to take action to reduce the growth of the 
emissions of their greenhouse gases. However, Article 4.7 of the FCCC makes action by 
developing countries dependent on assistance from developed countries.  
Under the climate change regime, there are in particular five flexible instruments to 
facilitate the cooperation between countries. These are the: 
- Global Environment Facility (GEF). The Global Environment Facility was 
established in 1991 by the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP, following a 
recommendation of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Brundtland et al. 1987). Its purpose was to provide financial incremental support for 
environmental projects in developing countries and in the countries with economies 
in transition (East and Central Europe) in relation to four issue areas including 
climate change. In 1992, the GEF was named as the operating entity of the financial 
mechanism in the climate convention (Article 11, Article 21; see Gupta 1995, 1997). 
The Independent Evaluation of the GEF (GEF 1994) criticised the GEF and several 
measures were taken since to make GEF projects more relevant to the developing 
countries. The GEF generally supports capacity building projects and projects that 
are reproducible in other countries. China and India have benefited substantially 
from GEF projects. 
- Joint Implementation (JI), Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM): Joint Implementation, a concept not defined, 
although included in the Climate Change Convention was meant to imply that in 
return for financial investments in projects in other countries that led to a reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions, the investor could credit itself with some of the 
reductions. This concept was adopted as a pilot project at the first meeting of the 
Parties to the Convention in 1995 and was referred to as Activities Implemented 
Jointly (AIJ). As of January 2001, 176 projects have been undertaken worldwide, the 
bulk of which are in East and central Europe and Central America. In 1997, the 
developing countries were reluctant to accept the end of the pilot phase and the start 
of actual crediting, and so Joint Implementation was adopted as a mechanism 
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between the developed and east and central European countries (Article 6 of the 
KPFCCC). In the mean while the developing countries were arguing in favour of a 
non-compliance fine on developed countries (the Clean Development Fund), which 
through the negotiations metamorphosed into the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which allows developed countries to invest in sustainable development 
projects in developing countries in return for emission credits. Furthermore, a small 
proportion of the proceeds of the project were to be reserved for adaptation projects. 
In fact, the developing countries perhaps got a worse deal than the east and central 
Europeans because sustainable development is an elusive term, and cooperation 
between North and South is now taxed making CDM projects more expensive than 
JI projects. This did not also serve the interests of the vulnerable countries, because 
if CDM is relatively small, so will the resources raised for them. The developing 
countries have tried to argue this in the recent negotiations, but there have as yet 
been no decisions on the issue.  
- Technology Transfer: Part of the reluctance of the developing countries in relation to 
the JI/AIJ/CDM discussion is because they see that the technology transfer 
provisions in the convention (Article 4.5) and protocol (Article 10) have not been 
implemented. They had initially expected that the developed countries would reduce 
their own emissions and transfer technologies and provide financial assistance. They 
now argue that instead the developed countries want to reduce their emissions partly 
via technology transfer and assistance. 
- Emission trading: Another instrument in the protocol is emission trading (Article 17) 
allowed between countries with quantitative commitments. This allows for efficient 
reduction of emissions at the lowest costs. This has also annoyed the developing 
countries because they argue that emission trading has de facto assigned property 
rights to the atmosphere to the developed countries. The rules and modalities in 
relation to this instrument have yet to decided. 
- In addition there are the ongoing instrument of cooperation; i.e. Foreign Direct 
Investment and aid. 
Table 1.1 highlights the goals of each of these instruments and compares and contrasts 
the characteristics of these instruments. Table 1.2 presents the pros and cons of the 
instruments for developed and developing country governments.  
The rules and regulations for the flexibility mechanisms have still to be determined and 
both countries still have an opportunity to influence these rules.  
The initial optimism in the system has been followed by pessimistic realisations that 
reducing emissions in the developed countries is likely to be very expensive. This has led 
to a situation in which the United States claims that it is unlikely to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol until and unless key developing countries are prepared to take ‘meaningful’ 
action (Clinton 1997; Albright 1998; Gupta 1998). This has led to increased pressure on 
the developing countries to state how they are going to participate more effectively in the 
negotiation process. With Argentina and Kazakhstan indicating that they would be 
willing to consider adopting serious emission related measures, the pressure has 
increased on the other developing countries. However, other developing countries argue 
that it is the responsibility of the developed countries to take action first. This has been 
used as an excuse for the US to delay ratification. Inevitably this delay has had 
ramifications with many other developed countries unwilling to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
because of the fear of the free-rider effect. However, the European Union (EU) has taken 
a number of measures in 2000 to try and promote a political atmosphere which will 
stimulate ratification to ensure that the Protocol will enter into effect by 2002 (Gupta and 
Ringius 2001). With President George W. Bush taking charge in January 2001, the 
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pessimism has increased regarding US ratification and this may have implications for 
European ratification. This has brought the negotiating process to a partial deadlock 
although there are many efforts at operationalising the various flexibility mechanisms. 
The key problem is that as long as there is uncertainty about the entry into force of the 
Protocol, industry, business and governments are unlikely to push for large-scale climate 
change measures because the financial risks are high. 
Table 1.1. The instruments of cooperation. 
Instrument Purpose Some details 
GEF Incremental funding for 
technical assistance and 
projects on, inter alia, 
climate change 
Mentioned in Art. 11/21 of the FCCC; Total grants 
between 1991-1998: $610 million; Total projects: 80 
energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in 40 
countries; 
AIJ Pilot phase projects in 
developing countries and 
East Europe; no crediting 
allowed during pilot phase 
Decided at the first meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the FCCC in 1995; 176 projects as of 1/1/01 
mostly in Central and Eastern Europe and Central 
America; 
JI Mechanism to allow 
investment in projects in 
East and Central Europe in 
return for emission 
crediting 
Mentioned in FCCC in 1992; Started in December 1997; 
Crediting allowed from 2008; no projects thus far, some 
AIJ projects may become JI projects; allowed between 
countries with a total emission allowance; Capacity 
building projects to facilitate JI begun;  
CDM Mechanism to allow 
investment in developing 
countries in return for 
emission crediting 
Mentioned in KPFCCC in 1997; Crediting allowed from 
2001; Projects must meet sustainable development 
criteria; Projects must be approved by multilateral body; 
Part of the proceeds must be reserved to finance 
adaptation projects and administrative costs; 
Technology 
transfer 
Mechanism to allow for 
technology transfer; but no 
quantitative or specific 
targets 
Mentioned in Article 4.5 of FCCC and Art 10 of 
KPFCCC. Has not really taken off; problems are that 
governments are not often owners of technologies; there 
are difficulties in financing such technology transfer; 
ET Mechanism to allow for 
trading of emission 
allowances between 
countries with targets 
Mentioned in Article 17 of the KPFCCC, Allowed from 
2008 for countries with quantitative commitments; 
FDI Existing mechanism of 
foreign investment in other 
countries 
An existing mechanism for commercial transactions 
between countries and the amount of resources in FDI is 
increasing; 
Aid Existing mechanism of 
providing financial support 
to developing countries 
Official development assistance (ODA) from the 
developed to the developing countries has been on the 
decline since 1990; though the resources devoted to the 
environment have increased. 
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Table 1.2. The advantages and disadvantages of the instruments for parties. 
Instruments Investor governments Host (developing country governments) 
GEF Pros: projects may lead to changes in Bank 
policies and developing country policies and 
lead to higher emission reductions than paid 
for; 
Cons: it costs resources and the 
governments have less control over which 
technologies (belonging to which countries) 
are transferred; 
Pros: Provides incremental costs of 
climate change projects; 
Cons: defining incremental costs 
problematic, difficult to secure GEF 
funding; 
AIJ Pros: Projects are expected to lead to 
emission reductions in developing countries; 
Cons: Industry does not get credits during 
pilot phase; 
Pros: Projects are expected to lead to 
emission reductions in developing 
countries; 
Cons: Not many projects in developing 
countries and no full evaluation; 
CDM Pros: Projects are expected to lead to 
emission reductions in developing countries 
in return for credits; 
Cons: The transaction costs may be high; 
the adaptation and administrative cost levy 
may be high; 
Pros: Climate change sustainable projects 
will receive financing; 
Cons: CDM more expensive than JI and 
credit giving may be politically and 
legally problematic; risk in case of project 
failure; 
 
While it may be understandable that the developing countries blame the developed 
countries for this deadlock, it is clear that none of the countries worldwide see any easy 
options before them. The initial optimism in the regime was to some extent linked to the 
so-called ‘inverted U curve’, i.e. that a permanent de-coupling between greenhouse gas 
emissions and economic growth is possible after a certain initial development is reached. 
However, recent research reveals that while the inverted U curve theory holds for single, 
local air pollutants, there in no compelling evidence that it might hold also in relation to 
global air pollutants (de Brujn 1998). The fear of loss of economic growth and increasing 
unemployment have thus become dominant in the European and the U.S. agenda even 
though at this moment unemployment has reached all time low levels in Europe and the 
US has enjoyed high economic growth. Ultimately it is those economic and political 
entities that can identify the way out of this labyrinth that will be able to make economic 
profits while achieving sustainable development. This is thus, just as much a challenge 
to the developing countries as it is to the developed countries. But, climate change is not 
the only motivating factor for re-examining the energy system in countries. The issue of 
fuel security is becoming increasingly more important for many Western countries, and 
this is another reason that may motivate changes in policy in these countries (IEA 2000). 
This is all the more evident, when discussed in relation to the issue of technology 
transfer. While developing countries have consistently asked for technology transfer 
from the developed countries as a way to short-circuit emissions, and while provisions to 
this effect have been included in several international treaties including the Climate 
Change Treaties, the developed countries in general are not owners of the technologies 
and thus are not in a position to actually ‘give’ these technologies (IPCC 2000). 
Furthermore, it is difficult to identify technologies that are non-controversial in the short-
and long-term except in the areas of renewable energy. Nevertheless, there are 
opportunities explored in this book. 
Having said that, development is not experienced homogeneously worldwide. The 
increase in energy demand is expected to be disproportionately higher in the developed 
countries and in a handful of developing countries like China and India. China and India 
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had a population of 1146 million and 850 in 1990 and this is expected to grow to 1500 
and 1297 in 2020 respectively (Boudri et al. 2000a). The fuel input for electricity 
generation is likely to increase fourfold for China from 7.7 in 1990 to 28.3 (EJ) in 2020. 
The fuel input for electricity in India may increase five fold from 3.6 to 14.6 EJ in 2020. 
The related CO2 and SO2 emissions are also likely to increase substantially. For these 
reasons we have decided to focus on China and India, and we have decided to focus on 
one specific issue – the production and use of electricity.  
1.3 The dilemma for China and India 
If we move from the abstract global to the concrete national scale, what does this mean 
for China and India. Both countries have substantial populations and are on a medium to 
fast economic growth track. At this point in their development, energy (with electricity 
as an important component) is a vital causal element of their development. They need 
large jumps in energy supply to meet the large latent demand (although this is not 
entirely true for China since there is an industrial recession currently). This brings them 
to the choice between for example, large hydro (e.g. the Sardar Sarovar dam on the 
Narmada and the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangze), nuclear and coal-fired thermal 
power stations. Choosing between the three is not easy since none of these options is 
environmentally sustainable. This is a complicated issue for these developing countries, 
especially when one takes into account that the bulk of the large hydro potential in 
mainland Europe has been utilised, and most of the developed world has benefited from 
thermal and nuclear power stations. Simultaneously, there is potential for reducing the 
energy consumption (per unit of product) in order to decrease the need for new power 
plants. Energy consumption is to some extent high in these countries because of poor 
housekeeping and maintenance and the processes used are outdated. On the other hand, 
even though in theory the efficiency of certain production processes can be improved, 
there are reasons why this is not feasible. Thus, while it is conceivable that an efficient 
water pump can reduce the amount of energy consumption per gallon of water pumped; 
if the pump is unable to function in a situation of fluctuating voltages; then the existing 
pump may be the most efficient under the circumstances. Thus, some of the technical 
potential for improvement may not be easily implemented because of the inter-linkages 
and context within which the technology operates. At the same time, better technologies 
generally bring a high price with them, which may be unaffordable for the consumer. 
Thus the technical feasibility is only part of the story.  
This raises the issue of the implications of the global climate change problem for the 
development paths to be chosen by these two countries and all “late-comers” to 
development. The dilemma is how to modernise the national economy with less 
compromises on environmental issues, and how to use imported technologies and 
lessons without becoming economically and technologically dependent. There are no 
easy answers to how the energy producing and consuming sectors should develop, 
although it appears a foregone conclusion that without continuously upgrading the 
different production and consumption sectors, growth is not possible. At the same time, 
choosing any one of these options may lead to technological lock-in and countries may 
get bound up in a technological trajectory the consequences of which they may have to 
face for several decades.  
Countries aspiring towards high economic development these days face, on the one 
hand, the accumulated knowledge of the negative impacts of certain developmental 
trajectories while, on the other hand, it is unclear if the alternative and, in general, more 
expensive, developmental trajectories are more feasible. The ‘mistake optimism’ 
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argument is that avoiding mistakes made by the developed countries in their economic 
growth process will be cheaper for the developing countries in the long term. According 
to this argument, “developing countries should not go through the evolutionary process 
of previous industrialisation, but must rather ‘leap frog’ ahead directly from a state of 
under-development, through to efficient, environmentally benign technologies” (SWCC 
1990). The ‘mistake pessimism’ argument is that ‘leap frogging’ may not always be 
affordable in the short-term for developing countries, and that those countries that have 
benefited from the dirty technologies have been able to accumulate wealth precisely by 
cutting corners. This has helped them to reach the stage of economic take-off (Gupta 
1997).  
Clearly, the vision of leap-frogging ahead is an attractive vision for developing countries 
like China and India. Some recent experiences are also promising. For example, China 
has successfully decoupled energy related greenhouse gas emissions from its national 
gross development product. Zhang (1999: 55) argues that “China has cut its energy 
consumption per unit of consumption in half since 1980. In other words, without these 
efforts, China’s CO2 emissions in 1997 would have been more than 50% higher than its 
actual emissions”. There are also indications that if the efficiency of generation, 
transmission, distribution and end-use can be improved, the electricity generated could 
lead to higher industrial output at lower environmental pollution. China has thus already 
taken many measures to increase national productivity while reducing the environmental 
pressure. In a similar vein, recent measures taken in the electricity sector in India have 
also led to reduced emissions. However, continuing indefinitely to de-couple emissions 
from economic growth will remain a critical challenge for China and India. This will 
also be a challenge for the developed countries; and even begs the question: Are the rich 
more ‘locked-in’ into technological and economic trajectories than the poor?  
Against this background of the increasing global emissions, the (ratification) bottleneck 
in the international negotiating process and the need and or desire to develop of all 
countries, the options for China and India appear to be two-fold. They can either insist 
that the North should lead and that they will follow once the North has demonstrated a 
commitment to reduce its emissions substantially; or they can argue that there is need for 
a concerted effort to analyse the problem and to see if there is a way for the “late 
comers” to join the fore-runners in dealing with the problem. This may call for a 
strategic combination of using “leap-frog” technology adapted to local circumstances 
and for developing research plans to develop country specific solutions. This book 
examines some of these issues at a technological, economic and political level to see if it 
can contribute to the analysis  
1.4 The research problem and focus 
We have thus far examined the climate change problem, the challenges in the 
international negotiating process, the specific challenges for China and India and have 
briefly examined the electricity sector, both from a demand and a supply side. This 
brings us to the goal of this research project which is to analyse the feasibility of policy 
and technological options to modernise the electricity sector in China and India and to 
stimulate the use of such policy options by the relevant agencies. This will be done by 
developing an integrated approach. In this context, the research question is: what are the 
feasible policy and technological options to modernise the electricity sector in China and 
India taking into account the supply and demand for electricity and given the conflict 
between the need for economic growth and the need to anticipate future developments in 
relation to the reduction of GHG emissions? 
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Let us also emphasise that we are not looking for ways to impose additional conditions 
on the developing countries. We are instead trying to make an analysis of what these 
countries actually want, what issue-linkages they make, and what their concerns are. We 
then examine the technologies that are available and/or used within the electricity sector 
through a combination of top-down and bottom-up methods and through interactions 
with stakeholder views in order to ascertain the political, economic and technological 
feasibility of making improvements to the system either incrementally or through 
movement to an alternative development trajectory.  
As can be clearly seen, although the issue concerns most countries in the world, we have 
chosen China and India as the area of the research focus of this book. We also focus only 
on the electricity sector (both in terms of generation and in terms of consumption). We 
focus on the national level and have occasionally drawn on the experiences at the 
regional level and the rural level. These limits to the focus are primarily to ensure that 
the research is manageable, especially given the size of the two countries concerned.  
The book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and methodological 
aspects of the research. Chapters 3 and 4 examine and analyse the institutional context of 
energy and electricity policy in China and India. Chapter 5 presents the business-as-usual 
scenario for China and India for the period 1990 to 2020. Chapters 6 and 7 examine the 
demand and supply side technological options for both countries and calculate the 
potential of emission reduction in different sectors. Chapter 8 analyses the feasibility of 
these options on the basis of the interviews and workshops. Chapter 9 presents a series of 
Best Practice Technology Practice Scenarios and also evaluates qualitatively the 
implications of the feasible options. Chapter 10 examines the domestic concern for 
climate change in China and India, as well as the domestic policies and perceptions in 
relation to the flexibility mechanisms. It looks at the potential for using these 
mechanisms in relation to the feasible options identified in the report. Chapter 11 draws 
conclusions and makes recommendations.  
1.5 Summary 
Chapter 1 explores the dilemma for China and India in relation to the electricity problem. 
It argues that the options for these two countries is to adopt a ‘business-as-usual’ 
approach or to adopt approaches ranging from alternative development to industrial 
transformation. These options are not easy choices. At the specific level of electricity 
generation, the options are certainly not easy given that the choice between nuclear 
energy, large hydro and coal-fired plants appear to be reminiscent of the proverb 
‘between the devil and the deep-blue sea’. The alternative energy choices exist, but the 
critical issue is to what extent can they reliably and affordably meet the demands of two 
such giant countries. At the specific level of electricity consumption, choices have to be 
made between large and small-scale, domestic and imported technologies, closure and 
retrofit. Given that international pressure to take action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions is gradually increasing, these countries will need to consider whether a 
defensive or a constructive, proactive role in the international climate change 
negotiations and in domestic climate change and energy policy. Thus, the overall goal of 
this book is to develop an integrated approach for analysing the feasibility of policy and 
technological options to modernise the electricity sector in China and India and to 
stimulate the use of such policy options by the relevant agencies. The research question is: 
What are the feasible policy options to modernise the electricity sector in China and India 
taking into account the supply and demand for electricity and given the conflict between 
the need for economic growth and the need to anticipate future developments in relation to 
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the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions? This chapter also provides a brief introduction 
to the structure of the rest of the book. 
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2. Methodology: An Integrated Framework 
Authors: Joyeeta Gupta, Carolien Kroeze and Jaklien Vlasblom3 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the research question is: What are the feasible policy and 
technological options to modernise the electricity sector in China and India taking into 
account the future development of supply and demand for electricity and given the conflict 
between the need for economic growth and the need to anticipate future commitments in 
relation to GHG emissions? This chapter presents the theoretical and methodological 
aspects of the research developed to address this question. 
In order to do so we have developed an integrated assessment approach. In doing so, we 
have drawn inspiration from the approaches developed within the industrial 
transformation’ and the ‘institutional dimensions of global change’ research programmes 
of the International Human Dimensions Programme of Global Change (Section 2.2). We 
then elaborate on our integrated assessment framework which combines three specific 
methodologies; namely the scenario approach, the bottom-up technology approach and the 
institutional and stakeholder approach (see Section 2.3). We then analyse some of the 
advantages and challenges of using the integrated approach (see Section 2.4).  
2.2 Links to International Research Programmes and Approaches 
Anthropogenic environmental problems are generally caused by human interactions with 
nature; this has led to the development of the national and international human 
dimensions research framework for the social sciences. The natural scientists have long 
had their own research collaboration forum – the International Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme (IGBP). The International Human Dimensions Research Programme (IHDP) 
is in response to the need for innovative and integrated methodologies for assessing 
human interactions within existing institutions and for identifying options for 
improvement. The current international human dimensions programme has five inter-
connected dimensions. Two of these focus on ‘Industrial Transformation’ (IHDP-IT) and 
‘Institutions’ (IDGEC).  
“Industrial Transformation research seeks to understand complex society-environment 
interactions, identify driving forces for change, and explore development trajectories that 
have a significantly smaller burden on the environment. It is based on the assumption 
that important changes in production and consumption systems will be required in order 
to meet the needs and aspirations of a growing world population while using 
environmental resources in a sustainable manner” (IHDP-IT 1999). The IHDP 
programme focuses on energy and material flows, food, cities, information and 
communication; and governance and transformation processes. The energy programme 
in particular focuses on the relation between the driving forces, institutional, socio-
psychological, and technical arrangements that influence energy policy from the demand 
and the supply side and the implications for international trade and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The research question in our project focuses 
on a critical research issue of IHDP-IT. 
                                                   
3  Based on work from Christiaan Boudri, Kees Dorland, Matthijs Hisschemöller, Kornelis Blok and Jan-
Willem Bode. 
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The research method of IHDP-IT focuses on different development stages in corporate 
and societal response to problems. These can range from reactive to proactive. In 
reactive approaches, the focus of policy is on end-of pipe changes and the driving 
philosophy is minimisation of the environmental impacts given the existing system. In 
receptive approaches, the focus is on the process of production and the aim is to optimise 
competing goals. In a constructive response, the focus is on modifying the nature of a 
product within the context of a sector and the underlying philosophy is accelerating 
change in society. In a proactive approach, the goal is to engage the entire society to 
modify the system based on a vision of change. In our project we will examine what the 
potential for modernising the electricity sector is within the context of these four 
dimensions. 
 
reactive receptive constructive pro-active
End-of-pipe     Process       Product System
Specialists   Managers       Sector Society
Minimisation  Optimisation    Acceleration Vision
B)
A)
D)
C)
 
A: response phase; B: Focus of attention; C: Main actors; D: driving philosophy 
 
Figure 2.1 Development stages in corporate and societal response (IHDP-IT 1999). 
 
The Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC) focuses on 
“Institutions” defined as: “systems of rules, decision making procedures and 
programmes that give rise to social practices, assign role to participants in these 
practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles”. The 
programme focuses on analysing the relations between institutions and outcomes 
(causality and performance) and what this means for the design of institutions in the 
future. The programme also focuses on the relationship between scale – the national and 
the global scale. In this research framework we will be using many of the terms, 
concepts and approaches used within the research framework of IDGEC.  
Our research, thus, straddles the objectives of both programmes. It aims to identify the 
technological potential for modifying existing energy trajectories and the potential for 
improving and switching to alternative trajectories for both the electricity supply side 
sectors and the demand side sectors. It further aims to examine the institutional context 
and the feasibility of such technological options within the countries examined.  
2.3 An Integrated Assessment Framework 
Integrated Assessment is a modern approach to combining a number of different 
disciplines and methodologies. One of the definitions of Integrated Assessment is ‘a 
structured process dealing with complex issues, using knowledge from various scientific 
disciplines and/or stakeholders, such that integrated insights are made available to 
decision makers’ (Rotmans 1998: 155). An integrated assessment framework in general 
tries to combine quantitative and qualitative analysis, and uses a combination of 
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analytical methods (integrated assessment modelling, scenarios and risk analysis) and 
participatory methods (dialogue, interviews, policy exercises with stakeholders and 
mutual learning). It has emerged as a response to the shortcomings of ‘normal’ science 
(Kuhn 1962). ‘Normal’ science generally involves a linear approach that adopts certain 
assumptions, develops certain hypothesis and tests these hypotheses. However, critics 
argue that such ‘normal’ science tends to be biased in favour of the assumptions, 
techniques and approaches used by the researcher and may be of limited use. Hence, the 
public interest science school argues in favour of including the opinions of people 
concerned and to develop the problem definition, the assumptions and hypotheses in 
consultation with the stakeholders in relation to the specific problem (Shiva and 
Bandyopadhyay 1986). The post-normal science school argues that this is especially 
relevant when the science is uncertain, the values are disputed, the stakes are high and 
decisions urgent (Functovicz et al. 1996). However, integrating the diverse views of the 
different stakeholders and the views of the scientists (through a literature survey) within 
a framework is a challenging exercise. This has led to the development of a variety of 
integrated assessment methodologies, and we have drawn inspiration from these 
methodologies to develop one relevant to address the research question at hand.  
Our framework combines a top-down approach (the scenario approach), a bottom-up 
approach (the technology assessment methodology) and the interactive approach (the 
stakeholder methodology). Before explaining the nature of the integration, we first 
explain key features of the individual methodologies. 
2.3.1 The Scenario approach 
“Scenarios are alternative images of how the future might unfold and an appropriate tool 
with which to analyse how driving forces may influence future emissions outcomes and 
to assess the associated uncertainties. They assist in climate change analysis, including 
climate change modelling and the assessment of impacts, adaptation and mitigation. The 
possibility that any single emissions path will occur as described in scenarios is highly 
uncertain” (IPCC- 1 2000: 3). In the scenario approach we use an extensive database and 
model – the RAINS ASIA model to investigate the impact of electricity use on 
greenhouse gas emissions and acid deposition. The input in RAINS is fuel use for the 
period 1990-2020 on a regional basis for a number of economic sectors. RAINS also 
includes socio-economic assumptions and demand scenarios to create, for the purpose of 
this project, electricity scenarios.  
We have used this approach to first develop a business-as-usual scenario for the 
electricity sector for China and India for the period 1990-2020. This scenario includes 
policy decisions taken in the period 1990-2000. We then re-use this approach to develop 
Best Practice Technology Scenarios that combine a range of options to show how 
electricity generation and end-use pathways can be modified and the implications of 
such modifications on the atmospheric pollutants, namely the greenhouse gases and 
acidifying gases. The key advantages of this approach are that it allows one to speculate 
about possible futures and what measures need to be taken in order to reach those 
futures; and how these futures differ from expected extrapolations of current trends. The 
risk of using this approach is that readers and policy-makers may interpret them as 
realistic pathways of development. In this project, we do not focus on the deposition and 
ecosystem protection parts of RAINS-Asia. 
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Figure 2.2  The Rains Asia Model (Foell et al. 1995). 
 
2.3.2 The technological approach 
The second tool, the technological bottom-up analytical approach, is used to identify 
technological options and emission reduction potential in the demand and the supply 
side. For the demand side, the methodology consists of (a) the selection of core sectors, 
based on their current and expected future share in national electricity consumption and 
the relative homogeneity in the processes used; (b) analysis of the structure of the sector 
(number of actors, ownership, production etc); (c) analysis of the alternative production 
processes and their share in total production; (d) collection of data regarding electricity 
consumption per ton of product per production process; (e) collection of information on 
the most efficient plants globally, with regard to the processes, technologies used and 
electricity consumption, and comparison with the Chinese and Indian technology level; 
(f) identification of technological options for efficiency improvement; (g) 
characterisation of options in terms of applicability (technical criteria for 
implementation), potential for energy saving (technical potential) and costs (economic 
potential); (h) and the study of implementation barriers (at the level of individual options 
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or sectors). In order to prepare each case study, we need the following input as shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 Inputs used for the bottom-up technology approach. 
 
Challenges in the bottom-up approach include enormous data requirements in relation to 
the subsectors, technological options and context specific factors. Such approaches also 
lead to optimistic conclusions which may not always be justified (Hourcade et al. 2000). 
On the other hand, this approach provides a causal understanding of the realities in each 
end-use market, clear insight into the structure of a sector and the possible contribution 
of technologies towards increasing end-use efficiency.  
The results from the bottom-up study have been used to construct an end-use Best 
Practice Technology Scenario, in combination with extrapolations for sub-sectors that 
were not studied, to obtain full end-use sector coverage. On the basis of a comparison 
with the end-use Business-as-Usual Scenario (adapted from Rains 2000 BAU Scenario), 
the best practice savings potential has been calculated. 
In relation to the supply side, the options to reduce emissions of SO2, CO2, CH4 and N2O 
during electricity production have been analysed and presented. For SO2, several end-of-
pipe technologies have been modelled. For CO2, CH4 and N2O options have been 
investigated, mainly on the basis of a literature research, which includes the technical 
potential of options to reduce emissions, as well as the additional costs involved. Three 
options are in particular presented in this report: (a) energy efficiency improvement of 
new and existing electricity plants, (b) fuel switch (including the use of renewable 
energy, nuclear and gas) and (c) end-of-pipe technologies to reduce emissions of for 
example flue gases.  
2.3.3 Institutions and stakeholder approaches 
The institutions and stakeholder approaches are two approaches focusing on policy, 
political and legal analyses. The institutions approach analyses the process of policy 
formation and change within a country. Policy analyses focuses on agenda formation and 
belief systems of policy-makers and policy-stakeholders including scientists (Lindblom 
and Cohen 1979; Hisschemöller 1993). Agenda building processes and policy belief 
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systems are analysed with reference to political theories which focus on the various 
interpretations of democracy, the role of realist, neo-realist, pluralist and other such 
approaches for studying decision making. The articulation of policy belief systems 
further clarifies the relationships between causal and normative arguments and the goals 
and means with respect to electricity policies. Legal analyses clarifies the role of law and 
the rights and responsibilities of the various institutional stakeholders within the 
countries. It also contributes to assessing the legality and legitimacy of policy decisions 
and options for change with regard to the electricity sector. The institutional approach 
uses the techniques of surveying literature and policy documents for legal analysis, 
mapping out the major electricity policies, and evaluating policy decisions and options.  
The stakeholder approach is used to constantly verify and check the results developed in 
the process of the institutional (and the scenario and technology) research. The purpose 
is to first understand how the domestic actors perceive the electricity problem, priorities 
and policies and what sort of changes they see as necessary. The approach is also used to 
understand the perceptions of the stakeholder in relation to the problem of climate 
change and the way the international community is dealing with it and the implications 
for domestic policy. The perceptions of the stakeholders in terms of linking the 
electricity issue with climate change and the international mechanisms are then analysed 
to see if there is a way out of the dilemma sketched in Chapter 1. A study of the issue 
linkages4 may reveal opportunities for making climate and electricity policy politically 
more or less attractive to take action in a specific field (Gupta et al. 1993; Gupta and 
Hisschemöller 1997). The institutional and stakeholder approaches focus on 
understanding the driving forces, the institutional context in terms of causality, 
performance and design and in terms of specific issues and policies (see Figure 2.4). 
 
 
Figure 2.4 The institutional and stakeholder approach. 
                                                   
4  Issue-linkages can serve four purposes: Where the problem of climate change is seen as abstract and remote, 
issue linkages can serve to personalise issues, to provide the problem with a ‘face’ so that people can relate 
to it. Where countries have different interests on the climate change problem, issue linkages may help to lead 
to a convergence of these different interests. Where countries and actors have diverging perceptions, issue-
linkages can be used to identify areas in which side-payments can be made to encourage the participation of 
the other countries. Where there is a conflict of interest between the countries, issue-linkages serve the 
function of providing valuable information to understanding the complexities of the issue, and to seeing if 
the problem definition and context is appropriate to addressing the problem. 
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2.3.4 The Approaches Integrated in a Framework Model 
In order to integrate the different approaches we have developed a model which has been 
systematically revised over time (see Figure 2.5) based on intensive interactions between 
the researchers to allow for cultural exchange and interaction between the different 
disciplines.  
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Figure 2.5. An integrated assessment model to assess the electricity sector. 
 
In this model, the first step was to define a research problem and a research question 
which was in itself based on earlier research regarding the dilemmas faced by developing 
countries in relation to the climate change problem (see e.g. Gupta 1997, Maya and 
Gupta 1996, Gupta 2000). The following step was to undertake a detailed literature 
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survey in relation to the electricity (demand and supply) sector for both countries and to 
identify a number of key issue. (see Chapter 3 and 4). 
Simultaneously, we performed a scenario analysis on the basis of existing information 
from the RAINS/ASIA model in order to examine the feasibility of modernising the 
electricity sector. We analysed the broad macro-level and examined the long term trends 
along with the implications for greenhouse gas emissions and acid deposition. A 
business-as-usual scenario for the electricity sector was thus developed (see Chapter 5).  
While such macro trends are useful for identifying the areas which need specific 
attention they are, at best, very general. In order to increase the level of detail we used 
the ‘bottom-up’ technological approach which examined the technologies in seven 
demand side sectors and several options for the supply side to identify the technological 
and economic potential for improving these sectors (see Chapters 6 and 7).  
However, the European experience in ‘bottom-up’ methodologies is that they tend to 
predict an enormous technical emission reduction potential without compromising 
economic growth, but that an undefined share of the so-called potential is at best 
theoretical due to institutional implementation barriers (Hourcade et al. 2000). This led 
us to the adoption of the institutional and stakeholder approach which examines those 
factors in the institutional context which influence implementation decisions (see 
Chapter 8). This led us to an analysis of the feasibility of the policy options. 
Then we developed scenarios in which we combine different Best Practice Technology 
options (Chapter 9). Chapter 10 examines the perceptions of China and India on the 
climate change issue and the potential for linking to the practical options identified in 
previous chapters. 
2.4 An assessment of the methodology 
Integrating the different approaches requires not just comprehensive diagrams but an 
extensive learning process and discipline on the part of the researchers. Although the 
above presentation may give the impression that we worked in a linear way, in actual 
fact, we developed an intensive interactive and iterative approach and almost all chapters 
of this book were born simultaneously, because nothing could be ready till everything 
was ready. This was very stimulating but also very exhausting since the rules of the 
integration process have to be constantly discovered and tested.  
Further, our attempts at involving stakeholders included a number of different techniques 
and were practiced by all members of the team in one way or other. These exercises 
included an initial workshop in New Delhi in December 1997, field work in India in 
relation to the sectoral bottom-up research in 1998, an internet survey with Indian 
stakeholders in 1999, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in March 2000; semi-
structured presentations in February 2001 and a review process in March 2001. For 
China, we had a detailed workshop and interviews in Beijing in 1999, field work in 
2000-2001 and another set of interviews and workshop in 2000.  
Some of the key challenges faced in the integration process were: 
- The differences in the definitions: For example, in the RAINS Asia approach, 
demand is set equal to supply, whereas in fact demand is greater than supply in India 
and demand was less than supply in China in the late 1990s. Finding a way to deal 
with this was a challenge. Furthermore, it is not clear whether co-generation, and 
transmission and distribution are part of the demand or the supply side. We have 
adopted a practical approach. 
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- The differences in data and assumptions: A key challenge in the research process 
was the diverging data that we uncovered through the three methodologies used. The 
literature used different data, government documents provided different data, IEA 
reports provided different statistics and so did the interviewees. In the final analysis 
we have tried to integrate the results by using the data as used by Tata Energy 
Research Institute in New Delhi and Energy Research Institute in Beijing in relation 
to the RAINS Asia Model as a starting point and for the rest of the data we have 
relied to the extent possible on domestic sources of information. 
- Aggregation and disaggregation of data: While the RAINS ASIA model provided 
aggregate data, disaggregating the data to make it consistent with the bottom-up 
demand and institutional research was a major challenge. To the extent possible we 
have tried to use some rules of thumb to deal with this issue. This weakness is a 
common weakness of most integrated assessment approaches (Rotmans 1998: 164). 
- Different time frames and speculations on the future: In developing scenarios, it is 
imperative to identify assumptions in relation to the future. Using data from planning 
documents while authoritative may not be a reflection of how the sector will 
develop. In fact, if there is one thing that the planning records show in India, is that 
the plans are never implemented in time and the optimism reflected in the plans are 
not reflected in the reality of implementation. Furthermore, a key point that emerged 
from the interviews was that as both countries are in a process of economic (and 
political in the case of China) transition, and since this implies structural change, it is 
extremely difficult to extrapolate into the future. We have thus used common sense 
in developing these scenarios, and these scenarios are at best speculations about the 
future, not predictions. 
- Identifying the stakeholders and securing and double-checking information: A key 
challenge in such research is does one identify the stakeholder first or the issue, since 
this has enormous consequences for the outcome of the research. Identifying 
stakeholders in India is not a problem and we were able to meet many experts and 
discuss the issues with them. In China, this is a more challenging task; as the 
stakeholders outside government are very reserved regarding their position, the 
majority of the Chinese interviewees were relatively less informed about the details 
of the climate policy process, but were more informed about the energy policy 
process. The policy-making procedures in China appear to be very centralised and 
are concentrated in the hands of a few insiders in the process. Furthermore, China is 
still in the process of evolving into a democracy and there are not many who are 
openly critical of the system. An interviewee explained that “One needs to 
distinguish between how prudent people and scholars in particular and how radical 
people view the issues. Prudent people tend to include scholars, people from the 
older generation and officials. These people are likely to emphasise that the views of 
the Government are based on the concerns of the people. Radical people may 
emphasise the opposite. Sometimes people have two faces. In universities, there is 
some degree of freedom in the discussion within the classroom, however when we 
publish in academic journals we have to be prudent, so we tend to be technical and 
not critical”. 5 However, although human right issues are considered to be extremely 
sensitive, the environment in contrast is not a politically sensitive issue.6 
Environmental issues are more technical. In general environmental issues are 
covered in the newspapers but not human rights issues. 7 There appears to be a strong 
                                                   
5  Meeting 12, 1999 
6  Meeting 12, 1999. 
7  Meeting 12, 1999. 
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tendency to consider the environmental issues as a scientific and technical issue as 
opposed to a political issue of how environmental problems need to be resolved. 
Most of the people we met during our meetings were also very cautious; and there 
were limited discussions during the workshop which took more the form of expert 
presentations and clarificatory questions. Nevertheless, we were able to identify a 
mainstream view from the prudent interviewees and a cautious critical approach 
from some of our more radical interviewees. While the mainstream view was that 
China had a unitary system,8 the government made policy in the public interest and 
people should implement these laws,9 there were others who claimed that China can 
hardly be seen as monolithic,10 and the lack of implementation of environmental 
policies reflected the lack of general public support. This makes the use of 
stakeholder approaches more complicated in China and the results may not be 
entirely robust.  
- Qualitative and quantitative data: We also faced the challenge of integrating 
qualitative data from the interviews and workshops with the quantitative data 
emerging from the scenarios in order to develop the feasible scenario. Our solution, 
thought not perhaps elegant, has been to indicate the maximum technical feasible 
options in scenarios and then to present the feasible scenarios through a qualitative 
analysis. This, too, is a common challenge faced in integrated assessments (Rotmans 
1998: 164).  
However, on the whole, we believe that our combined methodologies have increased the 
value of the results of the research and that such an approach may be useful for others 
who wish to conduct similar analyses.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter states that the book uses an integrated assessment model which builds on 
three approaches – a top-down scenario approach, a bottom-up technology approach and 
an interactive stakeholder and institutional approach. The approaches have been 
combined in a framework that allowed for systematic evaluation of the key issues. We 
believe that the combination of the three approaches helps to increase the value of the 
results for policymakers. 
 
                                                   
8  Meeting 2, 1999. 
9  Meeting 11, 1999. 
10  Meeting 1, 1999. 
3. China 
Authors: Kees Dorland and Joyeeta Gupta11 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the issues relating to electricity supply and demand in China 
based on a literature survey and institutional analysis. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine 
business-as-usual scenarios for the Chinese electricity sector and technical options for 
reducing emissions. Chapter 8 looks at the feasibility of these options while Chapter 9 
analyses the feasibility of other low emission scenarios. In Chapter 10, we examine the 
perceptions and policies of China on the global problem of climate change and the 
willingness to link electricity policy to climate change policy. The electricity supply has 
been analysed in more detail than the demand side. More detailed information on the 
demand side can be found in Chapters 6, 8 and 9. 
The introduction first gives a brief geo-political background, introduces the issue of 
greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental issues, presents the legal and 
organisational framework of the energy sector and discusses some general economic key 
issues. In the next two sections the electricity supply and demand sectors are briefly 
presented and key issues and policy in the sectors are discussed. The fourth section gives 
some options for policy improvements identified in the literature. Finally the fifth 
section presents a first round of analysis of institutional policy options. 
3.1.1 Geo-political background 
Twenty years ago China was among the world’s poorest countries. 80% of the 
population was living from less than US$ 1 per day and only 1/3 of the adults was 
literate. However, the economic reforms between 1978 and the present seem to have 
paid off. Between 1980 and 1995, China’s GDP grew with an average of 9.4% annually. 
In 1995 China was the world’s eighth largest economy with a GDP of US$ 696 billion. 
By 1997 GDP had grown to US$ 802 billion with inflation at 2.8%12 . China's income is 
rising at least twice as quickly as energy use. In other words, China has reduced its 
energy intensity by 4.5 percent each year over the past two decades. China's achievement 
is unique in the developing world (Chandler et al. 1998). 
The population was 1.1 billion in 1990, which is about 20% of the world’s population. In 
July 1997, Hong Kong, with a population of some 6 million people, reverted to China. 
Although China has a large and rapidly growing economy, since the recent economic 
growth has exceeded population growth, the average standard of living is improving. By 
1995 illiteracy had dropped to 18% of the population, consumption had more than 
doubled and poverty rates declined (12 and OECD 1996a). However, the developments in 
the coastal and urban areas are much faster than in the rest of the country.  
The population growth is slowing down and is expected to drop below 1% after the year 
2000. The infant mortality rate is low (38/1,000) and life expectancy high (70 years 
overall). The main population group consists of the Han Chinese (91.9%) while minority 
ethnic groups include Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uygur, Yi, Mongolian, Tibetan, 
                                                   
11  With contributions from K. Boutachekourt, C. Kroeze, M. Hisschemöller and J. Vlasblom. 
12 http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/china.htm. 
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Buyi, Korean, and other groups. The total work force is 699 million people of which 
60% is employed in agriculture and forestry, 25% in industry and commerce, 5% in 
construction and mining, 5% in social services, and 5% in other areas. Women comprise 
over 40% of the labour force, but this excludes the large number of women engaged in 
agricultural and household work13. The important Chinese industries include textiles, 
garments, machinery, cement, iron and steel, coal, and oil. The state owns most of the 
large companies, of which some 40% operate at a loss. Therefore, reforming the 
organisational structure of these large companies is a policy priority. China has recently 
announced its policy to speed up the privatisation of many companies (EIA 1998). 
The Chinese electricity sector is influenced by the political reforms that have taken place 
in the past two decades. In 1987 the Communist Party decided to modernise the 
economy in accordance with plans as described in ‘the four modernisations’ developed 
by Deng Xiaoping. With these modernisations a programme for political reform, 
intended to restore the trust of the people in the Party, was envisaged. The agricultural 
sector, industry, defence, science and technology had to be reformed and modernised. 
The aim was to increase the GNP and the per capita income by a factor 4 between 1987 
and the year 2000. 
As Deng Xiaoping came to power also the political structures were reviewed. Deng 
Xiaoping made the survival of the Party more or less dependent on the success of the 
‘four modernisations’. The large-scale experimentation with economic and political 
reforms was, however, halted by the massacre in 1989. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping declared 
that the reforms should again be continued. He suggested that experiments with 
introductions of capitalistic elements should be made provided the social character of the 
Chinese economy (e.g. the ownership of production goods) was to be maintained. The 
capitalistic elements included the introduction of market mechanism, market orientation 
of state companies, a free labour market and stock markets. 
These reforms led to a spectacular economic growth of 13% between 1992 and 1994. 
Deng Xiaoping’s capitalistic politics were even included in the Chinese constitution. 
From that moment, China aimed at forming a socialistic market economy with a large 
role given to demand and supply. 
In 1993 Deng Xiaoping officially retired and Jiang Zemin was his successor. However, 
Deng Xiaoping remained the key figure in Chinese politics until his death in 1997. Since 
1989 Jiang Zemin is the General Secretary of the CCP. In 1998 the new government 
announced a further reorganisation of government and to restructure the state companies. 
However, the economic problems in Asia at that time and the general fear of the 
government for social unrest have slowed down these reforms and reorganisations. 
These continuous reforms and reorganisations in government and the energy sector 
provide the background in which the options for modernising the electricity supply and 
demand sectors in China was performed. It is obvious that this has been a very complex 
process and that there are many uncertainties that could lead to unforeseen changes in 
the direction of developments. 
3.1.2 China and GHG emissions 
The CO2 emissions have increased by around 5% annually in all economic sectors in the 
80s except in the transport sector where CO2 emissions have not increased significantly 
                                                   
13  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china. 
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in that period. The energy consumption per capita is low due to the low state of 
development and low access to electricity. The per capita consumption has decreased by 
50% since 1970. Nonetheless, the Chinese industrial CO2 emission is the third highest in 
the world after the US and Russia. These high emissions are mainly due to the high coal 
dependency of the energy sector. 
Van Ham et al. (1996) analysed the CO2 emissions in China by province and sector in 
detail. A summary of their findings is presented in Table 3.1. They found that total CO2 
emissions in China were 5.3 billion tonnes of CO2 in 1994. As the key data was actually 
1990 data it can be argued that this could as well be seen as a 1990 emission value. Van 
Ham et al.(1996) concluded that the key sectors are the electric power sector, the iron 
and steel industry, the chemical industry, the non-metallic mineral industry, the 
residential sector, cement manufacturing and biomass burning (especially agricultural 
waste burning; 5.9%, and residential fuel wood and waste burning; 8.4 and 10.0 % 
respectively). Note that the figures in Table 4.1 differ from the estimates made in this 
study since this study focuses on the electricity use in the sectors only while van Ham et 
al. (1996) include all energy use. 
Table 3.1  CO2 emissions from total fuel consumption (including direct fuel consumption from in-
dustry) by sources and sectors in China in 1994. 
Source/Sector CO2 emission 
  Mton CO2 % of total 
Fossil fuel combustion 3276 61.3 
Transformation sector 1061 19.8 
Industrial sector 1445 27.0 
Transport sector 115 2.2 
Farming, Forestry, Fishery and Water conservation 76 1.4 
Residential sector 297 5.6 
Othersa  128 2.4 
Non-energy use and process emissions 208 3.9 
Cement manufacturing 76 1.4 
Naphta- and natural gas feedstocks in chemical industry 297 5.6 
Lubricants and LPG use 128 2.4 
Biomass burning 1432 26.8 
Non-fuel use 358 6.7 
Fuel use 1073 20.1 
Coal fires 430 8.0 
Total 5346 100.0 
a Commercial and Public Services, others. 
Based on van Ham et al. (1996). 
 
In a World Bank study, the 1990 CO2 emissions were estimated at 2.5 billion tonnes 
(Johnson et al. 1996). In this estimate only the emissions from the power sector, 
industrial boilers, residential coal use and the cement industry are included. Biomass 
burning is not considered in the analysis as this is assumed to be renewable. However, it 
is only the case if the biomass is produced sustainable, which can be disputed for a 
number of reasons. Furthermore, other emission sources were also not included. The 
total estimate for the sectors analysed is comparable with the estimates for these sectors 
produced by van Ham et al. (1996).  
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Van Ham et al. (1996) also argue that increases of CO2 emission of 10% annually are 
conceivable. The enormous economic growth is responsible for almost 80% of the 
increase and the population expansion is responsible for almost 20% of the increase). 
3.1.3 China’s environment 
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on coal for fulfilling 
the enormous demand for energy. This, combined with the poor technology in use and 
the lack of SO2 and NOx emission control technologies, causes severe local 
environmental pollution problems in many parts of the country and high CO2 emissions. 
In most Chinese cities the SO2 air concentration level are well above international 
standards. Five Chinese cities (Guangzhou, Shanghai, Senyang, Beijing and Xian) are in 
the top ten of the most polluted cities in the world. (China Energy Databook 1996) 
China has achieved a lot in the area of particulate matter (PM) emission control. These 
emissions from units larger than 6 MW have almost stabilised. The total emission only 
increased with 4% between 1987 and 1994 while the total installed capacity almost 
doubled. The average PM removal rate increased from 92% to 95.6% and the number of 
installed removal equipment increased from 100 to 364 in the same period (Chandler et 
al. 1998). 
The progress with reducing SO2 emissions by using flue gas desulfurisation (FGD) units 
is still relatively limited. In the past it was thought that this problem could be dealt with 
by just raising the height of the stack. However, this only increased the acid rain problem 
(Chandler et al. 1998). Regarding NOx, emission standards still have to be developed in 
China. However, new units are obliged to have low NOx burning technology (Chandler 
et al. 1998). By 1987 only 60% of the plants met national standards for emissions to 
water. The direct emissions of slag and ash directly to rivers and lakes created large 
environmental pollution. By 1995 these emissions had stopped completely. However, 
this created a new problem as the utilisation of slag and ashes from thermal plants is still 
very low (37% in 1994). 
A solution to the environmental problems related to the emissions from thermal plants 
could be by changing the fuel or switching to other power systems. However, these have 
their own environmental problems as well. For instance, hydropower leads to significant 
ecosystem damage and in many cases large groups of the population in the area have to 
migrate. Nuclear power brings operation risks and waste problems. A recent study 
performed by the World Bank (1997a) estimated the total costs of water and air pollution 
in China at 8% of its GDP (US $ 50 billion annually). 
3.1.4 The Legal and organisational framework 
In this section the legal and organisational structure of the Chinese electricity sector is 
discussed. However, the electricity sector in China cannot be discussed without 
discussing the energy sector as a whole and the overall political and organisational 
structure. Hence, a brief description of the political and organisational developments in 
the past decades is provided here. 
3.1.4.1 The Environmental Laws 
Following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, domestic laws on 
the environment were developed. A second international stimulus came with the United 
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Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 and the domestic 
political change in 1994 (Qijia 1998). Since 1997, when the new generation of 
communist leaders took over, there have been some changes (Xi 1997). 
Since 1980, China’s central leadership strengthened its environmental legislation when it 
promulgated the Environmental Protection Law. Many laws, acts and regulations 
followed. Local environmental protection bureau’s developed their specific laws, which 
were often more strict than the national laws. In the Basic Law on Environmental 
Protection it is stipulated that all large - and medium- sized projects must pass 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) before the project can be approved. In 1989 
the Environmental Protection Law was amended. The 1989 version has strengthened the 
operational authority of environmental protection organisations by offering clear 
authority for on-site inspection and demanding companies to co-operate (OECD 1996a). 
Apart from protection laws, Chinese environmental management relies heavily on the 
362 national and industrial environmental standards that were applicable in 1995. If 
companies fail to meet the standards they are charged a fee for violation of the standards. 
However, these fees are often far below the marginal costs of abatement technologies 
that would have to be implemented to meet the standards and thus many firms choose to 
pay the fees rather than invest in pollution prevention and new technologies. The 
companies can borrow money for financing abatement technologies at reduced rates 
from the State, however, awareness of these types of possibilities is low (OECD 1996a). 
The environmental legislative framework in the Basic Law on Environmental Protection, 
is presented in Figure 3.1. There was no legislative framework for the electricity sector 
in China before the Electric Power Law was introduced in 1996. The electricity sector 
was ruled by government directives, which were drawn up by many institutions on all 
levels within the government organisations. Thus, the electricity sector was subjected to 
more than 500 laws, regulations and administrative directives. There was a lack of co-
ordination of the legislative conditions and the directives were at least confusing but 
sometimes 
The lack of a legislative framework also resulted in extensive problems regarding the 
identification of and obtaining documents with the rules that should be used for the 
sector. Insight in legislation was obtained through discussions with and speeches from 
government officials. 
The Electric Power Law offers an extensive framework for reform and development of 
the electricity sector. However, it needs ot be modified further to make it more market 
oriented. Most of the generation companies are still dependent of State Power. Since 
there is a large number of electricity production companies, the law stimulates merges in 
the sector. The law acknowledges a role for foreign investments, including direct 
investments in power plants trough joint ventures with foreign companies. The foreign 
investments have to be in line with the national industrial policy and projects mentioned 
in the ‘Ninth Five Year Program’. Foreign loans, but not foreign investments, are 
admitted in the development of distribution networks. The Electric Power Law also 
regulates the development of electricity production and management to guarantee the 
safety and reliability of the distribution systems. It also protects the juridical rights of 
investors, managers and consumers. 
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Figure 3.1 Environmental Legislative Framework 
An Asian Dilemma 
To implement all the laws on resource and environmental protection (especially the Air 
Pollution Control Law and the Energy Conservation law), the State Government enacted 
120 administrative regulations, and local authorities enacted over 600 regulations and 
about 400 national standards were adopted (Xiangcong 1998). The principles guiding the 
laws include the recognition of the need to develop sustainably; which implies 
prevention in preference to curative approaches, the study of foreign legislations to draw 
lessons from them and harmonisation with international laws (Xiangcong 1998). 
3.1.4.2 Centre-State Relationship 
Despite the political and organisational reforms in China the decision-making process is 
still very much top-down (e.g. state oriented). The bureaucratic system consists of many 
layers. At the top there are 25 to 35 leaders followed by several intermediate links and 
staff-organisations, the State Council Commissions and national and provincial 
departments that implement policy.  
Due to the current economic reforms more autonomy in the policy making process has 
been given to the provincial level. This is especially the case in the fast growing coastal 
and southern provinces. With these reforms an attempt at reaching more consensus in the 
policy making process is made. 
China is governed on the basis of formal authoritative structures, which consist of 
networks of thousands of individuals with mutual obligations. Loyalty plays an 
important role in these networks. The relation between the state, the townships, the cities 
and the provinces in 1998 is presented in Figure 3.2. Since 1998 many changes in the 
Centre-State relationships are taking place.  
 
a There are three large cities directly administered by the state (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) .
  Thus they have the same position as the provinces.
b Eequivalent to provinces in the national minority areas.
c Regarded as rural.
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Figure 3.2 The structure of China’s government system. 
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The Chinese decision making process is also influenced by foreign factors. To obtain 
new capital and technologies Deng Xiaoping extended the ties with industrialised coun-
tries in the 80s as a part of the new policy. The urge to heavily invest in modernisation of 
the energy sector raised concern on the environmental impacts with the industrialised 
countries. Funding organisations, such as the World Bank, pointed at the importance of 
environmental measures. New technologies, however, in many cases already are 
equipped with environmental measurement devices (such as air emission measurement 
devices). The government’s wish to raise the level of production to international stan-
dards in many cases also included the introduction of the high international environ-
mental standards (Livernash 1996 p.64). 
3.1.4.3 The government bodies 
Until 1998 the electricity sector consisted of around 10,000 legal entities, 80,000 
electricity production companies and 1,600 distribution companies. All companies are 
branches of State Power. This large number of organisations increases the co-ordination 
problems between the production and distribution companies. According to Shiwei et al. 
(1997: 4), many of the production companies operate as autonomous subsystems, 
especially in the countryside.  
The organisation of the political administrative structure of China has been changing 
several times over the last decade. The State Council can be seen as the government of 
China. Below the State Council many Commissions and Ministries operate. These are 
the departments that develop policy. The Ministries and Commissions steer the 
Corporations, which can be seen as the utility companies. Many of these utility 
companies become independent and start defining their own management within the 
boundary conditions given by the government. The Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP), 
the Ministry of Coal Industry (MCI), the China National Petroleum Corporation, the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation and the China National Petrochemical 
Corporation dominated the energy sector until 1998. 
In 1972 China prepared a statement on environmental policy for the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment held in Stockholm. This eventually led to the foundation of the 
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). The NEPA became independent in 
1988. IT became a ministry in 2001 and renamed State Energy Protection Agency. 
SEPA is responsible for all aspects of related to environmental policy and management 
but has to share its authority with many other organisations.  
China has also established the National Clean Production Centre (NCPC) in December 
1994. This Centre promotes clean production technologies, conducts industrial pollution 
audits, provides technical training and international exchange. The Centre serves as a 
link to Section 3 of Agenda 21. More than 3000 enterprises are identified as heavy 
polluters by China. They have to bring down emissions within a given timeframe 
(OECD 1996a). 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) also plays a role in environmental enforcement. The 
loans and grants for pollution abatement projects are increasing and are distributed by 
commercial banks, such as ABC, CIB, CB and the National Development Bank. From 
1995 onward they demand projects to comply with all applicable environmental laws 
and regulations (OECD 1996a). With entry into the WTO, China will also open up the 
banking sector. 
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In March 1998, the National People’s Congress elected Zhu Rongji as Premier, replacing 
Li Peng. Just before his election, the legislature approved a major government reform 
package, which will eliminate or merge 15 of the 40 ministries and abolish 4 million 
government jobs in three years (a 50% reduction). Under this reorganisation the minis-
tries of electric power, petroleum and chemicals are to be transformed into state-owned 
corporations (EIA 1998). The MOEP and the MCI were abolished and some of the gov-
ernment functions were redirected to new bureaux in the State economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC). However, the ownership, enterprise management regulation and 
policy formulation continued to be unclear and even seems to have become more com-
plex then before14. The energy sector organisations and their specific responsibilities un-
til 1998 are shown in Figure 3.3. Since 1998, many changes have occurred and the in-
dustrial ministries have been abolished. 
 
 
                                                   
14  Energy Policy and Structure in the People’s Republic of China (1998), http://iceu.net/china, 5 February 
2001. 
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Figure 3.3 Organisation of the Chinese energy sector until 1998 (Adapted from EIA 1998). 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation  
China National Local Coal Mines Development Co-operation 
China North East and NEI-Mongolia United Coal Co-operation 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
State Power Corp. was established in 1997 to handle 
business aspects of the industry, with generation and 
transmission the responsibility of regional subsidiaries. 
The Ministry of Water Resources is concerned with 
China's hydropower production. 
State Council 
The State Council functions as a government headed by the Premier  
The State Planning Commission (SPC) has ultimate au-
thority for energy project approval, budget allocations, 
and financing arrangements. Thus, the SPC has a big in-
fluence on energy policy in China. The SPC is also deal-
ing with foreign investments. 
The State Science and Technology Commission 
(SSTC) and the State Economic and Trade Commis-
sion (SETC) are also involved with energy industry de-
velopment and efficiency increase.  
Corporations under the State Council 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is responsible for all onshore upstream oil and gas operations, includ-
ing shallow water areas. In the past few years, CNPC has begun the transformation into a multinational integrated oil com-
pany, establishing subsidiaries and acquiring overseas acreage and refineries in pursuit of export markets. 
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was established in 1982 to explore China's offshore petroleum re-
sources. CNOOC has four regional subsidiaries (Bohai, East China Sea, Nanhai East, and Nanhai West) and several special-
ised subsidiaries. China established a third state oil company, China National Star Petroleum Corporation,in January 1997. 
The company is awaiting central government approval of four proposed exploration ventures with foreign companies. 
The China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) is responsible for petroleum processing and product distribution, 
controlling production facilities for 90 percent of China's refined oil products and over three-quarters of its petrochemicals.  
The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is a conglomerate of more than 200 enterprises and institutions con-
cerned with China's nuclear power production and waste disposal facilities. The China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE)
operates under the CNNC and the China Academy of Sciences (CAS). It is a huge multidisciplinary institute with 3800 em-
ployees, including 900 senior scientists and senior engineers. It deals with nuclear energy- science and -technology. It is a 
well-equipped organisation and makes significant progress in R&D. It also uses its authority to influence the civil market. The 
China Energy Investment Corporation (CNEIC) oversees major investment loans for the energy sector.  
The Ministry of Power Industry which regulates power 
production, is being transformed into a new national 
power company.  
The Ministry of Agriculture  
The Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources  
China International Water and Electric Comp.  
The China National Chemicals Import and Export Corporation (Sinochem) is primarily involved in imports and exports 
of crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas.  
Unipec (for Sinopec)  China Oil (for CNP) 
Huaneng Group Inc. 
The Ministry of Coal Industry allocates national coal production and coordinates production activities by central-
government-controlled mines (about 45 percent of nation-wide production) and "local" mines (collective or private-ownership 
mines as well as state-owned mines operated at the provincial, prefectural, or county level).  
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3.2 Electricity supply  
3.2.1 Introduction 
The power industry is referred to as the centre of energy development. The Chinese 
electricity sector is the second largest in the world after the US electricity sectors. 
China’s electric power industry has developed very quickly over the past decade. The 
gross electricity production installed increased from 2.2 EJ in 1990 to an estimated 4.3 
EJ in 2000 (see Chapter 5). Many new power plants were relatively efficient because 
they were larger, reaching 200 megawatts and higher. However, a large number of 
smaller, inefficient, plants were also added to quickly meet soaring demand. Most of the 
country’s 1990 electricity was generated with thermal capacity while about 20% was 
hydro based and 1% nuclear based. The main share of the thermal capacity was coal 
based (5.8 PJ primary energy equivalent in 1990, see Chapter5).  
Before 1987, China’s electric power supply consisted only of conventional coal-fired, 
oil-fired, and hydropower plants. The electric power supply mix began to change during 
the late 1980s. In 1993, the first large-scale pumped storage hydropower station was put 
into operation. In 1995, hydropower stations with a total capacity of 45 GW were under 
construction, including the massive 18 GW Three Gorges Dam. Foreign investors have 
built several relatively small oil- and gas-fired combined cycle units in recent years, 
primarily along the eastern and southern coast. China also started commercial nuclear 
power production in 1992. By 1995, China had installed wind power farms, solar 
photovoltaic, geothermal, and ocean tidal power stations reached 50, 6, 32, and 11 
megawatts of capacity, respectively (Chandler et al. 1998; Shiwei et al. 1997). By 2010 
it is expected that coal based systems will still account for most of the electricity 
production in China. It is expected that in 2010 hydro plants will produce about one-fifth 
of the electricity. 
3.2.2 Policy 
The electricity sector went through many important organisational changes that are part 
of the changes of the Chinese socialist market economy. This section gives a brief 
introduction to the most important policies: economic reform, reforms in the electricity 
sector, electricity pricing, national investment, energy policy and foreign investment.  
3.2.2.1 Economic reform 
In the mid-90s a change took place as the country experienced a process of both decay 
and modernisation of the institutions. Many of the existing political-administrative 
institutions could not keep up with the reforms initiated in the period that Deng Xiaoping 
was in power. The reforms were mainly economic but they were based on 
decentralisation of economic power. This means that the authority of several actors was 
transferred to other actors. In this decentralised setting the government in Beijing would 
have less power over the decision-making processes at the provincial level. 
Before 1998 a few ministries and companies such as the Ministry of Electric Power 
dominated China’s energy sector. The sector is now dominated by State Power. 
Although there is a gradual trend towards using economic instruments, ‘command and 
control’ instruments still are very dominant. In the environmental area, some economic 
instruments have been used, such as national pollution exceedance charge; effluent 
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charges, user charges, SO2 charge, ecological destruction compensation, mineral 
resource compensation, resource taxes, tradable permits, deposits for clean up 
operations, subsides etc (Jinnan and Xinyuan 1997: 17). Of these the pollution levy 
system has been used for 16 years and works well.  
However, the economic reform also faces problems. The instruments are not always 
consistent with the shift towards a market economy. E.g. the pay back principle in the 
pollution levy fund and the loan forgiveness provisions are not consistent with the 
polluter pays principle. The existing policy instruments do not reflect the true 
environmental costs, and the existing policies are inconsistent (e.g. enterprises in some 
cities may pay charges on 11 parameters to 6 government departments, sometimes for 
overlapping issues) (Jinnan and Xinyuan 1997: 19-20). 
3.2.2.2 Reforms in the electricity sector 
The four basic problems with the power sector in China were the centralised organisation 
of the power sector, the direct management of the power sector enterprises by the 
government, the lack of a transparent legal and regulatory system, and the absence of 
incentives for efficiency (Shiwei et al. 1997). 
The Chinese government has recognised these problems and since 1985 the electricity 
sector is being reformed. In 1985 the State Council adopted the “Provisional Regulation 
on Encouraging Fund Raising for Power Construction”. The reforms include the 
separation of the government from power enterprises, the corporatisation and 
commercialisation of power enterprises, and the introduction of competition in 
generation. In this document the wish to admit more private investments from national 
and foreign sources was made explicit. The aim was to speed up the process of meeting 
the shortage in electricity supply. Since then the national and foreign investments have 
grown substantially. This also led to more competition. However, the reforms are more 
an answer to the acute problems than born from a long-term strategy.  
Most reforms were directed towards electricity production so as to tackle the problems 
with shortage in supply. The reforms were introduced to stimulate investments and a 
partial rationalisation of the electricity tariffs. Little attention was paid to modernisation 
of transmission and distribution networks. Also little attention was paid to 
commercialisation of the different parts of the organisations responsible for delivery of 
goods and services. 
According to Shiwei et al. (1997) there are concerns within the sector that these reforms 
will fail if the government regulatory system for the sector and enterprises is not 
reformed. Since 1998 many additional reforms have taken place. 
3.2.2.3 Electricity pricing 
The electricity price was totally regulated. The State Planning Commission (SPC) was 
the highest authorised organisation in electricity pricing and in theory they must approve 
any deviations from the catalogue price, so they are responsible for planning and reform 
of price adjustments. SPC reports to the State Council (SC) at least once a year after 
which they can implement plans/reforms approved by the SC. The provincial price 
bureau’s and the provincial electricity bureau’s implement the plans and reforms in 
practice. The country catalogue price is set and approved by SPC annually. However, 
this does not mean that there is a uniform pricing system. The electricity price is derived 
from the government set basic price and a number of national, provincial and local 
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surcharges (Estrada and Bergesen 1997:19). The catalogue prices take into account local 
and grid specific factors, such as transportation costs, distribution losses, electricity 
production costs, fuel costs (coal prices), etc. In 1993 the price differences among the 
grids were still significant with the lowest prices in the south-western provinces where 
hydropower is the main source of electricity. The highest prices could be found in the 
eastern and south-eastern provinces. Price differences for the same type of user were 
different up to a factor 2 to 3 for different grids. Rural users generally paid the highest 
prices, which could in some cases even be a factor 5 higher than in south-western urban 
areas. Furthermore, peak prices were up to 40% higher than prices during non-peak 
hours in some areas, while during periods with low demand prices they could be 35% 
below the regular non-peak hours. The basic and wholesale prices for irrigation in poor 
areas on average were respectively 50% below or equal to the State Power Co-operation 
Company (SP) prices in most grids. The wholesale price for agriculture is the price set 
especially for the rural areas where the distribution facility is not affiliated with the 
integrated network. Before 1988 the average wholesale price was stable but between 
1988 and 1992 the annual increase was around 10% and even over 30% in 1993. In 1995 
the price increase dropped to only a few percent again to produce an average electricity 
price of 27 US$/MWh (Chandler et al. 1998). 
The fact that power production enterprises raised the charges individually hindered the 
natural growth of the State’s electricity prices and has reduced the country’s capacity to 
withstand price reform in the power industry. In the Electric Power Law (promulgated in 
1995) it is stated that for the same type of consumer and in one grid the prices should be 
the same. The Chinese government in 1997 intensified its effort to reform electricity 
tariffs. In 1997 in 18 of the 27 grids under the SP a unitary selling price schedule became 
operational. This means that special local charges are no longer added to the country 
catalogue prices. The catalogue prices are still differentiated for different categories of 
consumers and depend on the peak demand, transmission capacity of the network and a 
‘power factor demand charge’. Exceptions to this price structure can be applied for 
individual users.  
China still uses two types of tariffs: the old administered prices for old power plants and 
"guidance" prices for new power plants, though the gap between the two types is 
decreasing. The government hopes to unify the price of electric power within grids soon, 
but many obstacles remain. The government still controls prices for some residential 
customers, large state-owned enterprises, and agricultural consumers. Subsidies to these 
sectors are decreasing but have not been completely abolished, particularly for irrigation.  
Shi Dazhan, the Chinese power industry minister, announced in 1998 that the charges for 
electricity will be further standardised and that inspections on electricity tariffs will 
increase to stop pricing irregularities. To further standardise the tariffs guidelines in 
which fuel and transportation costs will be taken into account will be developed.15 
3.2.2.4 National investment 
In 1980 the Chinese government initiated policy to emphasise energy exploitation and 
conservation, although it emphasised especially exploitation. Only some 6% of all 
investments between 1980 and 1990 were for energy conservation. The relatively low 
attention for conservation is due to the fact that the Chinese government has 
decentralised control over resources and has delegated decision making to local 
                                                   
15  http://203.207.119.2/sicnet/siccew/cewhtm/m073.htm , dd. 10/02/98. 
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governments and enterprises. The central government is still responsible for about 70% 
of budgetary financing for capital construction investments while the local governments 
and the enterprises control most technical updating investments. The current subsidies on 
energy consumption do not give an incentive to invest. Thus, the success of the 
implementation of these technical measures is very much dependent on the reform of 
energy pricing. 
The State opts for collaboration through joint ventures. The Chinese share in large joint 
ventures is usually dominant. However, the State has prescribed that the main part of the 
production units should be built with Chinese technology. A coherent distribution system 
for the whole country will have to be developed to tackle the existing problems between 
regional and local distribution systems. 
3.2.2.5 Energy policy 
The reforms started in the 80s were accelerated in the 90s. Below the Chinese 
memoranda on energy policy is discussed. 
China’s Agenda 21 programme 
The 1994 ‘White Paper on China’s Population, Environment and Development in the 
21st century’ was in response to the ‘Rio Conference’ in June 1992. This paper outlines a 
strategic plan for the sustainable development of China and includes the electricity 
sector. The State Council in Beijing approved this so-called ‘Agenda 21 Programme’ on 
25 March 94 (State Planning Commission 1994) and the plan should guide the 
development of social and economic projects on medium and long-term and foreign 
investors. The recommendations made are also to be found in the ‘Ninth Five Year Plan 
(1996-2000). 
The Ninth Five Year Plan 
In 1995 the Chinese government issued the ‘Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000)’. In the 
Ninth Five Year Plan the goal of improving the power effectiveness is set at: 330-360 
million tonnes of standard coal, with a power saving rate of 4.4-5.0%. As coal is the 
major source of energy for electricity production in China and the efficiency of the 
plants is low this sector has a high potential for energy saving. 
The most important goals regarding the energy sector are a) a 9% annual increase in total 
energy output until the year 2000; b) a 5% annual improvement of energy efficiency; c) a 
7% annual increase of electricity production capacity –i.e. 16 GW annually (including 
3.5 GW hydropower)- and the installation between 1996 and 2000 of 80-GW new 
capacity; d) achieving an installed capacity of 290 GW by 2000; e) an increase in total 
coal output up to 1.4 billion tonnes in 2000; f) a boost proven reserves by adding 33 
billion barrels of crude oil and 17.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas by 2000; g) an 
increase in crude oil output up to 3.1 million b/d and refinery output up to 4.5 million b/d 
by 2000; h) an increase in natural gas production up to 833 billion cubic feet by 2000; 
and i) having 70% of urban households using gas fuel by 2000. 
China also plans to extend the transmission system and couple the existing systems. 
Furthermore, it plans to have one fully operational national network by the year 2020 16. 
                                                   
16 http://203.207.119.2/sicnet/siccew/cewhtm/m043.htm 
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Renewable electricity 
Policy on renewable electricity production can be found in the both the Agenda 21 and 
the Ninth Five-Year Plan discussed above. In 1995 the ‘Report on Strengthening the 
development of New and Renewable energy in China’ and the ‘Programme on New and 
Renewable Energy Development in China (1996-2010) were approved by the State 
Council. The programme is directed towards research, demonstration and dissemination 
of new commercial technologies.14 
A major option for reducing GHG emissions in China is a fast introduction of alternative 
(non-coal based) energy technologies. Increased support for developments in the 
alternative technologies is needed. The alternative energy technologies could address the 
problems created by environmental impacts. In the next two decades most alternative 
energy technologies will probably be more expensive than large-scale coal conversion 
technologies. Based on predicted costs alone large projects in the field of nuclear and 
other large-scale non-coal technologies are probably too expensive. Thus, it is 
improbable that market forces alone will lead to increased used of these technologies in 
the next two decades. Therefore, a programme of well-targeted government and 
international co-operation for technology development and implementation is needed. 
Primary emphasis should be placed on technologies that could play a role in the long-
term energy supply. Special attention should be given to research, technology transfer, 
technology demonstration and dissemination activities aimed at reducing the costs of 
alternative energy supply and improvement of economic competition with coal based 
technologies. There are some opportunities for no-regret investments in the field of 
hydro plants, wind turbines, natural gas and fuelwood production (Johnson et al. 1996). 
Barriers for further market development of renewable electricity are the high degree of 
fragmentation of institutions, the lack of market (commercial) experience of institutions, 
the lack of awareness of the potentials of renewables among decisions-makers outside 
the renewable energy community, the lack of information exchange by practitioners of 
renewable energy technologies, the insufficient access to advanced technologies as well 
as to technical knowledge related to site selection and design optimisation, the 
insufficient market regulation, the underdeveloped state of regulatory framework for 
power sales (distribution), and the underdeveloped state of linkages with the financial 
community (Taylor and Bogach 1998). 
3.2.2.6 Foreign Investment 
Before 1990 guidelines for foreign investments existed that were directed to gaining 
access to technologies. There were also guidelines for foreign investment for enterprises 
focussing on exports. In 1995 the guidelines were detailed and in 1997 a new ‘Catalogue 
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment in Industry’ was issued. The main focus is still 
towards gaining access to foreign technologies.14 
It is estimated that around 20% of all investments will come from foreign investors. The 
Chinese government creates international admittance to the Chinese market. 
Encouraging foreign investment is a key feature of Chinese Government policy. It is 
expected that around 20% of all investments in the power sector will come from foreign 
investors. Although most investors have been expected to enter into joint venture 
agreements (Hayes 1998: 29-30), the recent trend is to encourage even fully owned 
foreign enterprises. In China’s the recently enacted Build Operate Transfer Law allows 
100% foreign ownership (China E-News 1997). The Government has also opened a 
Centre for Transfer of Environmentally Friendly Technology, which is supported by the 
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State Science and Technology Commission and the Asian Development Bank.17 The 
government is also interested, it appears, in transferring existing power plants to foreign 
operators under a Transfer-Operate-Transfer basis. China has adopted a new tariff policy 
to boost foreign investment on 1 January 1998; these apply inter alia to high and new 
tech technologies which replace outdated and inefficient equipment and accelerate the 
technological transformation of traditional industries (China E-News 1998). The 
government is encouraging bidding in relation to coal fired plants, renewable energy, the 
grid system, and energy conservation projects 
In their analysis of the foreign direct investment in China’s Power Sector, the author’s 
(Blackman and Wu 1999) conclude that the FDI has fallen far short of expectations of 
the Government because of institutional barriers (e.g. approval process, regulations and 
the risk of default on power purchase contracts), investors protect themselves by 
investing in small scale, imported technology based projects in coastal area, and that one 
third of the projects focus on efficiency enhancing generating technologies and one fifth 
on cogeneration plants.  
The Chinese government has granted the ‘Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project’ (a 720 
MW Laibin B coal fired plant) to a consortium led by The French EDF. A second project 
is open for bidding is a 600 MW plant in the Hunan province. 
3.2.3 Key Issues 
The key issues in the Chinese electricity sector are discussed below. 
3.2.3.1 Macro-economic factors 
The economic growth in China is directly linked to energy-efficiency. Accelerated 
development in the field of energy-efficiency will therefore lead in a faster development 
of the economy which leads to more opportunities for implementing new, more energy 
efficient, technologies. However, the difference in the increase in CO2 emissions by 
2020 between a low and a high economic growth scenario is expected not to be more 
than 10% (Johnson et al. 1996; see Section 4.7). 
Structural changes in the economy will probably continue to be the driving force for 
further reductions in energy intensity. Because of the changes in the product mix and 
sources of the increase of the value added in industry (especially from product 
diversification, specialisation and quality improvements), the energy use per head is 
expected to decrease sharply in the next few decades (Johnson et al. 1996). 
3.2.3.2 Management of the sector by the government 
A big problem in the electricity sector is the lack of clearly defined rights of ownership 
and control. The electricity production, transmission and distribution entities are largely 
owned by the State. However, at all government levels a large number of organisations 
participate in the process of management. Relatively few decision-making steps are 
delegated. Where decision-making is delegated, the decisions still have to be checked by 
government bodies. This makes decision making slow, diffuse, inefficient and non-
transparent. It also leads to negotiations between government organisations which only 
act in their own interest. This also leads to big problems with setting tariffs and approval 
of investments (Shiwei et al. 1997). 
                                                   
17  China EE Info Bulletin, February 1997, http://www.pnl.gov/china/eeinfo97.htm 
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3.2.3.3 Electricity pricing 
Until recently power production and the grids were mostly government owned. The grids 
were operated by the Ministry of Electric Power Industry directly (through large grid 
authorities) or by the provincial utilities. Many electricity companies had two roles to 
play. On the one hand they are government organisations and on the other hand they are 
responsible for costs and profits. In contrast to the newer production units, which are 
financed by foreign and local investors and thus fully commercialised, the older units are 
only partially commercial and under government control. The electricity produced by 
these companies is allocated to the government. It was sold at lower rates than the 
electricity from fully commercial companies due to subsidies (e.g. discounts) (Shiwei et 
al. 1997). 
According to Shiwei et al. (1997) tariff regulation is important. They identify the 
problem that the consumer tariffs are still set at the central level (catalogue prices), 
provincial level (guidance prices and surcharges) and municipal and county levels 
(surcharges). These problems lead to low investments in the sector and inefficient 
utilisation of scarce resources. The absence of clear pricing principles prior to the 
Electric Power Law was introduced, and the fragmentation, opacity, and complexity of 
the approval process discouraged investors. Shiwei et al. argue that prices are set without 
any reference to economic efficiency or willingness of final users to pay (the market 
value), but are rather negotiated. Therefore, consumers get the wrong price signals.  
Some of the most important problems of the sector are related to the inefficient tariff 
structure. As mentioned before, the tariffs of electricity produced with older production 
units are kept low artificially. Also the costs of industry are kept low artificially to keep 
up the standard of living. These developments limit the possibilities of the electricity 
companies to be financially self-supporting. It also undermines the development of the 
sector. Furthermore, it results in a shortage in allocation of funds at a provincial and 
county level, which slows down investments in the sector. The low tariffs also fail to 
stimulate users to restrict their electricity use. This leads to a paradox in which, on the 
one hand, there is an inefficient supply and, on the other hand, wastage in use (Shiwei et 
al. 1997). 
Shiwei et al (1997) identify the following problems with the producer and consumer 
prices still applied in large parts of the country: 
Producer prices: The “new plant-new price” policy has led to contractual arrangements 
based on “take-or-pay” provisions providing for minimum use of power plants (generally 
some 5000 hours per year) charged at an energy price covering the variable and capital 
costs and a reasonable profit. The same price is applied for generation above this “take-
or-pay” provision. This one part tariff structure leads to over-investment in base 
generation capacity and uneconomic dispatch because provincial power companies faced 
with higher prices from new and efficient plants limit power purchases to contractual 
minimum amounts and rely more on old, inefficient plants to minimise financial costs. 
This also leads to spilling of scarce resources. 
Consumer prices: Consumers with similar consumption characteristics still can pay 
different average prices because it is incorrectly assumed that they are being served by 
different mixes of new and old plants. This leads to inefficiencies in competitiveness of 
new industries because of high electricity prices that are above supply costs, and old, 
inefficient industries to enjoy low prices below the supply costs. The last leads to wastes 
in electricity use. Furthermore, other problems are that voltage differentials remain low 
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and do not reflect the supply costs, the demand charges are low and, when applied, only 
cover fixed costs, and the time-of-day and seasonal tariffs used in some cases do not 
consider the load profiles and time patterns of marginal costs of supply. Various 
surcharges unintendedly led to different problems for the power companies and lack of 
use of economies of scale and did not consider problems with transmission capacity 
shortages. 
3.2.3.4 Taxation 
Before 1979 a relative simple revenue system for enterprises was in place. In 1979 this 
system was replaced by a complex system including income and many other taxes. In 
1993 the taxation system was again reformed and simplified. The new system includes 
taxes on income (33%), turnover, investment, royalties, natural resource use, import 
duties and many other taxes.14 
3.2.3.5 Efficiency in production 
The overall conversion efficiency in China is considerably lower than in the developed 
countries in the world. Most of China’s electricity companies are not only inefficient but 
the quality of electricity supply is also low. The production companies themselves use 
much of the produced electricity. Roughly one third of all companies are too small to be 
technically efficient. This is not only the case for old companies but also for new 
companies and distributors (Shiwei et al. 1997). The State fears that the arrears (e.g. 
leeway) will even increase if no improvements are implemented.  
According to Zhengyan (1997) the main difficulties with power saving in China are a) 
the weakness in power saving legislation, the lack of power conservation laws and 
regulations, and the insufficiency in law enforcement and monitoring; b) the reform on 
economic system needs to go further and the mechanism with economic interests 
encouraging power saving has yet to take form; c) the lack of power saving funds - i.e. 
the need for the formulation of more economic policies such as power saving 
investments and loan policies suitable for the market-economy; and d) the lack of social 
consciousness about power saving - i.e. the need for the intensification of publicity and 
training on power saving. 
3.2.3.6 Renovation and modernisation 
The need for large investments in the sector is acknowledged but the unclear, non-
transparent and complex investment processes slow down new investments which are 
necessary for modernising and expanding the electricity supply in China (Shiwei et al. 
1997). The energy savings potential in China is high. As discussed previously the energy 
sector in China relies heavily on coal and the main air pollution and energy saving can 
thus be found in coal application technologies.  
3.2.3.7 Power shortage 
Until recently the most important problem was the shortage of electricity. The electricity 
sector was unable to meet the growing demand. This limits production in industry, which 
limits economic growth. However, new power supplies and conservation efforts have 
reduced this problem. Due to the economic crisis in Asia and domestic reforms in China 
the supply exceeded demand again in recent years. Some regions now, in fact, face 
temporary oversupply problems due to a combination of slower economic growth, rapid 
supply expansion, and lost demand in closed factories. According to Chandler et al. 
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(1998), supply shortages still affect many areas of the country; the regional power supply 
situation ranges from adequate to severe shortage. In the north, minor shortages were 
experienced, except in southern Hebei province. In the northeast, no shortages have 
occurred because of slow economic development in recent years. In eastern China, 
Shanghai and Jiangsu have suffered some shortages during peak summer periods, while 
rapid economic growth and variations in rainfall affecting hydropower generation are 
responsible for respectively serious shortages in Shandong and occasional shortages in 
Fujian. As in Fujian, hydropower generation problems caused shortages in Henan 
(central China) during peak loads as well as in some areas of Sichuan (southwest). In the 
northwest, supply shortages were often serious, except in Ningxia. Finally, in 
Guangdong, the electricity supply was adequate except for some areas in north and west. 
3.2.3.8 Urban electricity use 
The urban distribution networks are unable to cope with the ever growing household 
peak demand. An investigation in Congqing city shows that 50% of the 10 kV lines and 
80% of the lower voltage grids needs to be replaced with grids with a higher capacity 
(Falong 1995). 
3.3 Electricity demand 
3.3.1 Demand 
Electricity demand has doubled between 1986 and 1995. The demand by sector and the 
annual growth rates between 1990 and 1995 are presented in the table below. It is clear 
that the industry is the major consuming sector. The growth rates of especially the 
residential, commercial sectors were very high. 
Table 3.2  Gross electricity consumption by end-use sector in 1995 and annual growth rates be-
tween 1990 and 1995. 
Sector 1995  1990-95 
Annual Growth Rate 
 (TWh)  (%) 
Agriculture 53  4.6 
Industry and Construction 535  7.0 
Transportation and Communication 11  11.4 
Commercial 20  16.1 
Residential 104  9.3 
National Total 768  8.5 
Source: Rains Asia - 1999 BAU Scenario 
3.3.2 Policy 
This section gives a brief introduction to some policies in the demand sectors. As 
discussed earlier the analysis of the demand sectors has been less elaborate as the 
analysis of the supply sector. 
The electricity demand sector went through many important organisational changes that 
are part of the changes of the Chinese socialist market economy (see Section 4.2.2). 
The government since 1979 has carried out energy conservation projects. In 1998 the 
government formulated the Energy Conservation Law which contains many articles on 
energy efficiency. As discussed in the supply analysis many energy efficiency policies 
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have been described in several programmes, such as the Green Lights Programme (see 
Chapter 6) and the Industrial Boilers Programme. New policy on cogeneration was 
developed in the year 2000. Furthermore, policy on the closure of small, inefficient 
plants was also developed in the 90s. This last policy was born from concerns for 
environmental pollution and not directly from concerns for energy efficiency.  
Although many policies have been developed the administrative rules, the financial 
climate and the lack of financial resources stand in the way of large investments. The 
current oversupply in many of the sectors and the low electricity price prohibits large 
private investments in energy efficiency improvements. Private enterprises seem to 
prefer small technological changes based on technologies available in China as opposed 
to large technological changes for which they would heavily dependent of foreign 
investments. Policy implementation of the closure of small, inefficient plants is 
hampered by the fact that local governments depend on the tax income from these 
companies and thus do not support the national policy and enforcement is low. 
Furthermore, policy implementation is hampered by the fact that the central and local 
governments fear social unrest due to unemployment. 
3.3.3 Key Issues 
The following sections discuss the key issues and problems in the Chinese electricity 
demand sector. The key issues ‘macro-economic factors’ and ‘electricity pricing’ 
discussed in the supply section is also a key issue for the demand sector. Other key 
issues are energy efficiency, renovation and modernisation, power shortage, urban 
electricity use and rural issues. These are discussed separately below. 
3.3.3.1 Energy efficiency 
Large opportunities for improving energy efficiency are in the boiler sector. Despite 
major advances world-wide in boiler technologies, over the past 40 years China’s 
industrial boiler industry has operated in isolation of the rest of the world market. There 
has been a growing international interest in the large scale boiler sector in China. Among 
the reasons for the lack of foreign investments are: (a) low profit margins, (b) 
development is over a long timeframe, (c) for small scale boilers the partner companies 
in China are too small creating high risk, (d) there is little export potential. Besides the 
problems with access to advanced technologies in China there are also numerous 
domestic barriers as well. On both the consumer and the producer side: (a) the industry is 
highly fragmented, (b) product marketing capabilities are weak, (c) efficiency, coal 
quality and environmental standards for boilers are outdated and enforcement at the local 
level is difficult without access to advanced technologies, (d) high quality workers were 
drawn from the small boiler industry to the large boiler industry, etc. (World Bank 1996) 
The GEF has launched a project to increase the efficiency of small and medium coal 
fired industrial boilers in China. Advanced foreign technology should be adapted to the 
Chinese situation and then distributed widely. Some 20% of all boilers of this type will 
be replaced in the project over the next 20 years. The method of implementation of the 
project is to adapt The indirect implementation is estimated to be 50-60% of all boilers 
of this type in the sector in China (World Bank 1998). 
An Asian Dilemma  
 41 
3.3.3.2 Renovation and modernisation 
The need for large investments in the sector are acknowledged but the unclear, non-
transparent and complex investment processes slow down new investments which are 
necessary for modernising and expanding the electricity demand sector in China. The 
energy savings potential in China is high.  
3.3.3.3 Power shortage 
The demand for electricity in China has exceeded the supply between 1990 and 1997. 
This was because the GDP growth was higher than the increase in electricity production. 
About 1/3 of all industries was unable to use their full capacity due to this shortage in 
electricity and many households had to cope with regular power shortages as well. One 
of the causes of this power shortage was also related to inefficient energy use. On 
average the Chinese industries use more energy than comparable OECD industries 
(Shiwei et al. 1997). However, partly due to the economic crisis in Asia, supply has 
exceeded demand in the past two years. A number of industries have been shut and the 
household demand has decreased due to increasing prices of electricity. This situation is 
not expected to last for a long time. While electricity demand has doubled between 1986 
and 1995 it is expected to triple between 1995 and 2015. 
The growth of the services sector is expected to be responsible for the largest increase in 
demand in the coming decade. At present more than 100 million people in the 
countryside have no access to electricity and it is expected that the countryside will be 
responsible for a large part of the demand in the future. Electrification of the countryside 
and electricity supply to areas with cultural minorities is already in progress. However, 
the growth in economic development in the coastal and large urban regions will continue 
to be much larger than in the rest of the country (Shiwei et al. 1997). 
Some of the most important problems of the sector are related to the inefficient tariff 
structure. As mentioned before, the tariffs of electricity produced with older production 
units are kept low artificially. Also the costs of industry are kept low artificially to keep 
up the standard of living. These developments limit the possibilities of the electricity 
companies to be financially self-supporting. It also undermines the development of the 
sector. Furthermore, it results in a shortage in allocation of funds at a provincial and 
county level, which slows down investments in the sector. The low tariffs also fail to 
stimulate users to restrict their electricity use. This leads to a paradox in which, on the 
one hand, there is an inefficient supply and, on the other hand, wastage in use (Shiwei et 
al. 1997). 
3.3.3.4 Urban electricity use 
Electricity use in urban areas in China has grown by 16.5% on average annually between 
1986 and 1993 while total electricity use and urban energy use only increased by 9% and 
2% annually respectively. The growth is mainly due to the increasing household incomes 
leading to purchases and uses of washing machines, televisions, refrigerators, air-
conditioners and electric shower baths (86%, 79%, 58%, 5% and 18% respectively in 
1993). In 1993 the per capita electricity use in households (125 kWh) was still around 30 
times lower than in the US and 10 times lower than in Japan in 1986. The household 
electricity use was still only 12% of the total energy use in households in 1990. The main 
(76%) energy consumption was coal. In 1993 urban domestic electricity use accounted 
for 57% of the total electricity use in households while only 28% of the population was 
living in urban areas. Total household electricity use accounted for 8.7% of the total 
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electricity use in China in 1993. In the US, France and Japan, household electricity use 
accounted for 34.8, 30.5 and 26.5% respectively in 1986 (Falong 1995). 
The fast growth of the household electricity demand has widened the demand gap 
between peak and off-peak hours.  
3.4 Rural issues 
Rural development has been relatively more neglected than urban development. Many 
counties and townships build their own production units that are small and inefficient. 
Some 100 million people still do not have access to electricity. 
A key problem in rural issues is that the price of electricity is higher than in urban areas 
and is thus beyond the reach of most people. In the countryside electricity is more 
expensive than in the urbanised areas. Many counties and townships build their own 
production units, which are normally small and inefficient. Some 100 million people in 
the countryside still have to do without electricity (Shiwei et al. 1997). 
The potential for biomass use in electricity production in remote areas, far from the 
power grid, is high. Several projects in biomass power generation have shown notable 
progress in the past decade. (Dai et al. 1998: 106). From the beginning of the 80s some 
small scale generators using rice husks are used. At the moment 92 such generators with 
a capacity of around 160 kW are used. A 1,500 kW rice husk generator is built in 
Yueyang, Hunan Province. However, the plant is still in the stage of research for crop 
stalk-based biomass gasification generation. The high costs of the equipment prevents 
large scale introduction for the moment (Dai et al. 1998: 147)  
In rural areas the main issue in households is biomass use for cooking and space heating. 
The old stoves had a thermal efficiency of only 8-12%. The government has 
implemented a plan to replace old household stoves with new stoves with an average 
thermal efficiency of 20%. By 1994 some 70% of the rural households (700 million 
people) used these new stoves (Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study 
1999: 241-244). New technologies for different types of biomass are under development. 
China’s Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has made biomass energy exploration and 
utilisation a priority. 
As mentioned earlier rural development has received less attention than urban 
development. Some 100 million people still do not have access to electricity. A survey of 
3240 rural households in China, reveals that energy consumption per household accounts 
for 700-1200 kgce, 40-60% of which is used for cooking; the rest is used for lighting, 
heat and feeding. 60-90% of the energy used is from biomass and the average energy 
conversion rate is in the range of 10-20 %. The average cost of commercial energy per 
household was about 7-8% of the annual income. 
However, government policies are now geared towards promoting eco agriculture and 
the development of rural energy schemes. In 1991 a rural energy programme was 
launched in rural areas in 100 counties. In 1995 fuel saving stoves, methane, solar, wind, 
geothermal and small hydro were launched (Information Office of the State Council 
1996: 20-21) 
3.5 Future policy options 
This section gives options for improving electricity policy as identified in the literature. 
Options are presented for economic reform, reform in the electricity sector,  
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3.5.1 Economic reform 
- According to Lou (1997), China should aim at completing the reform to a market 
economy, creating the right institutional framework to achieve macro-economic 
regulation through monetary and fiscal policies. These policies aim at stable eco-
nomic growth, balance of payments, fair competition, and distribution mechanisms 
that emphasise efficiency while addressing the concerns of equity and social welfare. 
He supports a) the development of anti-inflation policy followed by system-wide 
transformation and structural adjustments to cope with recession; b) the development 
of national and integrated –as opposed to incremental- reforms; c) the introduction of 
standardisation to deepen the market; d) the enhancement of decentralisation when 
appropriate (thus not in fiscal affairs) and the need to develop cultural changes; and 
d) the analysis of the feasibility of plans. Concerning the latter, many plans encoun-
tered problems with implementation in 1994. This was due to the fact that many 
market instruments were not fully understood and vested work styles and departmen-
tal interests were difficult to change. 
Such reform could spur energy conservation and no regret projects. 
Experts recommend that there is need for price adjustments and full cost pricing (i.e. 
products should be priced at full cost),for an environmental tax, pollution levy and 
ecological destruction fees (i.e. the environmental costs should be reflected in the price), 
for an opening of the coal market to allow prices to gradually reach the world market 
prices, for investment management, a fund raising system, investment services, 
environment funds, a pollution permit discharge trading system, deposit, insurance and 
responsibility compensation, and an integrated accounting system at all government 
levels (Jinnan and Xinyuan 1997: 21). 
3.5.2 Reforms in the electricity sector 
- Shiwei et al. (1997) advise a reform of the regulatory system from the old-style 
command-and-control to light-handed supervision of autonomous, commercial ori-
ented enterprises. The principles of these reforms are:  
- Enterprise reforms through defining property rights, separating government from en-
terprise, commercialising and corporatising of enterprises and continuing multitrack 
financing policy;  
- Sector reforms through encouraging the “purchasing agency” model as a transition 
step, promoting generators that are unaffiliated with buyers, fostering developments 
of markets through “loose” and “tight” pools, assisting regional groups to be opera-
tors of the transmission grid and power tools, and encouraging educational and tech-
nical standard-setting roles for one or more industry associations;  
- Regulatory reforms include changes in the structure, the process and the policies of 
the regulatory framework: 1) the structure though consolidating regulatory functions 
that are currently dispersed, establishing multimember, national, and provincial regu-
latory commissions that are ultimately separate from other government entities, de-
lineating clearly the responsibilities of the national and provincial commissions, not 
establishing regional regulatory commissions, not giving policy-making functions to 
the regulatory commission, funding the commission through small levies on kWh 
sales and annual licence fees; 2) the process through adopting the principle of “once” 
is enough, establishing producers for procedural, substantive, and financial accoun-
tancy, pursuing transparency through public consultation clearly specified rules, 
written explanation of decisions, and public annual reports, creating procedures and 
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standards for appeals of regulatory decisions, requiring regulatory commissions to 
make public all licenses, regulations and decisions, along with indices and summa-
ries; 3) the policies through pursuing a new-style regulation that is limited, transpar-
ent, and “allows managers to manage”, regulating price or profits is only when an 
enterprise has monopoly power, setting tariff levels to enable enterprises to cover 
their costs of supply (if they operate efficiently), setting tariff structures to achieve 
the efficient production and use electricity, reviewing investment plans before the 
fact, not requiring additional approvals of projects that are consistent with approved 
investment plans, promoting competitive markets in generation and elsewhere if fea-
sible, requiring approvals of merges, acquisitions and other structural changes that 
could affect competition, and treat state and non-state power enterprises equally;  
- Legal reforms through issuing a State Council regulation that establishes national 
and provincial regulatory commissions, allowing commissions to issue licenses, 
regulations, and case-by-case decisions, developing model licences for network and 
distribution entities, creating monitoring and sanction mechanisms for violations of 
regulatory rules, giving enterprises the right to respond in writing to alleged viola-
tions, establishing clear standards for appeals of regulatory decisions, and restrict the 
ability of commissions to make unilateral changes to existing licenses. 
It is acknowledged that introduction of these recommendations will take time and should 
be implemented in phases. 
Furthermore, Shiwei et al. (1997) argue that the size and diversity of China imply that no 
single structural model for the sector is appropriate for all parts in the country. A 
purchasing agency structure and power pools could be a useful intermediate structural 
model for many parts of China. Along these lines, a single buyer or purchasing agency is 
the only buyer of power from generators in a specific geographic area. The single buyer 
usually owns the transmission facilities within this area and also performs the 
dispatching function, making him the only seller of power in the area to affiliated and 
independent lower-level power supply (distribution) enterprises, such as county, 
prefectural, and municipal power enterprises. Finally, independent and affiliated 
generators located inside or outside the geographic area compete for the right to make 
power sales to the single buyer. 
The advantages of such an agency could be that it could easily accommodate competitive 
bidding for the purchase of power with or without joint ventures, it could encourage 
more investment in transmission and distribution, it could serve as a transition to a more 
fully competitive market and, steps have already been taken to create this structure in 
many parts of China. The agency could implement policy that is made by and be 
accountable to the State Council. The commissions in the agency could have central and 
provincial entities with allocated responsibilities. It is important that the commissions 
inform and discuss with all effected parties on any proposed regulatory action. 
The biggest problem with this purchasing agency and the power pool structure is that 
this model should avoid both the perception and reality that the agency may unfairly and 
inefficiently favour its own power generators over others. This problem could be solved 
by signed contracts with all (affiliated and non-affiliated) power producers. However, the 
best option, according to overseas electricity regulators, is to ensure that there are 
affiliated producers (Shiwei et al. 1997). 
The same authors also suggest that the New Electric Power Law could provide a solid 
foundation for the regulatory system described above. However, the law includes 
sentences on the tariff system and regulatory responsibilities that could be interpreted as 
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inconsistent with the proposed reforms. On the other hand, these sentences could also be 
interpreted in a way not directly conflicting with the proposed reforms. However, the law 
may need to be amended or supplemented by additional laws in the future. 
Johnson et al. (1996) state that the policy should move towards a further enterprise 
reform by development of corporation autonomy and accountability, more competition, 
and further price-reforms. Also environmental regulation could be an important tool for 
improving energy efficiency and implementation of ‘clean’ technologies, especially at 
the local scale. They conclude that the environmental regulations should be adapted to a 
more market oriented system and the enforcement must be improved.  
3.5.3 Energy efficiency policy 
- According to Johnson et al. (1996), the government should aim at removing the bar-
riers of ‘no-regret’ energy efficiency projects. They argue that this could be done by 
a) increasing the access to information about the technical opportunities and experi-
ences as well as to foreign technologies; b) reducing both the high technical and 
market risks associated with new technologies, and the transaction costs of small 
transactions; c) improving credit facilities for energy conservation projects, espe-
cially for those projects with long payback time; d) developing well-targeted conces-
sional finance for demonstration of new energy saving technologies, especially those 
with high risks; e) developing energy service companies which bear the risk of in-
vestments for a share in the financial return of the enterprises; f) better disseminating 
information on energy conservation investments and returns, especially to TVEs and 
small enterprises; and g) providing technical assistance and technical and (financial-) 
management training. 
The same authors point out that a reduction of energy use could be accomplished 
through industrial modernisation and restructuring (i.e. more energy efficient processes, 
increase in the economies of scale, improvements in management), conventional 
industrial energy conservation projects (i.e. more waste heat and steam recovery, more 
co-generation, renovation of processes), improvements in the energy efficiency of new 
technologies already in use (i.e. technical and management capacity building, new coal 
conversion technologies and improvements in coal quality and stability of coal mix), and 
residential and commercial energy efficiency measures (improve building design, 
materials, central heating, stoves and electric equipment). 
They also argue that the implementation of new technologies is low because of the large 
investments needed and the relatively slow payback time. Corporations are currently 
only interested in small projects with short payback periods. The interest is also low 
because of the low energy prices. Furthermore, the availability of new and especially 
foreign technologies is low. 
3.5.4 Renewable energy 
In general the barriers of implementation of non-conventional energy conversion 
technologies could be overcome by international co-operation which aims at (Taylor and 
Bogach 1998): offering a strong support for already existing commercially viable (niche) 
markets, developing demand-based incentives, emphasising the need for development of 
market infrastructure, expansion donor-support for alternative technologies, creating 
awareness of the externalities of conventional electricity production and the advantages 
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of non-conventional technologies, and facilitating technology transfer through 
demonstration projects and joint ventures focusing on cost reduction. 
According to them, this can be done by strengthening the long-term R&D and 
technology transfer program for renewable energy, continuing assessment of 
commercialisation priorities, developing regulatory policies regarding electricity prices, 
agreements for small producers selling to the power grid, implementing and enforcing 
standards, testing and certifying programmes for certain technologies, increase 
awareness inside and outside the renewable energy sector, training governmental and 
related staff in the field of renewable energy, strengthening institutions in the field of 
renewable energy, incorporating the external environmental and social costs of energy 
conversion in the cost/benefit comparisons of non-conventional versus conventional 
technologies, and training energy planners, energy plant developers, and technical and 
management staff in enterprises through workshops, seminars and training programmes. 
3.5.5 Electricity pricing 
Shiwei et al (1997) identify the following problems with the producer and consumer 
prices still applied in large parts of the country: 
Producer prices: The “new plant-new price” policy has led to contractual arrangements 
based on “take-or-pay” provisions providing for minimum use of power plants (generally 
some 5000 hours per year) charged at an energy price covering the variable and capital 
costs and a reasonable profit. The same price is applied for generation above this “take-
or-pay” provision. This one part tariff structure leads to overinvestment in base 
generation capacity and uneconomic dispatch because provincial power companies faced 
with higher prices from new and efficient plants limit power purchases to contractual 
minimum amounts and rely more on old, inefficient plants to minimise financial costs. 
This also leads to spilling of scarce resources. 
Consumer prices: Consumers with similar consumption characteristics still can pay 
different average prices because it is incorrectly assumed that they are being served by 
different mixes of new and old plants. This leads to inefficiencies in competitiveness of 
new industries because of high electricity prices that are above supply costs, and old, 
inefficient industries to enjoy low prices below the supply costs. The last leads to wastes 
in electricity use. Furthermore, other problems are that voltage differentials remain low 
and do not reflect the supply costs, the demand charges are low and, when applied, only 
cover fixed costs, and the time-of-day and seasonal tariffs used in some cases do not 
consider the load profiles and time patterns of marginal costs of supply. Various 
surcharges unintendedly led to different problems for the power companies and lack of 
use of economies of scale and did not consider problems with transmission capacity 
shortages.  
Shiwei et al (1997) give 14 recommendations for the acceleration of the ongoing tariff 
reforms. First, they argue that all tariffs should always recover the full economic costs of 
supply; and should not discriminate between affiliated and non-affiliated producers. 
Concerning producer tariff, they recommend a switch from a one-part to a two-part or 
multi-part tariff structure for both producers and transmission, the acquisition of new 
generation supplies through (international and/or local) competitive procurement 
whenever possible, and focusing on prices as opposed to on operators profits. Finally, 
they argue against the establishment of uniform producer prices based on 
administratively determined estimates of long-run marginal costs. In terms of bulk tariff, 
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their recommendations are to use two-part tariff based on long-run marginal costs and to 
include generation and transmission costs in the tariff. With regards to consumer tariff, 
they support ideas such as using one or multi-part tariffs based on marginal costs, clearly 
separating taxes and fees from the electricity prices, unifying the prices charged to 
customers with similar costs and demand characteristics, charging prices to reflect the 
costs of providing service at different voltage levels, imposing capacity charge for 
customers when expected benefits exceed likely metering costs, and accelerating the 
movement of seasonal and time of day tariffs for larger consumers based on the 
supplying system marginal costs. 
3.6 Analysis: First round of institutional policy options 
In this analysis first the key problems in the electricity sector in the pre-1990 period are 
identified. The solutions that have been devised in the post-1990 period are then 
highlighted. Then the new problems in implementing those solutions are identified. 
Finally, a list of policy options is generated.  
3.6.1 The Pre-1990 period 
The key problems in the electricity sector in China are as follows:  
3.6.1.1 Organisational 
a)  Gross size of the problem: The sheer size of China, the population, the diverging 
social, political and management cultures, the division into provinces and county 
territories, its population and its financial problems make it much more difficult to 
develop a manageable and efficient system in China.  
b)  The highly centralised management system of the electricity sector led to stagnation 
and bureaucratic inefficiencies, enforcement problems. There was also lack of clarity 
in the division of responsibilities between centre (local governments) and state and 
between different organs at both levels. For example there is an absence of a 
commercial and administrative mechanism to regulate the inter-regional sharing of 
power. 
c)  The Government had almost 100% ownership of production, transmission and 
distribution; although the organisation of the system was not well structured. For 
example, there were 10,000 legal entities in the system, 80,000 independent 
production companies and 1600 distribution companies. The system was so large and 
complex that the government had difficulty in controlling and managing its own 
assets efficiently. 
d)  There were more than 500 laws, regulations and administrative directives governing 
the electricity sector and this implied the lack of a transparent, co-ordinated, 
consistent legal and regulatory system. 
e)  There was a lack of a good and well-managed information and communication 
system.  
f)  The government aimed at self-sufficiency in terms of fuel sources mostly for energy 
security reasons.  
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3.6.1.2 Technological 
a) Poor quality coal and long distance transport of coal: Of the extensive coal reserves 
in China, the bulk of the coal in the south near electricity generation facilities and 
industry is of poor quality. The high quality coal mines in China are in the north and 
western part of the country while the main use is in large urban areas in the east and 
south. This leads to large transportation distances. The coal is polluted with rocks 
and is not washed before transportation leading to a low transport efficiency factor.  
b) Low plant load factors: Most of China’s electricity companies are not only 
inefficient but the quality of electricity supply is also low. This is not only the case 
for the old companies but also for new companies. Many of the smaller companies 
are too small to be technically efficient. 
c) Transmission and distribution losses: Transmission and distribution losses are high 
because of the lack of investment. 
3.6.1.3 Economic and Financial 
a) There has been a complete lack of foreign investment in the pre 1990 period and 
reduced domestic investments in the production, transmission and distribution sector, 
in maintenance and repair activities.  
b) There was an irrational pricing policy, which led to energy waste, lack of efficiency 
improvement investments and lack of investments in new technologies. 
c) Several subsidies were provided by the state to finance the electricity production and 
distribution sector. There was also an irrational fee system in place, including 
national, provincial and local surcharges.  
3.6.1.4 Socio-economic 
a) There is poor energy literacy in industry. 
b) There is poverty among the bulk of the consumers, making both the production and 
the use of commercial electricity more unpopular. 
3.6.2 Transition solutions 
The government has been in the process of devising the following solutions. 
3.6.2.1 Organisational 
a) The government adopted policies to stimulate the decentralisation of state 
enterprises. 
b) Policies were introduced to rationalise the sector and to incrementally commercialise 
it and the introduction of competition. 
c) A national Electric Power Law was adopted to consolidate the provisions in the 500 
different regulations and administrative provision. 
d) There was a hesitant approach to import some fuels from other countries. 
e) Government participation in organisation of conferences and workshops. 
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3.6.2.2 Technological 
a)  The option of using high quality coal and coal washing are options for reducing the 
transport related emissions, although the use has been limited thus far. New 
production facilities may also be planned near the mines. 
b)  The government has planned the retrofitting of existing production facilities. 
c)  There are plans to modernise electricity transmission and distribution sectors. 
d)  There were also plans to encourage demand side management, technology upgrading 
and end-use energy efficiency improvements, such as the Green Lights Programme. 
3.6.2.3 Economic/Financial 
a)  The government developed a programme encouraging privatisation of the sector, the 
corporatisation and commercialisation of power enterprises; and inviting foreign 
companies to participate in such ventures. 
b)  The government adopted a price rationalisation programme.  
c)  The government decided to gradually gradual phase-out subsidies and rationalise the 
fee and surcharge system. 
3.6.3 New problems 
3.6.3.1 Organisational  
a)  The decentralisation process is partially undertaken not only because of the size of the 
venture but also because of the complications in the process. 
b)  The transition process is affected by lack of information on market instruments and 
bureaucratic inertia; Command and control instruments continue to be used although 
the enforcement and monitoring of such measures is limited. Many enterprises are 
still controlled by the government and property rights are still not defined. The 
government regulatory system for the sector and the power enterprises is still not 
reformed. 
c)  Parts of the electric law on the tariff system and the regulatory responsibilities are 
inconsistent with its overall reform goals and there still remain issues that need to be 
clarified. 
d)  There continues to be a lack of information and communication within the system.  
3.6.3.2 Technological 
a)  The decision to select and demand the right technologies is hampered by the lack of 
knowledge of appropriate technology choice, management and operation, the lack of 
communication within the sector. On the supply side, foreign investors were not 
forthcoming with the modern technologies. 
b)  There remained major problems in the connection between the local and regional grid 
system and that many of the grids have not been maintained and upgraded. This has 
lead to low supply security during peak hours.  
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c)  There were difficulties in encouraging the large companies to adopt technologies, 
although the small-scale companies and the individual consumers were more 
amenable to such policies.  
3.6.3.3 Economic/Financial 
a)  The foreign private sector was not as forthcoming as initially expected due to 
bureaucratic red tape, the lack of guarantees, the non-existence of properly 
functioning market system, long pay back times, etc.. 
b)  Gradual phase-out of subsidies and price rationalisation is not politically easy since 
the pricing system in each production system was different and different categories of 
consumers paid different amounts.  
c)  There was a lack of incentives to encourage the various social actors to take action in 
this field.  
3.6.3.4 Socio-economic 
a)  The risk and fear of increasing the rate of unemployment and, hence, instability, was 
a key challenge in implementing the reform of the electricity production and 
consumption sector. 
b)  Around 100 million people still do not have access to electricity and the relatively 
high price of electricity in rural areas implies that many potential consumers were 
unable to afford the available electricity. 
3.6.4 Policy Options 
The following section identifies a key set of policy options that may be relevant for 
discussion with stakeholders. 
3.6.4.1 Organisational  
a)  Further decentralisation of management and further commercialisation of enterprises 
through the identification of appropriate incentives and through policies to re-educate 
personnel so that they can apply for employment in the new private sector. 
b)  Personnel that have been working with an ideological orientation for several decades 
cannot change their work styles and patterns over night. This calls for intensive 
training programmes and workshops to help the personnel feel comfortable with the 
new rules of the game. There is need for technical and managerial capacity to plan, 
and increase operational and energy efficiency in the sector.  
c)  Policies need to be developed to encourage educational and technical standard setting 
roles for one or more industry associations. 
d)  There is need to create ‘purchasing agency’ model and foster developments through 
pools: The agency should treat affiliated and unaffiliated enterprises equally. 
e)  The legal regulations and policies need to be discussed with stakeholders in order to 
gradually increase the compliance pull of such decisions and to create the framework 
in which rule-based compliance is the rule, not the exception. On the basis of such 
discussions, there may be need for further reform of legal and regulatory systems and 
adapt regulations to a market oriented system. Create national and provincial 
regulatory commissions without policy making functions but with implementation 
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(delegated power to issue licenses but not to make unilateral changes to existing 
licenses) and enforcement functions (including powers for sanctioning). Create 
possibilities for appeals to decisions made by the commissions.  
3.6.4.2 Technological 
a)  There is need to develop a modus operandi to encourage information sharing and 
communication within the sector, to enhance the capacity of employees to identify, 
choose, adapt, improve and utilise technologies.  
b)  There is need for additional policies and incentives to encourage the 
commercialisation and modernisation of transmission and distribution and 
development of a nationally coherent network 
c)  Interviewees also point out that as long as there is surplus supply, the government 
should try and make use of the opportunity to retrofit the production sector to the 
extent possible. 
3.6.4.3 Economic/Financial 
a)  There is need for an institutional framework for macro economic regulation system 
and the further development of market instruments. Levy systems have proven to be 
appropriate.  
b)  There is need for simplification of bureaucratic procedures, single windows for 
licenses, to encourage foreign investors participate in the market.  
c)  Electricity pricing should be harmonised nationally in order to deal with the problem 
of the inconsistent pricing system.  
d)  There is need to create an incentive system for energy efficiency and implementation 
of new, (energy saving and less environmental polluting, technologies (including 
renewables) 
3.6.4.4 Socio-economic 
a)  There needs to be large-scale nation wide energy and environment literacy 
programmes to help consumers make informed choices and to make them familiar 
with the operation of a market system.  
b)  The use of progressive tariff may allow the low-income groups to have access to 
minimum electricity supply, and higher use of electricity is charged at proportionately 
higher rates.  
c)  There is also need to increase the scope and reach of the transmission lines in order to 
ensure that people in remote areas also have access to electricity or that local (non –
grid connected) electricity supply is set up. 
The policy options for the next twenty years would do well to identify and build on 
success stories in the electricity sector (and other sectors to the extent that they may be 
relevant). The above information has been summed up in the penultimate Table. 
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Table 3.3 First round of analysis of institutional policy options for China. 
 Pre-1990 problems Policies adopted ‘New’ problems 1999 Policy options 
Organisational · Size of the country and regional 
differences 
· Centralised management system 
· State ownership of 10,000 legal 
production, transmission and 
distribution entities; 
combination of administrative 
and business functions; 
· Confusing and contradictory 
legislation 
· Lack of information and 
communication 
· Self-sufficiency goals on fuels 
· Decentralisation of state 
enterprises 
· Commercialisation and 
rationalisation of legal 
entities; introduction of 
competition in sector 
· Adoption of electric power 
law 
· Occasional import of fuels 
· Government participation in 
workshops and seminars 
· Closure of small plants 
· only partial decentralisation 
· bureaucratic inertia; command and 
control still dominant; enforcement 
problems because of new patterns of 
vested interests; 
· parts of the law are not entirely clear 
and in conflict with reform goals; 
reforms are short term though 
structural 
· lack of information and communication 
· further decentralisation of management, regulation 
and policy implementation and tough enforcement 
· centralisation of policy formulation and fiscal 
system 
· bureaucratic unfreezing/institutional unlearning; 
capacity building within government and industries 
· create ‘purchasing agency’ and stimulate ‘pools’; 
already being experimented with 
· further commercialisation of enterprises, 
transmission and distribution 
· Involve stakeholders incrementally and increase 
legitimacy of policies 
· learn from success stories 
Technological · poor quality of coal and long 
transport distances for coal 
· low plant load factors (old and 
new plants) 
 
· poor supply security and high 
transmission losses 
· power shortage 
· coal washing, and locating 
new production at mines 
· retrofit existing plants 
technology imports 
· modernise trans-
mission/distribution 
· increase production and 
end-use efficiency 
· imported technologies not always 
cheaper or more appropriate than 
comparable domestic technologies;  
· poor local and regional grid connection 
· lack of information  
· problems with implementation since 
end-use efficiency was mostly on small 
consumers and industry 
· capacity building within government and industries, 
encourage communication in the sector 
· stimulate the development of a national, regional 
and local coherent transmission and distribution 
network 
· retrofit existing plants/increase efficiency; 
· learn from success stories 
Economic/ 
Financial 
· lack of foreign and domestic 
investment  
· irrational pricing policy in 
electricity and goods and services; 
bankrupt production entities 
· state provision of subsidies and 
inconsistent fee system 
· encourage foreign investors, 
privatisation  
· price rationalisation  
 
 
· gradual phase-out of 
subsidies and fees 
· few foreign parties, national 
investment slowed down,  
· price rationalisation only partly 
implemented, price elasticity low 
· the number of fees 
· subsidy phase-out and fee 
rationalisation difficult 
· Lack of incentives to facilitate the 
process. 
 
· create right institutional framework for macro-
economic regulation system , further develop 
market instruments (levy systems)  
· encourage foreign investors (develop less 
bureaucratic and simplified investment procedures)  
· making pricing a central government issue 
· create incentives for increasing energy efficiency 
and implementation of new (less environmental 
polluting) technologies 
· rationalisation of prices 
Socio-economic  · poor energy literacy in industry 
· poverty of consumers 
 · demand management inadequate 
· price puts electricity out of villagers’ 
reach 
· risk of unemployment 
· energy literacy programmes 
· focused demand management options 
· progressive tariffs? Efficient energy use incentives 
· further rationalisation of prices  
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3.7 Conclusions 
The key conclusions that emerge from this chapter are: 
First, the organisational and institutional frameworks relevant for the electricity sector 
are in a state of reform. The reforms are structural though based on short-term 
perspectives. The organisations are still only partly decentralised and there is strong 
bureaucratic inertia, large vested interests and a lack of information and communication. 
Second, a large number of policies have been developed to make the supply and demand 
sectors more efficient. However, although many policies have been developed the 
administrative rules, the financial climate and the lack of financial resources stand in the 
way of large investments.  
Third, reforms towards a market economy and local air pollution problems and are a 
driving force for energy efficiency improvements. 
Fourth, the current oversupply in many of the sectors and the non-rational electricity 
prices prohibits large private investments in energy efficiency improvements. 
Fifth, large technological changes depend heavily on foreign investments. However, 
there are only a few foreign investors that want to invest in China under the current 
setting. 
Sixth, local governments do not always support the national government policy and 
enforcement is lacking. Both fear for social unrest as a result of closure of small, 
inefficient plants. 
 
 
 
An Asian Dilemma 
 55 
4. India: The Institutional and Organisational Context 
Author: Joyeeta Gupta18 
4.1 Geo-political background and relation to greenhouse gas emissions 
This chapter introduces the issues relating to electricity supply and use in India based on a 
literature survey and institutional analysis. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine business-as-usual 
scenarios for the Indian electricity sector and technical options for reducing emissions. 
Chapter 8 looks at the feasibility of these options while Chapter 9 analyses the feasibility 
of other low emission scenarios. In Chapter 10, we examine the perceptions and policies 
of India on the global problem of climate change and the willingness to link electricity 
policy to climate change policy. It first presents a brief geo-political account of the 
country, and introduces the issue of greenhouse gas emissions in India. It then presents 
the institutional framework for analysis of the supply side issues. This is followed by a 
presentation of the institutional framework for analysis of the demand side issues. Then 
there is an analysis of the potential for cogeneration followed by an analysis of the 
transmission and distribution sector. Some rural issues are also highlighted. The 
institutional framework will highlight the key actors involved, the organisational 
structure, the policy and legal issues. 
India has a land area of 3.287 million square kilometres (seventh largest in the world) and 
a population of over a billion people (second largest in the world) growing at 1.9% per 
year. Industrial growth exceeds 9% annually. Politically, India has a socialist, democratic, 
secular system and a parliamentary form of government. Although relatively stable, the 
last decade has witnessed a number of elections. A number of political parties exist in 
India and the Congress Party, which used to win the elections, has recently given way to a 
range of other parties. The current government is a Bharatiya Janata Party (Hindu 
Nationalist) led government but is an uneasy coalition. Traditionally, India had a mixed 
economy with public sector involvement in most large-scale operations. Since 1991, the 
economy has been liberalising and all the parties that have been in power since then have 
implemented this policy.  
India has a federal political structure with 29 states19 and union territories20. The states in 
India differ not only in terms of language and culture but also in terms of size, income, 
population, and literacy levels. The states with the largest income are Maharashtra, Uttar 
Pradesh and West Bengal, while on a per capita basis, the states that have the highest 
income are Punjab, Maharashtra and Goa. The population density is highest in West 
Bengal, Kerala, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Fertility rates are lowest in Kerala 
and medium in West Bengal, while high in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Infant mortality is 
the highest in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh (India Handbook 1997).  
Agriculture employs 67% of the labour force and provides 25% of the GDP, industry 15% 
of the labour force and provide 30% of the GDP and service employs 15% of the labour 
and provides 35% of the GDP. Energy (including electricity) is a key input for all these 
                                                   
18  With comments from Christiaan Boudri, Kees Dorland, Carolien Kroeze, and Jaklien Vlasblom. 
19  Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhatisgarh (out of Madhya Pradesh), Goa, Gujarat, Hary-
ana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand (out of Bihar), Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tri-
pura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal (from UP), West Bengal. 
20  Andaman and Nicobar islands, Chandigarh, Dadar and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Delhi, Lakshadweep, 
Pondicherry. 
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sectors. The total primary energy input in India in 1990 was 15.6 EJ, of which 23% was 
used for electricity generation. The total energy-related emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O 
in India in 1990 amounted to about 693 Tg CO2-equivalents, of which 40% were from the 
power sector. 
There are as yet no official figures about Indian’s greenhouse gas emissions. In our 
estimates (see Chapter 5) India’s total emissions of CO2 emissions in 1990 was 164 MtC 
and this is projected to rise to 663 in 2020 (see Chapter 5 for details). India with 16 
percent of the global population emits 2.3 percent of global GHG-emissions which 
amounts to negligible emissions at a per capita level (0.2 tC/year in 1990, 0.5tC in 2020; 
see Chapter 5 and Mitra 1992b: 204) and per capita consumption of electricity continues to 
be extremely low, only 250 in 1990 and 330 kWh per annum in 1995. While the per capita 
income has increased by 1.6% since 1950 to 1990, the per capita carbon emissions have 
increased by 3.6% annually to 0.22 tC (Srivastava 1997: 942). Indian emissions are set to 
grow as the economy grows not only to meet the existing demand-supply gap in the 
electricity sector, but also to meet the growing needs of the economy.  
India’s emissions are mostly from energy production and use, the agricultural sector, and 
waste management. India’s CO2 emissions are mostly from the energy production sector, 
which consists of non-commercial biomass (which is seen as CO2 neutral because of the 
short Carbon cycle); and commercial energy (including electricity). India’s methane 
emissions from the sector electricity were 3,867 MT in 1990 and are expected to rise to 
8,259 in 2020. India’s N2O emissions from the electricity sector are 39 kt and are 
expected to grow to 60 kt in 2020. Indian electricity is, as far as it is produced for the 
grid, generated mostly from coal-fired plants. A small percentage comes from large 
hydro, renewable energy and gas-fired plants (see 4.2). Besides that, industry generates 
electricity in captive power plants. Indian electricity is mostly used in the industrial, 
agricultural and household sectors (see 4.3). Cogeneration also offers some potential for 
development. Rural India which mostly uses non-commercial energy is likely to use 
commercial energy in the future. The options for rural India are discussed in 4.4. The 
following sections present an analysis and conclusions. 
4.2 Electricity supply  
4.2.1 Resources 
India is rich in coal, thorium, hydro and solar resources, but poor in oil and gas reserves. 
With 1-3% of proven coal reserves in the world, the largest coal deposits and mines, 
mostly under state control, are in Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Andhra 
Pradesh and Maharashtra. Indian coal is generally of poor quality, with low calorific 
value, a high ash and low sulphur content. Using coal in the power sector leads to high 
CO2 emissions, high ash and, in total terms high SO2 emissions. India has enough coal 
deposits to meet its electricity needs for a century. India has a hydro potential of 84,000 
MW of large hydro capacity and 10 000 MW of small hydro capacity in 2020. Only 24% 
of the total potential up to 2020 has been used (and about 15% of the maximum potential 
for India). Wind power is estimated to have a potential of 20,000 MW or higher (TERI et 
al. 1999). It has, however, only 1% of the worlds oil production and 0.6% of the proven 
reserves, very little gas. 
Non-commercial biomass meets 1/3 of the total energy needs in India (Haider 1998, 
(TERI et al. 1999). People using non-commercial biomass will probably be connected to 
the national, regional or local grid some day; this thus gives an indication of the amount 
of growth expected in this sector. At present thermal plants provide 69% of the total 
commercial power generation, hydro provides 11.5% and nuclear power provides 1.3% 
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(RAINS-Asia data underlying TERI 1999, on the basis of primary energy equivalents). 
Out of a total thermal capacity of 62,439 MW, about 6,500 MW is based on oil, diesel 
and gas (Dua 1997). 
4.2.2 Institutions 
4.2.2.1 Existing laws and policies 
India has just completed 100 years of power generation with the first power plant being a 
small hydroelectric plant near Darjeeling in 1897 (Abraham 1998). When India became 
independent in 1947, electricity production was scattered in isolated facilities generally 
run by the provincial governments. When industries were established they were usually 
established along with their own generating facilities, referred to as captive power plants. 
These facilities were regulated by the Indian Electricity Act of 1910. After Independence, 
the power sector was centralised through the Electricity (Supply) Act. The Constitution of 
India put electricity on the concurrent list, i.e. electricity came under the State and the 
Central government authority.21 The 1991 Amendment to the Constitution enables 
devolution of authority on electricity even to the panchayats (local government).  
Prior to 1990, the generation and supply of electricity was mostly a public sector activity 
in the hands of the central government or in the hands of the state government. At the 
time, the sector was facing the challenges of electricity shortage, energy inefficiencies, a 
complicated pricing policy based on a system of cross-subsidies and was subject to 
populist policies. As a result of the unreliable service, large industries often coped by 
developing captive power plants,22 and small industries, middle class consumers and 
farmers by investing in a number of substitute appliances such as diesel generators, 
inverters, voltage stabilisers, etc.  
Since 1990 the entire sector has been undergoing a process of structural change as a result 
of policy. In 1991, a process of liberalisation was launched. 
(http://www.winrock.org/REEP/Publications/ india/INDIARPt.html). First, there has been 
a decision to privatise generation and following that transmission and distribution.23 In 
1991, there was a decision to liberalise the power sector. The Electricity Act was 
amended to enable private generating companies who could either provide electricity to 
                                                   
21  The Constitution of India allocates authority on various subjects to the federal and/or state governments. Elec-
tricity is in the concurrent list (entry 38 in list III of the seventh schedule) and hence the responsibility be-
tween centre and state is thus shared. The centre is responsible for atomic energy, mineral extraction, regula-
tion of oil fields and mineral oil, of petroleum and petroleum products, mines and mineral deposits, labour and 
safety in mines and inter-state rivers. Both centre and state can regulate electricity. 
22  Captive power generation is not in general encouraged by the government. It has been the result of regular 
power shortages. Captive generation is estimated at 11,161 MW in Industry and Railways (http:// 
www.nic.in/indmin/power.htm). This can range from stand by captive generator facilities such as diesel gen-
erators to cogeneration. While the former can lead to substantial pollution, the latter is desirable since it in-
creases the energy efficiency of a plant. Under the Electricity Supply Act, permission has to be sought prior to 
the setting up of a captive power generation unit. Although this is the case, the records of such generation are 
in general not kept except in relation to captive capacities of over 100kW. Such captive electricity is about 10-
12% of national production, although the rate of capacity increase has gone down. A field survey by TERI 
shows that establishments with the lowest captive capacity had one diesel generator. These account for about 
32% total captive capacity in Haryana in 1985 to 40% in Rajasthan; contributing at least 13.7% of total gen-
eration in Haryana (Ramesh et al 1990).  
23  Not only generation and distribution, but the coal sector was in government hands as well (Haider 1998). Only 
gas and oil was in the hands of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). Private sector and foreign mul-
tinationals are allowed to form joint ventures with the public Oil and Gas sector in India to build, own and op-
erate terminals, depots and other such infrastructure. The private sector is also allowed to import and market 
LPG, kerosene and low sulphur heavy stock. Furthermore, they are allowed to own refineries and it is ex-
pected that they will be total deregulated by 2001-2002 (Barwe 1998). In the coal sector, private sector wash-
eries are facilitated (Haider 1998). 
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the grid or to consumers. In 1991, the Investment Promotion Cell (IPC) was set up to 
provide information and assistance to the private sector and to encourage them to help in 
the privatisation process. The new policy enables 100% foreign owned companies on any 
type of fuel, renovation and modernisation of any existing plant that provides to more 
than one state, co-generation and repatriation of profits (RBI 1991-92/266). The policy 
enables producers to recover full fixed charges and a 16% return on the investment at 
specific (68.5%) plant load/availability factors. The policy established a High Powered 
Board to monitor and promote faster clearances of such projects. The board consists of 
the cabinet secretary, the secretary of the Ministry of Power, secretary finance, additional 
secretary banking, secretary planning commission, secretary environment, secretary 
industrial development, secretary technical development, the chairman of the Central 
Electricity Authority (CEA), and other officials from the state government. The Joint 
Secretary of the IPC provides secretarial assistance to the Board (Gazette of India 1991, 
22 October). Electricity generation projects that are below a certain budget (Rs. 10 
billion) do not need to be approved by the CEA. No less than 60% of the funding should 
come from Indian Public Financial Institutions (IPFI). The incentives include a five year 
tax holiday, a tax on only 70% of the net income for the next five years, reduced import 
tariffs for related equipment and counter guarantees from the centre only for the first few 
projects.24There is a requirement of competitive bidding. By 1997, the policy had led to 
more than 200 proposals being received of which 50 are from foreign companies at a 
value of US$ 39 billion for an additional capacity of 31.0 GW (Handbook 1997: 14).  
Second, there has been a decision to ensure independence of the pricing authorities from 
the political authorities by the creation of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(CERC), and by stripping the CEA of some of its responsibilities (see 4.2.2.2). The goal 
is to ensure rationality in tariff structure. In late 1997 price reforms were undertaken and a 
phased dismantling of prices has been initiated leading to a full liberalisation of prices by 
2002 (Haider 1998). Third, there has been a power sector reform bill which calls on all 
states to reform their power sectors. This is a decision to unbundle the SEBs into three 
different entities (see 4.2.2.3). At this moment several of the electricity boards are being 
restructured. Orissa was the first chosen since the agricultural sector is quite small (8.7%) 
and this sector may not be able to object and because the people are mild in nature 
(Ranganathan 1996: 823; Haider 1998). This has been followed by restructuring of other 
state boards such as Haryana and Andhra Pradesh. Fourth, there is a decision to 
encourage corporatisation of generation, transmission and distribution units. Fifth, there is 
a decision to focus on distribution issues. Sixth, there has been a decision taken that each 
state needs to facilitate the adoption of mega projects in line with central government 
guidelines.25 Seventh, each state will have to open lines of credit to ensure the prompt 
settlement of dues. Eighth, the debts of public sector undertakings will be scrutinised. 
Ninth, all half-completed hydel projects are to be completed and inter-state disputes are to 
be resolved. Tenth, a National Power Grid is to be established. Eleventh, each state is to 
promulgate energy conservation measures. Twelfth, each state is to increase the 
generation of power. Thirteenth, the railway tariffs will be rationalised as soon as possible 
(Ministry of Power 2000: 10).  
                                                   
24  However, since this means that market debt is converted into sovereign debt, the country’s credit rating may 
suffer in the long term. Further, this amounts to “encouraging fiscal indiscipline of the states” (Ranganathan, 
1996: 821). 
25  In 1995, guidelines for mega projects were adopted. A project of 1000MW or more supplying to more than 
one state was defined as a mega project. Such projects would be on the basis of competitive bidding. A Power 
Trading Corporation would be established to it would have security in terms of a letter of credit and could if 
necessary have recourse to central plan allocations for the state. Of course this is only possible if the states 
have already established the SERCs. The import of capital equipment would be free of customs duty for these 
projects (Ministry of Power 2000: 31). 
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A National Power Plan has been prepared in 1996-97 covering the period till 2011-12, by 
the Central Electricity Authority. This plan envisages an increase of 8413 MW capacity in 
hydro plants, 43528 MW in thermal plants and 88 MW in nuclear plants, over the 9th, 
10th and 11th five-year plans. This will require an estimated funding of 6,000,000 million 
rupees (http:// www.nic.in/indmin/power.htm). The government also has an active rural 
electrification policy (see 4.4).  
In addition to all these specific policies, the Government of India makes five year plans 
for the country as a whole. The Eighth Five-Year Plan period has been completed and the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan is currently being implemented. The Eight Five Year Plan 
succeeded to add barely 16,500 MW of the planned 30,538 MW of new capacity by 
March 1997. The failure was partly because of inadequate planning in relation to fuel 
sources, revenues and finances, reliance on para-statal agencies and “accentuating the 
tendency to ask the public sector managers who are to do this work to be accountable and 
question even on minute day-to-day decision making by the police and Parliament, 
besides a host of Government auditors and Ministries” (Dua 1997). Appropriate pricing is 
necessary.  
The Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) aims, inter alia, at “ensuring environmental 
stability of the development process through social mobilisation and participation of 
people at all levels;” It aims at a total capacity addition of 40245.2MW comprising 
9819.7MW of hydro, 29545.5 MW thermal, and 880 MW of nuclear.  
Although there are many changes in the organisational structure of the electricity sector, 
some policies have remained relatively constant. Thus, for example, the government 
policy on fuels focuses on self-reliance and on trying to use the foreign exchange reserves 
with care, i.e. this implies using domestic coal. Nevertheless, coal imports have been 
encouraged by some state governments and there is some change in this field (see 8.2.2). 
While coal is seen as the dominant fuel, electricity from renewable sources is also seen as 
very critical for India. Since India has large hydro resources, hydro power is also 
encouraged, although in recent years the social effects have caused tremendous social 
resistance to such power. India is the only country in the world with a ministry devoted to 
non-conventional energy (excluding large hydro), which evolved from department status 
in 1982 to a ministry in 1992. The growth in this sector has been very high and since the 
8th plan allowed for renewables to feed into the grid, there has been over-achievement in 
this sector. India is among the world leaders in wind based electricity and most turbines 
have been installed in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. A huge wind resource 
assessment programme has been established and a centre for Wind Energy Technology is 
planned to undertake research, technology development, standardisation of equipment, 
and certification. There is considerably small hydro potential in India especially in the 
hilly regions of North and North Eastern India, in Andhra Pradesh, Tammil Nadu and 
Karnataka, but not much has been exploited thus far. The policy aims to promote such 
projects and a UNDP/GEF hilly hydro project is providing an impetus. There is also 
considerable potential for biomass based combustion, gasification and cogeneration (see 
4.3.4). A huge integrated solar combined cycle power project of 140 MW is being 
developed in Rajasthan of which the solar component is 35-40 MW. Grid connected solar 
voltaic projects are also being commissioned especially in rural areas (see 4.4). 
Renewable energy (including electricity) is promoted in India through a 100% accelerated 
depreciation, tax holidays for power generation projects, soft loans, customs and excise 
duty relief, liberalised foreign investment procedures, etc. Guidelines were sent to all the 
States on general policies and facilities for wheeling, banking, third party sale, purchase of 
power at a minimum price of Rs. 2.25 (about US 6.5 cents) per kWh by SEBs, with an 
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annual escalation.26 Finance is available from the dedicated Indian Renewable Energy 
Development Agency Ltd. (IREDA), which also has resources from the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, USAID and the GEF to promote a range of renewable energy 
projects. The 9th five year plan aimed to increase the generation by 3000 MW including 
wind power - 2000 MW, biomass power - 450 MW, small hydro - 350 MW, solar - 150 
MW, energy recovery from wastes - 90 MW. It is expected that renewables will increase 
to 20,000 MW by 2012 (Gupta, A. 1997 OR 1987). In 2000, the Renewable Energy Bill 
was introduced in Parliament. 
Table 3.4.1. Electricity and related laws in India. 
Year Law Provisions 
1910 Adoption of the Indian Electricity Act Licensed generation; administration by prov-
inces 
1948 Adoption of the Electricity (Supply) Act Centralised planning; managed by provinces 
1950 Adoption of the Constitution of India Electricity in the concurrent list. 
1956 The Companies Act 1956 All generating companies must be registered 
under the Companies Act. 
1991 The Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act Enables privatisation 
1991 73/74th amendment to the Constitution Enables devolution of power to Panchayats on 
energy 
1992 Ministry of Power started functioning in-
dependently 
 
1992 Environmental audits mandatory  
1998 The Electricity Regulatory Commissions 
Ordinance 
Establishes the CERC and the SERC 
2000 Electricity 2000 Bill/ Act Unbundling of SEBs and benchmarking of sec-
tors 
2000 Energy Conservation Bill Promotes a 1st conservation in 2012 in relation 
to 2000 
2000 Renewable Energy Bill Establishes quantitative targets for renewable 
energy development 
 
The electricity supply sector is also subject to environmental legislation.27 This has led, 
on the one hand, to an excess of paper work and several permits are required before 
projects may be initiated, while on the other hand, there are limited resources to actually 
monitor the environment and to catch the offenders.  
In general, the energy ministry has more negotiating power than the environment 
ministry, and when there is a conflict between the two ministries, the government 
attempts to solve the problem through prioritising the concerns of the energy ministry. 
However, the recently enacted National Environment Tribunal Act of 1995 establishes a 
tribunal to award compensation to people negatively affected by the environmental 
impacts from any activity. It is also important in this context to note the increasingly 
activist role of the judiciary. 1500 industrial units have been closed down in Delhi or 
asked to move out of the city as a result of judicial decisions in favour of the 
environment. Many units have been closed down in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra. An integrated steel plant has been 
                                                   
26  About half the States have announced their policy for priority purchase of power from renewables. A few 
States have also announced an annual escalation of 5%. These policies aim at providing remunerative and as-
sured returns, and to motivate investments by private developers and investors (Gupta, A. 1997). 
27  These laws regulate water (1974, 76), air pollution (1981), environmental protection (1986), hazardous wastes 
(1989), environmental standards, statements and clearance (1993, 1994), coal beneficiation (1996), a National 
Environmental Tribunal Act in 1995, a National Environmental Apellate Authority in 1997 and an Energy 
Conservation Act in 2000. 
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abandoned in Mangalore. These could be indications that environmental issues will 
gradually become more and more important in the future. 
4.2.2.2 Distribution of responsibility regarding power  
Electricity generation is shared between the centre and state and there is potential for 
devolution of power to the village panchayats in relation to energy, while power supply is 
the responsibility of the state. At the central government level, the ministries of coal, non-
conventional energy sources, petroleum and natural gas and the ministry of power are 
connected with energy generation and related policy. In addition, there is the Department 
of Atomic Energy and the Planning Commission with authority over energy and electric-
ity policy.  
The power ministry is the key body in the field. Under it, fall the Central Electricity Au-
thority, the National Thermal Power Corporation, the National Hydro Power Corporation, 
the Power Grid Corporation, the Power Finance Corporation, The Rural Electricity Cor-
poration, and the Energy Management Centre. Under the ministry of non-conventional 
energy sources falls the IREDA and state level departments and they have authority over 
mini, microhydel, and wind energy projects, and projects that are below 3MW capacity 
and the geo-thermal energy and transmission system network. The Planning Commission 
has a special Energy Policy Unit. The Bhabha Atomic Energy centre, the Centre at Ta-
rapur and in Kalpakkam fall under the Department of Atomic Energy. 
Since the states did not have the resources to meet their own electricity demand, the Na-
tional Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)28 and the National Hydro Power Corporation 
(NHPC) were set up in the 1970s. Today, out of 87,000 MW of installed capacity, about 
one third of the capacity is owned by the Central Government utilities. NTPC alone with 
17,000 MW of capacity i.e. about 20% of the installed capacity, accounts for 25% of the 
generation in the country (Dua 1997). NTPC and NHPC, however, have no distribution 
arrangements and they sell electricity to the States according to an agreed formula and the 
States are required to pay for it to NTPC and other Central utilities.  
The ministry of power is responsible for general electricity and energy policy, research 
development and technical assistance in relation to electricity and its transmission, ad-
ministration of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity Supply Act of 1948, is-
sues relating to the Central Electricity Authority and the Central Electricity Board, issues 
relating to rural electrification, power schemes in Union Territories and power supply in 
States and Union Territories, issues relating to energy conservation and energy efficiency, 
and issues relating to the Public Sector Undertakings29. These bodies sell power to the 
State Electricity Boards (SEBs).  
The Planning Commission makes five year plans for India, and the energy policy unit 
prepares the energy policy on the basis of information received from, inter alia, the 
Central Electricity Authority (CEA). The CEA, created by the Electricity Supply Act of 
1948, forecasts demand, examines generation, plans, transmission plants and used to 
make system planning studies that underlay the five year plans of the government. The 
CEA monitors the performance of the utilities and the transmission and distribution 
bodies, focuses on renovation and modernisation schemes and is the arbitrator of conflicts 
                                                   
28  The NTPC was ranked in 1997 as the 6th largest thermal generator in the world and the most efficient, among 
the top ten, in capacity utilisation by Global Utility Benchmarking Survey, done by Marketline, UK.  
29  Damodar Valley Corporation, Bhakra Beas Management Board, National Thermal Power Corporation, Na-
tional Hydro Electric Power Corporation, Rural Electrification Corporation, North-Eastern Electric Power 
Corporation, Power Grid Corporation of India, Power Finance Corporation, Tehri Hydro Development Corpo-
ration, Naptha Jhakri Power Corporation, Central Power Research Institute, National Power Training Institute, 
Energy Management Centre. 
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between the State Electricity Boards (SEBs; see 4.2.2.3) and the provincial governments, 
and promotes research and policy in the area of electricity planning (CEA 1999).  
In order to deal with the problems that rose with the liberalisation of the energy sector 
since 199130 and the existing difficulties of the CEA in regulating price (see 4.2.2.3, 
4.2.3.3),31 the Government amended the Electricity (supply) Act, 1948, to enable the es-
tablishment of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and the State Elec-
tricity Regulating Commission (SERC). The CERC will regulate bulk pricing for central 
generating and transmitting units; interstate exchange of power and issue licenses; while 
the SERC will regulate the tariffs for the state generation and transmission and issue li-
censes at state level. The CERC and SERC are administratively linked, but financially in-
dependent from the Ministry of Power. The SERC controls the price at which the distribu-
tion utilities purchase power. The CERC looks at the selling end; the SERC at the buying 
end. There was also a strategic interest in creating the CERC; this was to make the SERC 
acceptable to state governments. The CERC has powers to advise government in policy 
formation; but it is not mandatory for it to accept the advice. Thus far the CERC and 8 
SERCs have been set up. 
However, despite the so-called independence, Godbole (2000) cautions that unless the 
CERC, in fact, has financial independence, and can raise public awareness and support 
for its policies through transparent and fair decision-making regarding tariffs, it may end 
up an empty gesture. In particular, the body is advised not to raise tariffs till all other 
leakages in the system have been plugged and to consider deeply the issue of how tariffs 
are to be identified for a wide range of producers, generating at differing costs. 
4.2.2.3 The State Electricity Boards and the private utilities 
At the state level, the State Electricity Boards (SEB) make the policy on generation and 
distribution. Generation and distribution was also concentrated in state hands, although 
there were also five private utilities in India partly because of historical circumstances. 
These are Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Limited, Tata Electric Companies, 
Ahmedabad Electricity Companies, Surat Electric Company and Calcutta Electric Supply 
Corporation. The number of private companies have grown since then and in 1995, the 
private electrical companies in India produce 5% of the total electricity, and the private 
industrial generators produce another 5% (USAID 1995). 
Initially, there were 18 State Electricity Boards in India.32 The SEBs were established in 
order to gain from the natural monopoly character of electricity supply, the ideology of 
government control, and the need to access the economies of scale (Subramanian and 
Vyasulu 1999: 2300). They provide about 75% of the total power generated in the 
country. They are autonomous bodies on paper although in general they tend to be closely 
linked to the state governments. They need approval from the state government for their 
investments, tariffs, salary structures and personnel.  
However, by the 1990s the SEBs were in a state of financial crises. In the early 1990’s, 
the SEBs in Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal and Kerala were the only 
                                                   
30  With the liberalisation of the energy sector, large multinationals wished to enter India. The CEA just did not 
have the authority, independence and experience to regulate such a powerful and large company since “this 
requires a critical mass of skill formation in technical, financial, and legal and project finance aspects of the 
power sector” (Ranganathan, 1996: 821). Ranganathan explains as a result ENRON (see Box 4.2) and Cogen-
trix were not closely questioned regarding the pricing and environmental aspects of their project by the rele-
vant authorities.  
31  The CEA and the SEBs were too closely connected to the generators, the politicians and the consumers and 
were unable to resist pressure regarding pricing. It was seen as critical that a rule based system was developed 
with minimum contact with the politicians and with the consumers (Meeting India 2000: 21, 22). 
32  Orissa SEB does not exist anymore since 1.4.96. Other SEBs are also being dismantled. 
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economically viable Boards that were able to recover their costs and make some profits. 
The states with the worst financial crises were Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. The 
crises was partly because of the high subsidies (e.g. discounts) provided to consumers 
especially from the agricultural sector,33 electricity theft (see 4.2.3.4) and distribution 
losses, high labour costs, arrears in revenue collection, etc. at the same time, the average 
price of electricity has increased five times from 42 paise per kWh in 1980-81 to 243 in 
1998-99; but there are huge state wise variations. The crises cannot be solely attributed to 
the SEBs. In general, the SEBs received instructions from the state governments in 
relation to pricing policy and they were never compensated for the loss of income, they 
were unable to capitalise interest during the construction phase, and there was heavy 
interests that had to be paid because there was no equity participation (CEA 1998: 43). 
The Ninth Five Plan records that in 1996-97 the average rate of return of the SEBs was –
17%. 
The financial crises affected the SEBs in several ways. First, they could not even 
undertake routine maintenance and repair work (Pachauri 1998b). This led to diminishing 
performance and efficiencies. Second, they could not invest in policies to improve the 
plant load factors. The plant load factor in SEB plants was low, much lower in the Eastern 
and North-Eastern regions than in the rest of India. This was because of inappropriate 
quality of coal, age and size of units, equipment deficiency and failure or backing down 
of units due to low load and low demand. The plant load factor (PLF) was 64.7% in 1997-
98, having incrementally climbed up from 52.4% in 1985. Third, they did not have the 
resources to invest in improving the T&D losses which were 22.3% in 1997-98. Carstairs 
and Erhardt (1995) argue that as long as the SEBs are weak financially they will be 
unable to access resources. 
This led experts to argue in favour of a complete restructuring of the Indian electricity 
sector. They argued in favour of removing all the subsidies, commercialising the 
electricity generation sector and making the sector more market oriented (cf. Wade-Gery 
1998). The Orissa State Electricity Board is the first board that is being restructured 
through a World Bank loan. This restructuring has led to the closure of the board and the 
establishment of the Grid Corporation of Orissa, Orissa Hydro Power Corporation and the 
Orissa Power Generation Corporation. This was possible by amending the Orissa 
Electricity Reforms Act, 1955. A SERC has been established to look into tariffs. 
Recently, also Karnataka has passed a reform ordinance (see Box 4.1).  
This led to policies to liberalise the electricity sector. However, new problems arose as a 
result. First, since the SEBs were not financially sound, they cannot provide the 
guarantees necessary to ensure foreign investors that the electricity will be bought at 
reasonable prices to the consumers. Second, in the process of corporatising and 
privatising the SEBs, the commercial value of these Boards is difficult to determine since 
many were making losses. Third, the history of the first few private sector entrants into 
the market shows that the government does not have the wherewithal to actually deal with 
the private sector (see Box 4.2). In a rush to meet the needs of the private sector, the 
Government has often acted rashly: “the speed, selectivity and secrecy with which the 
contracts for additional power were signed with foreign IPPS have resulted in a backlash 
questioning the competence and credibility of the decision making process, with such 
                                                   
33  According to interviewees, when agriculture was subsidised in India, the sector was hardly using any electric-
ity and it was considered important to stimulate the production of food through electrification of the irriga-
tions systems. However, by 1997-98, the agricultural sector had taken advantage of the subsidies and were us-
ing a substantial portion of the electricity, thus raising the subsidy bill for the SEBs considerably. The annual 
commercial losses reached an all time high of 10,684 crore Rs. which implied an effective subsidy of 22,216 
crore Rs. In 1997-98, the average tariff for agriculture was 28 paise per kWh, for households 134 paise per 
kWh, while for industry it was as high as 285 paise per kWh. 
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decisions being reversed or stalled” (Ranganathan 1996: 822). The private sector needs to 
ensure that they should strive towards transparency and robustness so that their deals can 
withstand public scrutiny (Ranganathan 1996: 822). 
 
Box 4.1. Case study of Karnataka Electricity Reform Ordinance 
 
Karnataka has a Karnataka Power Corporation (KPC) in charge of generation and the Karnataka Elec-
tricity Board (KEB) in charge of transmission and distribution. The KPC has in general functioned 
quite well; problems have occurred in the KEB. The KEB has had problems with overstaffing, lack 
of motivation and discipline, a huge army of linesmen and meter readers and unhappy clients, poor 
rules and little vision. Partly because of the cross-subsidies and the costs of electricity to industry, 
many have invested in captive power plants.  
In 1999, the Karnataka Electricity Reform Ordinance was promulgated to reform the State Electricity 
Board (KEB). This 63 page long ordinance tries to foresee every single eventuality and tries to 
make rules to deal with those situations. The KEB is also obliged to take instructions from the State 
Government, whether the directives make sense or not. There are certain archaic provisions such as 
an oath of secrecy that would have to be taken by members of the Commission in charge. The 
Commission is requested, inter alia, to promote energy conservation. Subramanian and Vyasulu 
(1999) argue that through this new ordinance, the state government hopes to access international 
loans; but in fact the ordinance “tinkers only with form, not substance”. This is because although an 
elaborate framework has been established, the powers of the Commission are unclear, the Govern-
ment still retains remote control over the KEB, and “the reforms also enable the state government to 
abdicate its responsibilities without in any way surrendering responsibility”. The fact that the 
change takes the form of an ordinance and not a provincial law in which all stakeholders could have 
provided their viewpoint is to be regretted. 
 
Source: Subramanian and Vyasulu (1999) 
 
All this implies that the rate of return was a dismal –18% on average. The average price 
would have to rise by 60 paise to achieve the statutorily required 3% rate of return 
(Planning Commission 1999). However, according to the accounting system used, only 
Assam, Meghalaya and Bihar are making losses (CEA 1999: 40). The CEA (1999: 43) 
even states that, since 31st March 1996, the SEBs have generated a cumulative surplus of 
Rs 741.31 crores.  
4.2.2.4 Financial institutions 
Investments to modernise the sector are possible through access to financial institutions. 
This section briefly discusses the different financial institutions and their role, 
shortcomings and potential. 
The Indian Banking system consists of the Reserve Bank of India, about 275 commercial 
banks, several development financial institutions (e.g. Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI), Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), the ICICI who have reserved 
about 15% of their capital for the power sector), 125 mutual fund schemes and some other 
types of national schemes (USAID 1995). The new Securities and Exchange Board of 
India and the National Stock Exchange supervise the 23 stock exchanges in the country.  
The Power Finance Corporation (PFC) and the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) 
established under the ministry of power, are dedicated to lend to the power sector and to 
projects related to rural electricity respectively. The IREDA lends for the purpose of 
renewable energy project appraisal and financing, technology promotion and organises 
business development meetings in relation to renewable energy.  
The Power Finance Corporation has three categories of interest rates: for thermal 
generation - 15% to SEBs and 16% to private investors; for transmission 14% to SEBs 
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and 15% to private investors, for all other schemes 13.5% to the SEBs and 14.5 to private 
sector. For communication and computers the rate is 12.275%. In this way the PFC has an 
active policy to encourage energy conservation schemes and system improvements; it also 
has environmental conditionalities in relation to ash use and SPM and SO2 emissions. It is 
also a financially viable organisation with a record of 99% resource recovery even though 
it lends to the SEBs.34 The PFC (2000) has set up a Reform Group to assist with the 
reform process. The Rural Electrification Corporation is also a financially sound 
organisation, but does not explicitly keep environmental and efficiency goals in mind 
(REC Annual Report 1998). The Indian Rural Energy Development Agency lends for 
rural electrification policies and also finances demand side energy efficiency projects.  
Within the Banking sector, the State Bank of India has been quite active. It has 
established the Project Finance Strategic Business Unit to develop the skill to finance 
power projects in collaboration with foreign partners. At present it finances 12 State 
Electricity Boards, and has taken part in the projects of Enron, GTECX, Spectrum Power, 
GVK, Bina and Essar.  
Until recently, Indian commercial banks only provided working capital finance for 
infrastructure projects. However, with liberalisation and privatisation, the Reserve Bank 
of India has decided to (a) remove the ceiling on the amount of investment that can be 
made by a Scheduled Commercial Bank (SCB) in power projects; (b) give tax benefits on 
income from lending to infrastructure projects; (c) no longer limit the primary leasing 
period for infrastructure projects; (d) extend the “group exposure norm of 50% of net 
worth to 60% in infrastructure projects”; (e) remove the industry exposure limit of 15% 
from the power sector (Barwe 1998).  
Indian Banks and All India Financial Institutions (AIFI) play an important role in the 
development of the energy sector in India. They can attract foreign investors by providing 
performance guarantees and provide low cost funding (from savings) and high cost 
funding (from investments in AIFI). However, in order to do so effectively, they have to 
learn to avoid asset-liability maturity mismatch, learn to evaluate projects in terms of their 
techno-economic viability and also in relation to the legal regulatory and institutional 
arrangements in a country. A key problem is that the rate of interest is very high. In 
comparison, the World Bank can lend at 7%; however, foreign loans are subject to 
exchange rate fluctuations and conditionalities. The banking sector is still monopolised by 
the government (80%), has a high interest rate, high reserve level, ineffective laws 
regarding debt recovery and subsidises sectors (ASSOCHAM 1999a and b). The capital 
markets although in a state of development have not yet really secured consumer 
confidence. The governing bodies need to be revamped to become more professional and 
transparent; the institutional organisation of the stock exchanges need to become more 
organised, the primary market needs to be revived (ASSOCHAM 1999a and b: 48). 
4.2.3 Key issues 
The following section discusses the key challenges in the electricity sector of plant load 
factors, renovation and modernisation, pricing, voltage fluctuation and load-shedding, and 
some regional issues. 
                                                   
34  Some SEBs have difficulties in paying back; Some financial institutions have established an escrow account 
and if the SEB fails, they collect from the escrow account and their efficiency in collection has been 99.4% 
(Meeting India 2000: 25). 
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4.2.3.1 The demand-supply gap 
Electricity is the fastest growing sector in the Indian economy. Power generation has 
increased in the period 1991 -1998 from 287 billion units (kWh) to 420 billion units 
(kWh). The installed capacity has increased from 636 billion units in 1990 to 891 billion 
units in 98 (Ministry of Power 1998: 3-4). The growth rate is about 7-8% annually 
(Barwe 1998). Barwe cites the 15th Electric Power Survey, which shows that the peak 
demand is estimated at 95.7 GW in 2002 and at 131.0 GW in 2007.  
There is a chronic shortage of electricity in the country. The gap between demand and 
supply is increasing. The electricity shortage is 11% on energy basis and during peaking 
demand the shortage is even around 18% on capacity basis. The gap has been steadily 
increasing and reduced slightly in 1999 (http://www.nic.in/indmin/power.htm).35  
The need is estimated at an additional 10.0 –12.0 GW per year until 2007. The demand 
for electricity is increasing by 9% per annum (cited in Fisher-Vanden et al. 1997). The 
gap between demand and supply is greater than one would expect. This is caused by the 
fact that the percentage increase of power consumption (which is less than demand) is 
higher than the percentage increase in GDP. This is the case in many developing countries 
as the elasticity of power demand to economic growth is low (Sankar 1998: 141). 
However, as Chapter 5 and 8 will show, this is likely to change in the coming decades. 
According to a World Bank estimate for every 1.5% increase in GDP, electricity capacity 
would have to increase by 1.5% (cited in Srivastava 1997: 947). 
The shortage of electricity has led to first, a loss of national income and workable hours 
(one estimate is that this gap has led to a 1.5 - 2% loss of GDP; Sanghvi 1991: 436). 
Second, it encourages substitution through inverters, kerosene lamps,36 diesel 
generators,37 voltage stabilisers, etc., which while creating an incentive for the 
development of new industry also leads to high environmental pollution. Moreover, it 
also causes product failure, such as energy efficient lamps whose life is cut short because 
of the voltage fluctuations.  
4.2.3.2 Efficiency Improvement in Power Plants 
On the supply side, the plant load factor is expressed as the ratio of the average power 
output during one year to the rated capacity. It thus gives an indication of the overall 
efficiency of the electricity production sector. The overall plant load factor (PLF) in India 
has been slowly improving. At the central government owned plants it has increased from 
62.7 in 1992-93 to 71.1 in 1996-97. At the state government owned plants it has increased 
from 45.1 to 60.3 (http://www.nic.in/indmin/india.htm). The central government owned 
plants seem to have been operated quite efficiently compared to the state and private 
sector owned plants.  
In the state of Bihar the plant load factor is as low as 14.3%; while the PLF in Andhra 
Pradesh is 73.7%. The impact of low plant load factor is that the plants are not generating 
as much as they could be; and this has implications for recovering revenues to improve 
the generation of the plant.  
Another key issue is renovation and modernisation. The idea behind renovation and 
modernisation is that experience of the Electric Power Research Institute at California 
shows that the life of a plant can be extended by at least 30 years at the original 80% 
                                                   
35  This gap is not made evident in the RAINS-ASIA model which assumes that supply is equal to demand plus 
transmission and distribution losses (see Chapter 5). 
36  Which consume 400 times as much energy as a fluorescent lamp (Foulkes, 1998). 
37  In Delhi, there are 20,000 diesel powered generators which cause direct local pollution whereas electric 
pumps do not (Kohli 1998). There are 6 million diesel pump sets in the villages (9th Five Year Plan). 
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operation level. Many of the electricity generation units in India are much in need of 
repair, maintenance and modernisation. From the 85.7 GW installed capacity, the 
government assesses that about 34.1 GW (24.4 GW coal fired plants and 9.7 GW hydro 
plants) needs to be modernised. It is expected that such modernisation can lead to a gain 
of 6.0 GW (http://www.nic.in/indmin/india.htm). Many state governments are hoping to 
secure additional funding to modernise the existing sector since they expect that such 
renovation may be cheaper than new plants. Out of a total of 1629 renovation activities, 
787 have been completed. This means that at a cost of about 20-30% of a new power 
plant, the life of an existing plant can be extended. The Confederation of Indian Industry 
argues that with R&M the plant load factor can be moved up to 75%. The Central 
Electricity Authority is less optimistic about the potential. NTPC has developed 
experience in this field and has offered to undertake such renovation. In general 
renovation is considerably cheaper than modernisation (SCE 1995). 
4.2.3.3 Pricing 
Until the late 1970s, electricity was priced on market principles and the utilities were 
required to operate with a 3% return on capital under the Indian Electricity Act. However, 
in the late 1970s Mrs. Gandhi promoted her “garibi hatao” movement and called for the 
provision of electricity at much lower rates; the utilities became non-profit organisations 
whose purpose was to promote social objectives. Since then electricity has been highly 
subsidised in India. This was also because the Constitution of India calls on the 
government to ensure that there is no concentration of wealth to the detriment of the 
common people and hence energy pricing is used to ensure access to energy to low 
income people, increased agricultural productivity and a wider dispersion of industry to 
rural areas (Srivastava 1997: 941).  
In 1996-1997, the subsidies provided to agricultural consumers amounted to Rs. 14,000 
crores, an amount that has further crippled the SEBs in India (Pachauri 1998b). However, 
agriculture in India only has a 2.7% subsidy as opposed to the 10% ceiling imposed by 
GATT (Ranganathan 1996: 821). In 1994/95, the Indian Railways paid on average the 
highest tariff of 248.6 paise per kWh, followed by industry at 211.6, commerce at 203.4, 
households 93.0 and agriculture 21.8 paise per kWh (GOI 1995). In India, services and 
industry pay the most, followed by the households and then agriculture. This is the 
opposite to the US where industry pays the least since they use the largest amount of 
(base-load) electricity and at the highest voltage (Wade-Gery 1998). According to 
interviewees, the actual price paid by Indian Industry and commerce is higher than that 
pai by industries in Western countries 
Each state in India has its own electricity pricing policy. At the national level the average 
cost of supply was 170.11 paise per kWh, and the average tariff was 140.72. The average 
cost of supply is the highest in Delhi at 210.30 paise per kWh, while the average tariff is 
174.96. The average cost of supply is lowest in Kerala at 116.70 and the average tariff is 
98.46 (Kedia 1997). Pricing in the future will be undertaken by the CERC and SERC (see 
4.2.2.2). 
The government’s pricing policy led on the one hand to increased agricultural production 
and on the other hand to the financial bankruptcy of the SEBs (see 4.2.2.3), and created 
disincentives for farmers to use the electricity with care; they do not invest in energy 
efficient pumpsets and instead overuse water (http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/pol-
pow.html; see 4.3.2). This policy also led to reduced revenues that can be ploughed back 
into the system to improve the quality of the service provided and to lower the costs, 
artificially lower fossil fuel electricity prices in relation to renewable energy, 
development of populist policies and a system of patronage in which politicians and the 
electricity sector were controlled by the powerful local people (Pachauri 1998b).  
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4.2.3.4 Transmission and Distribution 
India is a large country. Transmitting and distributing energy is a challenging task. The 
losses associated with transmission and distribution are as high as 21% (1995-96) or 65 
billion units (Abraham 1998). A 1% reduction in such losses implies a saving of 800 MW 
(http://www.nic.in/indmin/india.htm).  
As a whole, one of the key problems in the transmission and distribution sector has been 
poor investment strategies. Singh (1998) argues that a general rule of thumb is that 
investment distribution over the categories generation, transmission and distribution is 
50%, 25% and 25 % respectively. In India until 1997, the investment in transmission and 
distribution has been only 25-28% of the total investment in this sector except in the first 
five year plan. 
The main actors in the field of transmission are Power Grid Corporation of India,38 the 
Power Finance Corporation that finances large generation and transmission lines and 
large substations, and the Rural Electrification Corporation that finances the small 
generation and transmission lines. Private companies are now also being allowed to invest 
in transmission.  
The Power Grid Corporation of India is a public sector undertaking and has low 
environmental pollution, losses of 2-3% (international norm) and claims to be one of the 
six best utilities in the world. They are efficient and have a mini-ratna39 (PGCI 1998). 
Transmission losses range from 2-6%. On the whole, these losses are not very high. 
However, as explained above, the key problem in the transmission sector has been poor 
investment strategies. Second, the transmission of electricity was originally organised 
state-wise, then five electrical regions were developed - Northern, Eastern, Southern, 
Western and North-Eastern. The key problem was that inter-regional sharing was not 
possible and surplus production in one region could not be made available to a region in 
deficit. Now it is being decided to nationalise the circuit to allow for inter-regional 
sharing (Singh 1998) and perhaps even internationalise it. Finally, there is the problem of 
varying voltage rates. There are several transmission lines in India. Some (30,000 circuit 
kms.) have a voltage of 400 kV; some (75,000 circuit kms) 220 kV and the bulk (130,000 
circuit kms) 132 kV (Unstarred Question no. 2962 dated 19.12.96 in the First Chamber).  
On the other hand, distribution losses are very high ranging from 20% to 60%. The 
distribution issue is far more complex. Transmission and distribution losses in India were 
assessed at 24% till the SEBs were unbundled revealing losses as high as 40-45% in the 
distribution sector alone, while transmission losses were only 3%. These losses were 
being disguised as agricultural subsidies.40  
Within India, some states have higher losses than other states. Jammu and Kashmir and 
Arunachal Pradesh have high losses (above 45%), others are more efficient, like Dadar 
and Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. This calls for a state 
oriented approach. 
The key problem in the distribution sector is the large scale theft by large and small 
enterprises. The only way to address this problem is, on the one hand, metering, billing 
and collection and, on the other hand, modernising the conductor sizes, the rerating of 
lines, and changing the capacitors. To the extent that there are members of the population 
                                                   
38  In 1980, the Government set up the National Power Grid which was corporatised in 1989 as the Power Grid 
Corporation of India. 
39  A mini-ratna is an award from the central government for performance. 
40  Meeting India 2000: 3, 46 
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that cannot afford the electricity, they may receive subsidies, but then the subsidies should 
be based on actual use.  
The government of India intends to prepare guidelines for the power utilities, asking them 
to install energy audits, improve the voltage profile, tamperproof meter boxes to prevent 
theft, etc. and an amendment to the India Electricity Act in 1996 makes theft of electricity 
a cognisable offence under Section 39 (Handbook 1997: 146).  
4.2.3.5 Some regional issues 
Each province in India has its own characteristics and each has developed along different 
lines. Given that electricity is also a state subject, it is useful to examine the position of 
regions. The highest deficit in electricity production in India is in the states of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. The highest plant load 
factors are in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. The lowest 
plant load factor is in Bihar, Assam and Orissa (Handbook India 1997). The Union 
Territories/States with the highest per capita consumption of electricity are Dadra and 
Nagar Haveli (1574.40 kWh), Daman and Diu (1547.73), Pondicherry (968.85 kWh), and 
Punjab (756.37), Delhi (747.48) and Goa (601.82). The lowest consumption is in 
Nagaland (58.98), Tripura (66.28), Arunachal Pradesh (66.76), Manipur (107.41), 
Mizoram (111.74), Bihar (133.74). The data is for 1994-95 (Lok Sabha Unstarred 
Question No. 890 dated 27.11.96). 
There are some regional factors that play an important role in influencing state electricity 
policy and performance. Civic tension in the state of Assam has led to pipe-lines being 
blown up by militants. In Kashmir the Dul Hasti power project has been delayed for 
security reasons (Bray 1998). Some states choose for reform, some for status quo and 
some simply deteriorate (Nyman 1998). Regional politics and poor governance are also 
reasons affecting performance in some states.  
4.2.4 Privatisation and foreign companies 
With liberalisation, the market is now open for foreign investors. Any company that 
wishes to establish a power generation project in India has to (a) prepare cost estimates 
and have it cleared by the CEA (Section 29 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948; (b) seek 
techno-economic clearance from the CEA (Section 30 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 
This calls for an examination of the water works for dams and the availability of water for 
thermal plants, output of electric power, use of transmission lines and systems, 
reasonableness of the scheme, site locations, etc; (c) publish in the Official Gazette and 
local newspapers under Section 29 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, and check this with the 
State government; (d) ensure water availability with the State Government and the CWC; 
(e) ensure clearance from the State Electricity Board and the State Government under 
Section 44 E of the Act; (f) ensure pollution clearance from the Pollution Control Board 
from State/Central Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 and the Air 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981; (g) ensure clearance on forest and 
environment related issues from the State Forest Departments and the Central Ministry of 
Environment and Forests; (h) ensure clearance from the National Airport Authority on the 
height of the chimney; (i) register the company under Indian Companies Act 1956 with 
the registrar of companies; (j) ensure rehabilitation and resettlement of the displaced 
families as a result of land acquisition and secure clearance from the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests and the State Government; and (k) check current rules regarding 
equipment procurement under the import and export acts. 
In addition, the entrepreneur needs to check on land availability from the state 
government, on fuel linkage from the Departments of coal, petroleum and natural gas, 
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financing from the CEA and the financial institutions and on the transportation of fuels 
from several transport agencies. 
Foreign investors (Foulkes 1998, USAID 1995) have low confidence in India since the 
experiences of Enron (see Box 4.2). They want guarantees that contracts will be respected, 
and that there will be less red tape. They are afraid that the poor financial viability of the 
SEBs implies that they may not be in a position to pay for the electricity generated.41 The 
companies want rational tariff structures, access to foreign exchange, fuel supply 
agreements, and domestic capital markets. Bray (1998) argues that foreign investors see 
the following non-commercial risks in India: the need to take regional interests into 
account; the need to be aware of the local/poverty nexus which might erupt and change 
the context of investment (see the influence of the Marxist parties), and the delays in rule-
making (see the influence of the premature dissolution of Parliament in 1997 on the 9th 
five year plan and the New Exploration Licensing Policy). 
  
Box 4.2 The ENRON deal: A GHG friendly project at high cost 
 
Abhay Mehta (1999) has done an extensive review of the deal made by Maharshtra Government with 
Enron’s Indian subsidiary Dabhol Power Company. He explains that following liberalisation of the 
electricity sector, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Maharashtra Govern-
ment and Enron’s subsidiary which was soon followed by a legal contract. The Subsidiary would 
import gas to produce 2000MW of electricity for a period of 20 years. This is the single largest con-
tract in India’s history. The State Electricity Board is obliged under the contract to take the electric-
ity generated even if other producers are cheaper, and to pay according to a formulae based, inter 
alia, on the exchange rate of the dollar and the international price of gas. Since the Rupee is going 
down against the dollar and the gas price is going up, this is an extremely risky venture, apart from 
the fact that it has since led to reduced purchases from existing generating plants in Maharashtra 
even though they were much cheaper. The Maharashtra Government has counter guaranteed the 
deal and the Government of India has also provided a counter guarantee (which is based on all of 
India’s assets excluding military and diplomatic) in case the Maharashtra Government defaults. The 
lawyers of ENRON in effect argued that the project could not meet India’s laws and that Indian 
laws should be modified accordingly. Even though the project did not have formal clearance from 
the Central Regulatory Authority, even though there were several court cases, even though there 
were several questions asked, even though the World Bank refused to support the project, even 
though there was inadequate information regarding the financial viability of the project for the state 
government, the government has gone ahead and signed the contract. Protests from local people 
displaced by the company or affected by its policies have been brutally dealt with according to Am-
nesty International and Human Rights Watch. Mehta argues that this project, that has been ap-
proved through incompetence and lack of accountability and in breach of Indian laws, is likely to 
lead to a financial crises of one of the richest states in India. At the same time, Kohli (1998) ex-
plains that from ENRON’s perspective, it was very annoying that with each new government at 
state level ENRON had to renegotiate the deal, and that eventually ENRON received permission to 
construct the power station, but the entire process called for 145 different permits and about 27 
court cases.  
 
On the other hand, there is a lot of scepticism in India about the Enron project. Mehta 
(1999) recalls in his book on the ENRON project that the government of India has entered 
into an agreement that was beyond its means and that might lead to enhanced financial 
losses for the state electricity board.  
                                                   
41  Since the State Electricity Boards provide guarantees for purchasing the electricity from the private initiatives 
and since many of the SEBs are bankrupt, the private sector has demanded counter-guarantees from the cen-
tral government. The central government has provided such counter-guarantees for eight projects for a period 
of five years, after which the projects must become viable and achieve a 3% return on their net worth). 
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4.2.4.1 Case Study of the Power Policy in Gujarat 
The State of Gujarat came into existence in 1960. At that time, its consumption of 
electricity was 315 MW; today it is 6238 MW and 1306 MW from captive power 
production. The per capita consumption is 650 kWh almost double the national average of 
345 kWh. Gujarat has been experiencing industrial boom; ¼ of all industrial approvals in 
India are given in this state. The state also has near 100% electrification. It was therefore 
considered important to undertake a case study of this state. (The data below is prior to 
the earthquake of January 2001. The news indicates that the earthquake has destroyed 
most of the facilities in the state, but the extent of the damage is not yet known.) 
Gujarat’s Power System Master Plan calls for the establishment of new large power 
plants, encouragement of the establishment of captive power capacity by industrial units, 
short gestation small plants near the load distribution centre, gradual privatisation of the 
grid (transmission will be in the hands of the State although the private sector will be 
encouraged to augment the capacities of the grid); encouragement of the use of non-
conventional and renewable sources of electricity; rationalisation of power tariffs and 
duties through a Independent Statutory tariff Regulatory Commission; and a monitoring 
policy through a high powered committee. 
The power policy’s six objectives are to plan and build up adequate capacities in 
generation, transmission and distribution of power through efficient and cost effective 
means; to achieve optimum utilisation of existing equipment and assets through 
renovation and modernisation;42 to rationalise the tariff structure to ensure a reasonable 
rate of return to power utilities and generate surplus needed for future investment, to 
improve the delivery of services and achieve cost effectiveness through technical, 
managerial and administrative restructuring of the utilities; to achieve conservation of 
energy through efficient utilisation and demand side management, and minimising waste, 
and to encourage generation of power through non-conventional sources of energy.  
At present there are wind power plants at Lamba, Okha, Mandvi, Tuna, Thank and 
Bamanbore generating 64.53 MW of power. 16 new locations have been identified where 
the wind speed is between 19-25 km per hour. Government waste lands could be allocated 
profitably to such wind farms. Most parts of the state have solar insulation of 5.8-6.0 kWh 
per sq. metre per day. Solar power stations could be set up in North Gujarat and 
Kutch/Saurashtra. About 200 MW of energy can be produced by the 19 sugar mills in the 
state and there is ample biomass for electricity production. The potential for tidal energy 
is being studied.  
The Power System Master Plan in addition will consider supply and demand 
management, optimum new generation of power, up-gradation of transmission and 
distribution systems, establishment of new transmission and distribution systems, removal 
of sub-regional imbalances in power availability, achieve cost reduction in generation and 
distribution, look at the feasibility of locating power plants outside the state and 
purchasing power from other states and identifying new sources of funds. The state will 
also encourage co-generation. 
In addition, the cost of coal transportation has led the state government to import coal, 
naphtha, LNG and natural gas through its ports. Partly because of the expense of coal, 
renewable energy is considered important because the demand for electricity is expected 
to grow by 10% per annum. This will call for investments which the private sector is 
expected to participate in. Since the transmission and distribution losses in the state are in 
                                                   
42  It is estimated that renovation and extension programmes can extend the life of a power plant by 20-30 years, 
while the plant load factor can be increased by 76%. 5000 additional units of power can be generated by using 
this method in the state of Gujarat.  
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the order of 20%, the state will spend equal amounts on generation and on transmission 
and distribution. For this it would like to increase the voltage where possible, replace 
existing conductors by high capacity conductors, reduce the impedance in transmission 
lines by continued installation of Static Capacitators to an optimum level, ensure better 
vigilance and decentralise generation at peak period by installation of small power plants. 
Further, distribution losses through theft will be tackled by designing the distribution 
centres as profit centres where the executive will be held responsible for theft and will 
receive monetary incentives for better productivity and management. At the village level 
Helpers Scheme will be set up to provide service backing. To reduce wastage and 
encourage conservation, energy audits will be made compulsory for all major industrial 
and commercial establishments, fiscal incentives and disincentives will be given to 
encourage environment friendly equipment, consumer guidance and education 
programmes will be carried out regularly, farmers will be encouraged to use drip 
irrigation systems, and energy efficient pump sets. The environmental pollution from 
sulphur and ash from coal-fired plants will be discouraged through incentives for de-
sulphurisation equipment and use the ash for other constructive purposes. Finally, the 
state has decided to rationalise the tariff structure, but the Independent Statutory Power 
Tariff and Regulatory Commission will ensure that the cost of inefficiency is not passed 
on to the consumer. The revenues generated will be used to maintain and improve the 
plant and machinery. The utilities will be run on commercial principles. There will be 
higher tariffs for peak hour usage. Subsidised tariffs will continue for “socially obligatory 
activities” such as drinking water, street lighting and lighting for the urban and rural poor. 
These subsidies will be made explicit, quantified, reasonable and targeted.  
The management of all these new utilities will fall under a new to be established Gujarat 
Council of Power Utilities; and a High Level board will be established to oversee the 
implementation of the policy (http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/pol-pow.html). Since 
September 2000, all sectors in Gujarat have to make audits and there is also a list of 
consultants who can do this, since Gujarat is the most industrialised state in India.43 
4.2.4.2 Case Study of Andhra Pradesh 
The state of Andhra Pradesh had a peaking shortage of 1808 MW, despite its high tariffs 
on electricity use and its high plant load factor. As a result of the shortage, power cuts of 
50-60% of the consumption in 1989 were imposed on bulk consumers in 1990 and 
households faced daily power cuts of 1-4 hours a day. Many domestic industries were 
obliged to set up captive generating units (Sankar 1998: 142). The state government has 
adopted a policy following advice received in 1995 from a High Level Committee that 
aims to provide operational, managerial and functional autonomy to SEB or other 
successor to enable it/them to operate along commercial lines; establish a regulatory 
framework that ensures costs optimisation and operational efficiencies in generation, 
transmission and distribution of energy; encourages energy conservation and discourage 
unessential energy demand; ensures that while the government directs, it does not regulate 
the sector; promotes private sector participation and support progressive participation of 
the private sector in the distribution; removes dependence of SEB on government 
budgetary assistance.  
In order to do so, the SEB is being restructured, it is being converted into a corporate 
body under the Indian Companies Act 1956; and all distribution companies will be wholly 
owned subsidiaries, that will be gradually privatised. An Independent Regulatory 
Committee will be set up to promote efficiency and economy in generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity, promoting competition in the generation and supply of 
                                                   
43  Meeting India 2000: 27 
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electricity, publishing information, advising the state government and making 
recommendations to the government. In addition it should enable the licensees to carry on 
their activities in accordance with the terms and conditions of their license. Furthermore, 
the pricing will be progressively reformed so that no sector pays less than 50% of the 
average cost of supply of electricity. The costs should be enough to compensate for the 
costs of the licensee, cover the costs of power and wheeling charges and give appropriate 
signals to licensees and consumers. A Steering Committee will oversee the 
implementation of these policies (http://www.apinfo.org/press5.htm).  
 
Box 3.3 Success story of a captive-collective and capital-cooperative venture 
 
Sankar (1998) argues that captive-collective and capital-cooperative ventures in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh have met with such success that these can serve as models for future electricity develop-
ment projects in India. Given the electricity and capital shortage in the state and since foreign fund-
ing was not forthcoming, the Andhra Pradesh SEB invited the largest of the 3500 bulk users of elec-
tricity to participate in a joint venture undertaking for the generation of electricity in which only the 
participants would be entitled to receive electricity from the project in proportion to their invest-
ment. The electricity generated would be fed into the state grid and each participant, no matter 
where it was located could draw its power from the grid. Although the project was set up as a co-
operative, it was registered under the more efficient Companies Act. The two key concerns of the 
participants was if the SEB could correctly determine and guarantee the entitled supply to the bulk 
users. Companies not needing their share could wheel their surplus on the basis of bilateral ar-
rangements with other companies. Participants were convinced in three meetings to participate in 
this gas-based power plant (which is cheaper, quicker to install and more environmentally friendly). 
The power plant provided electricity to its owner – consumers at 20-25% less tariff than was normal 
and nevertheless made substantial profits. This was partly because of the innovative management 
structure and the goals to reduce the capital costs and to ensure a short gestation period. Given the 
cumbersome procedures of the Government of India, the project group adopted a ‘turn-key’ fi-
nancer who could advance loans to the company if there was delay in the national clearances. 
Sankar concludes that the cooperative approach between the state and the private sector (i.e. the 
marriage between private sector efficiency and the need for government clearance) and the several 
innovations of the group led to an efficient and affordable system of electricity generation. How-
ever, without the political commitment to this project, it would not have been a success. 
 
4.3 Electricity demand  
4.3.1 Introduction  
Murthy et al. (1997: 334-335) claim that the key sectoral contributors to greenhouse gas 
emissions in India are electricity generation, gas and water supply, transport (excluding 
rail), iron and steel, cement and non-metallic mineral products.44 We expect that energy 
demand will increase by 4500 PJ by 2020 and half of that will be from the domestic 
sector (including agricultural) and 1/3 from the industry sector.  
By developing energy efficiency instruments, a key contribution to the reduction of the 
rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions can be made by sectors that use electricity in 
production, transport and consumption. Given the growing electricity demand and 
shortage in the country, and the need to manage financial, electric and environmental 
resources efficiently, end-use management should be an important element of national 
policy. This includes the better use of current technologies through, on the one hand, 
management information systems, better housekeeping, reduction of system conversion 
                                                   
44  Curiously, these sectors contribute very little to the national income, where the major contribution is from 
food and cash crops, textiles, chemicals, construction, trade and other services.  
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losses and energy leakage. There is considerable potential for reducing energy and 
electricity use in the agricultural and industrial sectors in India. Mongia et al (1994) show 
that there is a trend to reduce energy consumption per unit produced in various sectors. It 
should however be realised that a fuel use reducing option sometimes results in 
simultaneous electricity consumption increase (see Chapter 6). The following section 
describes the key tasks of all the major actors in this somewhat diffuse field, identifies the 
contribution of different sectors and then identifies the key actors and issues in each of the 
sectors. Chapter 9 highlights the bottlenecks and challenges in implementing policies in 
these sectors. 
The major consumers of electricity in India are industry (cement, iron and steel, 
aluminium), commercial companies, agriculture and households. The major actors in this 
sector include the central government ministries, the producers of these products 
(industry), and the consumers of these products (agriculture, households and railways), 
the banks that lend resources to these sectors, and the industry federations.  
A key element of demand side energy conservation is the institutional framework within 
which the industries have to operate. ASSOCHAM (1999 a and b) calculates that there 
are about 2,500 central laws in force and 25,000 laws in the states; many obsolete, 
contradictory and not easy to find your way through. The Commission of the Review of 
Administrative Laws has recommended repeal of about 1,300 laws at central level! It 
argues that government structure is based more on secrecy than transparency, and more 
on generalism than specialisation. Furthermore, there are 28 million lawsuits yet to reach 
the courts and there is thus a huge back log. ASSOCHAM recommends reform in 
legislative functioning, reform of government, administrative tribunals, judicial reforms, 
democratic decentralisation, review of old legislation, and that the recommendations of 
high powered bodies should be binding on government. 
Following the oil shock of 1973, the government Fuel Policy Committee of 1974 and the 
Working Group on Energy Policy in 1979 laid emphasis on the need for energy 
conservation. The 1983 report of the inter-ministerial group on energy conservation 
examined specific areas of energy conservation. The Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) 
launched a National Energy Efficiency Programme to save energy by 5,000 MW in the 
electricity sector and 6 Mt in the petroleum sector and to increase the power generating 
capacity through the use of non-renewable sources of energy (including photovoltaic 
street lights in villages, PV water pumps, PV domestic light units and wind farms) to the 
extent of 750 to 1,000 MW. The four ministries of Coal, Petroleum and Natural Gas, 
Power and Renewable Energy, have all launched modest programmes to increase the 
efficiency of production. 
The Energy Management Centre was set up in 1989 under the Ministry of Power, but ten 
years later it is seen as a defunct body with marginal significance.45 This is because it was 
not empowered to be able to operate outside the system of the ministries. There are some 
initiatives taken at state level (see 4.2.4.1), and some at central level. Till recently the 
only instrument was compulsory energy audits for some types of companies; but there has 
been a huge problem of non-compliance. Only 3000 out of the hundreds of thousands of 
industries in India submitted their audits in 1993. This is also because of the lack of 
public participation, erroneous and insufficient monitoring and institutional gaps (Sharma 
1998). The ministry has drafted a law on energy conservation which sets up a Bureau of 
Energy Efficiency largely for setting norms and standards for energy consumption in 
process and production, transportation and end-use and for mandating energy audits by 
large consumers.  
                                                   
45  Meeting India 2000: 20, 21 
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In addition to the legal and policy framework, there are a number of ministries that make 
policies that are relevant for specific sectors. India has at present 75 ministries at the 
central government level and different ministries have different responsibilities with 
respect to specific sectors.  
Industry interests are represented by three major industrial organisations. The 
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) (brochure) represents 80% of the organised 
industrial sector. It aims at facilitating change and fostering industrial integration with the 
global economy. It has a national council, regional, state and zonal councils. It has 
specialised committees, industry divisions and affiliated associations and institutions. The 
CII focuses on environmental and energy related issue. The Environment department 
focuses on convincing industry to become ISO 14000 companies, they conduct audits, 
draft policies, site assessments.46 The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 
India (ASSOCHAM) focuses more on fiscal issues. The Federation of Indian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI 1999 a) has 417 ordinary members, 1187 associate 
members and 50 Corporate members. It has been around for 73 years! Then there are 
specialised bodies such as Engineers India Limited (1999), Bharat Heavy Electricals 
Limited (BHEL) that makes power plant equipment, the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) which examines macroeconomic issues like industrial and 
demand surveys with expertise on power and infrastructure and others.  
 
Box 4.3 Elements of the Energy Conservation Bill 2000 
 
The Energy Conservation Bill establishes a Bureau of Energy Efficiency with specific powers and func-
tions. It explains the power of the central and state governments in enforcing efficient use of energy 
and its conservation. It makes provision for funding these tasks. It outlines the penalties to be im-
posed in case of violation of the laws. The law identifies the following sectors as energy intensive 
sectors: aluminium, fertilisers iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper, chlor-alkali, sugar, petro-
chemicals, gas crackers and naphtha crackers and thermal power stations, electricity transmission 
and distribution companies and commercial buildings or establishments specified as designated 
consumer (The schedule). In particular, the Bureau is empowered to make recommendations to the 
government on norms for processes and energy consumption standards, labelling on equipment, 
guidelines for energy conservation in building codes, training for personnel, consultancy services, 
research and development on energy conservation, development of testing and certification proce-
dures, development of pilot projects, promotion of energy efficient uses, innovative financing, fi-
nancial assistance to companies, levy fees, maintain a list of accredited energy auditors, and, inter 
alia, implement international co-operation programmes on energy conservation. The state is also 
empowered to constitute a State Energy Conservation Fund, in which money will be collected for 
the purpose of funding conservation projects under this Act. 
 
The banks that lend to this sector include the Industrial Development Bank of India 
(IDBI), the Small Industries Development Bank (SIDB), and The National Bank for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) in India.  
Research and Non-Governmental Organisations play a major role in influencing policy. A 
key actor is the Tata Energy Research Institute.  
The following section discusses the cement, iron and steel industry, aluminium, 
household and lighting, water pumps, cogeneration and motors and drives. 
                                                   
46  Meeting India 2000: 27 
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4.3.1.1 Cement 
Cement is a major and growing sector in a developing country like India and has received 
considerable government attention. India has substantial limestone; about 1/3 of the 
sedimentary rocks in India have limestone. The deposits are mostly in Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The actors in the cement sector 
consist of the (a) the public sector (the Cement Corporation of India),47 about 100 large 
private sector companies, 57 cooperatives, 300 small plants, (b) the Ministry of Industry 
which includes the Development Council for the Cement Industry, (c) the Cement 
Manufactures Association (CMA)48 which represents the large scale companies and the 
All India Mini Cement Manufacturers Association which represents the small scale 
industry, (e) the National Council for Cement and Building Materials, (f) the IDBI and 
the state banks lend to this sector, and (g) environmental regulations are made by the 
environment ministry. 
CCI
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Industry
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Figure 4.1 Actors in the cement sector. 
 
The policy in this sector is made by the Ministry of Industry. The old policy has been to 
control price and distribution of cement and freight equalisation. The decontrol policy 
began in 1977 with a 12% post tax returns on net worth on new capacity creation and was 
completed in 1989. In 1991 licensing was abolished for the sector (Sarathy and 
Chakravarty 1999: 6). 
The new policy includes permission to own captive mines, and an ‘own your wagon’ 
scheme initiated by the Railways, and the Ministry coordinated the Cement Industry 
Human Resource Development Project assisted by the World Bank, and Danida to 
modernise the sector. The policy on freight equalisation has also been discontinued to the 
benefit of this sector. 
                                                   
47  The CCI has nine units, 3 in Madhya Pradesh, 2 in Andhra Pradesh, 1 each in Karnataka, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Assam, and Delhi and the total production is 38.48 lath tonnes. Of this 7.8 lakh tones is produced by 
the wet process. Since July 1996, CCI is a sick company; there is a sluggish market and the profits are low. 
The sizes of the companies are also not very economical for the latest technologies. Three of the factories (two 
in Madhya Pradesh and one in Haryana) are in the process of being sold to the private sector. CCI is also a 
member of the CMA (Meeting India 2000: 39 ). 
48  The CMA was established in 1961 and represents 58 companies with 120 plants. It promotes the growth of the 
industry, protects consumer interest, identifies new uses of cement and exchanges information (CMA 2000). 
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The cement producers themselves have certain environmental goals. The sector wishes to 
use washed coal since it reduces freight costs, cost of processing the raw materials and 
increases the efficiency of pyro processing. Dipika washeries has been set up and began 
production in 1999. The cement plants in the Bilaspur cluster will probably be taking 
advantage of these washeries (CMA 1999: 17). USAID’s Clean Technology Initiative is 
developing a project to improve the energy efficiency and performance of the cement 
industry in two plants in Rajasthan, one in Gujarat, two in Madhya Pradesh and one in 
Tamil Nadu (CMA 1999: 30). The sector is considering the development of Voluntary 
Environmental Agreements with the government. Some of the industry has received 
prizes from the National Productivity Council and Energy Efficiency Awards from the 
Union Ministry of Power and the NCB energy efficiency Awards. While the large-scale 
sector is motivated towards modernisation, the small-scale sector is facing considerable 
difficulties.  
3.3.3 Iron and steel 
The iron and steel sector is seen as the backbone of a developing country and will need to 
grow over time. The growth will be facilitated by available resources, loans and export 
demand.49 However, the experience over the last ten years has been mixed (see Chapters 6 
and 9). 
The iron and steel sector is a sector that has been at the focus of government policy 
attention for several decades. India has large iron ore deposits (10053 Mt of heamatite and 
3407 Mt of magnetite) spread through Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Goa, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu (Ministry of Steel 
1999: 20). The demand for iron and steel is growing and expected to show a similar 
growth in the future (see Chapter 6).  
The key actors in the field are (a) the public sector undertaking Steel Authority of India 
Limited (SAIL)50, the private company Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (TISCO)51, 
and some 19 new private sector entrants like ESSAR, ISPAT, JINDALS, 52 etc. and 
another 400 players in the field;53 (b) the Development Commissioner54 of steel, ministry 
                                                   
49  Meeting India 2000: 2 
50  SAIL, with 4 plants and 2 captive power units per plant produces 12 Mt of steel (Meetings 2000: 2) and is the 
10th largest steel producer in the world (Meeting India 2000: 31). 85% is owned by the Government of India. 
SAIL has another plant in Vishakapatnam (Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited) (Meeting India 2000: 4). SAIL 
was originally conceived to produce steel and had its own captive power plants. There was no real incentive to 
ensure energy efficiency. In the last few years SAIL came under heavy criticism because of poor quality steel 
rails sold to Indian Railways and poor quality bullet proof shirts and because of its financial losses (Meeting 
India 2000: 6). In order to compete in the new open market, SAIL has invested in new technologies, and since 
the government has decided to disinvest in the process of divesting in power, fertilizer and steel, SAIL has 
spent Rs 1200 crores in modernisation to use continuous casting and BOF casting. Thin slab casting is not yet 
used and strip casting is seen as not necessary. The aim of SAIL is to be one of the cheapest steel producing 
company in the world, but unfortunately has too many employees. SAIL has an Environment Management 
Group to supervise the emissions in each plant and treat the fuels (Meeting India 2000: 4 ). 
51  TISCO is the oldest private sector steel company producing 3.6 Mt of steel annually (Meetings 2000: 2). 
Since liberalisation there are a number of new entrants Mukand Ltd. Sunflag Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. And 
Mahindra Ugine Ltd. 
52  They reportedly use state of the art technologies to generate about 3.5 Mt of steel annually (Meetings 2000: 
2). However, they have not invested wisely and so they are not doing very well. 
53  Meeting India 2000: 31 
54  The development commissioner of steel is responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating informa-
tion, monitoring regional supply and price trends and suggesting remedial measures, monitoring and advising 
on import and export, management and allocation of distribution to priority sectors (defence, railways, small 
scale industries Corporation, engineering goods export units, North-Eastern states), survey steel industry, ren-
der assistance to EAF units and the secondary sector in terms of capacity assessment, procurement of indige-
nous and imported raw material etc, interface between government and consumers, co-ordinate the movement 
of raw materials to steel plants and vigilance functions to prevent misuse of steel.  
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of steel and ministry of industry who provide the framework for decision-making, (c) the 
ministry of environment which adopts environmental norms, (d) the provincial 
governments that provide incentives for industry, (e) the Steel Consumers’ Council which 
is at present passive, (f) the Steel Exporters Forum,55 (g) Indofer – the federation of new 
companies, and (h) the banks that lend to this sector – including the Industrial 
Development Bank of India. 
Figure 4.2 Actors in the iron and steel sector. 
Pre 1990, the Department/ Ministry of Steel and the Ministry of Industry made policies, 
controlled pricing, production and distribution.56 The production was concentrated in 
three companies - SAIL (and its plants Indian Iron and Steel Company – IISCO), 
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL) and TISCO - and although TISCO was more 
energy efficient than SAIL, neither was efficient. Both had captive power plants. The 
Indian iron and steel companies, like its Brazilian counterpart, was unable to modernise 
its technological base, as was undertaken in Korea, where the state through strategic 
interventions ensured the technological modernisation of the sector (D’Costa 1999).  
Since 1991, the policy is in a state of transition. The key features of this transitional 
policy are: 
- Liberalisation: The New Industrial Policy of July 1991 exempted the sector from 
compulsory licensing and iron and steel was no longer reserved for the public sector. 
In May 1992, the industry was included in the list of high priority industries for 
automatic approval of foreign equity investment up to 51% (and today up to 74%). 19 
new projects have been cleared since 1991 by the All India Financial Institutions.  
- Pricing: Pricing and distribution was controlled since 1964 by the Joint Plant 
Committee because of steel scarcity and the government wish to guarantee 
availability for defence and railways.57 Since 1992, price and distribution have been 
deregulated but the Development Commissioner monitors and allocates steel to meet 
the needs of small scale industries, exporters of engineering goods and the North 
                                                   
55  The Steel Exporters forum, established in February 1998, was set up resolve the common challenges faced by 
all actors in the field in relation to export. It is chaired by the development commissioner and includes all pro-
ducers, major consumers and key ministries (Ministry of Steel 2000: 16). An Institute for Steel Development 
and Growth (INSDAG) was set up in Calcutta with leading producers as members and focuses on reduced 
costs of power and raw materials for mini steel plants, strengthening of anti-dumping rules, etc.  
56  Meeting 2000: 2, 4 
57  Meeting 2000: 31 
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Eastern region, defence and railways have access to steel (The Ministry of Steel 1999: 
11).  
- Import regime modified: Prior to 1990 there was controlled import through licensing, 
foreign exchange control, canalisation and high import tariffs. This has been modified 
and import duties have fallen. 
- Freight equalisation: The freight equalisation policy that led to common prices for all 
states was withdrawn in 1992 and now states closer to the mines can access the iron at 
cheaper prices.  
- Levy: The levy on producers to contribute to the Steel Development Fund has been 
abolished since 1994. 
- Export-import policy: The Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Steel decide on 
export policy; both import and export is freely allowed and the process is monitored 
through a Duty Entitlement Pass Book. The government, however, imposes ceilings 
on the export of high grade ore which may be needed for the domestic market.  
Exports now include high grade products such as hot and cold rolled coils, colour 
coated sheets and GP/GC sheets.  
The Ministry of Steel (1999: 8) now facilitates the steel production process and tries to 
provide guidelines. They have established: 
- A Management Information System to, inter alia, monitor steel production and 
supply;  
- An Empowered Committee to approve and support Scientific Research Programmes 
to provide direction to the research efforts on iron and steel. The focus is on  
improving the quality of steel products, utilising waste and reducing energy 
consumption;  
- Policy to promote and observe the energy conservation activities in each industry, 
with a specific focus on certain technology options;  
- Rules to promote Environmental Management and Pollution Control plans to achieve 
pollution control norms by the plants (Ministry of Steel 1999).  
Many of the larger plants have undertaken large tree planting activities as part of their 
environmental policy.  
4.3.1.2 Aluminium 
India has the fifth largest alumina deposits (3037 Mt) in the world, with a potential to last 
for 350 years of use. Most of the deposits are in Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Bihar. There is growing demand for aluminium in a 
developing country like India in the sectors of construction, power transmission and 
distribution, aircrafts, space crafts, automobiles, kitchen ware, architectural fittings, grain 
silos, industrial explosives, defence and packaging.  
The main actors in the sector are (a) the two public sector companies (NALCO58 and 
BALCO59), three private companies (HINDALCO,60 INDAL61 and MALCO62), and the 
                                                   
58  NALCO was established in 1981 to implement the Bauxite Alumina Aluminium project in Orissa with a ca-
pacity of 800,00. It has one smelter. It used technology from Aluminium Pechiney of France. It is a multiloca-
tional greenfield project. It has bauxite mines in Panchpatmalli, an alumina refinery in Damanjodi, a smelter 
pant in Angul, a captive power plant in Angul and port facilities in Bizag. It used captive power of 3950 mil-
lion units in 1998-99. They have been having problems in performance (see Chapter 8), but expansion plans 
are being developed. An energy audit has been done by TERI. 
59  BALCO was established in 1965 and has an integrated Alumina/Aluminium Complex at Korba in Madhya 
Pradesh with a capacity of 200,000. It has one smelter. It uses Soviet technology. A second unit is in West 
Bengal. It has captive power production. BALCO is in the process of being privatised. 
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55 smaller extrusion companies that use aluminium ingots,63 (b) the ministry of Mines64 
and the Ministry of Industry which provides the framework for decision-making, (c) the 
ministry of environment which adopts environmental norms, (d) the provincial 
governments that provide incentives and no objection certificates for industry, (e) 
Aluminium Association of India in Bangalore,65 (f) the banks that lend to this sector,66 
and (g) the scientific centres – Jawaharlal Nehru Aluminium Research development and 
Design Centre JRDC in Nagpur67 and the National Environmental Engineering Research 
Institute (NEERI) in Nagpur (see Figure 3.3). 
The policy for the sector is developed by the Department of Mines in the Ministry of 
Steel and Mines. Pre 1990, the central government made policies, and controlled pricing, 
production and distribution.68 The current government policy is to simplify the 
privatisation process. There are two major considerations. First, the plant should not be in 
urban areas, and second, it should not be in areas where the small-scale sector is 
flourishing.69 The sector is very diverse regarding the age and quality of technologies 
used, making it difficult to generalise. The industry has occasionally consulted companies 
like EIL for energy audits.70  
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Figure 4.3 The actors in the aluminium sector. 
The sector was highly regulated till 1989 and has been gradually deregulated with the 
rescinding of the Aluminium Control Order in 1991. The government has: 
- Set mutually acceptable targets in a Memorandum of Understanding with NALCO 
and BALCO;  
- Set excise duty on aluminium and aluminium products at 15%; 
                                                                                                                                                 
60  Hindalco (1999), a private company of BIRLA, is the largest single location integrated aluminium facility in 
the world with an installed capacity of 350,000 in Renukoot in Uttar Pradesh. It has one smelter. They are the 
lowest cost producers in the world. It produces 44% of the Indian primary aluminium. 
61  Capacity of 312,000 in Muri in Bihar and Belgaum in Karnataka. It has three smelters. 
62  Capacity 50,000 in Madras in Tamil Nadu. It has one smelter. 
63  Meeting India 2000:19 
64  The main function of the Department of Mines is the survey and exploration of non-ferrous metals including 
bauxite.  
65  The AAI established in 1981 represents the primary producers extruders, fabricators, foundries, downstream 
product manufacturers, reeseachers, technologies and R&D institutions. 
66  Meeting India 2000: 16, 19 
67  The JRDC focuses, inter alia, on the digestion efficiency and precipitation characteristics in the Bayer process, 
reuse of waste material, benificiation of bauxite.  
68  Meeting 2000: 19 
69  Meeting India 2000: 44 
70  Meeting India 2000: 17 
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- Set custom duty of 20% ad valorem;  
- Granted exemption from compulsory licensing; 
- Included aluminium in the list of industries where automatic approval of foreign 
equity up to 51% is available to encourage foreign investment. 
The aluminium industry has itself also taken some energy and environment related 
measures. NALCO has adopted a system of constant monitoring of specific energy 
consumption figures, it has taken energy conservation measures, conducts energy audits 
and is exploring the possibility of using renewable energy. All the units have ISO 140001 
environment management system certificates. In total 5.3 million trees have been planted 
by the company. Its record has been so good that it has five major awards in this field.71 
Also BALCO and Hindalco have taken energy conservation measures and undertake tree 
planting activities.  
4.3.2  Households and Lighting 
Light is a basic necessity in the industrial and household sector. Lighting accounts for 
34% of peak power consumption and 17% of total power consumption in India (cited in 
Sastry and Gadgil 1996: 804), although only 30% of the 130 million households are 
presently electrified. Savings are possible through replacement of conventional lamps by 
energy efficient ones. However, since the initial costs are high and electricity is subsidised 
for certain groups of consumers, the consumers are averse to the such changes. This 
measure is very important for peak power planning, which in its turn is important since 
India mainly possesses base-load plants (Kedia 1997). Urbanisation is also likely to have 
an impact on electricity use. One estimate shows that if urbanisation shares double, then 
even if per capita income remains and industrialisation unchanged, energy including 
electricity consumption could increase by 45% (Jones 1991: 628). 
The actors in the lighting sector are (a) the companies like Surya, Philips, etc. that are 
producing CFLs (b) the older companies producing conventional bulbs, (c) the 
households, (d) commercial consumers, and (e) the SEBs possibly. The standard in India 
is a maximum limit on power consumption for each rated wattage (see Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4 The actors in the light bulb sector. 
 
The variety of energy efficient lighting available in India is GLS lamps, fluorescent tubes, 
high and low pressure mercury and sodium vapour lamps, allied equipment like chokes, 
capacitors and domestic, industrial and outdoor fittings. There is not much technology for 
                                                   
71  The Gem granite environment award for 197-98, the Sitaram Rungta Memorial Social Awareness Award 197-
98, Polution control Excellence Award from the Orissa State Governemnt, Best Occupational Services Award 
for the state and Indira Priyadarshini Briskhamitra Award for 1994.  
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production of these lamps in India and hence modernisation calls for imports (Ministry of 
Industry 2000: 68-69).  
In the urban household sector, cooking takes about 57% of the energy, space cooling 
18%, lighting – 9%, water heating 7% and others – 9% (Srivastava 1997: 945 citing an in-
house publication of 1988). In a study of 2000 households in Hyderabad, it was seen that 
although all the houses had access to electricity, the electricity supply was not stable and 
was subject to load shedding, voltage fluctuations and black outs. Most houses use about 
30 different appliances for lighting, heating, kitchen gadgets and entertainment and 
electricity is one fourth of the total energy consumed. The average consumption per 
household is 90kWh and the per capita rate is 15 kWh. The average price paid was Rs. 
1.10 kWh while the generation costs are Rs. 1.27/kWh. For the poorest households, 
energy costs about 14% of their income, for the richest – it is about 3%. As a result of the 
subsidies, the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board loses Rs 150 million in the city of 
Hyderabad alone and is in a financial crisis. Interviews with households reveal that the 
richer households would support price rationalisation, while the poorer households would 
need price support (Alam et al. 1998). 
4.3.3 Water pumps for Irrigation 
Another major consumer of electricity is the sector ‘water pumps’. Water pumps in 
particular consume 85% of total agricultural electricity consumption (Kirloskar Borthers 
1999: 10). The number of pumps today in agriculture is about 15 million consuming 
between 25 to 40% of the national electricity, using energy inefficient technologies. 
(Kirloskar Brothers 2000). It is expected that this will continue to be a major consuming 
sector because of the importance of agriculture to the Indian economy, and the current 
heavy dependence on the rains. Electric pumps in general are driven by motors and drives 
and used in industries, municipal works, in agriculture and domestic situations (see 4.3.4).  
The actors in this sector are (a) the millions of farmers, (b) the large companies like 
Kirloskar,72 Lubi, Texmo, Crompton Greaves, PSG, Unnati, Sabar and Kalsi, (c) the 
thousands of assemblers and repairers who make a living in this sector, (d) the state 
governments and the SEBs, (e) IREDA, REC and other state banks, (f) the Central Board 
of Irrigation and Power set up by government but now a professional consultancy73 (see 
Figure 4.5). 
In 1969 the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) was established to provide loans for 
rural electrification and in the last thirty years the number of electrified water pumps have 
multiplied and now provide enough water to increase the food production in India to meet 
the growing population of the country. This in itself is a tremendous achievement.74 There 
is no organised policy for this sector as a whole; although there have been some 
initiatives. The Government of India has adopted standards of IS 10804 for the system 
and the pipes that are meant to guide the sector.  
 
                                                   
72  Kirloskar pumps provides to about 45% of the market and exports to 32 countries. They expect a penetration 
of 800,000 pumps per year for the next 20 years (Meeting India 2000: 13).  
73  The CBIP established in 1927 has specialists in water and energy management and its purpose was to advance 
knowledge and technical forecasting, undertake research and establish communication with the actors in the 
field. Although established by Government of India, today it is a private company.  
74  Meeting India 2000: 5 
An Asian Dilemma 
 83 
Figure 4.5 The actors in the water pump sector. 
Charges to farmers for agricultural pumping vary from region to region. In Delhi, tube 
wells and threshers pay Rs 50 per kWh for a load up to 10 kW and farmhouses pay the 
same as domestic rates for a load up to 25 kW. In Punjab electricity for pumping is 
provided free. In Rajasthan there are minimum monthly charges for pumping, depending 
on the horsepower of the pump. In Uttar Pradesh there is a fixed charge per pump. In 
Madhya Pradesh, the charges are seasonal. In Maharashtra there is a minimum charge per 
pump (COPU 1998). 
Non-electrified pumps use diesel and these too lead to the emissions of greenhouse gases, 
especially when the diesel (Rs 7 per litre) is then subsequently adulterated with kerosene 
(Rs. 2.70 per litre; cross-subsidised through higher prices on petrol) and this leads to 
reduced efficiency of the pump.75 Water pumps are used mostly by large and rich farmers, 
small farmers that work through cooperatives but not marginal farmers. Different parts of 
India use different systems. The technical options available for modernising this sector 
are in Chapter 6, and the institutional challenges are highlighted in Chapter 9. 
4.3.4 Co-generation 
Co-generation calls for the more efficient use of fuel by generating electricity and heat (at 
a useful temperature and pressure) simultaneously. Cogeneration of heat and power can 
take place at three different levels: at large scale power plants, at the level of industrial 
parks (serving different plants) and at the individual plant level. At the individual plant 
level, there is a theoretical potential for cogeneration of 6500-8000 MW in the sugar, 
alcohol, paper, rice paddy, iron and steel, fertiliser, petrochemical, paper, aluminium and 
cement sectors (76 ; http://www.nic.in/indmin/india.htm). More than 50% of this potential 
is located in the sugar industry. 
The policy in this sector is made by the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources 
(MNES). The Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources has established a National 
Programme on Bagasse-Based Cogeneration in January 1994 offering several incentives 
which have been quite successful (Dadhich 1997, Gupta, A. 1997). A number of 
government supported initiatives are underway. These aim at optimising generation of 
surplus power for the grid from sugar mills. A large capacity is already established or under 
construction (see Chapter 6). Use of advanced technologies such as Biomass Integrated 
                                                   
75  Meeting India 2000: 6, 24 
76  Meeting India 2000: 8, 26 
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Gasification-cum-Gas Turbine Combined Cycle which would enable production of almost 
twice the useful energy from the same biomass, is also being explored. A revised policy 
document is expected in 2002.77  
The field is not very well defined and the actors are diffuse. There are research institutes 
promoting the issue (e.g. TERI), implementing companies (e.g. WINROCK 
International)78 the confederation of Indian Industry, and there are some industries 
interested, and potential lending agencies. 
Cogeneration in the sugar industry: Except in 1998-99, with only 2.7% of the land under 
sugar cultivation India has been the world’s largest producer and consumer (12%) of 
sugar in the world. With the increase in consumption growth, population growth and junk 
food production, the industrial use of sugar will go up. Sugarcane is the most profitable 
commercial crop in India. In the 9th plan there was a 5.6% increase expected in the sugar 
industry. However, in other parts of the world sugar growth is stabilising; and some 
countries are developing high fructose corn sugar in the chemical industry as a sugar 
substitute. Nevertheless, it is expected that in 20 years the sugar industry will double, 
because of the increased demand, and the de-licensing of the sector from 1998.79  
The sugar sector is interested in cogeneration and there are many identifiable actors in 
this sector. These include the (a) sugar industry80 and its (b) cooperatives81 producing 
60% of the sugar, the (c) MNES, the (d) provincial governments that provide incentives, 
(e) the State Electricity Boards that need to make power purchase agreements, (f) the 
potential and actual lenders like the Rural Electrification Corporation82 (see Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6  Actors in the sugar cogen sector. 
 
The internal power of the sugar sector was always met through cogeneration. The key is-
sue now is: can they improve their efficiencies to such an extent that surplus electricity 
will be generated which can be sold? In 1992 the sugar industry produced 150MW of 
                                                   
77  Meeting India 2000: 8 
78 WINROCK International is funded by USAID to do technical assistance in this area and they promote capacity 
building in this sector and the in-plant training. They complement the work of the MNES. The bagasse based 
plants usually have a plant load factor of 70-75%; the GEF funded plants have a PLF of 80% (Meeting India 
2000:15).  
79  Meeting India 2000: 38 
80  The sector consists of about 250 mills of which 125 are in Maharashtra and the rest are in Karnataka, Gujarat, 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh (Meeting India 2000: 15, 30). 
81  Each cooperative has from 5000-150,000 members, farmers, with a little bagasse. 
82  Meeting India 2000: 5 
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electricity. It has been estimated that around 3500 MW of additional power could be pro-
duced if all of the sugar mills switched over to modern techniques of cogeneration (Gupta, 
A. 1997 or 1987). Since then the number of units and the size of the sector has gone up. In 
1992 the MNES set up a scheme to subsidise demonstration cogen plants. However not 
much happened in practice. There was difficulty getting grants from the MNES.83 
The sector is however convinced that there is considerable potential if they can sell the 
electricity to the grid. “The problem is the sugar industry is not doing very well at present 
and there is a shortage of funds in the sector. The Clean Development Mechanism or the 
Global Environment Facility could play a role in this sector. But the government must 
take the decision here. The CDM should also offer a financial rebate.”84 
 
Box 4.4 State policy on cogen 
 
Maharashtra, which produces more sugar than Australia, has 130 mills, 128 cooperatives and 2 in the 
private sector.85 For the cooperatives, equity has been a major bottleneck in developing cogenera-
tion here, but the state government has very good policies.86 Maharashtra had its first cogen project 
in 1991. Since then they have encouraged all new mills to add a boiling house for cogen; and have 
invested in old mills and made deals with the SEB so that power can be sold at Rs 2.60 per unit. 
About one dozen units are in operation producing at 10 MW capacity; some have a capacity of 
about 25-30 MW. There is a state cooperative federation; and all the cooperatives have a Research 
and Development Institute with 120 scientists and technocrats. They focus on (a) continuously de-
veloping the sugar cane, (b) developing machinery, (c) the use of by-products for cogen and alcohol 
based products, and (d) training. “Our experience with the paper mills is that it is not competitive 
for us. We cannot create enough bagasse to supply continuously for the paper mills, and so the best 
use of the bagasse is cogen.”87 However, although Maharashtra has good policy, there are few Inde-
pendent Power Producers that are willing to take on the job of generation using the bagasse. The 
government offers 25% of the investment if a IPP comes in. It will provide free electricity to the 
sugar farmer if he can provide electricity all the year round by augmenting the bagasse in some 
way.88  
Gujarat has no active policy implementation in this field.89 Uttar Pradesh has tried to encourage cogen, 
but the UPSEB pays too little and too late.90 It decided that if it pays within a month of the pay date, 
it should get a rebate of 2 ½ % instead of having to pay a fine!!!  
Tamil Nadu has a good policy and payment system.91 The first two projects in Tamil Nadu demon-
strated the possibility of increasing the efficiency and making profits in the sugar sector. In Tamil 
Nadu, the TNSEB was willing to pay for the electricity generated by the Cooperative Sugar Mills. 
For the private sector this is a win-win situation if they can get a power purchase agreement with 
the SEBs. In the case of Tamil Nadu, the MNES lent straight to the State Government to invest in 
this field, because TEDA only looks at wind energy and biomass assessment. For the cooperative 
sector it makes sense to collect their bagasse and sell it to an Independent Power Producer; the risk 
then has to be taken by the IPP and they see the potential in this sector. But there are not that many 
IPPs in this sector yet. The technologies for bagasse cogen are available in the country.92 Tamil 
Nadu agreed to give us Rs 2.25 against a base year of 94-95. There is an escalation of 5% per 
year.93 
 
                                                   
83  Meeting India 2000: 38 
84  Meeting India 2000: 38 
85  Meeting India 2000: 23 
86  Meeting India 2000: 30 
87  Meeting India 2000 
88  Meeting India 2000: 15, 27,38 
89  Meeting India 2000: 30 
90  Meeting India 2000: 15, 27 
91  Meeting India 2000: 27 
92  Meeting India 2000:15 
93  Meeting India 2000: 38 
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4.3.5 Motors and drives 
Motors and drives are used in all industrial sectors as well as the agricultural sector and 
household appliances, in the form of pumps, fans, blowers, compressors, cooling etc. 
Motors consume 74% of all industrial electricity use and a substantial part of agricultural 
and residential use. 
There is no institutional framework as such in the sector – motors. The key actors in this 
field are the (a) large companies like Kirloskar (33% of the market), Crompton Greaves, 
NGEF (New Government Electrical Fittings), Kawat, Bharat Bijli, Siemens, ABB, Jyoti, 
GEC Alstom, (b) the Motor Manufacturers Association (MMA) in Bombay which 
represents 60% of the market, (c) the remaining 20% of non-branded motor 
manufacturers and assemblers consisting of about 474 companies (Kirloskar Brothers 
1999: 10; 94), (d) industrial sectors, (e) consumers, (f) the ministry of industry, and (g) 
provincial government policy. Most of the large companies have technical tie-ups with 
foreign companies and most of the motors are produced through local research. The CII 
and the Motor Manufacturers Association have prepared manuals on motors.95 
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Figure 4.7 The actors in the motors and drives sector. 
 
The policy is that motors need to comply with Bureau of Indian Standards and that a 
motor should be capable of delivering its rated output with a voltage variation of + 6% 
and frequency variation of + 3%. India manufactures motors, transformers and generators 
using ISI standards which are parallel to IEC standards especially during the last ten 
years.96 The ISI has a variety of standards for different classes of insulation and motors – 
from grade A to F. Most small manufacturers are using grade E while the bigger 
manufacturers use some high standard.97  
4.3.6 Analysis 
The lack of progress in the energy conservation process in the different sectors can be 
attributed to (a) the absence of a comprehensive conservation policy; (b) lack of 
conservation awareness in medium and small industries; (c) weak financial incentives; (d) 
shortage of trained manpower and demonstration centres, (e) poor energy pricing policies 
                                                   
94  Meeting India 2000: 11 
95  Meeting India 2000: 27 
96  Meeting India 2000: 11 
97  Meeting India 2000: 11, 28 
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and subsidised electricity prices; (d) poor information and promotion programmes; (e) the 
cost and reliability of efficient technological options; (f) weak markets and the lack of 
competition and social and political consideration (Shukla 1993 or 1995, Kedia 1997). 
The technological options for each sector are discussed further in Chapter 6, and Chapter 9 
examines the stakeholder perceptions in more detail. 
4.4 Rural Issues 
“One long-term policy that serves the objective of sustainable development is the 
promotion of rural development (Adballa 1994: 34). The bulk (70%) of the Indian 
population lives in rural areas. 43% of the rural population lives below the poverty line. 
Only one-third of the total electricity supply is consumed in the rural areas, despite three-
fourths of the population living in these areas. The rest of the rural energy demand is met 
by fuelwood, dung cakes, crop residues, oil, LPG, CNG and coal.  
The main actors involved in rural electrification are the farmers, the SEBs, the Rural 
Electrification Corporation that lends for such projects and the Central Institute for Rural 
Electrification.98 The Rural Electrification Corporation is empowered to make loans to the 
State Electricity Boards for the purpose of financing such electricity projects.  
Rural electrification was prioritised in the 1970s and 1980’s. Since the 1980’s, rural 
electrification in India has not received much attention. Rural energy is used for 
agricultural operations, domestic activities like cooking,99 lighting and industry (pottery, 
flour mills etc.). At present these needs are met in general by fuelwood, human energy, 
kerosene, bullock energy, and electricity (Reddy 1999). In terms of consumption, the 
villages use electricity primarily for water pumps and lighting (see 4.3.2). Govinda Rao 
(1997) argues that 35% of the electricity is used by agricultural pumpsets which consume 
25%-40% more energy than efficient pump sets. In India, rural electrification100 was 
translated into grid extension to villages. Government policy aimed at full electrification 
of all villages starting from the concept of one connection per village. “Rural 
electrification is an ongoing process. It begins with the provision of an electric connection 
to a village and as the demand for the load increases, the provision of load to the village 
has to be augmented and so the village is helped to develop. Village electrification does 
not thus come to an end. It provides services for basic uses and over time moves on to 
provide services for more sophisticated uses” explained an interviewee. The government 
aims to electrify all the 5,87,000 villages of the country. At present 86% of the villages 
(5.04 lakh villages) have access to electricity, and only about 31% of the rural households 
use electricity. About 81,000 villages are yet to be electrified and 76 million rural 
households still do not have access to electricity. Only about 15,000 villages qualify as 
remote or inaccessible. The remaining 65,000 lack electricity because of the lack of 
resources at the state level and the poor functioning of the SEBs. 
                                                   
98  The Rural Electrification Corporation is a financial institution that lends money to the SEBs if a proposed pro-
ject is viable for the express purpose of intensification and augmentation of the electric supply to the rural ar-
eas. They finance the particularly weak financial borrowers. The Government is the only share holder. 
99  Cooking, a major consumer of energy, but not electricity, uses mostly biomass. In 1984-85, the Ministry of 
Non-Conventional Energy Sources initiated a programme to improve the thermal efficiency of chulhas by 20-
25%. However, improved cook stoves only penetrated 15% of the households (Parikh et al 1999: 539-544; 
Srivastava 1997: 945). 
100  This was previously defined as “A village is classified as electrified if electricity is being used within its reve-
nue area for any purpose whatsoever”. This definition has now been modified to: “A village will be deemed to 
be electrified if electricity is used in the inhabited locality within the revenue boundary of the village for any 
purpose whatsoever.” The data in this section is based on the old definition. 
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The maximum number of pumpsets energised by REC projects in a state by 1999 was 1.3 
million in Andhra Pradesh, 1 million in Madhya Pradesh and the least was 29 pumps in 
Manipur (REC 2000: 44). 
Rural electrification is a challenging issue since people in rural areas can generally not 
afford to pay for the electrification. Thus the process of rural electrification begins as a 
process to provide villagers services and a chance to escape from the poverty trap. Why is 
rural energy important? Because, world-wide 1.7 billion people live without electricity 
and basic lighting facilities. Because the needs of the poor need to be taken into account 
to guarantee less rural urban migration on the one hand, and better quality of life for the 
villagers. However, centralised systems of electricity generation while suitable for supply 
to concentrated populations, may not be suitable for dispersed housing across the land. 
Rural electrification thus far has been successful to the extent that India is now self-
sufficient in food grains. However, it has not been successful in jolting the village 
economy out of its stagnation. Further, the inability of the villagers to pay coupled with 
populist policies of state governments led to financial crises in the state electricity boards 
thereby hampering the modernisation of these Boards. What are the reasons of such 
failure and what does this mean for the future policy? Foley (1992b) argues that rural 
electrification does not cause development. He argues that only when a rural area has 
reached a certain degree of development and needs electricity should it be provided. 
Hence, he is opposed to subsidies for rural electrification, since this will never lead to a 
sustainable system. Areas suitable for electrification are those that have infrastructure, 
there is agricultural output, evidence of production, clustering of villages, improving 
income standard and plans for developing the region (Foley 1992b: 146). He concludes 
that it is not the principle of rural electrification that is the issue but the timing and level 
of resources that should be devoted to it.  
On the other hand, this view is rejected by many from the developing countries that argue 
that there are many reasons for providing electricity and subsidising it for an initial set of 
years. Ranganathan (1993) explains that there are four rural electrification theories/ 
perceptions. The commodity perspective argues that rural electricity is only affordable in 
rich countries and income determines the demand for energy. From this perspective 
providing rural electrification in poor countries is an economically unviable proposition. 
The production input perspective argues that rural electrification can contribute to the 
production process of a particular rural economy. From this perspective, rural 
electrification helps a village to produce the products it is already producing. However, 
the key question here is: Does electricity demand arise from the need, or does electricity 
supply lead to growth? The idea of rural electricity as infrastructure implies that rural 
electricity can lead to secondary benefits by bringing down the costs of production. This 
means that if the village authorities decide to develop street lights etc., as part of the 
service they offer to villagers, this will bring down the costs of the electricity that is 
provided to the villagers since the costs of extending the grids will already have been 
borne by the village authorities. Here, the theory argues that if rural energy is included 
with other infrastructural needs, this will help to promote growth. Finally, rural electricity 
can be seen as a means to meet basic needs and as a means of redistributing income. In 
such a system the electricity is provided as part of a free package to villagers to improve 
their living conditions. The government of India approach has been to provide at least one 
connection to each village and as demand increases to try and meet the demand.  
However, none of these theories suggest ways to develop an electrification scheme that 
becomes self-sufficient in the long run. Hence, theorists argue that if rural electricity is to 
pay back in the long-term, it needs to be part of a system which provides complementary 
inputs to the system. Rural electrification tends to fail because either there is (a) good 
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demand but poor pricing, (b) low manifest demand but high latent demand,101 (c) entry 
barriers, (d) time lag before the demonstration effect operates, (e) lack of complementary 
inputs, (f) poor load factor and distance from the grid. If you provide electricity for rural 
industry then the costs of street lights and housing is only incremental. This makes it 
attractive in comparison to the alternatives to electrification. The problem is that utilities 
are adopting a loss minimising approach rather than a profit maximising approach 
(Ranganathan 1993: 148). This means that rural electrification should be a part of rural 
development planning and not a part of rural electrification planning. Reddy (1999) 
argues that rural energy systems must be economically efficient, need-oriented and 
equitable, self-reliant and empowering, and environmentally sound. This means that it 
must help to alleviate poverty, and improve the physical quality of life (PQOL) and the 
human development index (HDI). He argues that this means that the focus should be on 
energy services for cooking, water, lighting, transportation, employment and income 
generation and large improvements in HDI can be achieved through small energy inputs 
in the early stages of development. The focus should also be on poverty alleviation via 
improving the HDI so that the humans have the basic conditions and needs met and can 
move towards income generation. Reddy argues that there is need to harness the ‘blessing 
of the commons’, where individual interests can add up to community interests at the 
village level. He suggests that this means closing substance cycles at village level, and 
that systems should be biomass based, accessible, affordable and safe. He argues that 
solar home systems and PV systems are too expensive and elitist for the rural poor. 
However, if the PV systems are used to finance commercial activities in the village they 
may become viable in the long term (see Box 8.2).  
It is not just the philosophy of how to provide electricity to rural areas that is of relevance, 
but what kind of electricity. Till recently the focus has been on grid based electricity. But 
as the villages are becoming more and more remote, the question is are there alternatives? 
Sinha and Kandpal (1991) calculate that the costs of electrifying these villages will be 
much higher since these are by definition more remote. On the basis of several 
assumptions in relation to transmission and distribution losses (35% in rural areas), with 
low load factors and the costs of thermal power (which ranges from Rs. 0.538kWh to Rs 
0.317kWh), they calculate on the basis of several studies that the price of renewable 
energy is likely to range from 1.33 kWh to 35.41kWh. Solar pond costs Rs 6.80 per kWh, 
photovoltaic 19.98 and dish stirling Rs 5.0 per kWh; wind turbines of of 5, 8 and 10 CUF 
cost Rs. 35.41, 22.13 and 17.71 per kWh.  
The authors conclude that for villages about 15 km from the 33 kVgrid with a peak 
demand of 10kW, diesel and biomass based technologies become cost-effective for all 
load factors. Solar thermal becomes competitive at a load factor below 0.9. Wind 
becomes competitive when the load factor is 0.05 and the turbine can generate 700kWh 
per kW of rated capacity per year. These systems may become competitive in Orissa and 
the North Eastern States. India is already implementing perhaps the world's largest solar 
photovoltaic programme for decentralised applications in rural and remote areas. About 
425,000 systems aggregating to 30 MW have been installed. These include stand alone 
village, home and street lights; water pumps for drinking and irrigation; and , an extensive 
programme on solar lanterns. Appropriate integration of locally available renewable energy 
sources, is being attempted for total and continuous supply of electricity in the villages 
(Gupta, A. 1997). 
                                                   
101  The demand for energy (and hence electricity) is difficult to calculate. Some studies calculate such a demand 
on the basis of 510 kcal or 2.13 MJ daily per person. There are no empirical studies showing an increase in 
energy consumption per household in the rural areas. The emphasis is thus on energy needs, a normative is-
sue, as opposed to consumption, a factual issue (Sinha and Joshi 1997: 132).  
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Kishore (1997) classifies renewable energy technologies for rural areas into four 
categories. The first category includes technologies that have achieved a high degree of 
maturity in the developed countries such as PV systems, wind electric generators, solar 
thermal power plants, biomethanation systems. The second category includes 
technologies that have achieved a high degree of maturity in India such as solar water 
heaters, solar cookers, wind pumps, small-hydro turbines, biomass briquetting machines, 
biomass gasifiers, improved metal stoves and biogas burners. The third category consists 
of potentially suitable for future commercialisation while the last category consists of 
technologies that could specially benefit the rural areas such as family sized bio-gas 
plants. In the case of biogas, Abdalla (1994: 32) argues that these technologies are 
available in the developing countries and should be used to the utmost.  
Reddy (1999: 3442) argues that electricity development in rural areas would include 
biomass based generation, internal combustion engines coupled to generators in the short-
term, biomass based generation through microturbines and IGCC turbines, PV, wind, 
small hydro and solar thermal in the medium-term and fuel cells for base load power in 
the long-term. He also shows that there is potential for cogneration through internal 
combustion engines in the near term, and micro turbines and integrated gasified combined 
cycle turbines in the medium term.  
In the specific context of off-grid electricity to remote areas, the issue becomes more 
complicated. While on the one hand, it is precisely in these areas that renewable energy 
becomes competitive with non-renewable energy, this does not mean that it becomes 
affordable especially to the people in such remote areas. A remote area by definition is so 
far away from the rest of the country, that frequently there are no other good 
transportation or infrastructural facilities available to the people in these areas. This 
implies that the villagers may not be in a position to either afford such electricity or to 
maintain such infrastructure. For a renewable energy project to work, it needs to be 
combined with other infrastructural and institutional support. This makes it all the more 
vital to heed the warnings issued above as to the kind of criteria that must be satisfied if 
village electrification is to work and become self-sustaining.  
On 3 March 2001, the Chief Ministers and/ or Power Ministers of the different states met 
in Delhi and decided that rural electrification may be treated as a Basic Minimum Service 
under the prime minister's progremme - Gramodaya Yojana. The states aim to complete 
rural electrification by the end of the 10th Plan in 2007 and all households should have a 
connection by 2012. This programme is to be funded partly through the Rural 
Development Programmes and partly through special financing for remote villages.  
4.5 Analysis: First round of institutional policy options 
This chapter has been an extremely complicated exercise since everything, the 
organisations, the laws, the policies, and the society is in a state of flux and change. For 
the purpose of this analysis, we divide the analysis into four periods (pre-1990 and 
transitional solutions, problems in the interim period and post 2000), four categories 
(organisational, technological, economic, and social) and three issue areas (power supply, 
demand side management, and rural issues).  
In the pre-1990 period, the key organisational issues were the gross size of the problem,102 
the lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between centre and state and between 
                                                   
102  The sheer size of India, the population, the diverging social, political and management cultures, the division 
into states and union territories, its population and its financial problems make it much more difficult to de-
velop a manageable and efficient system in India. This problem had been initially dealt with by the Constitu-
tion of India by ensuring that the centre and the state had concurrent responsibility on the issue. 
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different organs at both levels.103 There was also government monopoly in electricity 
generation (with few exceptions). The tendency towards monopolisation especially at the 
state level of the sector led to lethargy and indifference to consumer interests, 
discouragement of captive power generation by taxing producers and discouragement of 
cogeneration. There was also vertical integration, bureaucratic control and lack of 
accountability. Curiously however, the PLF is better in central power plants than in state 
run power plants and in private power plants. The technological factors included the poor 
quality of coal and the high ash but low sulphur content, the inefficient plant load factors, 
the high transmission and distribution losses, the poor quality of technologies in use (see 
Chapter 6), and the low maintenance and renovation. In terms of economic and fiscal 
policy, there was neglect in investment in many sectors, an irrational pricing policy, 
controlled pricing in other sectors, poor collection of revenues and bankrupt state 
electricity boards.  
The end-use sectors, such as the iron and steel and aluminium sectors were under strong 
government control; they were monopolies with administered prices and had captive 
power plants. The water pump sector was heavily subsidised (or not; see Chapter 8). 
Cogeneration was not encouraged. Rural electrification meant the extension of a 
connection to each village.  
In the transition period, the government liberalised the electricity sector, encouraged coal 
and technology imports, retrofitting of existing plants, and a gradual phase-out of 
subsidies and price rationalisation. It also liberalised several end-use sectors and tried to 
encourage demand side management. 
In implementing the policy, there have been many challenges. Bureaucratic inertia and 
political instability104 have delayed implementation, technology imports were not always 
cheaper than domestic substitutes, the private sector was not forthcoming to invest in the 
electricity sector105, and the gradual phase-out of subsidies and price rationalisation is not 
politically easy. Electricity theft continues as although energy availability increased by 
4.2%, 75% of the increase was stolen. The increase in tariffs have ironically made theft 
more attractive. The per capita consumption of electricity has gone down from 336 units 
to 334 units in 1996-97. The PLF of plants may be going down. Demand management is 
inadequate and the population has reached the 1 billion mark. The increase in public 
sector generation has been low in this decade and the private sector generation also 
dismal (Neogi 2000). Neogi argues that “islands of change if attempted in isolation, will 
not work till corporate traditions for conduct of business are established”. As the 
Chairman of PFC (2000: 4) put it: “India suffers from a 1/3rd shortage syndrome. On a 
long term basis only 2/3rd of planned generation gets implemented; and only 2/3 of the 
capacity is generated and of the generated electricity only 2/3 rd reach the consumer. 
Only 2/3rd of the power supplied is billed and so there is shortage of finances in the 
sector.” 
                                                   
103  For example there is an absence of a commercial and administrative mechanism to regulate the inter-regional 
sharing of power; there is lack of synchronisation between generation and transmission facilities. The Naptha 
Jhakri Transmission System was completed in October 1999, although the Naptha Jhakri Hydro Electric Pro-
ject will only be completed in December 2001 (Singh 1997).  
104  ASSOCHAM (1999) argues that a key problem is that the politicians are not functioning. In the Lok and Ra-
jya Sabha bills pend for a long time from 7 months to a year; New bills are yet to be put on the agenda. Court 
disputes take about 20 years to resolve. 
105  Because of the bureaucratic problems and the lack of financial guarantees from the SEBs, the number of 
clearances required to set up a private power plant, the long negotiations needed for key projects like the 
Power Purchase Agreement and the Fuel Supply Agreement. For example, while ENRON jumped into the 
fray, it discovered soon that the government was not yet ready to deal with privatisation, and there have been 
relatively few takers in the following months. 
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Nevertheless, a number of policies and laws are being developed and implemented. Three 
energy bills are pending before Parliament. A number of new decisions have been taken 
to end theft and rationalise tariffs. The key conclusions that emerge from this chapter are 
as follows: 
First, the organisational, institutional, legal, policy and market framework relevant for the 
electricity sector is in a state of structural change since 1990. At the same time, the 
changes are being resisted by the people whose livelihoods are affected and are being 
hampered by the constantly changing governments in power in the last decade. This 
change amidst the continuity makes it difficult to predict how soon or fast actual change 
will be visible in the sector. Although major structural change is on the way, we maintain 
that although some states find themselves well into the transformation stage, others may 
still be in the pre-1990 stage in terms of the actual situation in these states.  
Second, what is amply clear is that a large number of measures have been taken in the 
energy supply side to rationalise the sector, to make it more cost-effective and efficient, 
which will help to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of generation since 1990. 
These measures include new laws such as the Coal Beneficiation Rules in 1996, the 
amendments to the Indian Electricity Act, the establishment of the Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions Ordinance, the Electricity 2000 Bill, the Renewable Energy Bill and the 
Accelerated Power Development Programme, as well as policy measures like the 
liberalisation of generation and distribution, the unbundling of the State Electricity 
Boards and the liberalisation of the investment rules and banking regulations. The 
decision to connect the regional grids will also lead to improvements in efficiency of 
electricity use. 
Third, although end-use efficiency improvement is a relatively new concept, the 
liberalisation of the cement, aluminium and iron and steel sectors, the de-licensing rules, 
the modified pricing policy, the establishment of management information systems, 
conservation and environmental guidelines, the adoption of the Energy Conservation Bill, 
the promotion of cogeneration, indicates major structural upheaval in the consuming 
sector. The increasing desire of large scale industry to conform to ISO standards and the 
pressure from the consumers means that in this sector too the efficiency of electricity use 
is being actively promoted and this will have an impact on the greenhouse gas emissions.  
Fourth, although in theory the rural sector is mostly electrified, electrification has yet to 
reach the rural homes. This is a major bottleneck that stands in the way of rural 
development. An integrated approach to rural development and electrification is 
necessary for this sector to develop. However, extension of the grid may be relatively 
more expensive than local grids based on renewable energy sources. To make these 
economically viable and affordable they have to be based on local sources, need to 
substitute existing unsustainable practices and need to lead to commercial gains for the 
villagers. The development of the rural areas may lead to an inevitable increase in 
electricity: the challenge is to find affordable ways of developing an environmentally and 
economically viable source of electricity.  
These are all very promising developments and imply that the greenhouse gas emission 
level of India is already below a business-as-usual level from the 1990 base year level and 
projections (see Chapter 5).  
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Table 4.2 The key issues affecting the electricity sector. 
 Pre-1990 problems Post 1990 policies Problems in the 
interim period 
Policy options for 
beyond 2000 
Power supply 
Organisational Problem size, 
lack of clarity in the 
division of 
responsibility 
government 
monopoly in 
production 
New administrative 
structure; unbundling 
of SEBs generation, 
transmission, and 
distribution 
activities, 
establishment of 
CERC and SERC; 
 
Political delays 
bureaucratic inertia; 
teething problems; 
resistance from 
employees in some 
states, unbundling is 
in different stages in 
different states; 
valuing the assets of 
SEBs difficult; 
privatisation process 
slow and problematic 
Learn from success 
stories and 
challenges; 
Continue with policy 
on organisational 
change; privatisation 
per sé is not the 
answer, increasing 
accountability is;  
need for bureaucratic 
“unfreezing”/instituti
onal “unlearning”; 
Renewable Energy 
Bill; Electricity 2000 
Bill 
Technological poor quality of coal; 
inefficient plant load 
factors; 
transmission losses; 
poor technologies in 
use 
coal imports; 
technology 
development and 
imports; 
retrofit existing 
plants; reduce 
transmission losses 
 
expense of the 
coal/gas imports; 
imported 
technologies not 
always cheaper than 
comparable domestic 
technologies; 
Import 
rationalisation: when 
does it make sense? 
Need to develop a 
clear institutional 
framework to 
support technology 
cooperation;  
Economic/Financial lack of investment in 
grid; 
irrational pricing 
policy; 
bankrupt SEBs; high 
cost of loans 
Increasing 
privatisation of the 
sector to increase 
investment; 
gradual phase-out of 
subsidies and price 
rationalisation; 
liberalisation of 
banking sector 
Few interested 
parties in 
privatisation because 
SEBs could not 
provide guarantees 
and the bureaucratic 
hassles 
price rationalisation 
and subsidy phase-
out not easy; interest 
rates are still quite 
high 
Simplification of 
bureaucratic 
procedures; 
foreign company 
investment code; 
prioritisation of 
options;  
Develop policies to 
scrutinise contracts 
with foreign 
companies; prioritise 
rational pricing 
through 
CERC/SERC 
Socio-economic  Electricity 
theft/distribution 
losses 
poor energy literacy 
in industry 
poverty of 
consumers 
Audits; compulsory 
metering in some 
areas;  
Policy 
implementation slow 
 
Metering and billing 
by 2002; 
Compulsory energy 
auditing; Public 
relations campaigns; 
making the 
distribution sector 
viable 
End-use efficiency improvement 
Organisational 
 
Too much 
government control 
on cement, iron and 
steel and aluminium; 
Too little attention to 
quality of water 
pumps and 
household appliances 
like lighting; and 
cross-sectoral issues 
like motors and 
drives, cogeneration; 
Liberalisation of 
cement, iron and 
steel and aluminium 
sectors; reduction of 
price and production 
controls; 
encouragement of 
the private sector and 
competition; Policy 
to encourage cogen 
through, inter alia, 
demonstration 
projects; Energy 
Management Cell 
Political delays 
bureaucratic inertia; 
teething problems; 
small enterprises 
unable to cope; 
government 
corporations have 
difficulty in 
changing attitudes; 
cogen takes of in 
sugar industry slowly 
– problem with 
power purchase and 
payments 
Continuation of the 
policy change 
process. Need for 
policies on water 
pumps and motors 
and drives. Need for 
a proper and 
empowered agency 
focusing on 
electricity 
conservation. Need 
to push cogen further 
and simplify power 
purchase agreements; 
Energy Conservation 
Bill 
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 Pre-1990 problems Post 1990 policies Problems in the 
interim period 
Policy options for 
beyond 2000 
Technological (see 
chapters 6 and 7 for 
more details) 
Out-dated 
technologies in use 
in most sectors; 
Where modern 
technologies used, 
operation and 
maintenance a 
problem; 
Encouragement of 
new technology use; 
Cement sectors use 
modern technologies 
Import expenses, 
some technologies 
available 
domestically, but not 
used because of 
social factors; 
foreign technologies 
expensive 
Need for clear 
technological 
standards and 
incentives for both 
the large and small 
scale industry; 
adoption and 
implementation of 
the new Energy 
Conservation Bill 
Economic/Financial Poor investment, 
collapse of some 
government 
enterprises, lack of 
incentives, price of 
electricity high for 
industry, need for 
captive power, lack 
of incentives for 
agriculture since 
price of electricity 
too low. Bank loans 
expensive 
Restructuring of 
pricing policy; 
dedicated lending 
institutions. 
Cost of domestic 
loans too high; slow 
changes in pricing 
policy 
Need for 
restructuring the 
financial sector, 
incentives for energy 
and environment 
efficient industry; 
use of CDM to 
finance projects; 
policies to reduce 
electricity theft by 
end-use sectors 
thereby making 
incentives to invest 
in energy efficient 
technologies 
Socio-economic  poor energy literacy 
in industry; 
poverty of 
consumers 
   
Rural energy 
 Active policy to 
connect villages to 
the grid; high 
subsidies 
Policy to gradually 
reduce subsidies, and 
make the sector more 
market oriented 
Reducing subsides 
difficult 
A more integrated 
approach to rural 
energy needed that 
can cope with low 
purchasing capacity 
and relatively high 
latent electricity 
demand; need for 
renewable energy for 
remote areas 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the institutional framework, the laws, policies, and used the 
analysis that emerges from the literature. It has shown that the policy is in a state of flux, 
and there have been a number of legal, organisational and policy changes that have been 
promoted and these are expected to lead to reduced greenhouse gas emissions as 
compared to a business-as-usual scenario when drawn from 1990 onwards.  
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5. Business-as-Usual Scenario 
Authors: Carolien Kroeze and Christiaan Boudri
106
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters illustrate that China and India are countries with rapidly growing 
economies undergoing a process of structural change. Demand for electricity is expected 
to increase as a result and this may have an effect on the environment. In later chapters of 
this report we will evaluate the feasibility of technological and institutional options in the 
process of modernising the electricity sector in China and India. For such an analysis a 
reference scenario is needed that describes the development of power generation, 
electricity demand, and electricity losses, including their relation to socio-economic 
development. 
For this project, a reference scenario was found in the Regional Air pollution INformation 
System (RAINS-Asia), which is an integrated assessment model for acidification in Asia 
(Amann et al., 2000; Foell et al., 1995; Shah et al., 2000). The fact that this model offers 
the most detailed energy scenario presently available for these two countries is enough 
justification to take its Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario as a basis for the Asian 
Dilemma-reference scenario. 
In 1995, a base case scenario for RAINS-Asia was developed in 1995 by combining 
efforts of research institutes of participating Asian countries, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (the originator of RAINS), and RMA (the developer 
of the energy module in RAINS-Asia). This work has consequently been accredited by 
the World Bank. An update of this 1995 scenario has been realised in the year 2000 in the 
framework of additional RAINS-Asia work. This update includes revised projections for 
the use of renewable energy sources. Here we refer to the updated scenario as the RAINS 
2000 BAU-scenario. This scenario is described in detail in Amann et al. (2000), TERI et 
al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a). We interpreted the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario, so 
that it could be used as a basis for our analyses.  
The RAINS Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario is an energy database including estimates 
for fuel use in 48 regions in China and India, for the period 1990 – 2020. Traditional, as 
well as non-traditional fuels are included in the scenario, as well as a number of end-use 
sectors. Thus the scenario is based on many assumptions needed to derive estimates for 
different sectors, fuel types and regions, from available information for the years 1990 
and 1995 (and sometimes 1980 as well), and, on the other hand, assumptions on the 
development of this information in time. Research institutes of several Asian countries 
provided information and were involved in the scenario construction (Foell et al. 1995). 
For the RAINS 2000 scenario, use has also been made of national statistics for 1995 from 
IEA. Final data transformation was done at IIASA.  
In this chapter we first describe the RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU-scenario and the assumptions 
underlying it (Section 5.2) (based on Boudri et al., 2001). The description focuses on 
social and economic driving factors underlying energy use projections, the fuel input 
categories, and the assumed energy intensity. Part of the chapter is a description of the 
Regional Energy Scenario GENerator (RESGEN), which was used to develop scenarios 
for RAINS-Asia. More information on RESGEN can be found in Foell et al. (1995) and 
                                                   
106  This chapter has been written on the basis of Boudri et al. (2001) and with comments from Joyeeta Gupta, 
Jaklien Vlasblom and Kornelis Blok. 
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the RESGEN User’s Guide. Section 5.3 focuses on the electricity sector, and presents the 
BAU scenario for electricity generation as used in our study. 
5.2 Business-as-Usual scenario: total energy use in China and India 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Starting point for our analysis are RAINS Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenarios for future 
use of fuels in China and India revised as of 1999. This implies that the scenarios have 
taken policies plans for the period up to 2020 that were developed during the nineties into 
account. The scenarios cover the period 1990 – 2020 and are based on demographic and 
economic trends for the Asian region as envisaged during the late nineties. The scenario 
illustrates that China and India are countries with rapidly growing economies undergoing 
a process of structural change. Population and economy are assumed to drive fuel use and 
related emissions of air pollution (Box 5.1).  
Before we go into the details of the scenario used in our analyses, we would like to 
introduce the model for which the scenario has been developed (RAINS-Asia). RAINS is 
an integrated assessment model for acidification in Asia. It has the same structure as the 
European version of RAINS (Alcamo et al., 1990). In Europe, integrated assessment 
models have been used during international negotiations on transboundary air pollution 
policies (Tuinstra et al. 1999). The models provided national governments with a full 
regional picture of the problems associated with the entire causal process from energy 
systems and emissions through to the ultimate impact on natural and on man-made 
systems. In Asia, acidification is not yet a serious problem, but this may change as 
economies are developing quickly.  
In 1992 the World Bank commissioned several research institutes to develop an 
assessment model for acidification in Asia (Foell, et al. 1995; Shah et al., 2000). As a first 
step for the integrated assessment of air pollution in east- and south-east Asia, RAINS-
Asia confines itself to the acidification problem, primarily caused by emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (SO2). RAINS version 8.0 consists of three modules: the emission-cost module 
(EMCO), an acid deposition and ecosystems impact module (DEP), and an optimisation 
module (OPT). In the earlier versions of the model, the energy scenarios fed into RAINS 
were from the Regional Energy Scenario GENerator (RESGEN). The most recent version 
of RAINS runs separate from RESGEN, but the energy scenarios are still largely based on 
RESGEN projections. RAINS-Asia can be used to explore future trends in fuel use in 94 
regions in Asia, and calculate the resulting acidifying deposition on a grid basis. 
Furthermore, the model includes information on sensitivity of ecosystems to acidification. 
RAINS-Asia takes 1990 as the base year and has time intervals of ten years in the 
analysis, extending through the year 2020. The thirty-year horizon is consistent with the 
five- to ten-year implementation periods for major energy facility investments (e.g., 
power plants) (Foell et al. 1995). The energy scenarios are derived from simple 
representations of the relations between the policy input variables of the modules (e.g., 
economy development for the energy module, annual emissions of the atmospheric 
module and deposition for the impact module) and the output variables (annual emissions 
of the energy module, deposition of the atmospheric module and protection of an 
ecosystem for the impact module). For the final implementation of the integrated tool, 
these simple relationships are then connected with each other into an overall assessment 
framework allowing the comparative analysis of alternative energy and emission 
reduction strategies for acidifying compounds. 
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A number of databases were developed, including a socio-economic database (RESGEN), 
energy database, fuel characteristics database, and large point source database. These 
databases include information for the year 1990 and projections for future years up to 
2020 (Foell, et al. 1995; Shah et al., 2000).  
The RESGEN module estimates present and future energy supply and sectoral energy 
consumption for a wide variety of socio-economic and technological assumptions (Legler 
et al., 1996). It incorporates an elaborate database on energy demand and supply for the 
94 Asian regions for the base year (1990) and necessary information to develop regional 
and Large Point Source (LPS) energy consumption scenarios up to the year 2020. 
However due to the regionalisation process, the estimates are rough. 
The scenarios contain six end-use energy sectors: residential, commercial, industrial, 
transportation, agriculture, and non-energy use of fuels, and two energy conversion 
sectors: electric utilities and non-electric energy, such as petroleum refineries. It includes 
policy strategies such as increasing the efficiencies of energy use, fuel switch to fuels 
with low sulphur content, or implementing emission control measures. RESGEN permits 
the user to examine, at the sectoral and spatial level, the effects of energy demand 
changes and energy supply management policies. For details we refer to RESGEN and 
RAINS background documents (Foell, et al. 1995; Shah et al., 2000; Legler et al., 1996). 
After 1995, two important changes to the RAINS database have been made: the 
development of new scenarios for the use of renewable energy, and an updated projection 
of primary energy consumption on a national level. We refer to the resulting scenario as 
RAINS 2000 BAU-scenario, and this will be the basis for the rest of our study.  
The RAINS 2000 BAU scenario includes projections for use of renewables from a study 
of the potential for use of renewable sources of energy in China and India (Boudri et al., 
2000a). Renewable energy consumption in China and India has been estimated on a 
regional basis for various fuel categories for the year 1990, and projections have been 
made for the years 2000, 2010, and 2020 for two different scenarios: a Business-as-Usual 
(BAU) and a Policy Scenario (TERI, et al. 1999; Li, et al. in prep; Panwar et al. in prep). 
The BAU projections are based on extending short term policies and trends to 2020 
including considerations on sustainability, existing institutional barriers, and economic 
constraints. Thus the BAU scenario reflects what the researchers of the project in 1999 
regarded as the likely autonomous penetration of renewable energy sources in the absence 
of additional policies. We therefore consider this scenario to take into account the effect 
of policy plans as of 1999, as well as some additional constraints on the consumption of 
fuel wood to a sustainable level. 
The RAINS 2000 BAU scenario includes projections for total fuel use that differ from the 
1995 versions of the scenarios. The updates are reported in Amann et al. (2000) and 
Boudri et al. (2000a). The revisions of the scenarios for use of conventional fuels for 
China was based on estimates supplied by the Chinese Energy Research Institute (ERI, 
1999). For India, the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) provided a revised projection 
of conventional energy demand in aggregated form (TERI, 1999) that was used as a basis 
of the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario. 
The energy system in China and India is highly dominated by coal in the BAU scenario, 
in line with current trends. The scenario takes into account the effect of policy plans on 
renewable energy as of 1999. The governments of China and India aim at decreasing the 
use of biomass (fuelwood mainly) as a fuel for sustainability reasons. For other sources of 
renewable energy policies exist on increased used. 
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Box 5.1. The Business-as-Usual Scenario 
 
The RAINS Business-as-Usual scenario is based on extending short term policies and trends to 2020 
including considerations on sustainability, existing institutional barriers, and economic constraints. 
The scenario we use here was developed in 1999, and therefore reflects what the involved re-
searcher institutes regarded as the likely autonomous penetration of fuel types in the absence of ad-
ditional policies. This implies that the scenarios have taken policies plans for the period up to 2020 
that were developed during the nineties into account.  
The scenario covers the period 1990 – 2020 and is based on demographic and economic trends for the 
Asian region as envisaged during the late nineties. It includes estimates for different types of fuels 
used in six end-use sectors and 48 regions in China and India, for the period 1990 – 2020. Tradi-
tional, as well as non-traditional fuels are included in the scenario.  
The BAU scenario illustrates that China and India are countries with rapidly growing economies un-
dergoing a process of structural change. The countries are experiencing rapid industrialisation, 
while agricultural output remains stable. The contribution of the services sector to the total eco-
nomic production is assumed to increase during the coming decades, while industry will decline 
slightly. The assumed projections of regional economic growth have been derived through the 
RAINS-Asia Energy Network. The economic recession in 1998-2000 has been incorporated in the 
BAU scenario. The projections for population GDP, primary fuel use and CO2 emissions is well 
within the range of SRES A1 and B1 scenarios for Asia (IPCC, 2000). The BAU scenario is there-
fore consistent with long term scenarios based on low worldwide population growth and relatively 
high worldwide economic growth. 
Fuel use increases with economic growth in the BAU scenario, albeit at a slower rate. The efficiency of 
the power sector is improving in the BAU scenario and results in part from reduced transmission 
and distribution losses and from replacement of inefficient power plants by more efficient plants. 
The scenario ignores a possible gap between electricity demand and supply. 
 
5.3 Socio-economic developments   
5.3.1 Population 
In the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario, the population in China increases by 30% from 1146 
million people in 1990 to 1500 million in 2020 (Table 5.1). For India, the increase is 50% 
(from 850 million in 1990 to 1297 million in 2020). Projections for population growth are 
available for three time periods: 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010, and 2010 to 2020. The 2000 
scenarios are an update of the previous 1995 scenarios (Table 5.1). For China, the revised 
estimates are similar, but for India a lower growth is estimated, resulting in a 300 million 
or almost 20% smaller population in 2020 than in the 1995 scenario. The most recent 
projections for both India and China may differ slightly from the population projections 
used here. 
Regional population scenarios are also available (although not shown here) and based on 
projections of the annual growth rates. Since no internationally recognised sources were 
available when the scenarios were constructed, these projections were obtained through 
the RAINS-Asia Energy Network. Regional growth rates have been derived from the 
national values.  
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Table 5.1  Population of China and India according to RESGEN 1995 (as used in the RAINS 1995 
scenarios) and RAINS 2000 (Foell et al., 1995; Amann et al., 2000). Unit: millions and 
% increase per year. 
 Source 1990 Growth 
1990-2000 
2000 Growth 
2000-2010 
2010 Growth 
2010-2020 
2020 
China RESGEN 1995 1172 1.2% 1324 0.9% 1453 0.6% 1535 
 RAINS 2000 1146 1.3% 1300 0.7% 1400 0.7% 1500 
India RESGEN 1995 847 2.2% 1048 2.1% 1294 2.1% 1597 
 RAINS 2000 850 1.9% 1021 1.3% 1166 1.1% 1297 
Asia  RESGEN 1995 2938 1.7% 3464 1.5% 4009 1.3% 4573 
 
5.3.2 Gross Domestic Product 
At the time that the 1995 scenario was constructed, many countries in Asia were 
experiencing rapid industrialisation, while agricultural output was stable. For the next few 
decades it has been anticipated that the contribution of the services sector to the total 
economic production will rise, and industry will decline slightly. Values for growth of 
gross domestic product (GDP) have been derived from region-based economic 
projections, accounting for different regional levels of economic growth and 
industrialisation. The projections of regional economic growth have been derived through 
the RAINS-Asia Energy Network. 
In the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario, the GDP in China may grow by a factor of 7.5 
between 1990 and 2020, and in India by a factor of 5.8 (Table 5.2). The RAINS 2000 
projections for China are marginally higher than the earlier RAINS 1995 projections, 
resulting in a 2% higher national GDP in 2020. The economic recession in 1998-2000 has 
been incorporated in these projections. In India, GDP development is in the RAINS 2000 
scenario expected to be slower than in the RAINS 1995 scenario, resulting in a 3.5% 
lower GDP in the year 2020 (transport not included). The main reason for the reduction 
seems to be the industrial sector, for which the projected growth rate in the 2000 scenario 
is considerably lower than envisaged in the 1995 scenario. The GDP of the commercial 
sector is also a few percent lower than in the 1995 scenario, and agriculture somewhat 
higher. 
Table 5.2  Gross domestic product (GDP) in China, India and Asia according to RESGEN 1995 
(used in RAINS 1995 scenarios) and RAINS 2000. Unit: million US$1990 and % increase 
per year. 
 Source Sector 1990 Growth  
1990-2000 
2000 Growth  
2000-2010 
2010 Growth 
2010-2020 
2020 
Industry 0.1 6% 0.2 3% 0.2 5% 0.3 
Agriculture 0.1 8% 0.3 6% 0.6 5% 1.0 
Other 0.8 12% 0.3 8% 0.6 6% 1.0 
RESGEN 1995 
Total 0.3 9% 0.7 6% 1.4 5% 2.4 
China 
RAINS 2000 Total 0.3 8% 0.7 7% 1.4 6% 2.4 
Industry 0.1 5% 0.1 4% 0.2 4% 0.2 
Agriculture 0.1 4% 0.1 7% 0.2 7% 0.4 
Other 0.1 10% 0.2 7% 0.3 7% 0.6 
RESGEN 1995 
Total 0.2  7% 0.4  6% 0.7  6% 1.3  
India 
RAINS 2000 Total 0.2 6% 0.4  6% 0.7  6% 1.2  
Industry 0.3 4% 0.5 2% 0.6 6% 1.1 
Agriculture 1.7 4% 2.7 4% 3.9 4% 5.8 
Other 2.5 5% 4.0 4% 6.0 4% 8.6 
Asia RESGEN 1995 
Total 4.6 5% 7.1 4% 10.6 4% 15.5 
Source: Foell et al. (1995); bold data derived from TERI et al. (1999) 
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5.3.3 Regional differences 
RAINS and RESGEN distinguish between 48 regions in China and India and there are 
considerable differences between these regions in population density, GDP and fuel use. 
In the following, we highlight some of these differences, based on information from 
RESGEN. The regional patterns in the RESGEN 1995 scenarios are the basis for the 
regional patterns in the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario. 
5.3.3.1 China  
Regional differences in China are much larger than in India. Agricultural growth ranges 
from 2% per year for Fujian to 26% in Taiyuan for the period 1990-2000. Also in the 
periods thereafter large differences occur, with even negative growths between 2000 and 
2010 for Shenyang (-2.7% per year) and between 2010 and 2020 for Shandong (–7.5% 
per year). The ratio of agricultural GDP in 2020 to that in 1990 ranges from 1.1 to 23, 
with city regions like Tianjin, Beijing, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Taiyuan, Shanghai forming 
the top six (ratios between 10 and 23). Shandong brings up the rear with 1.1, and most 
other regions have ratios between 2.5 and 6.3. 
Commercial growth between 1990-2000 is between 0.5% and 14% per year (with the 
exception of Yunnan, where it is 37%) but is estimated to diverge much less in the 
coming periods: 7.6 – 10% per year between 2000-2010 and 4 – 7% between 2010-2020. 
Commercial GDP in 2020 is 5 - 18 times as high as in 1990. Top growth regions are 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Hunei, Guizhou, and Guangxi. Shenyang, Guangdong-Hainan, 
Beijing, Jiangxi, and Fujian have relatively low ratios. 
Industrial growth between 1990 and 2000 is 3–14% per year, and is, similar to the 
commercial sector, expected to diverge less in the coming decades: 4 – 7% per year 
between 2000 and 2010 and 5-7% between 2010 and 2020. The ratio of industrial GDP in 
2020 and that in 1990 ranges from 4 to 13. It is remarkable that most city regions, like 
Shanghai Guiyang, Wuhan, Tianjin, Shanxi, Beijing, Shenyang, Guangzhou, and 
Chongqing are not expected to grow above average (ratios 2020/1990 of 5 to 7). Taiyuan 
is the only city region with high growth (ratio 2020/1990 of 13). 
5.3.3.2 India  
For India, RESGEN assumes that the agricultural growth is the same in all regions: 5% 
per year during 1990-2000 and 3.6% from 2000-2020. Exceptions are the city regions 
Calcutta, Madras, Bombay – where a growth of about 6% per year is assumed – and New 
Delhi, where agriculture is ignored.  
Commercial growth is 10% per year from 1990-2000 for all Indian regions, except the 
city regions Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, where it is about 6 - 6.5 % per year. For the 
period 2000-2020 the difference is smaller: about 7% per year for most regions, and about 
6% for the city regions Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. Commercial GDP in 2020 is 
about 9 times as high as in 1990 for provincial regions, as well as for the city region New 
Delhi, 6 times in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. 
In the industrial sector, annual growth is 3.5% from 1990-2000 and 6.8% from 2000-2020 
for most regions and for the city region New Delhi, whereas for the city regions Calcutta, 
Madras, Bombay, these values are 6 - 6.5% for the period 1990-2000; and about 6% per 
year for the period 2000-2020. Commercial GDP in 2020 is about 5 times as high as in 
1990 for provincial regions, as well as for the city regions New Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay 
and Madras. 
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5.3.4 Total fuel use in the RAINS-Asia BAU scenario   
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present projections for fuel use in China and India together with the 
assumptions on population and GDP growth underlying the RAINS 2000 BAU-scenarios. 
Also the national energy-related emissions of CO2 are presented. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 
present the estimated energy-related SO2 emissions for the two countries. The way energy 
and emission scenarios have been derived will be discussed in some detail below. 
In the RAINS BAU scenario, demand for primary energy in China increases from 36 EJ 
in 1990 to 82 EJ in 2020 (an 125% increase relative to 1990; Fig. 5.1). In India, the 
increase is 150%, from 16 EJ in 1990 to 39 EJ in 2020 (Fig. 5.2). In both countries, coal 
is the most important fuel used (Table 5.5 and 5.6). In 1990 about 20% of the fuels use is 
for electricity generation and in 2020 about 35%. Also in electricity generation fossil 
fuels are the most important energy source in China and India. However, there is a 
considerable increase in generation from non-fossil sources. In China, this is mainly large 
hydro, nuclear, and renewable energy sources. In India it is large hydropower and 
bagasse. In both countries the consumption of gas will increase. The projections for 
nuclear power in India are not consistent with policy plans; in the BAU scenario 
electricity production in nuclear plants is assumed to decrease after 2000, while policy 
plans aim at increased capacity (see also chapter 7). 
As described above, the socio-economic assumptions for China for the period 1990 – 
2020 include a 30 percent growth of population and a 7.5-fold increase in GDP (Table 
5.3; see Boudri et al., 2000a). For India, the projections are based on a more than 50 
percent increase in population accompanied by an 5.8-fold increase of GDP (Table 5.3; 
see Boudri et al., 2000a). 
These scenarios assume that electricity supply follows the increase in electricity demand, 
and that there is no gap between demand and supply. In reality, however, the actual 
growth in electricity supply may lag behind changes in electricity demand. This may 
especially be the case in India, where demand for electricity has been exceeding supply 
(Ministry of Power, 1999; see chapter 4). Our BAU scenario ignores the possibility of 
such a lag, which may lead to an overestimation of the growth in electricity supply. 
In China, the use of biomass is expected to decline by almost 19%. Other renewable 
energy sources (hydropower, wind, etc.) will largely increase their contribution and will 
thereby lead to almost 500% higher overall consumption of renewable energy, or an 
increase in primary energy share from 3% in 1990 to 9% in 2020. Although the increase 
of renewable energy will more than compensate the decrease in use of biomass, the share 
of biomass, large hydro, and other forms of renewable energy in total fuel use reduces 
from 26% to 17% (Table 5.3). 
Also in India the use of biomass is expected to decline by almost 12%. Other renewable 
energy sources (hydropower, wind, etc.) will largely increase their contribution and will 
thereby lead to a 300% higher overall consumption of renewable energy, or an increase in 
primary energy share from 3.7% in 1990 to 6% in 2020. Although the increase of 
renewable energy will more than compensate the decrease in use of biomass, the share of 
biomass, large hydro, and other forms of renewable energy in total fuel use reduces from 
53% to 23% (Table 5.3).  
From the RAINS BAU scenarios described so far, we have derived BAU scenarios for the 
electricity sector (see chapter 5.4). Before we present the details of these electricity sce-
narios, we would like to highlight some of the underlying features of the RAINS scenar-
ios on electricity generation. 
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Figure 5.1  Final and primary energy consumption in China by sector in the BAU scenario. Note: 
Total conversion losses include all losses from primary to final energy (including elec-
tricity use by power plants, transmission and distribution losses, etc.); Non-energy in-
cludes use of fuels for other purposes than combustion 
 
Figure 5.2  Final and primary energy consumption in India by sector in the RAINS 2000 BAU sce-
nario. Note: Total conversion losses include all losses from primary to final energy (in-
cluding electricity use by power plants, transmission and distribution losses, etc.); Non-
energy includes use of fuels for other purposes than combustion 
 
5.3.4.1 Electricity use by power plants and transmission and distribution losses 
In the RAINS BAU scenario, gross electricity production in China is projected to be 2800 
TWh in 2020, while the electricity by end-users amounts to 2393 TWh (Annex 5.1). For 
India gross electricity production is estimated at 1504 TWh in 2020 and end-use at 1250 
TWh. 
These differences between the amount of electricity used by end-users and the gross 
electricity production in a country reflects the net effect of transmission and distribution 
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(T&D) losses and energy use in the electricity generation process (own use). More 
specifically, the difference is due to (1) transmission and distribution losses for fuels 
produced by the fuel conversion sector, (2) own-use of electricity and heat by the fuel 
conversion sector, (3) own-use of electricity and heat by the industrial auto-producers of 
electricity and heat, (4) own-use of electricity and heat by centralised power plants and 
district heating plants, and (5) electricity and heat transmission and distribution losses. 
We can also distinguish between technical and commercial losses of electricity. In our 
scenarios, transmission and distribution losses include only the technical losses of 
electricity that take place during transportation of electricity from the power plant to the 
end-user. However, there may be commercial losses as a result of electricity tap by non-
paying end-users. This is a problem in India (see chapters 4 and 8). The phenomenon of 
electricity tap makes it difficult to judge the technical and economic potential to improve 
the efficiency of the power system. Technical, social, economic, and institutional aspects 
are closely linked and complicate the issue. Non-paying electricity users are, for example, 
not sensitive to economic instruments aiming at improving the end-use efficiency. 
Likewise, efficiency measures for the supply-side may have a longer pay back time. 
The own-use consumption and T&D losses are relatively high in many developing coun-
tries in Asia, including India and China. In the RAINS-ASIA 2000 scenario it is assumed 
that there is some improvement in China and India over time. For China the scenario 
shows a decrease from 24% in 1990 to 15% in 2020 (Annex 5.1). For India, the total of 
own-use and T&D losses in the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario is assumed to decrease from 
24% of gross electricity production in 1995 to 17% in 2020. (These percentages from the 
original BAU 2000 scenario presented in Annex 5.1 may differ to some extent from our 
interpretation of the scenario described in chapter 5.4).  
For China, the BAU scenarios assumes closure of small power plants, in line with current 
policies; in the middle of the 1990s the Chinese government planned an improvement of 
the electric power sector consisting of hardware upgrades and employment, and software 
improvements. Closure of old and unreliable units is also part of this program 
(UNDDSMS 1996) and these are replaced by new and more efficient plants (Xinhua 
News 2000; Vlasblom 2000: 17, 18, 20). As a result, the BAU scenario already reflects a 
considerable efficiency improvement with time. In India, closing of small power plants is 
not considered in present policy plans, because the capacity is needed to meet the demand 
for electricity and because of employment considerations. In India the focus of improving 
the electricity system is more focused on improving the efficiency of the existing system. 
5.3.4.2 LPS scenarios  
The RAINS-Asia model identifies 355 Large Point Sources (LPS) at 332 unique 
locations. Eighty percent of the LPSs are located in three countries: China (133), India 
(47), and Japan (19). Area-source electricity production is assumed to be generated by 
small, dispersed plants or plants having low SO2 emission characteristics, e.g. hydro, 
nuclear, natural gas, and some oil-fired plants (Foell et al., 1995). 
For the power generation sector, data were gathered on the location and fuel consumption 
at specific generating facilities. The size and location of coal-fired power generating 
facilities was obtained from Mannini, et al. (1990). Locations and types of oil-burning 
power generation facilities were obtained primarily from UN and IEA sources. Emissions 
calculated for these individual emission sources were assigned to their specific grid cells 
and were subtracted from the national emission total for power generation. Once all 
power generation emission sources had been identified and located, the remaining non-
point source emissions were allocated to grid cells on the basis of population shares (Foell 
et al. 1995). 
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For the RAINS-Asia 1995 scenario, LPS scenarios have been derived from the RAINS-
Asia Energy Network, (Mannini, et al. 1990; ADB 1993; Maude, et al. 1994). In general, 
the RAINS-Asia project team judged expansion possibilities of existing plant sites (Foell 
et al. 1995).  
For the new RAINS-Asia 2000 scenario, LPS scenarios have been modified, due to a 
change in the end-use scenarios, as well as a higher penetration of renewable energy 
sources. As one of the constraints in the construction of the scenario was that only area 
sources could be replaced by renewable energy sources, a large amount of electricity 
generated from LPSs was moved to the category area sources. The changes have been 
carried out on the basis of expert judgement by IIASA (see Amann et al. 2000). The 
consequence of this modification is that the definition of LPS is no longer strictly valid. 
Area sources can contain plants of more than 500 MWe.  
5.3.5 Greenhouse gas emissions  
5.3.5.1 Emission factors used  
We estimate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide for 
total fuel use (this chapter) and for fuels used for electricity production (later chapters). 
Our estimates include emissions taking place during combustion processes. For methane 
we also include emissions during the production and transport of fuels. For CO2 and N2O 
we assume that emissions taking place before fuel combustion are negligible. The 
emissions are estimated following the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories (IPCC 1997), unless mentioned otherwise. For the scenario calculations on 
the electricity sector in later chapters aggregated emission factors are used as presented in 
Annex 5-6. 
Emissions of CO2 are calculated on the basis of the IPCC Reference Approach (Tier 1 
method; IPCC 1997). For China, estimations on carbon content have been provided by 
ERI; for India, default IPCC values have been assumed. Multiplying this by the fraction 
of carbon oxidised, gives the CO2 emission factor. It is important to note that the fraction 
used here is a default value. In the scenario calculations other values may be used, e.g. if a 
change of coal combustion technologies is considered (see also IPCC 1997). Where 
possible, country-specific emission factors were used.  
Disregarding the uncertainty in the carbon content of fossil fuels, the IPCC Reference 
Approach provides an upper bound to CO2 emissions, because carbon that is emitted as 
CH4, carbon monoxide (CO), or non-methane VOCs is included in the emission factor. 
Because we calculate CH4 emissions separately, we have corrected the CO2 emission 
factors to avoid double counting.  
CH4 and N2O emissions from fuel combustion have been calculated on the basis of IPCC 
Tier 1 method (IPCC, 1997).  
For methane we not only estimate emissions from fuel combustion, but also emissions 
from venting of natural gases from coal mining and handling, and emissions from flaring 
of natural gases. The IPCC recommends global average CH4 emission factors of 10 to 25 
m3/ton of coal mined for underground mines, and 0.3 to 2 m3/ton for surface mines (not 
including post-mining operations). For post-mining activities, another 0.9 to 4.0 (coal 
from underground mines), and 0 to 0.2 (coal from surface mine is recommended; IPCC 
1997). For the calculations in the present chapter, an intermediate value has been taken of 
10 m3/ton of hard coal mined, which is equivalent to 350 kg/TJ. Emissions of CH4 from 
lignite mining have been ignored.  
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For fugitive methane emissions from oil and natural gas production, no clear 
recommendations were available in 1997. On the basis of (Houghton et al. 1997), 
estimations should lie between 1 and 7 kg/TJ for oil, and between 156 and 436 kg/TJ for 
gas. For the calculations in the present chapter we have chosen intermediate values of 4.1 
kg/TJ for oil and 300 kg/TJ for gas.  
It is assumed that biomass energy sources are produced on a sustainable basis, so that 
CO2-emissions from biomass burning are not included in the calculations. However, CH4 
and N2O emissions from biomass used as fuel have been included. 
5.3.5.2 Emissions  
For China, we calculate that CO2-equivalent emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O from fuel 
use increase from 2.5 Pg CO2-equivalents in 1990 to 5.7 Pg in 2020 (Table 5.3). About 
one-third of these emissions are from the power sector. Carbon dioxide is by far the most 
important greenhouse gas emitted from energy use in China, contributing by at least 90% 
to total energy-related emissions. 
For India, we also calculate an increase in CO2-equivalent emissions of CO2, CH4 and 
N2O from fuel use: energy-related emissions increase from 0.7 Pg CO2-equivalents in 
1990 to 2.6 Pg in 2020 (Table 5.4). The power sector contributes by about 40% to these 
emissions. Like in China, carbon dioxide is by far the most important greenhouse gas 
emitted from energy use, contributing by at least 87% to total energy-related emissions. 
Our calculations indicate that the power generation sector in China is the second-most 
important source of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions (following the industrial 
sector), and in India the power sector is the main contributor to energy-related greenhouse 
gas emissions (Fig. 5.4). 
5.3.5.3 Comparison with other studies  
Our calculated emissions for China and India are in line with estimates by Amann et al. 
(2000) and Boudri et al. (2000a). For India, our estimates for 1990 (0.7 Pg CO2-
equivalents) and 2020 (2.6 Pg) are somewhat higher than the 0.5 Pg (1990) in India´s Na-
tional Greenhouse Gas Inventory (www.ccasia.teri.res.in/country/india/ ghg/tables.htm) 
and the 2.3 Pg (2020) estimated in the ALGAS project. These differences may result from 
the underlying socio-economic assumptions, the emission factors used or from the fact 
that we also include emissions of methane during the production of natural gas, which 
may be not included in other inventories. 
We also compared the BAU scenario to the IPCC SRES scenarios. There are four groups 
of SRES scenarios. Of these, most of the A1 and B1 scenarios assume a population in-
crease in Asia of about 40% between 1990 and 2020, which is in line with the BAU as-
sumptions (30% for China and 50% for India). The other SRES scenarios show higher 
population growth. The population in India and China is about 70% of the population of 
the SRES Asia region. The SRES A1 and B1 scenarios assume that 2020 GDP in Asia is 
5 – 12 times (A1) and 3.5 – 12 times (B1) the 1990 level while the BAU scenario assumes 
a 7.5 (China) and 5.8 (India) fold increase. The 2020 primary fuel use in China and India 
is 2.3 times the 1990 level in the BAU scenario, respectively, while the SRES A1 and B1 
scenarios show a 1.5 – 8 fold increase. Emissions of energy-related CO2 in the BAU sce-
nario from India and China are about 65% of the estimated SRES emissions for the year 
1990. The SRES A1 and B1 scenarios estimate that 2020 emissions are 1.5 – 5 times the 
1990 level. Thus the increase in population, GDP, primary fuel use and CO2 emissions is 
well within the range of SRES A1 and B1 scenarios for Asia. The BAU scenario is there-
fore consistent with long term scenarios based on low worldwide population growth and 
relatively high worldwide economic growth. 
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Table 5.3 Demand for primary energy (EJ) and emissions of the greenhouse gases (GHG) CO2, CH4 
and N2O (Pg CO2-equivalents) for China in the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario. Modified 
from Amann et al. (2000) and Boudri et al. (2000a)1. 
Fuel 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 21.2 28.1 33.1 37.7 42.1 
Biomass 8.3 8.6 7.9 7.3 6.7 
Oil 4.5 6.4 8.5 11.8 15.6 
Gas 1.0 1.9 1.9 4.8 7.9 
Hydro 0.8 1.8 1.7 3.0 4.7 
Nuclear - 0.1 0.1 1.1 2.2 
Renewable 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 2.3 
Total 36.2 47.2 54.0 66.7 81.5 
Of which for electricty production3 7.7 12.7 14.0 19.5 28.3 
      
GDP (1990=100) 100 153 224 431 754 
Population, million 1146 1209 1300 1400 1500 
      
Total GHG 2.5 3.3 4.0 4.9 5.7 
GHG from power (%)2 25% 31% 28% 26% 32% 
CO2 (%)
2 90% 90% 91% 91% 92% 
1 Differences are due to including CH4 and N2O, excluding Hong Kong from fuel and emission esti-
mate and use of more detailed emission factors 
2 Percentage of total energy-related GHG emissions 
3 Annex 5.2 
Table 5.4 Demand for primary energy (EJ) and emissions of the greenhouse gases (GHG) CO2, CH4 
and N2O (Pg CO2-equivalents) for India in the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario. Modified 
from Amann et al. (2000) and Boudri et al. (2000a)1 
Fuel 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 4.4 6.0 7.2 10.5 15.7 
Biomass 7.8 8.3 7.2 7.0 6.8 
Oil 2.4 3.1 4.5 7.3 10.7 
Gas 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.9 3.5 
Hydro 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.4 2.2 
Nuclear 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Renewable 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Total 15.6 18.9 20.7 28.2 39.1 
Of which for electricity production3 3.6 5.4 6.4 9.4 14.6 
      
GDP (1990=100) 100 138 181 327 582 
Population, million 850 937 1021 1166 1297 
      
Total GHG 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.6 
GHG from power (%)2 37% 45% 43% 39% 40% 
CO2 (%)
2 87% 88% 90% 92% 93% 
 
1 Differences are due to including CH4 and N2O, and use of more detailed emission factors 
2 Percentage of total energy-related GHG emissions 
3 Annex 5.2 
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Table 5.5  Emissions of SO2 by fuel in China
1 in a scenario assuming no emission control. Unit: 
million tons. 
Fuel 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 19.7 22.6 26.8 30.7 34.7 
Oil 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Other 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Total 20.8 23.9 28.3 32.4 36.7 
1 Source: NOC scenario from Amann et al. (2000); including Hong Kong 
 
Table 5.6  Emissions of SO2 by fuel in India
1 in a scenario assuming no emission control. Unit: mil-
lion tons. 
Fuel 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal 2.3 3.2 3.8 5.5 8.1 
Oil 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.7 4.4 
Other 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Total 3.7 5.0 6.0 8.6 13.0 
1 Source: NOC scenario from Amann et al. (2000) 
 
Figure 5.3  Emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O from fuel use in China, as calculated for the RAINS-
Asia 2000 BAU Scenario. 
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Figure 5.4  Emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O from fuel use in India, as calculated for the RAINS-Asia 
2000 BAU Scenario. 
 
5.4 The Business-as-Usual scenario for the power sector 
5.4.1 Description of the BAU scenario 
So far, we have given an overview of existing RAINS scenarios for total fuel use in China 
and India. In this project, however, we focus in particular on the production of electricity. 
RAINS scenarios include information on fuel use for electricity production by region and 
by year. From these RAINS scenarios this, we know that total electricity production in 
China and India may increase considerably during the coming decades (TERI et al., 1999; 
Boudri et al., 2000a; see section 5.2). In the following, we interpret the RAINS scenarios 
in such a way, that it allows for an analysis of options to reduce emissions of air 
pollutants from the power sector in China and India in Chapter 7. 
Partly based on RAINS information and partly based on other information on power 
generation in China and India, we estimate the fuel use and electricity production for 
fossil and renewable fuels: 
 
 Et,c,l = Ct,c,l * cft,c,l * u      (5.1) 
 Ft,c,l = Et,c,l / eft,c,l       (5.2) 
 
Where 
 
C =  total capacity (MW) 
E  =  gross electricity production (PJ/year) 
F  =  demand for primary energy for electricity production (PJ/year) 
cf  = capacity factor (fraction) 
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ef  =  electrical efficiency (fraction) 
u  =  full load power generation factor = 8.76 * 3.6 = 31.54 PJ/MW/year = 31.54 109 
sec/year indices 
t  =  fuel type 
c =  capacity class of power plants (MW); only for coal/oil fired power plants 
l  =  lifetime class of power plant (building year); only for coal/oil fired power plants 
The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents that are defined as 
- the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied 
by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ, or 
- an equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) in accordance with the 
convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities 
(both grid and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 
PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary 
energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
5.4.1.1 China 
For natural gas, nuclear power and renewables, the information was largely taken from 
the RAINS 2000 Business-as-Usual scenario as described in TERI et al. (1999) and 
Boudri et al. (2000a). 
For coal and oil-fired power we subdivided the RAINS information into classes of power 
plants of varying capacity (c) and age (l). To this end, we used the following information 
from the RAINS 2000 BAU scenario described in TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. 
(2000a) as a basis: 
- Total national demand for primary energy in the power sector for fossil and renewable 
fuels by type of fuel (Ft); 
- Total electricity production (E) 
From these data, and additional information from RAINS on large point sources, we 
constructed an electricity generation scenario, in which we distinguished between the 
following capacity classes (c) for coal- and oil fired power plants: 
< 50 MW, low or medium pressure 
< 50 MW, high pressure 
50 – 125 MW 
125 – 200 MW 
> 200 MW 
And we used the following lifetime classes (l) for coal- and oil fired power plants 
- built before 1990 
- built between 1990 and 2000 
- built between 2000 and 2010 
- built after 2010 
The total capacities (C) and the electrical efficiencies (ef) were estimated, while the 
capacity factors (cf) and the age of power plants (size of classes l) were partly based on 
RAINS information and partly on other sources. We assumed that the cogeneration 
capacity amounts to 12% of the total capacity. See Annex 5-7 for details. 
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5.4.1.2 India 
For natural gas, nuclear power and renewables, all information was taken from the 
RAINS Business-as-Usual scenario as described in TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. 
(2000a). 
For coal and oil-fired power we subdivided the RAINS information into classes of power 
plants of varying capacity (c) and age (l). To this end, we used the following information 
from the RAINS BAU scenario described in TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a) 
as a basis: 
- Total national demand for primary energy in the power sector for fossil and renewable 
fuels (Ft); 
- Total electricity production (E). 
In RAINS-ASIA, a distinction is made between large point sources and so-called area 
sources of air pollution. The large point sources in earlier RAINS versions include 
electricity production facilities with capacities of 500 MW or more. Although these 
definitions changed to some extent, we here follow the RAINS-ASIA 8.0 subdivision and 
distinguish between the following capacity classes (c) for coal- fired power plants: 
- large point sources (LPS) 
- other power plants 
And we used the following lifetime classes (l) for coal-fired power plants 
Large point sources: 
- built before 1990 
- built between 1990 and 2000 
- built between 2000 and 2010 
- built after 2010 
Other power plants: 
- built before 2000 
- built after 2000 
The electrical efficiencies (ef) and the age of power plants (size of classes l) were either 
taken from RAINS-ASIA, or estimated from the literature. Additional assumptions were 
made on cogeneration. (see Annex 5-8). For India we did not quantify total capacities (C).  
5.4.2 Electricity production in the BAU scenario  
5.4.2.1 China 
In the BAU scenario, total electricity production in China increases from 2.2 EJ in 1990 
to 10.1 EJ in 2020 (Fig. 5.5). In 1990, about 70% of the electricity was produced in 
coal/oil fired power plants and by 2020 about 60%. The average capacity of power plants 
increases considerably over time. By 2020, almost 95% of the electricity from coal/oily 
fired power plants is produced in plants with a capacity of more than 200 MW, while in 
1990 power plants larger than 200 MW contributed less than 50% to electricity produced 
by coal/oil fired power plants in China. About 20% of the electricity is produced from 
renewables, of which large hydropower is the most important. 
5.4.2.2 India  
In the BAU scenario, total electricity production in India increases from 1 EJ in 1990 to 
5.2 EJ in 2020 (Fig. 5.7). In 1990, about 65% of the electricity was produced in coal-fired 
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power plants and by 2020 about 60%. About 17% of the electricity is produced from 
renewables, of which large hydropower is the most important. 
5.4.3 Emissions of air pollutants in the BAU scenario 
We use aggregated emission factors reflecting the emissions per unit of primary energy 
equivalent (Annex 5-6). For CO2, N2O and SO2 the emissions included emissions during 
the production of electricity. For methane, the emission factors include both emissions 
during fuel combustion and those occurring before the actual electricity production 
(during mining and transport). For the other gases, we assume that these pre-combustion 
emissions are negligible and only calculate emissions from electricity generation. The 
emission factors for cogeneration only reflect the emissions that can be assigned to 
electricity production. The calculated emissions therefore do not include additional 
emissions that are assigned to heat production (see Annex 5-6). 
In China, the total greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are calculated to 
increase from 510 Tg CO2-equivalents in 1990 to 1554 CO2-equivalents in 2020 (Fig. 
5.6). More than 90% of these emissions are CO2 emissions, while CH4 and N2O 
contribute less than 10%.  
In India, the total greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are calculated to 
increase from 256 Tg CO2-equivalents in 1990 to 978 Tg CO2-equivalents in 2020 (Fig. 
5.8). Like for China, more than 90% of these emissions are CO2 emissions, while CH4 
and N2O contribute less than 10%. 
5.5 Summary  
In this chapter we summarized the BAU scenario for the power sector that we used as the 
basis for our scenario analyses in chapters 7 and 9. To this end, we used the RAINS-Asia 
2000 BAU scenario and interpreted its data in such a way that we can use the scenario as 
a starting point for the analysis of options to reduce greenhouse gases. This chapter 
presents BAU scenarios revised as of 1999. This implies that the scenario has taken 
policies plans for the period up to 2020 that were developed during the nineties into 
account. The implications of the research are as follows.  
First, the BAU 2000 scenario has lower projections for power generation and 
consumption and the related greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2020 than the BAU 
1995 scenario, which already included a number of policies implemented before 1999. 
Although there may be other reasons for the revisions of the scenario, the downward 
adjustments are in line with policy measures developed after 1995. These developments 
have two implications in relation to the climate change convention. (a) They indicate that 
both countries have measures (see chapters 3, 4) that have incidentally led to a reduction 
of the growth of their power consumption and related greenhouse gas emissions in the 
period 1990-2000 and the period thereafter till 2020. (b) A second point to note is that 
although the revised scenarios include policy measures, these may not, in fact, be 
implemented since both countries suffer from an implementation deficit (see Chapters 3, 
4). 
Second, for China the BAU scenario assumes a 30% growth of population and a 7.5-fold 
increase in GDP, while total primary energy demand is expected to increase by 125%. As 
a result of this energy-related emissions of CO2 are by 2020 calculated to be more than 
twice the 1990 level. Emissions from the power sector contribute by about 30% to total 
greenhouse gas emissions. The total greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production 
are calculated to increase from 510 Tg CO2-equivalents in 1990 to 1554 CO2-equivalents 
in 2020. More than 90% of these emissions are CO2 emissions, while CH4 and N2O 
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contribute less than 10%. Emissions of greenhouse gases from the power sector increase 
by a factor of three, while total electricity production increases by a factor of five, 
illustrating that total emissions per unit of electricity are expected to decrease 
considerably over time. 
Third, for India, the BAU scenario assumes a more than 50% growth of population and a 
5.8-fold increase in GDP, while total primary energy demand is expected to increase by 
150%. As a result of this energy-related emissions of CO2 are by 2020 calculated to be 
more than three times the 1990 level. Emissions from the power sector contribute by 
about 40% to total greenhouse gas emissions. The total greenhouse gas emissions from 
electricity production are calculated to increase from 256 Tg CO2-equivalents to 978 Tg 
CO2-equivalents. Like for China, more than 90% of these emissions are CO2 emissions, 
while CH4 and N2O contribute less than 10%. Emissions of greenhouse gases from the 
power sector increase by a factor of four between 1990 and 2020, while total electricity 
production increases by a factor of five, illustrating that total emissions per unit of 
electricity are expected to decrease considerably over time. 
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Figure 5.5  The BAU scenario for China: Demand for primary energy for electricity production (top) 
and electricity production (bottom). 
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Figure 5.6  The BAU scenario for China: Emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) 
and sulphur dioxide (bottom) from the electricity sector. 
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Figure 5.7  The BAU scenario for India: Demand for primary energy for electricity production (top) 
and electricity production (bottom). 
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Figure 5.8  The BAU scenario for India: Emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) 
and sulphur dioxide (bottom) from the electricity sector. 
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ANNEX 5.1 DETAILS ON RAINS-Asia BAU SCENARIO  
 
Table A5.1.1 Overview of electricity supply and demand in China (excl. Hong Kong) in the RAINS-Asia 
2000 scenario. 
Electricity generation needs (TWh) RAINS-ASIA 2000 BAU 
    1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Electricity demand   511 767 972 1494 2393 
 Industry*   382 535 697 1148 1752 
 Domestic   119 221 246 302 587 
 Transport   11 11 28 44 54 
Own use and T&D losses (%)  18 24 19 17 15 
Own use and T&D losses (TWh)  110 236 228 305 407 
Gross Electrical output needed  621 1002 1200 1800 2800 
         
Electricity generation sources       
Net import (+)/Export(-)  -1 -5 1 0 -1 
Fossil plants   497 807 943 1294 1972 
Biomass*    1 1 1 3 6 
Hydro    86 142 184 321 501 
Renewable*   39 47 56 67 94 
Nuclear    0 13 16 117 235 
Total electricity generation  621 1008 1199 1800 2801 
* Renewables and biomass that are used for district heating (GTH and part of WSF and BGS) has been 
substracted 
Table A5.1.2 Overview of electricity supply and demand in India in the RAINS-Asia 2000 scenario.  
Electricity generation needs (TWh) RAINS-ASIA 2000 BAU 
    1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Electricity demand   215 315 459 752 1250 
 Industry*   109 144 210 345 575 
 Domestic   102 165 241 395 659 
 Transport   4 6 9 12 16 
Own use and T&D losses (%)  26 24 22 21 17 
Own use and T&D losses (TWh)  75 101 131 200 253 
Gross Electrical output needed  291 416 590 952 1504 
         
Electricity generation sources       
Net import (+)/Export(-)  1 -2 1 -1 -1 
Fossil plants   221 338 501 792 1256 
Bagasse    4 5 6 10 15 
Hydro    61 72 78 148 230 
Renewable    0 0 2 6 15 
Nuclear    7 8 9 7 3 
Total electricity generation  289 418 589 953 1504 
* Bagasse based own generation included 
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ANNEX 5.2 SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
CHINA 
 
Table A5.2.1 Demand for primary energy1 for electricity production in China in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Adapted from RAINS 2000 BAU scenario (see text). Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 1723 2767 2767 2333 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 738 1189 1189 1127 543 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 517 815 815 772 442 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 2221 3434 4562 7478 14243 
Cogeneration 1190 2323 1913 2422 4019 
Biomass 89 89 124 167 226 
Large hydro 812 1341 1742 3039 4743 
Other renewables2 371 474 533 638 886 
Nuclear3 0 122 147 1113 2228 
Natural Gas 63 112 185 398 1006 
Total 7724 12665 13977 19487 28336 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Geothermal used for electricity production, wind and small hydropower. 
 
 
Table A5.2.2 Production of electricity in China in the Business-as-Usual scenario. Adapted from 
RAINS 2000 BAU scenario (see text). Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 486 780 780 666 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 221 357 357 338 164 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 166 267 267 253 147 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 755 1216 1645 2820 5610 
Cogeneration 123 209 243 353 603 
Biomass 3 3 4 10 21 
Large hydro 308 509 662 1155 1802 
Other renewables1 141 180 202 242 337 
Nuclear 0 46 56 423 847 
Natural Gas 35 61 102 219 553 
Total 2237 3628 4317 6479 10084 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
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ANNEX 5.3 SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN CHINA 
 
Table A5.3.1 Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in China in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal < 50 MW 148 238 238 201 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 64 102 102 97 47 
Coal 125-200 MW 45 70 70 66 38 
Coal > 200 MW 191 296 393 644 1227 
Cogeneration 20 38 32 40 66 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 4 6 10 22 56 
Total 471 752 846 1071 1435 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
Table A5.3.2 Emissions of CH4 from electricity production in China in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal < 50 MW 11.5 18.4 18.4 15.5 0.0 
Coal 50-125 MW 4.9 7.9 7.9 7.5 3.6 
Coal 125-200 MW 3.4 5.4 5.4 5.1 2.9 
Coal > 200 MW 14.8 22.9 30.4 49.8 94.8 
Cogeneration 1.5 3.0 2.4 3.1 5.1 
Biomass 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.5 6.4 
Total 36.6 58.3 65.8 83.7 113.0 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
Table A5.3.3 Emissions of N2O from electricity production in China in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal < 50 MW 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.0 
Coal 50-125 MW 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 
Coal 125-200 MW 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Coal > 200 MW 0.9 1.4 1.8 3.0 5.7 
Cogeneration 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Biomass 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 2.3 3.6 4.1 5.1 6.8 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
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Table A5.3.4 Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O) from electricity production in 
China in the Business-as-Usual scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal < 50 MW 161 258 258 217 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 69 111 111 105 51 
Coal 125-200 MW 48 76 76 72 41 
Coal > 200 MW 207 320 425 697 1328 
Cogeneration 21 41 34 43 72 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 4 7 11 25 63 
Total 510 813 916 1160 1554 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
 
Table A5.3.5 Emissions of SO2 from electricity production in China in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg SO2/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal < 50 MW 1.6 2.5 2.5 2.1 0.0 
Coal 50-125 MW 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.5 
Coal 125-200 MW 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 
Coal > 200 MW 2.0 3.1 4.1 6.7 12.8 
Cogeneration 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Biomass 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 4.9 7.8 8.8 11.0 14.5 
1 Geothermal, wind and small hydropower. 
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ANNEX 5.4 SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
INDIA 
 
Table A5.4.1 Demand for primary1 energy for electricity production in India in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Adapted from RAINS 2000 BAU scenario (see text). Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 465 1254 1699 1275 854 
Coal, other, >2000 0 0 0 1990 2628 
Coal, LPS, <2000 1907 2389 2574 1360 1094 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 0 0 1060 3824 
Cogeneration 0 240 333 500 667 
Oil 112 99 121 159 190 
Bagasse 318 422 500 821 1280 
Large hydro 581 681 735 1398 2175 
Other renewables2 0.50 2 21 57 145 
Nuclear 67 72 81 68 33 
Natural Gas 140 226 350 723 1693 
Total 3591 5385 6414 9412 14583 
1 The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. 
An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, 
etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both 
grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. 
For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Wind and small hydropower. 
 
Table A5.4.2 Production of electricity in India in the Business-as-Usual scenario. Adapted from 
RAINS 2000 BAU scenario (see text). Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 107 339 578 433 290 
Coal, other, >2000 0 0 0 756 998 
Coal, LPS, <2000 572 741 816 484 394 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 0 0 403 1453 
Cogeneration 0 36 50 75 100 
Oil 32 29 39 58 71 
Bagasse 9 12 14 22 35 
Large hydro 221 259 279 531 827 
Other renewables1 0 1 8 22 55 
Nuclear 25 27 31 26 12 
Natural Gas 77 124 193 398 931 
Total 1043 1568 2007 3209 5168 
1 Wind and small hydropower. 
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ANNEX 5.5 SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN INDIA 
 
Table A5.5.1 Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in India in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2/year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 43 116 158 118 79 
Coal, other, >2000 0 0 0 185 244 
Coal, LPS, <2000 177 221 239 126 101 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 0 0 98 354 
Cogeneration 0 4 6 8 11 
Oil 9 8 9 12 15 
Bagasse 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables2 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 8 13 20 40 95 
Total 236 362 430 588 899 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity 
of more than 500 MW 
2  Wind and small hydropower. 
 
Table A5.5.2 Emissions of CH4 from electricity production in India in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 3.4 9.2 12.5 9.4 6.3 
Coal, other, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 19.4 
Coal, LPS, <2000 14.1 17.6 19.0 10.0 8.1 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 28.2 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.9 1.4 2.2 4.6 10.7 
Total 18.6 28.9 34.5 47.7 74.3 
1 Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity 
of more than 500 MW 
2  Wind and small hydropower. 
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Table A5.5.3 Emissions of N2O from electricity production in India in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Coal, other, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.7 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.6 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Total 1.4 2.1 2.5 3.6 5.4 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity 
of more than 500 MW 
2  Wind and small hydropower. 
 
Table A5.5.4 Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O) from electricity production in 
India in the Business-as-Usual scenario. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. LPS = 
Large Point Source1. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 47 126 171 128 86 
Coal, other, >2000 0 0 0 200 264 
Coal, LPS, <2000 192 240 259 137 110 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 0 0 107 384 
Cogeneration 0 4 6 9 12 
Oil 9 8 9 12 15 
Bagasse 1 1 1 2 2 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables2 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 9 14 22 45 105 
Total 256 393 467 639 978 
1 Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity 
of more than 500 MW 
2 Wind and small hydropower. 
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Table A5.5.5 Emissions of SO2 from electricity production in India in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario. Unit: Tg SO2/year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Coal, other, <2000 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Coal, other, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 0.9 1.4 1.6 2.2 3.3 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity 
of more than 500 MW 
2  Wind and small hydropower. 
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ANNEX 5.6 EMISSION FACTORS 
 
For the calculations presented in 5.4, chapters 7 and 9, the emission factors presented in 
Table A5.6.1 were used. 
 
Table A5.6.1 Emission factors used for calculations for China in chapters 5.4, 7 and 9. Source: 
IPCC (1996) for greenhouse gases; Foell et al (1995)1 for SO2. Emission factor for 
cogeneration only includes emissions assigned to electricity production2. 
 CO2 CH4 N2O SO2 
 t C/TJ kg CH4/TJ kg N2O/TJ kt SO2/PJ 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 23.5 317 1.3 0.9 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 23.5 317 1.3 0.9 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 23.5 317 1.3 0.9 
Coal/Oill > 200 MW 23.5 317 1.3 0.9 
Cogeneration (Coal) 4.5 61 0.2 0.2 
Cogeneration (Gas) 7.2 142 0.05 0.005 
Biomass 0 30 4 0.4 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 15.22 301 0.10 0.01 
1 Current versions of RAINS-ASIA may use updated emission factors for SO2 
2  Emissions factors for cogeneration only include emissions that can be assigned to the electricity 
generated and are excludung emissions assigned to heat production. Hence, the emission factor (per 
ton of coal input) of electricity generated via cogeneration, is lower than of electricity generated 
without heat production. The emission factor of gas-based cogeneration is higher than that of coal-
based cogeneration because the ratio of heat to electricity is lower for gas-based cogeneration, re-
sulting in less emissions assigned to heat production. To calculate the emission factor per unit of 
fuel input (TJ-p), the following formula could be used: (1-(hCHP heat production/hCHP system))*emission 
factor fuel power plant, in which the system efficiency equals the summation of electric and heat effi-
ciencies. To calculate the emission factor per unit of electricity output (TJ-e), the following formula 
could be used: ((1/hCHP electric)-(hCHP heat production/(helectric*hsystem)))*(emission factor fuel power 
plant/hconversion power plant).  
 
Table A5.6.2 Emission factors used for calculations for India in chapters 5.4, 7 and 9. Source: 
Houghton et al. (1997) for greenhouse gases; Foell et al (1995) for SO2. Emission 
factor for cogeneration only includes emissions assigned to electricity production. 
 CO2 CH4 N2O SO2 
 t C/TJ kg CH4/TJ kg N2O/TJ kt SO2/PJ 
Coal, small, <2000 25.3 351 1.4 0.33 
Coal, small, >2000 25.3 351 1.4 0.33 
Coal, large, <2000 25.3 351 1.4 0.33 
Coal, large, >2000 25.3 351 1.4 0.33 
Cogeneration (coal) 4.5 62 0.2 0.06 
Cogeneration (gas) 7.2 142 0.05 0.005 
Oil 20.9 7.1 0.6 0.26 
Bagasse 0.0 30 4 0.33 
Large hydro 0.0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0.0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0.0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 15.2 301 0.1 0.01 
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ANNEX 5.7 DETAILS ON POWER SECTOR IN 2020 FOR CHINA – 
Business-as-usual 
 
Table A5.7.1 Power sector in China in 1990 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
 Primary energy demand1 (F) Electricity 
produced 
Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity 
(E) 
el.eff  
(ef) 
capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 1144 1030 114 312 0.27 22 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 579 521 58 174 0.30 11 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 738 664 74 221 0.30 12 0.60 
125 – 200 MW 517 466 52 166 0.32 9 0.60 
>= 200 2221 1999 222 755 0.34 40 0.60 
cogeneration 1190 1071 119 123 0.10 13 0.31 
Totals        
Coal/Oil 5199 4679 519 1628 0.31 106  
Cogeneration (coal) 1190 1071 119 123    
Natural Gas 63   35 0.55   
Nuclear 0       
Geothermal (PP) 1   0 0.38   
Waste Fuel 0   0 0.23   
Bagasse 89   2 0.03   
Wind 0   0 0.38   
Large Hydro 812   308 0.38   
Small hydro 370   140 0.38   
Total 7724 5751 638 2237 0.29   
For comparison: total 
from RAINS-BAU Sce-
nario 
7723 5751 638 2237    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.7.2 Power sector in China in 1995 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
 Primary energy demand1 (F) Electricity 
produced 
Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity 
(E) 
el.eff 
(ef) 
Capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 1144 1066 78 312 0.27 22 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 579 539 40 174 0.30 11 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 738 687 51 221 0.30 12 0.60 
125 – 200 MW 517 482 35 166 0.32 9 0.60 
>= 200 2221 2068 152 755 0.34 40 0.60 
cogeneration 1190 1109 82 123 0.10 13 0.31 
Built: after 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 718 669 49 196 0.27 12 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 327 304 22 98 0.30 6 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 451 420 31 135 0.30 6 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 297 277 20 101 0.34 5 0.70 
>= 200 1214 1130 83 461 0.38 21 0.70 
cogeneration 1133 1055 78 86 0.08 7 0.40 
Totals        
Coal/Oil 8205 7643 562 2619 0.32 163  
Cogeneration (coal) 2323 2164 159 209    
Natural Gas 112   61 0.55   
Nuclear 122   46 0.38   
Geothermal (PP) 2   1 0.38   
Waste Fuel 0   0 0.23   
Bagasse 89   2 0.03   
Wind 8   3 0.38   
Large Hydro 1341   509 0.38   
Small hydro 465   177 0.38   
Total 12665 9806 721 3628 0.29   
        
For comparison: total 
from RAINS-BAU Sce-
nario 
13076 9806 721 3628    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.7.3 Power sector in China in 2000 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
 Primary energy demand1 
(F) 
Electricity 
produced 
Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity 
(E) 
el.eff 
(ef) 
Capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 1144 1066 78 312 0.27 22 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 579 539 39 174 0.30 11 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 738 688 50 221 0.30 12 0.60 
125 – 200 MW 517 482 35 166 0.32 9 0.60 
>= 200 2221 2069 151 755 0.34 40 0.60 
cogeneration 1190 1109 81 123 0.10 13 0.31 
Built: after1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 718 669 49 196 0.27 12 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 327 304 22 98 0.30 6 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 451 420 31 135 0.30 6 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 297 277 20 101 0.34 5 0.70 
>= 200 2342 2183 159 890 0.38 40 0.70 
cogeneration 722 673 49 120 0.17 9 0.40 
Totals        
Coal/Oil 9333 8698 635 3048 0.33   
Cogeneration 1913 1782 130 243    
Natural Gas 185   102 0.55   
Nuclear 147   56 0.38   
Geothermal (PP) 2   1 0.38   
Waste Fuel 4   1 0.23   
Bagasse 120   3 0.03   
Wind 15   6 0.38   
Large Hydro 1742   662 0.38   
Small hydro 516   196 0.38   
Total 13977 10481 765 4317 0.31   
        
For comparison: total 
from RAINS-BAU 
13978 10481 765 4317    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.7.4 Power sector in China in 2010 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
 Primary energy demand1 
(F) 
Electricity 
produced 
Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity 
(E) 
el.eff 
(ef) 
Capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 710 674 36 199 0.28 14 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 579 549 30 174 0.30 11 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 676 642 35 203 0.30 12 0.55 
125 – 200 MW 474 450 24 152 0.32 9 0.55 
>= 200 2072 1967 106 705 0.34 40 0.56 
cogeneration 1103 1047 56 114 0.10 12 0.31 
Built: 1990-2000        
<= 50 MW low pressure 718 681 37 196 0.27 12 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 327 310 17 98 0.30 6 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 451 428 23 135 0.30 6 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 297 282 15 101 0.34 5 0.70 
>= 200 2342 2222 120 890 0.38 40 0.70 
cogeneration 722 685 37 120 0.17 9 0.40 
Built: 2000-2010        
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 0 0 0 0 0.34 0 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0.70 
>= 200 3064 2907 157 1225 0.40 56 0.70 
cogeneration 597 566 30 119 0.20 8 0.50 
Totals        
Coal/Oil 11710 11180 530 4077  239  
Cogeneration (coal) 2422 2313 110 353    
Natural Gas 398   219 0.55   
Nuclear 1113   423 0.38   
Geothermal (PP) 5   2 0.38   
Waste Fuel 25   6 0.23   
Bagasse 142   4 0.03   
Wind 47   18 0.38   
Large Hydro 3039   1155 0.38   
Small hydro 586   223 0.38   
Total 19487 13492 640 6479 0.33   
For comparison: total 
from RAINS-BAU sce-
nario 
19493 13492 640 6479    
1  he demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.7.5 Power sector in China in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a) 
 Primary energy demand1 
(F) 
Electricity 
produced 
Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity 
(E) 
el.eff (ef) Capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990        
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 92 89 4 28 0.31 2 0.50 
125 – 200 MW 145 139 6 46 0.32 3 0.50 
>= 200 672 645 27 228 0.34 14 0.53 
Cogeneration 164 164 0 25 0.15 3 0.31 
Built: 1990-2000        
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 451 433 18 135 0.30 6 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 297 286 12 101 0.34 5 0.70 
>= 200 2342 2248 94 890 0.38 40 0.70 
Cogeneration 585 585 0 88 0.15 7 0.40 
Built: 2000-2010        
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 0 0 0 0 0.34 0 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 0 0 0 0 0.36 0 0.70 
>= 200 3064 2941 123 1225 0.40 56 0.70 
Cogeneration 796 796 0 119 0.15 8 0.50 
Built: after 2010        
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0 0 0.30 0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 0 0 0 0 0.31 0 0.60 
125 – 200 MW 0 0 0 0 0.32 0 0.60 
>= 200 8166 7840 327 3267 0.40 173 0.60 
cogeneration 2475 2475 0 371 0.15 24 0.50 
Totals        
Coal/Oil 15229 14620 609 5921  338  
Cogeneration (coal) 4019 4019 0 603    
Natural Gas 1006   553 0.55   
Nuclear 2228   847 0.38   
Geothermal (PP) 13   5 0.38   
Waste Fuel 75   17 0.23   
Bagasse 150   4 0.03   
Wind 84   32 0.38   
Large Hydro 4743   1802 0.38   
Small hydro 788   300 0.38   
Total 28336 18639 609 10084    
For comparison: total from 
RAINS-BAU scenario 
27161 17396 584 10084    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in United 
Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ 
of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ 
of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100. 
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ANNEX 5.8  DETAILS ON POWER SECTOR IN 2020 FOR INDIA – Business-
as-usual 
 
Table A5.8.1 Power sector in India in 1990 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
INDIA 1990 Demand for primary 
energy (F)1 
(PJ) 
Gross electricity pro-
duction (PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil Total Coal Oil  
Coal         
Built <1990 Other power plants 487 465 22 112 107 5 0.23 
 Large point sources 1997 1907 90 599 572 27 0.3 
 Cogeneration 0 0  0 0  0.15 
All fuels Coal 2372   679    
 Cogeneration (coal) 0   0    
 Oil 112   32    
 Natural gas 140   77   0.55 
 Nuclear 67   25   0.38 
 Bagasse 318   9   0.03 
 Wind 0.40   0.15   0.38 
 Large hydro 581   221   0.38 
 Small hydro 0.10   0.04   0.38 
 Total 3591   1043    
 Total BAU-EU 3591   1042    
1 The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.8.2 Power sector in India in 1995 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a) 
INDIA 1995 Demand for primary en-
ergy (F)1  
(PJ) 
Gross electricity pro-
duction (PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil Total Coal Oil  
Coal         
 Other power plants 1288 1254 34 348 339 9 0.27 
Built <1990 Large point sources 2143 2086 57 643 626 17 0.3 
Built >1990 Large point sources 311 302 8 118 115 3 0.38 
 Cogeneration 240 240  36 36  0.15 
All fuels Coal 3643   1079    
 Cogeneration (coal) 240   36    
 Oil 99   29    
 Natural gas 226   124   0.55 
 Nuclear 72   27   0.38 
 Bagasse 422   12   0.03 
 Wind 1.6   1   0.38 
 Large hydro 681   259   0.38 
 Small hydro 0.5   0   0.38 
 Total 5385   1568    
 Total BAU-EU 5385   1505    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.8.3 Power sector in India in 2000 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et al., 
1999; Boudri et al., 2000a) 
INDIA-2000 Demand for primary 
energy (F)1  
(PJ) 
Gross electricity pro-
duction (PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil Total Coal Oil  
Coal         
 Other power plants 1747 1699 48 594 578 16 0.34 
Built <1990 Large point sources 2083 2026 57 625 608 17 0.3 
Built >1990 Large point sources 563 548 15 214 208 6 0.38 
 Cogeneration 333 333  50 50  0.15 
All fuels Coal 4273   1394    
 Cogeneration (coal) 333   50    
 Oil 121   39    
 Natural gas 350   193   0.55 
 Nuclear 81   31   0.38 
 Bagasse 500   14   0.03 
 Wind 16   6   0.38 
 Large hydro 735   279   0.38 
 Small hydro 5   2   0.38 
 Total 6414   2007    
 Total BAU-EU 6415   2121    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.8.4 Power sector in India in 2010 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (based on TERI et 
al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a) 
INDIA-2010 Demand for primary en-
ergy (F)1  
(PJ) 
Gross electricity pro-
duction (PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil Total Coal Oil  
Coal         
Built <2000 Other power plants 1310 1275 36 446 433 12 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2046 1990 56 778 756 21 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 835 813 23 284 276 8 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 563 548 15 214 208 6 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1089 1060 30 414 403 11 0.38 
 Cogeneration 500 500  75 75  0.15 
All fuels Coal 5686   2077    
 Cogeneration (coal) 500   75    
 Oil 159   58    
 Natural gas 723   398   0.55 
 Nuclear 68   26   0.38 
 Bagasse 821   22   0.03 
 Wind 47   18   0.38 
 Large hydro 1398   531   0.38 
 Small hydro 9   4   0.38 
 Total 9412   3209    
 Total BAU-EU 9412   3430    
1 The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A5.8.5 Power sector in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (based on TERI et 
al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
INDIA-2020 Demand for primary 
energy (F)1  
(PJ) 
Gross electricity pro-
duction (PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil Total Coal Oil  
Coal         
Built <2000 Other power plants 874 854 19 297 290 7 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2687 2628 59 1021 998 23 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 556 544 12 189 185 4 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 563 551 12 214 209 5 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1089 1065 24 414 405 9 0.38 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2821 2759 62 1072 1048 24 0.38 
 Cogeneration 667 667  100 100  0.15 
All fuels Coal 8400   3136    
 Cogeneration (coal) 667   100    
 Oil 190   71    
 Natural gas 1693   931   0.55 
 Nuclear 33   12   0.38 
 Bagasse 1280   35   0.03 
 Wind 129   49   0.38 
 Large hydro 2175   827   0.38 
 Small hydro 16   6   0.38 
 Total 14583   5168    
 Total BAU-EU 14582   5416    
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100. 
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6. Technological analysis of end-use energy efficiency 
Author: Jaklien Vlasblom107 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter studies the energy conservation potential in several important electricity end-
use sectors. Most end-use studies focus on fuel efficiency and deal with electricity 
consumption in the peripherals. However, since this project studies the potential for 
modernisation of the electricity sector, the fuel consumption by end-use sectors is only 
described briefly, and fuel efficiency improvement potentials are based on rough 
assumptions. The selection of sectors for detailed analysis is based on their current share 
in total electricity consumption and the expected share in 2020 based on the growth in 
from 1980 to 1995 (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1.  Shares of sectoral electricity consumption in 1995 and the average annual growth in 
China and India. 
 India 
Share of total electricity 
consumption 
China 
Share of total electricity 
consumption 
China 
Growth (1980-1995) 
Industry 46% 69% 7% 
Cement 4% of national cons. 6% of national cons. 12% 
Iron and Steel 4% of national cons. 12% of national cons. 7% 
Aluminium 3% of national cons. 4% of national cons. 10% 
Residential 17% 13% 15% 
Commerce 8% 7% 12% 
Agriculture 27% 7% 6% 
 
The sectors have been introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 for India and China respectively. 
They can be divided into three categories: 1) the industrial sectors (cement, iron and steel, 
and aluminium) produce with suboptimal efficiency; 2) the residential, commercial and 
agricultural sectors use appliances and devices which consume more electricity than 
necessary; 3) two cross-cutting sectors are the cogeneration of heat and power and energy 
efficient electric motors and drives, which should be adopted where possible. 
The methodology of the sector studies has been described in detail in Chapter 2, under 
‘scenario approach’. A bottom-up analysis is used to describe the sector structure (historic 
output, number of plants etc. (also see Chapter 5) and technological options are studied 
and compared to the Global Best Practice technology. This detailed sectoral information 
is used as input to construct three scenarios: an end-use Business-as-Usual scenario 
(compatible with the Rains-Asia 2000 BAU scenario – see Chapter 5), and an end-use 
Best Practice Technology scenario per sector. Extrapolations were needed to construct the 
‘other industries’ and transport sector in order to obtain full end-use sector coverage. The 
final result is an estimation of the technical energy savings potential per sector, and a set 
of technical options can help achieve those savings. 
It is necessary to define the term ‘end-use Best Practice Technology (BPT) scenario’. It 
refers to the set of assumptions and calculations made on end-use efficiency in this 
chapter, of which only the integrated result is used as an option in the Best Practice 
Technology scenario in Chapters 7 and 9. Secondly, the following criteria are used for the 
                                                   
107 With contributions from Kornelis Blok, Jan-Willem Bode, Joyeeta Gupta. 
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technical options included in the scenario: currently available on the international market, 
already adopted by some actors in other countries, low- or reasonably priced108, 
reasonable turn-over of stock109, appropriate technology110. Hence, our potential includes 
more than an economic potential (some options are more expensive and are assumed to 
have implementation possibilities via special policies or international cooperation), and 
less than a pure technical potential because that often does not take any cost or other 
barriers into account. 
A ‘frozen efficiency scenario’ has been added to each sector’s scenario construction, 
which shows the development of energy consumption assuming that energy efficiency 
remains constant at the level of the year 2000, irrespective of product mix changes. This 
means that the difference between the frozen efficiency and BAU scenario shows the 
effect of the efficiency improvement measures assumed to be taken in the BAU scenario 
(autonomous technological progress).  
6.2 Cement Industry 
6.2.1 Current situation (1990-2000) 
6.2.1.1 Sector structure 
Limestone, coal and electricity form the most important input in the cement production 
process (see Figure 6.1). Natural gas could, in principle, be used as a substitute for coal, 
but its availability is low in China as well as India (Das and Kandpal 1997; Sarathy and 
Chakravarty 1999: 54).  
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Figure 6.1 Schematic description of the cement production process. 
 
The average annual growth of Chinese cement production was high (12%) in the period 
1980-1998. This is about 50% higher than the average annual GDP growth (ca. 8.4%) and 
almost twice as high as the industrial average GDP growth in that period (5.9%) (see 
Section 5.2.2). The low output growth of recent years is caused by domestic reforms and 
the Asian crisis (see Figure 6.2). In India the average annual growth rate was 7.3% from 
the years 1985/86 until 1996/97. This growth was relatively constant compared to the 
                                                   
108  When expected that the technology will never be adapted at large scale in developed countries because of its 
high price, it is not expected that China or India will achieve a high penetration rate. 
109  It cannot be expected that all current technologies in use will be discarded or all current plants be closed long 
before their economic life. 
110  For example, not all ball mills in the cement industry is likely to be replaced by roller mills, because the latter 
need high quality input material which cannot be obtained in all situations. 
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large fluctuations in the Chinese production growth (see Figure 6.2). In 1985, the cement 
production in China exceeded that in India by a factor 4.5 and in 1997 the difference 
increased to a factor 5.8. The expected production volume in 2020 can be seen in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4. In 1997 the per capita production was around 450 kg/yr in China and 80 
kg/yr in India (own calculations) compared to 450 kg/yr per capita consumption average 
for the EU in 2000 (Cembureau website 2001). 
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Figure 6.2 Output of Cement (MTon/yr) in China (NBS 1999) and India111 (CMA 1998). 
 
In both countries, a very large number of plants exists. In India (see Chapter 4), most 
plants are owned by private entities while in China, up to recently, state-ownership 
dominated. The average plant size is low: India had 14 plants in 2000 
(www.cementindia/net) and China 12 plants in 1995 with an annual production capacity 
over 2 Mton, maximum 40 plants between 1 and 2 Mton and hundreds (India) and 
thousands (China) of mini plants producing below 300 Kton per year. The resulting small 
average capacity has a negative impact on the energy efficiency (112; Sarathy and 
Chakravarty 1999: 244; CMA 1998) However, large plants (>1 Mton) often consist of 
several small kilns, which might be similar to the kilns in small plants (UNDP 1993). 
Conclusions regarding economies of scale cannot therefore be easily drawn. The reason 
for the large number of small plants in China is the sudden economic growth and 
construction in the beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 6.3), resulting in the unparalleled 
fast construction of simple, vertical kiln cement plants, to satisfy the large demand for 
cement.113 The scale of the plants may impact the energy efficiency, together with the mix 
of production processes (see paragraph on ‘Sectoral Energy Consumption’). 
The different production processes can be divided into vertical and rotary kilns (shares: 
see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). In China, about 80% of the total cement production is made in 
vertical kilns. This is an old technology which, in its simplest form, leads to low quality 
cement (it is therefore not allowed to be used in Chinese urban areas). However, after 
extensive retrofit, high efficiency and product quality can be reached. Most manually 
operated kilns have been converted into mechanised kilns to increase production output 
and quality.114 Traditional rotary kilns (lepol and long kilns) are slowly being phased out 
in China because of their inefficiency. The inefficient wet rotary kilns have not yet been 
phased out totally because they allow for low quality input. Modern processes exist such 
as the pre-heater, pre-calciner cement plant with integrated cogeneration.115 In India, the 
share of dry kilns has increased considerably up to almost 90% in 1997/98 but this 
                                                   
111  Indian data are for the fiscal year starting from the May in the year mentioned on the x-axis, upto April of the 
next year. 
112  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
113  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
114  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2, 3 
115  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
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includes vertical and rotary kilns (detailed data have not been found) However the share 
of wet kiln production is reducing drastically, resulting in an increased energy efficiency. 
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Figure 6.3 Process mix changing over time 
(1985-1997) of cement production 
in China.116 
Figure 6.4 Process mix changing over time 
(1960-1997/98) in India (TERI 
1994), (CMA 1998) 
 
6.2.1.2 Sectoral Energy Consumption 
The cement sector is an important sector to study because its 1995 share of national 
electricity consumption was 6% and 2.5% for China and India respectively, and 5 and 9% 
relative to industrial electricity consumption. The consumption of fuel accounted for an 
even higher share of national and industrial consumption (State Statistical Bureau 1998) 
(Das and Kandpal 1997). The total consumption of fuel and electricity in the cement 
industry has grown significantly (see Figure 6.5). The specific fuel consumption has 
decreased over the years, but the electricity consumption per ton of cement has been 
stable due to the compensating effects of the closure of old inefficient plants on the one 
hand and the construction of new plants with electricity intensive quality and emissions 
control and electricity intensive grinders.117 and 118 The costs of energy are high, and 
energy efficiency investments are therefore viable (119; Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999)120. 
The specific fuel consumption has reduced faster in India and is currently at a lower level 
than in China, possibly because of the higher share of large scale plants and a lower share 
of vertical kilns out of the dry process production. 
                                                   
116  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
117  The closure of wet plants and replacement by more efficient dry plants is another example: wet grinding needs 
less electricity than dry grinding (109 kWh/ton cement versus 122 kWh/ton), but the overall efficiency of wet 
plants is low (>6 GJ-final per ton clinker versus 4 GJ for dry plants) (TERI, 1995). 
118  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1, 2 
119  Interviews (JV) 2000: various 
120  India: roller presses, high efficiency separators, grate coolers, cogeneration, etc. (Sarathy and Chakravarty 
1999: 25). 
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Figure 6.5 Annual total fuel and electricity 
consumption in PJ-final/yr (various 
sources in Asian Dilemma scenario 
calculations, i.e. State Statistical 
Bureau (China)) 
Figure 6.6 Historical Specific Energy Con-
sumption of Cement production in 
China and India in GJ-
electricity/ton cement and GJ 
fuel/ton clinker (various sources in 
Asian Dilemma scenario calcula-
tions) 
 
6.2.2 Technological Options for Energy Conservation 
The average specific energy consumption (SEC) per ton of cement is higher in China and 
India than the Best Practice plants in the world, because part of the plants use outdated 
technologies and the operation and maintenance is not optimal. For India it has been said 
that the large scale plants are generally up-to-date and that mainly the small scale sector 
has low efficiencies (Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999). Success stories in the 1990s have 
reduced fuel consumption considerably. In Table 6.1 the SEC values of China and India 
are compared to the SEC of the Global Best Practice (GBP) plant. This results in the 
maximum potential of energy conservation, in this case for the mid-1990s, of 40% of fuel 
consumption in China and maximum 30% in India,121 and at least 25% of electricity 
consumption in India and 20% in China122.  
In future, BAU efficiency savings will take place, and the Global Best Practice will 
improve as well. In the following, the most important energy saving options will be 
discussed that could be adopted in the future. The 2020 Best Practice savings potential 
will be calculated in Section 6.2.3. 
Table 6.2  Specific Energy Consumption (GJ-f/ton cement) compared to the Global Best Practice 123. 
 India (1997) China (1995) Global Best Practice 
Fuel consumption 4.4 GJ/ton clinker # 5.0 GJ/ton clinker ~ 3.05 GJ/ton clinker ^ 
3.24 GJ/ton clinker* 
2.77 GJ/ton cement* 
Electricity consump-
tion 
0.4 GJ-e/ton cement 
# 
0.36 GJ-e/ton cement ~ 0.29 GJ-e/ton cement^ 
0.34 GJ-e/ton cement*@ 
 
                                                   
121  It is mainly the small scale sector that has large savings potentials in India. 
122  The specific electricity consumption in China is low due to low-tech plants. As mentioned before, the state of 
the art technologies generally have in a higher quality product and lower fuel consumption, accompanied by a 
relatively high electricity consumption. An improvement of the Chinese plants will therefore initially lead to 
an increase in SEC-elec. 
123  Worrell (1995a): 0.36 GJ-e/ton ground clinker(+ assume 80% clinker per ton cement) *Japan 1992 (UNIDO, 
1998) at 85.5% clinker/cement ratio; @ 0.25 GJ-e/ton cement possible (Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999: 339); 
~ (SSB, 1998); various sources in Asian Dilemma scenario calculations. 
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Based on a detailed techno-economic analysis of energy efficiency options, a cost-
effectiveness (supply) curve can be constructed. The following Box Item shows such a 
curve generated by Bode (1999) on technical options and their current potential to reduce 
energy consumption in the cement sector in India. The figure shows for each numbered 
technical option, the savings potential (horizontal axis) and the costs (vertical axis).  
Box 6.1 Cost effectiveness curve for cement production in India (Bode 1999)  
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1 High-efficiency motors 9  New burners, including dual firing sys-
tem 
2 Closed circuit milling 10 6 stage suspension pre-heater 
3 Adjustable speed drives 11 Waste heat recovery 
4 Process management systems 12 Conversion of wet to dry process with 
suspension pre-heater systems 
5 Replace old cyclone pre-heaters by new 13 Fluidised bed furnace 
6 Adding new pre-heater with pre-calcination 14 Roller press as pre grinder 
7 Improved housekeeping 15 Mineralisers 
8 Grate cooler modification 16 Installation of vertical roller mills 
 
Options 1 and 3 account for a significant potential through the use of increased motor efficiency. This 
will be dealt with in Chapter 6.8. 
Options 4 and 7 deal with a high savings potential via improved management and housekeeping. Those 
exist of a list of management and small technical measures.  
Transforming a wet plant into a dry process, has a high fuel saving potential per retrofitted plant. But 
since the share of wet plants has reduced drastically in recent years (see Figure 6.3 and 6.4), and the 
price is very high (cheaper options have been utilised), it is not considered to be an option in this 
study (Bode 1999). There are at least 59 wet kilns part of the Cement Manufacturers Association 
(CMA). Those are joint to bigger companies. An unknown share of the other 300 existing small 
kilns is likely to be using the wet production process (CMA 1998). 
The fluidised bed furnace (nr 13) promises a large energy savings potential. This technology is not 
available on the market right now, and it is not known when market penetration of this technology 
can be expected. Fletcher et al (1998) assume this technology not being implemented before 2020. 
The roller press and vertical rolling mill (Options 14 and 16) have a large potential per plant, but in In-
dia the current penetration rate is higher than that of other options and the total potential is therefore 
not higher. The costs are higher than other options, and the total costs of saved energy are positive: 
the investment can therefore not be earned back during the life of the technology under current 
prices. The big advantage for this option is that it results in mainly electricity savings, which are fo-
cussed on within this project.  
 
Within this project, it was not possible to develop a comparable cost-effectiveness curve 
for cement production in China and neither for other sectors studied (Sections 6.3-6.8) 
due to data constraints. Therefore the most important technological options have been 
focussed on and will be discussed below. Feasibility issues are dealt with in Chapter 8.  
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New Capacity addition at Global Best Practice level 
In the BAU scenario, new plants or capacity added by retrofitting124 are assumed to be 
based on domestic technologies125. For the Best Practice Technology (BPT) scenario, new 
capacity is assumed to be built at the Global Best Practice level. For projections for the 
future it is assumed that the specific fuel consumption with the Best Practice 
Technologies decreases by 0.5% per year. Considering the development of electricity use 
in cement production in the recent past, it is assumed that the electricity consumption 
remains unchanged in future. 
Process mix 
The process mix has improved in the last decade: production by the use of wet processes 
has decreased and the oldest vertical kilns have been taken out of production (China). 
New, modern pre-calciner and pre-heater plants have been built (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4) 
These measures were partly taken for product quality reasons (issue-linkage: see Chapter 
2) and partly for environmental reasons. In the BAU scenario it is assumed that 70 MTon 
of production (100 MTon capacity) from old cement kilns will be taken out of production 
in China up to 2020, consisting of inefficient vertical kilns, wet and other old rotary 
kilns.126 In the end-use Best Practice Technology scenario 140 MTon of production could 
be reasonably stopped. Mechanical but inefficient vertical kilns need to close at a rate of 
1% per year, on top of the above mentioned categories in the BAU scenario.  
A major bottleneck of closing small plants is that their local importance is large: they 
provide a cheap product (often low quality) for rural areas where transportation would be 
either impossible or expensive. Furthermore, the local authorities keep the plants open for 
tax and employment reasons.127 There is a trend towards small plants merging locally in 
China. The policy should be towards reaching efficiency improvement in those larger 
plants, which might not occur in the BAU due to capital and administrative approval 
constraints. 
Grinding system 
The grinding (and mixing) system is the major electricity consuming process128. More 
efficient grinding systems exist, which simultaneously increases output quality but often 
an even higher quality is aimed for which results in a net increase of electricity 
requirement.129 The traditional ball/tube mill (AIT 1997) can be replaced by a roller mill 
or complemented by the roller press and an efficient classifier130. Roller mills and 
classifiers produced in China are said to be of low quality and their penetration rate is 
therefore low (131 ; Liu et al 1995).  
                                                   
124  In recent years, a large share of the capacity addition was achieved by retrofitting existing plants. New plants 
are often not built due to administrative difficulties or location problems (Interviews (JV) 2000: 1,2). The effi-
ciency of the additional capacity is therefore hard to predict. 
125  The small-to medium capacity precalciner kiln is the most efficient plant manufactured by China (Interviews 
(JV) 2000: 1) and modern vertical kilns are expected to be built (Liu et al, 1995). In India precalcinators can 
be made upto 7.5 MT which are large scale (Ministry of Industry 1999: 60) 
126  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1, 2 
127  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
128  70% of total electricity consumption (Interviews (JV) 2000: 1,2) of cement production takes place in the two 
grinding steps: raw input material and clinker grinding towards final cement production (also see Figure 6.1). 
12000 grinding mills were working in China in the beginning of the 1990s (UNDP, 1993) 
129  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
130 The technology which separates larger particles to be returned for further grinding. It reduces waste and there-
fore increases the cement output (by 8%) (Liu et al, 1995). If also increased output quality. 
131  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1,2 
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An improved grinding system can save 8-10 kWh/ton clinker out of total 25 kWh 
required on average for raw materials grinding input. For finish grinding (excluding 
grinding of mineral addition), 15-20 kWh/ton clinker could be saved relative to the 45 
kWh average consumption (132 ; Cembureau 1997). When assuming average electricity 
consumption to equal 100 kWh/ton cement, the total electricity savings in this study are 
assumed to be at 25-30% per improved grinding system installed. This is similar to the 
UNDP (1994) estimated savings potential of 20-30% of electricity consumption. 
The current and potential penetration rate of improved grinding systems is difficult to 
predict. 50% of India’s dry plants is said to have already adopted an improved grinding 
system (AIT 1997), which might refer to large plants only. This option is expensive for 
small scale plants, and as long as low priced and low quality cement is in demand in rural 
areas, the small-scale sector cannot be expected to make this type of investment.133 A 
merger between local plants and a regulation regarding grinders might be an option, but it 
would still be high-cost. Other barriers are the material input quality requirements of 
roller mills and presses, and the fact that owners do not want to dispose of the current 
system (sunk costs). It is illustrative that new plants in China use ball mills, which are 
sometimes even imported.134 
Increased blending of cement 
Blending of cement refers to the step in which clinker is mixed with additives to form 
cement. In the last decades, the share of clinker in cement has decreased from 90% to 
84% in China and has been stable at 88% in India (CMA 1998) (State Statistical Bureau 
1998). Increased blending of cement reduces the clinker demand and therefore the fuel 
consumption per ton of cement (Worrell et al 1995a). An extra CO2 emission reduction 
takes place on top of the fuel based emission reduction: the chemical process related CO2 
emissions will also reduce per ton of cement.  
Three major varieties of cement each have different characteristics regarding share of 
clinker, type of additives and strength135. When estimating the maximum potential 
blending, the limitations need to be taken into account, e.g. the total availability of 
additives -especially (granulated) blast furnace slag and pozzolane material-, the demand 
for additives from other sectors, as well as their geographic location in relation to the 
location of cement plants. The following assumptions have been made: 
- In the Business-as-Usual scenario for India the share of clinker in cement stays con-
stant at 89% (which requires growth of additives use equal to total cement output 
growth). The Best Practice Technology (BPT) potential entails a reduction of 6%-
points, to 83%136. The fuel savings in the BPT scenario are in that case 7% while the 
electricity consumption will rise slightly due to extra additives grinding and mixing.  
                                                   
132  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
133  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
134  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2 
135 Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) with 95% clinker and the rest gypsum, with a high early strength; Portland 
Pozzolana (PPC) with 15-20% gypsum, fly-ask, brick bats, broken tiles etc. which cannot be used for high 
strength concrete and has 10% lower emissions than OPC (Das and Kandpal, 1997) OR 30% fly-ash and poz-
zolanes135 (volcanic material) and a higher final strength than OPC (Worrell et al, 1995); Portland Slag Ce-
ment (PSC) which includes 25-65% blast furnace slag and gypsum, has a lower early and higher final strength 
than OPC (Worrell et al, 1995) and 40% lower emissions than OPC (Das and Kandpal, 1997). 
136  It is assumed that the output of OPC cement is sufficient for future purposes, that output growth will mainly 
be realised via PPC production and that PSC increases slightly, through more BF slag availability via a larger 
effort, e.g. the iron industry needs to produce more granulated slag instead of air-cooled slag, for which mini-
mal investments are needed (Worrell et al, 1995). Das and Kandpal (1997) assume BF slag cement cannot in-
crease and therefore arrive at a lower blending potential. 
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- In the Business-as-Usual scenario for China the share of clinker in cement stays con-
stant at 84%137. The Best Practice Technology (BPT) potential entails increased 
blending by 0.35% annually to 78% in 2020138. Improved government policy and 
awareness creation will increase additives availability and use up to levels mentioned 
by the expert.139 Fuel savings are then at a maximum of 7% and electricity use will 
increase slightly. 
Implementation barriers are140: costs of additives are high because of transportation and 
competitive demand from other sectors; the general opinion is that blended cement has a 
lower quality than Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC)141 resulting in a lower market price. 
In industrialised countries the image of blended cement was also negative in the 
beginning; quality standards were not present and blended cements were limited in 
building codes. In the meantime it has generally been realised in industrialised countries 
that blended cement is functioning well and that it is even more suitable than OPC in 
certain applications (Worrell et al 1995). The lower quality might be existing if the 
grinding/mixing technology is not sufficient for blending, which might be the case in 
small, low-tech plants (personal communication Worrell 1999). 
The Chinese government is in favour of using blended cements since the policy is that the 
producer will get tax benefits when blending more than 30% (clinker less than 70%). 
However, there are implementation difficulties since the local authorities are responsible 
for the enterprise taxes and is not cooperating with this policy of the central 
government.142 
6.2.3 Scenarios and Saving Potential up to 2020 
In the previous paragraphs, a bottom-up study was carried out. Knowledge was acquired 
on a) the historic development of production output, the sector structure, fuel and 
electricity consumption, and b) possible technological options to reduce energy 
consumption. This knowledge serves as a foundation of various assumptions to be made 
for this sector’s scenario analysis. Assumptions were made on the growth of physical 
output until 2020, on the autonomous Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) reduction in 
the BAU scenario and the reduction of the SEC under the BPT scenario for new as well as 
existing plants. Furthermore, the share of blended cement in both scenarios were 
projected. The assumptions are presented in Table 6.3 for China and Table 6.4 for India, 
given in the end of Section 6.2. 
The following graphs show the total primary energy consumption in the frozen 
efficiency143, end-use BAU and end-use BPT scenarios for the cement sector. The 
expected growth of energy consumption is much larger in India than in China, in all 
scenarios, resulting in a possible absolute reduction of primary energy consumption in the 
Chinese Best Practice Technology scenario, whereas in India the energy consumption will 
be growing even in the BPT scenario. The 2020 maximum potential savings for fuel in 
                                                   
137  Expert’s opinion is that additive availability does not grow faster than cement output (Interviews (JV) 2000: 
1) 
138  Besides BF slags, slags from the non-ferro industry are expected to have a high potential availability (Inter-
views (JV) 2000: 1). Other interviewed cement experts as well as literature didn’t have information on in-
creased blending in China 
139  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
140  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
141  Small-plant owners feel that their quality is already low, and they don’t want to make it any lower by in-
creased blending (Interviews (JV) 2000: 1) 
142  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
143  See explanation in Section 6.1 Introduction. This scenario shows the energy consumption in case no efficiency 
measures were taken from the year 2000 onwards. 
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China and India are estimated at 23-27%, whereas the electricity savings potential is 
much higher in India than in China (see Table 6.2). The results are explained and 
discussed in the overview (see Section 6.2.4) and conclusions will be drawn in the end of 
Chapter 6. 
Throughout the demand sector studies it is assumed that the conversion factor from 
primary to final electricity is 35%, so that the countries can be compared to each 
other without involving the efficiency (changes) of the power supply side. 
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Figure 6.7  Primary energy consumption for the 
Chinese cement industry under the 
assumptions of the (Frozen Effi-
ciency), Business-as-usual (BAU) 
and the Best Practice (BP) scenario 
Figure 6.8 Primary Energy consumption under 
the assumptions of the (Frozen 
Efficiency), end-use BAU and the 
end-use BPT scenario for the 
Indian cement industry 
 
Table 6.2 Best Practical Technology savings potential relative to the end-use BAU scenario (PJ-final 
and Share of BAU consumption) 
 CHINA (2020) INDIA (2020) 
Fuel savings 680 PJ (27%) 220 PJ (23%) 
Electricity savings 47 PJ-e (14%) 42 PJ-e (31%) 
Total Primary savings 814 PJ-primary (23%) 339 PJ-primary (25%) 
 
6.2.4 Overview 
The annual output growth of cement has been very large in China (12% average between 
1980-1998) and in India (7.3% average between 1985-1996), as is the number of plants in 
both countries. The average capacity per plant is very small and the plants are widely 
distributed over the countries due to high transportation costs and insufficient 
infrastructure. Availability of capital is another factor. Old process technologies are 
slowly being replaced by newer processes, often domestically produced and in a few 
cases imported technologies. The average specific fuel consumption has been reducing 
strongly over the last decades, but is still 30-40% higher than the Global Best Practice 
plant in 1995. The specific electricity consumption has stayed relatively stable and is less 
than 20% higher than the Global Best Practice. It is expected that in a BAU situation, the 
specific fuel consumption will reduce autonomously, but that the electricity consumption 
will increase slightly due to new air pollution control measures and the construction of 
new plants which have higher general control measures and output quality, resulting in 
lower fuel but higher electricity use. 
A set of measures have been identified that can be used to reduce energy consumption on 
top of the BAU scenario. Important technological measures are: a) closing small, 
inefficient vertical kilns, wet process plants and old rotary kilns; b) installing high 
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efficiency, modern pre-heater pre-calcination plants; c) improving the grinding system 
through installing roller mills, roller presses and high-efficiency classifiers; and d) 
increasing the share of additives to clinker in cement. For some of the options, the 
individual energy savings potential has been calculated.  
The Best Practice Technology scenario shows the lower energy consumption possible 
when introducing new technologies and retrofit options at a reasonable rate (reasonable 
capital overturn and price not higher than industrial countries would be willing to pay). 
To construct the BPT scenario, assumptions were made on 1) production output: in China 
the output growth is assumed to be 2.5% between 2000 and 2010 and 1.5% from 2010-
2020, in India 7% and 6% respectively. The reason for the low growth in China compared 
to the past decades is that there is already a large production capacity and a small growth 
is sufficient to cover the future additional cement demand; 2) the share of blended cement 
increases at a certain rate; 3) the Specific Energy consumption changes by a certain rate 
annually. All data and assumptions are presented and explained in Tables 6.3 and 
6.4. 
1. Deducing the BPT scenario energy consumption from the BAU, the maximum elec-
tricity savings potential is calculated at 47 PJ-e (33%; China) and 42 PJ-e (14%; In-
dia) of its BAU electricity consumption in the cement sector. The primary energy sav-
ings are around 25% of BAU consumption for both countries. The reason that the 
relative savings are higher in India than in China, is that the expected output growth 
and therefore capacity addition (including replacement) is larger in India than in 
China, and that the 1995 specific electricity consumption of Indian cement production 
showed a larger gap with the Global Best Practice than the Chinese consumption, re-
sulting in a higher Indian electricity savings potential. The fuel savings potential is 
larger in China for a similar reason: the gap with the Global Best Practice was larger 
in 1995. 
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Table 6.3 The main assumptions made in the scenario analysis for China GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE (1995) IS 3.1GJ fuel/ton clinker and 0.29 GJ elec/ton cement. 
 Current 
Situation 
(1995) 
Business-as-usual scenario Best Practice scenario  
Production 475 MTon 
cement 
· 810 MTon cement in 2020  
· 2.5% growth 2000-2010, 1.5% growth 2010-2020144 
· Equivalent to BAU scenario 
Existing plants · SECfuel decreases 2.1% per year (SEC 2020 equals GBP of 1995) 
· SECelec decreases 0% 1995-2010 (fuel saving and air pollution 
reducing retrofit results in initial higher intensity) and 0.5% from 
2010-2020 resulting in a SECelec 2020 of 0,35 
New Plants 
SEC fuel 5.0 
GJ/ton clinker 
SEC elec 0.36 
GJ/ton cement 
· SEC fuel reduction of 1% per year (autonomous reduction145) to 3.9 GJ/ton 
clinker 
· SEC elec increase of 0.5% per year146 to 0.41 GJ/ton cement 
 
· SECfuel and SECelec equal the Global Best Practice of that moment, 
which reduces with 0.5% per year up to a 2020 level of 2.8 and 0.33 
respectively. 
Blending 84% 
 
· 84% constant clinker share in the period 1995 to 2020 (requiring the share of 
available and utilised additives to grow at the same speed as the cement 
demand147) 
· Share of blending increases with 0.35% annually so that clinker share 
reduces to 78% in 2020 (active government policy results in a higher 
utilisation (involving price, transportation) and higher availability of 
additives 147 
                                                   
144  11% growth 1985-1995 (NBS, 1999), 3% growth 1995-2000. Around 500 Mton will be produced in 2020 (Interviews (JV) 2000: 1, 2), (World Bank, 1995) 
145 In the period 1981-1995 an annual SEC fuel reduction in key plants occurred equal to 1.2% (Liu et al, 1995), (NBS, various years). This resulted from a combination of efficiency improve-
ment in old plants and the construction of new plants (Liu et al, 1995). A slightly lower percentage (1%) is chosen for the future BAU energy efficiency improvement since other than key-
plants need to be included, which are smaller and in a larger number, and therefore harder to retrofit. Furthermore, the growth of capacity, and therefore the installation of new plants, will 
be lower than in the past.  
146  In the period 1981-1990 an annual SEC elec increase occurred in key plants, equal to 1.2% (Liu et al, 1995), whereas this increase was only 0.7 in ALL plants from 1980-1995 (NSB, vari-
ous years). This resulted from increasing automation, pollution control etc, which might have happened at a higher rate in the key plants. New plants are also expected to have a higher en-
ergy consumption, but since output growth from 2000-2020 is much lower than in the previous years, the number of new plants decreases and the electricity intensity increases at a lower 
rate (0.5% annually). 
147  Based on calculations made in Paragraph 6.2.2 (option ‘blended cement’). 
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Table 6.4 The main assumptions made in the scenario analysis for India GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE (1995) IS 3.1GJ fuel/ton clinker and 0.29 GJ elec/ton cement. 
 Current 
situation (1995) 
Business-as-usual scenario Best Practice scenario 
Production 65 MTon · 310 MTon in 2020148 
· 7% growth from 2000-2010 and 6% growth from 2010-
2020 
· Equivalent to BAU scenario 
Existing 
plants 
· SEC fuel decreases 2% per year, resulting a SEC 2020 of 2.9 GJ/ton cement 
· SEC elec decreases 0.5% per year up to 2020, arriving at a SEC 2020 of 0.37 
GJ/ton 
New Plants 
SEC fuel 4.1 
GJ/ton clinker 
SEC elec 0.41 
GJ/ton cement 
· SEC fuel 1.2% reduction per year (autonomous) up to 2020, 
resulting in SEC of 3.4 GJ/ton clinker 149 
· SEC elec 0% increase per year up to 2020 resulting in a 
SEC 2020 0.46 GJ-e/ton cement 150 · SECfuel and SEC elec equal the Global Best Practice of that moment, which 
reduces with 0.5% per year, resulting in a SEC fuel 2020 of 2.8 GJ/ton clinker 
and SEC elec 2020 of 0.26 GJ-e/ton cement 
Blending 89% · 89% constant clinker share in the period 1995 to 2020 
(requiring the share of available and utilised additives to 
grow at the same speed as the cement demand 151 
· Share of blending increases with 0.35% annually so that the clinker share 
reduces to 83% in 2020 151 
                                                   
148  The growth rate over the period 1985-1997 was 7.6% (Cembureau, ?). Partha Sarathy (1998) expect an 8% output growth in the coming decade. The Ministry of Industry expects around 
200-250 Mt of cement output in 2020. In the 310 small plants the capacity is 9 Mt (Ministry of Industry 1999: 64; CMA 1999). The per capita consumption is 78 kgs in 1996 compared to 
328 in USA, 333 in China and 642 in Japan (Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999: 244). 
149  From 1985-1994 the SEC fuel reduction is 2.4% average, including retrofit and construction of new capacity. This is assumed to stay at half of this level, at 1.2% reduction per year upto 
2020, since this high autonomous improvement is hard to maintain, and the reasons are not known within this study. Older plants can be renovated to achieve power consumption of 90-
100kWh per tonne (Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999: 339). 
150  The SEC elec has reduced from 0.50 to 0.41 from 1985 to 1995 and is assumed to stay stable since new plants and fuel savings result in an increasing electricity consumption, which com-
pensates the ongoing retrofit of electricity consuming process steps. 
151  Based on calculations in Paragraph 6.2.2, option ‘blended cement’. 
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6.3 Iron and Steel Industry 
6.3.1 Current situation (1990-2000) 
6.3.1.1 Sector Structure 
Steel can be either produced from iron ore (primary steel) or from steel scrap (secondary 
steel). Primary steel is nowadays produced in Blast Furnace Basic Oxygen Furnace 
(BF/BOF). Another primary steel process which has been phased out in industrialised 
countries, but is still used in China and India, is the Open Hearth Furnace (OHF). 
Secondary steel is made out of scrap in an Electric Arc Furnace (EAF). Relatively new 
processes are the direct reduction of iron (DRI) and smelt reduction. The main processes 
are depicted in Figures 6.9 and 6.10.  
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Figure 6.9 The main input material and 
process steps for producing primary 
steel through the BF/BOF process. 
Figure 6.10  The main input material and 
process steps for producing 
secondary steel through the EAF 
process. 
 
The growth of total output (see Figure 6.11) has been 5.4% p.a. in India152 and 7.4% p.a. 
in China in the period 1990-1999. The high average growth in China is mainly caused by 
the peak in the first years of the 1990s. The average output growth of the period 1971-
1998 was 6.5% in China (MMI 1994; IISI 1997).  
The share of the inefficient OHF production process is larger in India than in China, but is 
decreasing through shut down and no new construction of OHF, and transformation of 
OHF plants into BOF. The share of secondary steel production (EAF) is diminishing in 
China whereas it has been practically stable in India (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13) A reason 
is that EAF figures in India included Direct Reduction of Iron, which is increasing 
whereas the share of scrap input is reducing as in China (interviews India 2001: 15,16).  
 
                                                   
152  In terms of planning and projections by the Indian government, it is expected that the sector is all set for rapid 
growth. From 1950-1970 the average annual growth rate was 8%, then it dropped to 5.7% in the 70s and rose 
to 6.4% in the 80s (Ministry of Steel 1999: 10). With liberalisation, the production of finished steel has 
jumped from 14.33 Mt in 1991-1992 to 23.37 in 1997-98. The Government of India aimed to reach 38 MT by 
the end of the 9th plan, i.e. almost a doubling of existing capacity. It is expected that internal demand for steel 
will increase to 48Mt and supply to 57.8 in 2006 by the end of the tenth plan. The goal is unlikely to be 
reached because of the depression in the economy. The current capacity is 32 Mt (Meeting India 2000: 32). 
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Figure 6.11 The annual production of crude steel 
in India and China (IISI 1997; IISI 
2000b). 
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Figure 6.12 The shares of the 3 processes In the 
total steel output for CHINA in the 
period 1972-1998 (IISI 1997) 
Figure 6.13 The shares of the 3 processes in the 
total steel output for INDIA in the 
period 1982 – 1995 and 1999 (IISI 
1996; IISI 2000b). 
 
The average size of primary steel plants is low in China and India153. Various steel 
products are manufactured, which are not high quality and complicated in China. The 
government policy is to reduce low quality production and start using modern equipment 
so that the import of steel (complex products) will reduce and export will increase. 
Foreign technologies might be needed for the quality upgrading, for example improved 
casting techniques but Chinese enterprises prefer small technological changes based on 
domestically available technologies because of capital restrictions.154 The current years 
might be most suitable to make this transition since the total demand for steel is low in 
these year.155 In India the situation is similar with the difference that modern and high-
tech technologies are often manufactured domestically (in Indian or joint-venture 
machinery plants). 
6.3.2 Sectoral Energy Consumption 
The Indian and Chinese iron and steel sector accounts for a considerable share of the 
national and industrial energy consumption and is therefore an important sector to 
                                                   
153  The number of large primary steel plants in 1993 was very small in India (8 larger than 1 MTon) and China 
(21 larger than 1 Mton and 20 between 0.5 and 1 Mton) between 1000 and 2000 small plants exist in both 
countries (MMI, 1994). EAF plants also have a small average plant size: in China almost all are smaller than 
15 kTon/yr and the largest produces 50 kTon per year. In India 180 EAFs produce 50 kTon per year on aver-
age. 
154  Interviews (JV) 2000: 4 
155  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5 
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study156. It is likely that the plant owners are interested in savings since the costs for 
energy out of total costs is high due to inefficient plants and -operation as well as high 
unit cost of energy157. The total consumption of fuel and electricity has risen significantly 
(see Figure 6.14). The specific fuel consumption has reduced strongly whereas the 
specific electricity consumption is stable in both countries (Figure 6.15). It can be 
concluded that it is difficult in this sector to decrease electricity consumption, and 
efficiency improving options will therefore have to be supported actively. 
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Figure 6.14 Annual fuel and electricity 
consumption (PJ-f per year) in the 
I&S sector in China and India (1980-
1995). 
Figure 6.15 Specific Energy and Electricity 
Consumption of crude steel production in 
China and India (GJ-f/ton steel*yr). 
6.3.3 Technology options for Energy Conservation 
The specific energy consumption (SEC) per ton of steel in China and India is higher than 
the Global Best Practice and higher than the average of the world, because of outdated 
technologies, non-optimal operation and maintenance practices, and –especially in the 
case of India, the high ash-content of coal. The maximum savings potential equals the 
difference between the Global Best Practice and the average Chinese and Indian SEC. 
The potential which can be achieved with currently available technologies is 35-50% per 
ton of produced steel, and is even higher when the future Best Practice Technology is 
accounted for (see last column of Table 6.5 and the last bar in Figure 6.16) with the 
newest technologies such as Smelting Reduction and Near Net Shape Casting (Worrell et 
al 1995b)158. In Section 6.3.3 the potential for the year 2020 will be calculated which is 
different from the above potential because of autonomous energy efficiency improvement 
in the Business-as-Usual scenario.  
                                                   
156  Out of national Chinese electricity and fuel consumption, 10% and 9% respectively are used by the steel sec-
tor. Relative to the industrial consumption, these figures are 15% and 18%. For India the share of national 
electricity and fuel consumption is 4% and 12%, relative to industrial consumption: 8% and 22%  
157  For India, 35% was mentioned by some authors, whereas this is around 20% in industrialised countries. 
158 Up to now smelting reduction has not shown to result in substantial energy use reduction 
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Table 6.5 Global Best Practice and Indian and Chinese SEC in GJ-final/ton steel (various sources 
and assumptions159). 
(1995) INDIA b) CHINA a) GBP 
Generally available Technol. 
GBP  
Advanced 
Techn e) 
SEC-elec Primary steel: 2.2 
Secondary steel: 3.4 
Average steel: 
2.9 (prim+ 
secondary) 
Primary steel 1.55 d) 
Secondary steel 2.67 d),f) 
Primary steel 1 
SEC-fuel All steel: 27 All Steel: 30 Primary steel 17 d) 
Secondary steel 3.83 d) 
Primary steel 6 
SEC  
Total g) 
32 GJ-p/ton steel 38 GJ-p/ton 
steel 
Primary steel 19.2 (Japan) c) 
Primary steel 21.5 d) 
Secondary steel 11.5 d) 
Primary steel 9 
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Figure 6.16 Specific primary Energy consumption in China, India, current Global Best Practice 
(GBP) and the GBP expected in the future, from Table 6. (GJ-primary/ton Steel). 
 
The SEC of both countries can be reduced towards the Global Best Practice by 
implementing certain changes in the production processes, in existing plants and via 
the closure of old plants and construction of new, more efficient ones. These options 
generally have an impact on fuel as well as electricity consumption, even though this 
study’s focus is on electricity savings.  
Share of secondary steel: The EAF process is fed with scrap160 and requires less primary 
energy input per ton of steel output, compared to the primary steel process (see Table 
6.5). The share of EAF has been stable at 25-28% in India (IISI 1996) and has reduced to 
16% in China.161 The expansion of EAF is hampered by scrap scarcity162 and –in the case 
of India- the unreliable electricity supply and high price. The Indian scrap scarcity has 
                                                   
159  a) (MMI, 1994&1998); b) (TERI, 1996), (IEA, 1998); c) (SSB, 1998); d) Worrell, 1995, technical minimum 
with current technologies, including 100% cold rolling (cold strip mill), and 15% scrap addition in the BOF 
process, full use of BOF gas and steam; e) Worrell, 1995, Smelt reduction and Near net shape casting ; f) 2.35 
for a German plant in 1986: 450 kWh/ton (+200 for casting and rolling) (Johansson etc, 1989), but this figure 
is not used because the electricity use could have been increased in the period after 1986; g) assume BAU 
share: EAF 16% (China) and 25% (India) (IISI, 1996) and an electricity generation efficiency of 35% for both 
countries, to make comparison possible and for the Best Practice Technology scenario: EAF 30% (China) and 
40% (India). 
160  or directly reduced iron. 
161  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5  
162  Low cumulative steel usage in the decades upto 2000. Currently scrap is being imported which amount might 
need to increase and improved waste collection methods will be necessary (Vlasblom 2000: 5). 
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enhanced the development of Directly Reduced Iron163 which can be used as an alterna-
tive for scrap. India wants to limit import of scrap because it drains foreign exchange and 
reduces the chance of survival of the domestic DRI industry (Soman and Bedekar, year 
unknown; 164). Other problems in the Chinese EAF sector (not checked for India) are the 
low quality and limited variability of output products, which is keeping the market de-
mand low (Vlasblom 2000: 3). The Chinese government is promoting the closure of small 
EAF plants so that a few large scale plants can be built in the future (Vlasblom 2000:3). 
The global share has reached 34% in 2000 and is expected to rise to 40% (IISI 2000a and 
b). It is assumed that in the BAU, the share of EAF steel will stay constant at the 1995 
level while it will increase to 30% in China and 40% in India in the end-use Best Practice 
Technology scenario165. Implementation (feasibility) problems mentioned above, are also 
dealt with in Chapter 8.  
Conversion from OHF to BOF: Most studies stress the option of reducing the share of 
OHF. Figure 6.12 shows that the output share has decreased drastically in China up to 2% 
in 1998 (Vlasblom 2000: 4,5). This is in accordance with the government policy to reduce 
it to 0% in 2000 (Vlasblom 2000: 4,5). This is therefore not an option for the Chinese 
end-use BPT scenario. The OHF use in India is showing a similar trend with a reduction 
from 41% in 1985 to 14% in 1999 (IISI 2000a and b); the BPT scenario can include an 
accelerated close-down compared to the BAU, but since all OHF plants can assumed to 
be closed in 2020 under the BAU, this option will not increase the 2020 savings potential.  
Improved Casting Techniques: Since the share of Continuous Casting has increased 
tremendously over the last decade (see Figure 6.18), it is assumed that it will be adopted 
to the maximum extent in the BAU scenario166. The Chinese government is –after OHF 
production has been successfully limited- focussing on continuous casting technology, 
which increases the enterprises’ chance to obtain funding for investment.167 
                                                   
163  In India, 18 plants have a total capacity of 5.6 MTon producing (sponge) iron via DRI, making India the sec-
ond largest global producer (Department of Steel 1999: 3; Meeting India 2000: 31 ). 60% of capacity is gas 
based and 40% coal based whereas the share of coal based processes is only 8% globally (Spaan, 2000). The 
capacity is expected to increase to 7 MTon in 2000 (output 6 - 7 MTon). The output has grown from 102 kTon 
in 1985 to 4.4 Mton in 1995-96, but the export has risen as well, to 0.8 MTon in 1995-96 (IISI, 1996). The 
coal based process still has a high energy consumption. This process has to be supported by the government to 
grow further since the low availability of natural gas and non-coking coal in India. 
164  Interviews India 2001:15 
165  This is based on the planned (but not achieved) 36% of secondary steel in India for the year 2001/2002 which 
includes DRI technology (Steel authority of India ltd 6th Five Year Plan). The Chinese estimation it is based 
on a Chinese steel expert’s opinion of 25% in 2015 (Vlasblom 2000: 5). See footnotes Tables 6.7 and 6.8 
166  Continuous Casting is an important option with its savings potential of 4.4 GJ primary/ton of milled product, 
but is assumed to be part of the BAU. Maximum penetration in China is estimated at 90% since it is not feasi-
ble for small plants (Vlasblom 2000: 4). In the beginning of the 1990s 80% of the mini-plants has adopted 
continuous casting, and only 15% of the integrated steel plants (Schumacher, 2000). 
167  Interviews (JV) 2000: 4 
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Figure 6.17 The share of Continuous Cast steel output over time (IISI 1996). 168) 
 
Future improvements of the casting process are expected by near net shape casting, which 
entails direct casting of the metal into (or near to) the final desired shape, e.g. strips or 
sections169. It replaces the step of hot rolling, saving heating energy and material losses. 
The implementation of this technology is assumed to be part of the Best Practice scenario 
to a limited extent170. Limitations include the fact that this is currently a very advanced 
technology even for developed countries, that it is not suitable for the casting of all 
products, and that existing plants that have (recently adopted) full continuous casting 
capacity, are not likely to invest in a near-net shape casting.171 The simple pay back 
period is around 3 years for industrialised countries. The savings of energy are calculated 
at maximal 4.2 GJ primary/ton crude steel for the western situation, for which continuous 
casting is in this project assumed to be the base line (International Working Group 2000). 
Efficiency improvement: various172 
35 kWh/ton iron (15-40 kWh in US situation (Worrell et al 1999) can be generated using 
a top gas recovery turbine (TRT) with the blast furnace173 and 174. The retrofit investment 
costs are relatively high (RMB 4000/kW ~ US$ 500/kW) but the payback period of 
around 3 years could be acceptable for plant owners and banks.175 
The Blast Furnace gas can be used for different purposes: heating gas for the Blast 
Furnace process itself, generating electricity or using it for the rolling process.  
Waste heat is generally utilised, especially in Integrated Steel Plants. Limitations are 
formed by the current high share of non-integrated plants in China (but the policy is to 
                                                   
168  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5 
169  Slabs are produced with a thickness of 30-60mm., compared to the 120-300 mm slabs produced in continuous 
casting. (International Working Group, 2000) A next step of improvement is Direct Strip Casting (1-3 mm). In 
China, sheets can be produced with 50-70 mm thickness, and the goal is to allow for 10-50 mm production. 
Less than 10 mm product output is very advanced for industrial countries (Interviews (JV) 2000: 4).  
170  The ‘Technology Vision: 2020’ carried out by TIFAC resulted in a vision on the steel industry including the 
near net shape casting producing bulk tonnages of steel by the year 2010 in India. 
171  Interviews (JV) 2000: 4,5 
172  For India, it is known that the focus is on coal dust injection in the blast furnaces, mixed gas firing in stoves 
and blast furnaces, on line ceiling of steam, blast and gas leakage; fuel efficient burners; optimisation of com-
bustion and modification of thermal regime. These are measures taken by SAIL; TISCO is using higher by-
product gases, lower petro fuel consumption, and has introduced a rich CO gas firing system in Sinter Plant. 
ESSAR is investing in change of reformer fuel, retrieving power from then turbo expander, decreasing tap to 
tap time in EAF, and Ferro Alloy Corporation is using hot charge mix directly to produce low carbon ferro 
chrome  
173  Economic feasibility with minimum size 1000 m3, which are currently 44 furnaces in China, of which 12-16 
have already been equipped with TRT and are producing half of current national output (Interviews (JV) 
2000: 5) 
174  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5 
175  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5 
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close the smaller plants of this category), and the current use of heat in, for example, 
district heating.176  
Fuzzy Logic is a computer system that is more advanced than the standard computers or 
manual regulation, and adjusts the heat input to the amount of product processed which 
varies with time.177 Output quality improves and 40 kWh/ton steel can be saved in a US 
situation (Worrell et al 1999) but this might be depending on the plant size. Information 
has not been found on the current penetration rate of any computer regulation is not 
known in this project. In an EAF plant the pay-back period could be 1 year. 
Waste heat can be used for scrap preheating before entering the EAF or BOF. (Levine et 
al 1995) (Worrell et al 1999). Electricity savings for US EAF plants were estimated at 
0.36 GJ-e/ton steel, with additional benefits of flue gas emission reduction, reduced 
electrode consumption and increased productivity. The electricity savings depend on the 
scrap used and the oxygen levels in the combustion. The total pay back period is 
calculated at 1-2 years for large US furnaces (International Working Group 2000). The 
savings could be lower (and PBP higher) since the equipment as well as the scrap in 
China is often not of high quality (scarcity of scrap inhibits selectivity).178 Scrap 
preheating represents a particularly attractive retrofit option for Electric Arc Furnaces due 
to their high electricity consumption179. In 1991 Nadel et al estimated a 30% savings 
potential in Indian EAF plants, i.e. ca. 1 GJ-electric/ton. 
The low share of Integrated Steel Plants in China results in a high average energy 
intensity in China. The sensible hot-metal heat losses could amount to 7.3 GJ-p/ton crude 
steel. Furthermore, the potential for scrap addition in the BOF decreases due to the heat 
losses. This is an additional loss since every ton of scrap used in the BOF instead of EAF 
saves 5.8 GJ-primary (generally scrap accounts for 10% of BOF input). 
New Technologies: Pulverised Coal and Oil injection reduce the input of cokes into the 
Blast Furnace (cokes production is energy inefficient and polluting). Smelting Reduction 
produces hot metal from coal without the intermediate step of cokes production, resulting 
in less pollution and increased energy efficiency (some of the smelting reduction 
processes are not more energy efficient than the original cokes + Blast Furnace 
combination)180. Direct reduction of iron and fuelling the EAF with DRI was already 
mentioned in the first technology option (‘Share of secondary steel’). 
                                                   
176  Interviews (JV) 2000: 5 
177  Interviews (JV) 2000: 22 
178  Interviews (JV) 2000: 4 
179  Technology options include: pretreatment of scrap (segregation and selective charging; pay-back period (PBP) 
< 0.5 year); replace small by large plants; improve ladle preheating; scrap preheating (see Option 5); DC-EAF 
which saves 5-10% in US situation with PBP 3-4 years, however, only 4-5% savings in China (Interviews 
(JV) 2000: 4); Process automation: a varied set of options with PBP between 1.7 and 6 years; Variable Speed 
Drives on motors (see Chapter 6.8), (Worrell et al, 1999), (Interviews (JV) 2000: 4). 
180  Several smelting reduction processes are still under development. COREX is already in the commercial stage. 
However, since there is no cokes shortage and global capacity addition is small, there is no present demand. 4 
plants have been built using the COREX process and 3 more companies have bought the design but have not 
built the plant up to now (Spaan, 2000). Capital investment, reduced plant space and coal gas generated are 
economic advantages of this technology, including the fact that also lower quality coal can be used as an input 
(Spaan, 2000). A Chinese expert is of the opinion that smelting reduction will not be used in China since the 
coal gas cannot be used for electricity generation (low heating value) so other utilisation will have to be con-
sidered (Interviews (JV) 2000: 5). Opinions differ since this state-of-the-art technology is said to be under 
consideration (negotiation stage). It has a big potential and is not too expensive. Several demonstration plants 
might be in place in 2020. It is however not expected to be used at a larger scale since no new plants are ex-
pected to be constructed (capacity addition often takes place via retrofit of existing plants) (Interviews (JV) 
2000: 4). A Chinese institute (Chemical Metallurgy) has given an effort to developing a smelting reduction 
process (Liand and Xu , 1996). 
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6.3.4 Scenarios and Saving Potential up to 2020 
In the previous paragraphs, a bottom-up study was carried out. Knowledge was acquired 
on a) the historic development of production output, the sector structure, fuel and 
electricity consumption, and b) possible technological options to reduce energy 
consumption. This knowledge serves as a foundation of various assumptions to be made 
for this sector’s scenario analysis. Assumptions were made on the growth of physical 
output until 2020, on the autonomous Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) reduction in 
the BAU scenario and the reduction of the SEC under the BPT scenario for new as well as 
existing plants. Furthermore, the share of secondary steel production via EAF in both 
scenarios had to be projected. The assumptions are presented in Table 6.7 for China and 
Table 6.8 for India, given in the end of Section 6.3. 
The following graphs show the total primary energy consumption in the frozen effi-
ciency181, end-use BAU and end-use BPT scenarios for the iron and steel sector. The ex-
pected growth of energy consumption is much larger in India than in China, in all scenar-
ios, resulting in a possible absolute reduction (compared to 2000) of primary energy con-
sumption in the Chinese Best Practice Technology scenario, whereas in India the energy 
consumption will be growing even in the BPT scenario. The 2020 maximum potential 
savings for fuel in India are –under the set of assumptions- much higher than in China, 
whereas the electricity savings potential is much higher in China than in India (see Table 
6.6). The results are explained and discussed in the overview (see Section 6.3.4) and con-
clusions will be drawn in the end of Chapter 6. 
Throughout the demand sector studies it is assumed that the conversion factor from 
primary to final electricity is 35%, so that the countries can be compared to each other 
without involving the efficiency (changes) of the power supply side. 
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Figure 6.19 Primary energy consumption until 
2020 for different scenarios (PJ-
primary/yr) CHINA. 
Figure 6.20 Energy consumption in India in the 
three scenarios. 
                                                   
181  See explanation in Section 6.1 Introduction. This scenario shows the energy consumption in case no efficiency 
measures were taken from the year 2000 onwards. 
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Table 6.6 The energy savings (PJ-final) and Share of BAU consumption in the year 2020 when the 
End-use Best Practice Technology scenario takes place instead of the Business-as-usual 
scenario. 
 INDIA CHINA 
Fuel savings 562 PJ (43%) 900 PJ (25%) 
Electricity savings 17 PJ-e (14%) 145 PJ-e (33%) 
Total Primary savings 612 PJ-primary (37%) 1314 PJ-primary (27%) 
 
6.3.5 Overview 
Similar to the cement sector, the annual output growth was high in both countries (7.4% 
in China, 5.4% in India in the period 1990-1999), and production share of the inefficient 
process (OHF) has reduced significantly over the last decades. The plants are relatively 
small, and especially in China, there exists a large number of specialised plants producing 
either iron or steel, whereas an Integrated Iron and Steel plant can have a higher 
efficiency level. The specific fuel consumption has decreased considerably in the past, but 
the electricity efficiency has reduced only slightly. The reason could be that electricity 
conservation is difficult to carry out, or that it has not been given priority. For India, 
another reason could be that the share of EAF has increased, which has a high electricity 
consumption (and a low fuel consumption). The average specific electricity consumption 
for the primary and secondary process routes is 35-50% higher than the best practice of 
currently operating plants. In future new technologies could become commercially 
available that will decrease the Global Best Practice even further, increasing the 
conservation potential. 
The following energy conservation measures have been identified: a) increasing the 
share of secondary steel; b) near net shape casting; c) increasing the efficiency in the 
EAF through different smaller measures; d) miscellaneous options such as top gas 
recovery, fuzzy logic and scrap preheating; e) introducing new technologies when 
commercially available such as directly reduced iron, pulverised coal injection and 
smelting reduction; f) increasing the production share of integrated steel plants. 
The Best Practice Technology scenario shows the lower energy consumption possible 
when introducing new technologies and retrofit options at a reasonable rate (reasonable 
capital overturn and price not higher than industrial countries would be willing to pay). 
To construct the BPT scenario, assumptions were made on 1) production output: in China 
the output growth is assumed to be 1.5% between 2000 and 2010 and 1% from 2010-
2020, in India 4%. The reason for the low growth in China compared to the past decades 
is that there is already a large production capacity and a small growth is sufficient to 
cover the future additional steel demand; 2) the share of EAF is assumed to grow to 30% 
and 40% in 2020 in the best practice situation; 3) the Specific Energy consumption 
changes by a certain rate annually. All data and assumptions are presented and explained 
in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. 
Deducing the BPT scenario energy consumption from the BAU, the maximum electricity 
savings potential is calculated at 33% (China) and 14% (India) of its BAU electricity 
consumption in 2020. The primary energy savings can be 24% and 37% respectively. It 
can be seen that the fuel savings potential is larger for India than for China and that the 
electricity savings potential is higher in China. This is based on the EAF potential that has 
been estimated higher for India and the fact that the Chinese specific electricity 
consumption shows a larger gap with the Best Practice in 1995.  
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Table 6.7 Assumptions on which the Chinese Business-as-usual and End-use Best Practice Technology Scenarios are based. GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE IN 1995 is 
13.05 GJ fuel/ton steel AND 1.89 GJ elec/ton steel, assuming a share of 30% secondary steel. 
 Current 
Situation 
(1995) 
Business-as-usual scenario End-use Best Practice Technology scenario (changes occur only after the year 2000. 
From 1995 – 2000, the BAU data are valid). 
Production 95 MTON steel · 150 MTON steel in 2020 182 
· 1.5% from 2000-2010 and 1% from 2010-2020 
· Equivalent to BAU scenario 
Existing plants · SEC fuel reduces 1.4% per year to end up in 2020 at 19.4 GJ/ton steel, 50% above 
the GBP 1995185 183 
· SEC elec reduces 1% per year to result in a 2020 SEC at 2.17 GJ-e/ton steel, 15% 
above the GBP 1995 184 
New Plants 
SEC fuel 29.7 
SEC elec 2.94 
· SEC fuel 0.75% annual reduction up to 2020 183, resulting in 
a 2020 SEC of 22.1 GJ/ton steel 
· SEC elec 0.5% per year improvement,184 resulting in a 2020 
SEC of 2.39 GJ-e/ton steel 
· SEC fuel and elec equal the GBP which improves by 0.5% per year 
Share of EAF/ 
secondary steel 
output 
16% · Constant up to 2020 at the 2000 level of 16%. 186 · Is assumed to increase with 3.2% annually, as was predicted by the experts 186 
arriving at a share of 30% in 2020. 
 
                                                   
182  The expert estimation is 140-145 MT (2015); 150 MT (2020) (Interviews (JV) 2000: 5). The government doesn’t give a long term estimation for this sector (Interviews (JV) 2000: 5). This 
output in 2020 results in a per capita production of 100 kg annually, which seems reasonable given the per capita productions of 1992 (72 kg), 1998 (91 kg) and the global average in 1992 
(143 kg). The annual output growth in the period 1980-1999 was 6.5% average (IISI, 1997; Interviews (JV) 2000: 5). This growth is assumed to reduce drastically to 1.5% from 2000-2010 
and 1% from 2010-2020. 
183  SEC fuel has reduced at an average rate of 1.4% per year from 1987-1996 (retrofit + new capacity). The future autonomous SEC reduction is assumed to be smaller (0.75%) since the pro-
duction growth is assumed to be very low compared to the previous decade. The Best Practice reduction of retrofit of existing plants, is assumed to be equal to 1.4%. The 2020 SEC will not 
reach the 1995 GBP since the gap is too large (3.3% annual reduction via retrofit would be necessary). 
184  The SEC elec has decreased at less than 1% annually between 1985-1995 (retrofit + new capacity). This is assumed to be even lower in the BAU future (0.5%) due to the low output growth 
and therefore low construction of new capacity. For the Best Practice scenario, it is assumed that merely retrofit of existing plants can reach that level of 1%. 
185  One of the experts believes that the average Chinese plant will in the year 2020 be at the level of the average western plant, since Chinese plants are improving much faster than the western 
plants (Interviews (JV) 2000: 4). However, there is still a gap with the GBP expected in this scenario analysis. 
186  For the BAU scenario a constant share is assumed (requiring scrap use growth equal to steel output growth) since the scrap availability is currently low and is not expected to grow signifi-
cantly. The Best Practrice scenario is based on the assumptions of (Interviews (JV) 2000: 5): EAF: 15.8% in 1998; 20% in 2005; 25% in 2015. 
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Table 6.8 Assumptions on which the Indian Business-as-usual and End-use Best Practice Technology Scenarios are based. THE GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE (1995) 
EQUALS 11.7 GJ FUEL/TON STEEL AND 2.0 GJ-ELEC/TON STEEL, ASSUMING 40% OUTPUT FROM EAF. 
 Current Situation (1995) Business-as-usual scenario End-use Best Practice Technology scenario (changes occur only after the year 2000. From 
1995 – 2000, the BAU data are valid). 
Production 24 MTON steel · 55 MTON in 2020; 4% annual growth 187 · idem BAU scenario 
Existing plants · SEC fuel 2.8% reduction per year so that SEC 2020 is 16.9 GJ/ton cement 
· SEC elec 1% reduction/yr so that SEC 2020 equals 1.96 
New Plants 
SEC fuel 27.4 GJ/ton steel 
SEC elec 2.51 GJ/ton steel 
· SEC fuel 1.4% reduction/yr so that SEC 2020 is 19 GJ 188 
· SEC elec 0.5% reduction/yr so that SEC 2020 is 2.17 
GJ/ton steel · SEC fuel and elec equal in 2000 the 1995 GBP and improve with 0.5% annually 
Share of EAF/ 
secondary steel output 
26%  · Share of secondary steel output (and capacity) stays 
constant after the year 1995 189 
· the share of secondary steel is increasing to 40% in 202 since India is active in 
building large EAF plants and using DRI technology189 
                                                   
187  The average annual growth of the period 1985-1998 was 5.4%. An extrapolation of this growth would result in a 2020 output of 73 MT, which is almost triple the 2000 output. This does 
not seem correct, considering the opinion that the output should not more than double in the next 20 years (Meeting India 2000: 32). On the other hand, the per capita steel production 
would only rise to 46 kg/year in the year 2020, which is still low compared to the global average of 148 (in 1992). The Indian per capita production was 25 kg in 1995. Furthermore, the In-
dian government estimation was an output of 57 MT in 2012 (and 37 MT in 2000) (Roa, ?). This seems overestimated since the 2000 production is below that number. Another high estima-
tion came from Soman and Bedekar (year unknown) who assumed a GDP and steel output growth of 6.1% resulting in 52 Mt production in 2012. Other sources have mentioned 4-10% 
growth, and this study assumes the lower boundary of 4%. 
188  The average SEC fuel has reduced at a rate of 2.8% per year in the period 1988/89-1994/95, when the production growth was on average 7% per year. Since the future capacity addition is 
expected to be lower due to the lower output growth (4% per year) the SEC reduction will also be lower in the BAU future, in this study at 50% of the autonomous rate, at 1.4%. The aver-
age SEC fuel in 2000 is much higher than the GBP 1995 and can therefore not be expected to reach much closer to the GBP 1995 in the year 2020. The Best Practice scenario assumes the 
rate of improvement in existing plants can be 2%. 
189  Steel Authority of India Ltd. The 6th Five Year Plan has presented a planned 36% of secondary steel in the year 2001-2002. Assuming that this has not been reached, but that the govern-
ment and sectoral interest is still present, it is assumed that a 40% share can be reached in the future in the Best practice scenario. Business-as-usual, it can be expected that the EAF share 
stays constant, as was seen in China. 
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6.4 Aluminium Industry 
6.4.1 Current situation (1990-2000) 
6.4.1.1 Sector Structure 
The Bayer-Hall-Heroult process is used to produce aluminium from bauxite190. This 
process has remained largely unchanged since 1886 (Ministry of Industry 1988). Alumina 
is extracted from bauxite, followed by production of aluminium by ways of 
electrolysis191. The aluminium is then shaped into various products (see Figure 6.21). 
Secondary aluminium is produced from scrap and is not depicted in the figures since the 
production volume is not known.  
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Figure 6.21 Schematic description of the 
(primary) aluminium 
production process. 
Figure 6.22 The output of aluminium in India and 
China (Mton/yr). 
Indian aluminium output growth (at 7.2% per year) was lower but more constant than in 
China (averaging 12% per year) in the period 1985 through 1998 (see Figure 6.22). In the 
1980s, the growth rate in India was only 3.8% per year, partially caused by the 
government influence on the product mix (50% of the end product had to have a certain 
quality to be used in electrical industry) (also see Chapter 3).  
The 10 largest aluminium plants (100-220 Kton per year capacity) in China produced 
1.55 Mton of aluminium in 1998, and are called the ‘key plants’ which are generally 
state-owned, even though privatisation takes place within the recent reforms. The 
remaining 0.8 Mton was produced by approximately 90 small plants (below 35 Kton 
capacity per year), of which around half are privately owned.192 In China, there exist 4 
medium to large companies (100-160 yr/yr capacity) that in 1996/97 jointly accounted for 
a large share of production (500 yr per year) (Das and Kandpal 1998; ADB 1996); Roy et 
al (1998). 2 large companies are state-owned, the remaining are in the private sector (Das 
                                                   
190  Export of aluminia and aluminium is restricted in China, (at least with taxes, and possibly also using other 
regulations) since the domestic demand for aluminium is large while there is not sufficient bauxite. Therefore 
the Chinese aluminium should be used for the domestic market (Interviews Workshop China, 2000). India 
however has large deposits of bauxite, ranking 5th in the world (Wadhawan, 1992). 
191  During the electrolysis, CO2 is released at the carbon anode. Even though this accounts for more than 10% of 
total CO2 emission (Das & Kandpal, 1998) it is not included in the project on hand since it is not an energy re-
lated emission. 
192  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
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and Kandpal 1998). There probably exists a large number of small plants comparable to 
the Chinese situation. It is possible that merely casting takes place in those small plants. 
6.4.1.2 Sectoral Energy Consumption 
It is important to study the electricity savings in the aluminium sector, since it accounts 
for 4% of national electricity consumption and 6% of industrial electricity 
consumption.193 These numbers are 3% and 6% for India (Das and Kandpal 2000).  
Table 6.9 shows the average electricity consumption per process step, which is similar for 
India and China. The electricity consumption per ton of aluminium differs widely per 
plant (also see Table 6.10). The Indian figure for aluminium production from alumina is 
an average of two larger plants with a SEC of 13700-15000 kWh/ton and two medium 
sized plants with a SEC around 18000 kWh/ton aluminium.  
Table 6.9 Electricity consumption per step per kilogram of product (kWh/ton aluminium AC). 
 INDIA CHINA194 
 Electricity Electricity 
Bauxite -> Alumina 400 *# 500  
Alumina -> Aluminium 16250 * 16050 
Final Shaping of Aluminium  3000-3500 
Auxiliaries 4-7%  
* 16778 (Das and Kandpal 1998); 16500 (ADB 1996) 16250 from Table 6.10; Average electricity consumption 
North America: 16015, Europe 15339; # lower figure than Chinese consumption because of higher grade ore 
available.195 
 
The electrolysis of alumina to obtain aluminium (in the smelter) is the main energy (elec-
tricity) consuming step, and will therefore be focussed on in this sector study. It is in in-
ternational comparisons often taken as the base for comparison. In Table 6.10 it can be 
seen that Balco uses the normally inefficient Soderberg196 technology, and has a high 
electricity intensity, but its design value is lower than for the HINDALCO plant which is 
using the pre-baked technology.197 This might be caused by the age of plants and exten-
sive renovation in later years. In general, the pre-baked technology has a higher efficiency 
because this technology has been developed further.  
                                                   
193  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
194  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
195  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
196  The anodes used for electrolysis can be of two types: Soderberg (continuous self baking during electrolysis) 
and the Prebaked anodes. Prebaked anodes have been prepared before use and are the more modern and effi-
cient type (ADB, 1996). 
197  Meeting India 2000: 16, 19, 44 
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Table 6.10 Energy performance of the various plants in India in 1994/95. Sources: (Das 1998), 
completed by (Saxena 1999). 
Actual per-
formance 
Anode type  Alumina plant Smelter Smelter – 
design 
values 
Company   Steam 
T/T 
coal 
Ton/T 
Fuel oil 
kg/T 
Power 
kWh/T 
kWh/T kWh/T 
HINDALCO  Pre-baked Renukoot (UP)  4.2 1.0 76 362 15,341  18,000 
BALCO  Soderberg Korba (MP)  3.3  0.6  121  470  18,022  16,020 
INDAL   Total Indal 2.4   -  220 250  17,921 18,500 
 Soderberg Aluparam (Kera-
la)  
N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a  
 Pre-baked Belgaum #,*  -    -    -   17,000   
 Pre-baked Muri *  -     -    -   18,500   
 Soderberg Hirakud (Orissa)* N/a N/a N/a N/a 17,000   
NALCO  Pre-baked Angul (Orissa)  N/a N/a N/a N/a 15,548  13,742 
# Belgaum smelter not under operation, due to non-availability of power. 
* Design norms, actual performance data are not available. Total average as given in table however is weighted 
average of all INDAL plants. 
 
6.4.2 Technology options for Energy Conservation 
The current electricity efficiency gap between average Indian and Chinese plants versus 
the Global Best Practice is 25% (see Table 6.11). The plants in India are said to use 
technologies supplied by reputed international companies (Wadhawan 1992) but these are 
still less efficient than Global Best Practice. Retrofit and improved operation and 
maintenance is necessary to make the plants run at their design value. The calculated 
potentials are supported by ADB (1996) saying that a 15-20% reduction can be reached 
by modernisation and modification of almost all operations. It would be expected that the 
plants are interested in savings energy because energy costs account for 50-78% of total 
production costs in Indian plants (Das and Kandpal 1998). ADB (1996) gives the share of 
40% for total energy costs and 30% for electricity input costs. 
Table 6.11 Average Indian, Chinese and Global Best Practice (GBP) energy consumption per ton of 
aluminium (GJ-final/ton*yr) in the year 1995 (various sources 198). 
 INDIA CHINA GBP (GJ/ton steel) 
SEC-elec 63 b) 61 c) 47 a) 
SEC-fuel 30 b) 25 e) 18 d) 
SEC Total (final) 93 86 65 
SEC Total (primary) f) 221 210 160 
 
Studying the technical options and their potential of energy conservation is difficult199: a) 
limited information is available in China due to the high strategic importance and state-
owned status of the sector; b) different sizes and types of electrolysis cells exist, which 
each have their own conservation potential; c) large plants are not automatically the most 
efficient plants. The efficiency depends partly on the size of the electrolysis cells; large 
plants often consist of a set of smaller cells and are therefore not more efficient than 
                                                   
198  a) 47 GJ-e (Levine et al, 1995): newest smelters in the beginning of the 1990s. 240 kWh (Interviews (JV) 
2000: 7) + 12500 kWh/tonne aluminium (Phylipsen et al, 1998); b) 16778 kWh + 7.25 gcal fuel (Das and 
Kandpal, 2000); 16500 (ADB, 1996) + 400 kWh for alumina production; c) (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7); d) 
Slade in Germany (Ministry of Industry 1995), equals (Alber et al, 1992) in (Phylipsen et al, 1998); e) own es-
timation based on (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7); f) assume 33% electricity generation efficiency 
199  Interviews (JV) 2000: 6, 7 
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plants with a small capacity200 and 201; d) electrolysis does not consist of several smaller 
steps which could be optimised: replacing the total cell is possible but can be considered 
equal to building a new aluminium plant with corresponding costs; e) it is not known if 
past retrofit options in larger plants202 have also been carried out in smaller plants. Some 
important options are mentioned here. 
Change Soderberg into Prebaked electrodes: In China, the share of aluminium 
produced using the inefficient Soderberg anodes203 decreased from 80% in 1990 to 50% 
in recent years. Of the 10 key plants, already 70% of output is based on the alternative, 
more efficient, pre-baked anode- process204 and 205. In India, 2 large companies (60% of 
capacity) are equipped with pre-baked electrodes (Das and Kandpal 1998). Retrofit of 
plants from Soderberg to Prebaked electrodes has occurred in the past, and significant 
savings can be achieved, but it is an expensive option206. The construction of new plants 
(or extension of existing plants with new electrolysis cells) will increase the share of pre-
baked electrodes. The Chinese government will force smaller Soderberg plants to either 
close or make the transition to pre-baked anodes207. The government might provide a 
special loan (70% of total costs).208 Closure of small plants might be the best efficiency 
improvement option since larger plants are generally more energy efficient.209 
The savings could be 7.2 GJ-e/ton aluminium210, and assuming a 40% penetration 
potential in India, 1.5 PJ-e could be saved in the current Indian situation and 4PJ-e in 
China (4-5% of the sectoral electricity use for both countries). This savings potential will 
be smaller in the future because old plants will be closed and new ones with pre-baked 
anodes can be expected to be built under the BAU scenario. 
Increase share secondary aluminium production: Secondary aluminium production 
requires only 5% of energy needed for primary aluminium production (Levine et al 1995). 
There is no information on the current share of secondary aluminium production in China 
or India211. In China, aluminium waste from the primary process is added to the process 
again; separate plants for secondary production do not exist (interview China workshop 
2000). It should be realised that the quality is often lower than primary aluminium, 
reducing its suitability for certain high-quality products (Phylipsen et al 1998). An 
important barrier is the currently limited availability of waste do to low cumulative 
historic use and disposal of aluminium (similar to scrap in the iron and steel sector). 
                                                   
200  The Indian plants of nr 1 and 2 in size are also nr 1 and 2 with respect to electricity efficiency (a partial 
explanation might be the recent commissioning of the nr 1 plant) (ADB, 1996). 
201  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
202  Increasing the quality and size of the electricity input line; improving and increasing the shape of the electrode 
so that the electrolysis reaction becomes more efficient etc (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7). 
203  If it has been developed further, this would have been an efficient technology (Bode, 1999). 
204  Electrolysis cells based on Soderberg anodes are small sized (20-75 kA); most cells using prebaked anodes are 
around 160 kA. In China, three plants exist with prebaked-based cells larger than 280 kA (Interviews (JV) 
2000: 6, 7) 
205  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
206  The investment costs are high: 3750 US$/ton*yr and the specific costs are: > 100 US$ per GJ saved for India 
(Saxena, 1999), (Fletcher, 1999), (Das, 1998), (TERI, 1996); CHINA: around US$ 2000/ ton aluminium, and 
a pay back period of 3-5 years (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7). The figures are very different for India and China 
and might be incorrect. 
207  UNDP (1993) mentioned that small cells (<60 kA) should be eliminated and middle-size Soderberg cells 
could be improved by equipping it with a microprocessor and coating it with titanium boride, which will save 
power by 400-500 kWh/ton metal. 
208  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
209  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
210  (Saxena, 1999), (Fletcher, 1999), (Das, 1998), (TERI, 1996). The transition will also increase production ca-
pacity. 
211  From 1970-1985, this share in the total US aluminium production grew from 25-50%, including fabricators’ 
as well as post-consumer scrap (Williams et al, 1987). In India in 1992, the share of secondary aluminium 
production was far below the satisfactory level, around 10% of total consumption (Wadhawan, 1992). 
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Computer controlled processes: Electricity consumption can be reduced through 
computer controlled processes, to make all parameters match. China can make such 
computer controlled process. It is not too expensive, but it might not be feasible for small 
plants.212 Two examples are automatic feeding of alumina and cell operation (ADB 
1996)213.  
Electrodes (miscellaneous): Several improvement options exist besides replacing 
Soderberg with Prebaked anodes214. These options together with improved computer 
monitoring could result in savings of around 400 kWh (1.5 GJ-e) /ton aluminium (UNDP 
1993). Additionally, the rectifier could be replaced resulting in 2% savings potential (300 
kWh (1.1 GJ-e)/ton aluminium) (UNDP 1993). 
Alternative processes: The Bayer-Hall-Heroult process has remained largely unchanged 
since 1886 (Ministry of Industry 1988). Several organisations in the world are 
experimenting with alternative process routes that might be more energy efficient and 
cheaper. They are not yet commercially available (ADB 1996): a) the ALCOA process 
plans to reduce factory space, electricity consumption by 30% and direct emissions will 
be limited through a closed system; b) Carbothermic process uses carbon to chemically 
reduce alumina during electrolysis; c) Toth process claims to reduce costs by 50%, power 
input by 90%, and pollution problems totally215; d) Kuwahara Process plans to reduce 
power input as well as manpower by two-third216. If sufficient development takes place in 
the next 20 years, India and China could utilise these technologies for new plants to be 
constructed. 
Specific Fuel saving measures: The extraction of alumina from bauxite is the main fuel 
consuming process. Measures mentioned in (UNDP 1993) are: a) Replace direct heating 
melting with indirect heating melting (with continuous desiliconisation); b) Apply flash 
smelting instead of rotary kiln; c) Apply middle ignition calcining process; d) 
Modernising the low efficient evaporators; e) Stoving the grog outside kilns through 
preheating; f) Falling film and flash evaporation. The current penetration rate or expected 
adoption under BAU is not known but the total savings could be up to 40% of the fuel 
used for alumina production according to the source (UNDP 1993). 
                                                   
212  Interviews (JV) 2000: 7 
213  The pay back period for better process controls and other measures that reduce electricity intensity was 1-4 
years in the first half of the 1980s (Levine et al, 1995). 
214  a) improvement of anode design, increase anode surface area by redesigning existing cell; b) improvement in 
cathode lining; c) inert Anode/ Stable Cathode (its high potential of 3500 kWh/ton alum is not included in this 
study because the commercialisation date is expected in the far future); d) adopt lithium anode paste with 
lithium salts or add lithium salts into electrolyte; e) widen power supply busbar and anode; f) semi-graphitized 
cathode (UNDP, 1993). 
215  Clay and other aluminous ores can be used instead of bauxite. The process uses a fluidised bed reactor and 
chlorination. It is in the pilot stage (ADB, 1996) 
216  Carbon and alumina are briquetted and heated, an alloy with several metals is made and purated resulting in 
99.9% pure aluminium metal. 
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Box 6.2  Examples of efforts of Indian aluminium 
plants for energy conservation and environmental 
protection  
 
Balco has an old plant and is gradually trying to take energy conservation measures in the alumina 
plant, smelter plant with technology from Kaiser Aluminium technical services Inco USA, foundry 
(with technology from Almex USA) and the fabrication complex. They have planted 75,000 trees in 
1998-99 (Balco 1999: 17). Hindalco claims that it has on an annual basis reduced its average power 
consumption per unit production, its bauxite consumption and steam consumption through fine-
tuning of the system. Hindalco has ISO 14001. They have installed Gas suspension Calciners re-
placing rotary kilns, a computerised firing system in baking furnaces and a micro processor based 
computerised control mechanism. They have planted 125,000 trees over the years. At Renukot, the 
Company uses cogeneration to generate 229.8 Million Units. Best Practice in India is 13700 
kWh/tonne of Aluminium. This is a result of (among others) the following improvements: interna-
tional (French) smelter technology, pre-baked anode with automatic centre feeding of alumina, con-
trol of anode- cathode distance, optimum and steady alumina concentration, electrolytic pot design 
with dry scrubbing system for pot gases permitting use of highly acidic electrolyte (operation at low 
temperature possible) (Wadhawan 1992). 
6.4.3 Scenarios and Saving Potential up to 2020 
In the previous paragraphs, a bottom-up study was carried out. Knowledge was acquired 
on a) the historic development of production output, the sector structure, fuel and 
electricity consumption, and b) possible technological options to reduce energy 
consumption. This knowledge serves as a foundation of various assumptions to be made 
for this sector’s scenario analysis. Assumptions were made on the growth of physical 
output until 2020, on the autonomous Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) reduction in 
the BAU scenario and the reduction of the SEC under the BPT scenario for new as well as 
existing plants. The assumptions are presented in Table 6.13 for China and Table 6.14 for 
India, given in the end of Section 6.4. 
The following graphs show the total primary energy consumption in the frozen 
efficiency217, end-use BAU and end-use BPT scenarios for the aluminium sector. The 
expected growth of energy consumption is much larger in India than in China, in all 
scenarios. The 2020 maximum potential savings for fuel and electricity are around 20% in 
both countries (see Table 6.12). The results are explained and discussed in the overview 
(see Section 6.4.4) and conclusions will be drawn in the end of Chapter 6. 
Throughout the demand sector studies it is assumed that the conversion factor from 
primary to final electricity is 35%, so that the countries can be compared to each other 
without involving the efficiency (changes) of the power supply side. 
                                                   
217 See explanation in Section 6.1 Introduction. This scenario shows the energy consumption in case no efficiency 
measures were taken from the year 2000 onwards. 
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Figure 6.23 Energy consumption in the Chinese 
aluminium sector for different 
scenarios (PJ-primary/ton 
aluminium). 
Figure 6.24 Energy consumption in the Indian 
aluminium industry for different 
scenarios (PJ-primary/ton 
aluminium). 
 
Table 6.12 Aluminium Production: the energy savings of the end-use Best Practice Technology 
scenario relative to the Business-as-Usual scenario  
2020 INDIA CHINA 
Fuel savings218 10 PJ (22 %) 18 PJ (20%) 
Electricity savings 21 PJ (19%)  39 PJ-e (18%) 
Total Primary sav-
ings219 
 80.2 PJ-primary (19 %) 129 PJ-primary (18%) 
 
6.4.4 Overview 
The annual output growth has been extremely high in China and much lower in India 
(12% and 7.2%, respectively, from 1985-1998), especially due to government regulations 
in the 1980s in India. The electricity efficiencies were in 1995 almost 25% higher than the 
Global Best Practice. The technologies of Indian plants are said to be supplied by foreign 
companies, but these are still less efficient than the Global Best Practice level, and, on top 
of that, the actual efficiencies are often much lower than the design values. Operation and 
maintenance therefore seems to be an important measure to bring the actual operation to 
the design level of the plants. Other measures are a) the replacement of soderberg-using 
plants by ones based on prebaked electrodes; b) increasing the share of secondary 
aluminium production from scrap; c) increased and improved use of computer controlled 
processes; d) increasing the size of electrolysis cells; e) several electrode improving 
options; f) alternatives to the conventional process, ones they are commercially available. 
The Best Practice Technology scenario shows the lower energy consumption possible 
when introducing new technologies and retrofit options at a reasonable rate (reasonable 
capital overturn and price not higher than industrial countries would be willing to pay).. 
To construct the BPT scenario, assumptions were made on 1) production output: in China 
the output growth is assumed to be 2.3% (2000-2020), in India 6% (2000-2020). The 
reason for the low growth in China compared to the past decades is that there is not a 
                                                   
218  Fuel consumption has not been focussed on, and therefore the consumption of alumina extraction from baux-
ite has not been included in this table. 
219  Throughout the demand sector studies it is assumed that the conversion factor from primary to final electricity 
is 35%, so that the countries can be compared to each other without involving the efficiency (changes) of the 
power supply side. 
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sufficient supply of bauxite and China is already importing bauxite and ingots; 2) the 
Specific Energy consumption changes by a certain rate annually. All data and 
assumptions are presented and explained in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. 
Deducing the BPT scenario energy consumption from the BAU, the maximum electricity 
savings potential is calculated at around 19% (both countries) of the BAU electricity 
consumption in 2020. These estimations are conservative since the future possible 
alternative aluminium production processes have not been taken into consideration, and 
existing cells are difficult to renovate. India has a larger output growth (caused by a lower 
current per capita production) and therefore a larger share of new plants in 2020, but the 
resulting higher savings potential might be compensated by the fact that the penetration of 
prebaked electrodes in 1995 is higher than in China. 
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Table 6.13 Assumptions on which the Chinese Business-as-usual and End-use Best Practice Technology Scenarios are based. THE GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE IS 18.3 GJ 
FUEL/TON ALUMINIUM AND 46.6 GJ ELEC/TON ALUMINIUM. 
 Current Situation 
(1995) 
Business-as-usual scenario End-use Best Practice Technology scenario (changes occur only after 
the year 2000. From 1995 – 2000, the BAU data are valid). 
Production 1.9 MTON · 4 MTON in 2020, increase of 2.3% per year220 · dito BAU scenario 
Existing plants · SEC fuel reduces 1.3% per year resulting in 18.3 in 2020 (~ equal 
to GBP 1995) 
· SEC elec reduces by 1.2% per year resulting in 46.3 in 2020 (~ 
equal to GBP 1995) 
New Plants224 
SEC fuel 25 
SEC elec 60221 
· 0.5% SEC fuel reduction per year, resulting in SEC 
2020 = 22.1 GJ222 
· 0.5% SEC elec reduction per year, resulting in SEC 
2020 = 53.7 223  
· SEC fuel and SEC elec equal the Global Best Practice, which is 
improving by 0.5% annually, resulting in 16.6 and 41.6 GJ 
respectively 
Share of secondary 
aluminium output 
 · Since no information is available on the (development of 
the) share of secondary aluminium, this is assumed to 
stay constant 
· Dito BAU scenario 
 
                                                   
220  (World Bank, 1995) 4 MT in 2020. (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7) mentioned an output of 3.7 MT in 2010 and 5 MT in 2015. This study assumes a lower future production because of the fol-
lowing reasons: although import and export quantities are not restricted any longer, the taxes have increased which has stagnated trade. Bauxite, alumina and even aluminium ingots need to 
be imported because China’s supplies do not suffice. Future government and world mining regulations might restrict import in the future (Interviews China workshop, 2000). 
221  The current best practice Chinese plant has a SEC elec of 50.4 GJ-e (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7). 
222  It is assumed that 40% of unit fuel consumption and 15% of unit electricity consumption can be saved from several measures mentioned in (UNDP, 1993) 
223  2020 expectation: average electricity consumption below 14000 in 2020 due to small plants being closed (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7). 
224  In recent years, no new plants have been built in China (economic slow down). Building new plants is difficult since a good location needs to be found close to sufficient water and electric-
ity resources. Therefore existing plants are generally renovated to increase capacity, sometimes by adding new electrolysis cells (Interviews (JV) 2000: 6,7)  
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Table 6.14 Assumptions on which the Indian Business-as-usual and End-use Best Practice Technology Scenarios are based. THE GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE IS 18.3 GJ 
FUEL/TON ALUMINIUM AND 46.9 GJ ELEC/TON ALUMINIUM. 
 Current 
situation (1995) 
Business-as-usual scenario End-use Best Practice Technology scenario (changes occur only after the year 
2000. From 1995 – 2000, the BAU data are valid). 
Production 0.5 MTon · 2 Mton in 2020 via 6% annual growth from 2000-2020 225 · dito BAU scenario 
Existing plants · SEC fuel 2.4% annual reduction so that SEC 2020 is 18.3 (~ GBP 1995) 
· SEC elec 1.2% annual reduction so that SEC 2020 is 46.3 (~ GBP 1995) 
New Plants 
SEC fuel 30 
SEC elec 60 
· SEC fuel 1.5% annual reduction so that SEC 2020 is 21.9 
GJ/ton aluminium, 20% above the GBP 1995 226 
· SEC elec 0.5% annual reduction so that SEC 2020 is 53.3 
GJ-e/ton aluminium, 15% above GBP 1995 226 
· The SEC fuel and elec of 2000 equal the GBP of 1995 and improve by 
0.5% annually 
Share of primary 
aluminium output 
 · No information available and therefore assumed to stay 
constant 
· Dito BAU scenario 
                                                   
225  The output growth between 1980 and 1996 has been 6.2% (TeddyO, 1997) and the 1995 per capita production was 0.56 kg. Das and Kandpal (2000) assume a scenario with 5.7% GDP 
growth up to 2021 (7.6% upto 2006 (Das, 1998)) and a corresponding 6% aluminium demand growth. The corresponding per capita aluminium demand is 1.65 kg per year. The world aver-
age is 5 kg per capita, 10 kg in Europe, 25 in the US (ADB, 1996) and 29 in Japan (Meeting India 2000:24). A higher production growth is possible since plans of constructing 3.5 MT ca-
pacity has been talked of in the 1990s (ADB, 1996). Roy et al (1998) predict 2.5 MT will be produced in the year 2020. Some insecurity exists since India has become an exporting country 
since the middle of the 1990s, so the calculated production (which is equal to the domestic demand) might be lower than the actual production which might include increased export (Roy et 
al, 1998 
226  Since there are no historic data available on energy consumption for aluminium production, a relatively high average autonomous improvement has been taken for fuel reductions (high 
output growth and therefore a high construction of additional capacity) and a relatively low electricity efficiency improvement level is used since it is difficult to achieve electricity conser-
vation (electrolysis cells are difficult to retrofit unless fully replaced). Since there are less (small-scale) plants than in China, it is harder to close small inefficient plants in order to improve 
average electricity efficiency. The assumed SEC reduction is supported by Das and Kandpal (2000) who arrived at a similar al electricity consumption for 2020 (33 TWh/yr) with the same 
production growth. 
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6.5 Domestic Sector: Households, Commerce and Agriculture 
6.5.1 Current situation (1990-2000) 
6.5.1.1 Sector structure and Energy Consumption 
The three sectors household (residential), commerce and agriculture have been combined 
into the Domestic Sector, since the model RAINS is structured in that way. Detailed 
analysis will be done for the three individual sectors. The highest domestic electricity 
consumption takes place in the Indian household and agricultural sectors and the Chinese 
household and commercial sectors (see Table 6.15). The Chinese agricultural electricity 
consumption will not be studied in detail since its importance in the future decreases (low 
growth in the past decades). The Indian Agricultural sector consumes 25-40% of its 
electricity for irrigation water pumps227. This is expected to grow and it is therefore an 
important sector to study. A detailed study of energy efficiency in electric irrigation 
water pumps has been done, presented in Section 6.6. 
In the United States, two thirds of all electricity generated nationally, is used for the 
building sector (household, commerce and industrial buildings) (International Working 
Group 2000) The building sectors in China and India can therefore be expected to increase 
their power consumption share in the future. 
Table 6.15 The share of the sectors in national electricity consumption (IEA 1997) and the average 
annual growth rate of energy consumption in the period 1990-1995 (India) and 1980-1995 
(China) (IEA 1993 & 1997), (LBNL 1993). 
1995 INDIA CHINA 
ELECTRICITY Share Growth Share Growth 
Share Households 16% 228 (12%) 13%  (16%) 
Share Commerce 8% 229 (9%) # 7%  (13%) 
Share Agriculture 27%  (13%) 8%  (5%) 
 
The residential and commercial sectors are mainly using electricity for lighting, air 
conditioning and refrigeration230 (see Figure 6.25 through Figure 6.28). 
                                                   
227  Kirloskar Brothers, 2000. 
228  Nadel et al (1991) say that in 1990 the domestic appliances consumed 11% of all electricity and lighting ac-
counted for 13%. 
229  Table in (Nadel et al, 1991) for the period1980/81-1987/88. 
230  For Japan (1996), the residential electricity is used for 16% for lighting, 18% refrigeration and 22% air-
conditioning (Proceedings Green Lights, 1998). 
United States: The largest energy consumers in residential buildings are space and water heating (49%) and 
refrigerator and space cooling (17%). In commercial buildings, lighting is responsible for 25% of primary energy 
use and water heating and space heating & cooling for 26%. The EIA projects refrigeration energy use to reduce 
its share from 9% in 1997 to 4% in 2020 due to implementation of standards and technological improvements. 
The share of commercial office equipment is expected to increase from 9 to 12% of the commercial building 
sector in 2020, through a demand increase over 2% per year. The techno-economic potential electricity savings 
in the advanced efficiency scenario are 26% and 37% for the commercial and residential sector respectively for 
the year 2020. Of these, around 65% is achievable with programs and policy. 20% is the policy-potential for 
refrigerators and freezers and 25-30% for lighting (International Working Group, 2000). 
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Figure 6.25  Electricity consumption by 
different applications in the 
Chinese residential sector in 
1995 (PJ-electric/yr) (IEA 
1997), (Nadel et al 1995), 
(CHEAA 1997), (Xin 1999). 
Figure 6.26  Electricity consumption by different 
applications in the Chinese 
commercial sector in 1995 (PJ-
elec/yr) (Xin 1999), (Nadel et al 
1995) 
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Figure 6.27  Share of total Electricity 
consumption by different 
applications in the Indian 
Residential sector (1989/90) 
(Nadel et al 1991). 
Figure 6.28  Share of electricity consumption of 
applications in the Indian 
commercial sector (1989/90) (Nadel 
et al 1991) 
 
6.5.2 Technology options for Energy Conservation 
6.5.2.1 Lighting in China231 
Energy efficient lighting is very important since it can save a significant quantity of 
electricity232. Global lamp use can be categorised in: incandescent lamps (has a large share 
in residential lighting), fluorescent lamps (commercial and industrial) and high intensity 
discharge (industrial and outdoor lighting) (Levine et al 1995).  
The production of energy efficient (EE) lamps in China is large (6 billion pieces in 1998) of 
which a large share is exported. Unfortunately, it is mainly the good quality EE lights that 
are exported and the domestically used ones often are of poor quality. 180 million CFL 
lamps were produced in 1998, of which 57% was exported. 84 million T8 linear fluorescent 
lamps were produced (also EE lighting) and 26 million high intensity discharge lamps of 
                                                   
231  This study does not focus on electricity savings through a change in consumers’ habits. 
232  Which is mainly peak hour electricity (Kedia, 1997). 
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which 45% was exported in that year. The output of EE lamp production has grown, but the 
export percentage has grown as well (CALI 1998). 
The Chinese market situation changes rapidly as can be seen from the fact that the number 
of lamp producers increased from 400 in 1993 to 1000 producers in 1999 (Lin 1999) There 
exists a mixture of large state-owned companies, small town and village enterprises and 
large and small joint ventures between Chinese and foreign firms (Nadel et al 1997). 
Projects generally focus on increased EE lighting adoption in the commercial sector -which 
have already given good results233- since it is a relatively easy target. The industrial sector is 
often more interested in other types of energy saving234; and the residential consumer 
choices are difficult to influence235 (236 ; GLO 1998). An important program in China is the 
Green Lights Program, which is supported by the Chinese government (see Box 6.3). 
Box 6.3 Green Lights Program China 1996-2000 (Nadel et al 1999;237)  
Funded by: UNDP/World Bank (financial grant) and Government of China (staff, loans) 
Carried out by: SETC and BECON collaborate through Green Lights Program Office 
Goal: stock of 300 million EE lamps (CFL + T8) by the year 2000, resulting in a) saving 26 TWh in the 
period 1995-2000; b) avoiding construction of 7.6 GW peak load power generating capacity; c) 30-40 
billion RMB savings (~ 3.6-4.8 billion US$); d) SO2 emission reduction 0.2 MTON and CO2 emission 
reduction 7.4 MTON compared to the base line. 
Activities and focus: capacity building via training, standard development, surveys, workshops, study 
tours, promotion (TV, radio, newspaper, magazines, local government promotion, exhibitions, news 
release) 
Prospect of achieving goal: from 1995 through 1998, over 200 million energy efficient fluorescent tubes 
were sold, and over 100 million CFL’s; the prices of efficient lighting products have dropped; the 
availability and use has increased; the quality has improved; modern, newly constructed commercial 
buildings in major cities use 90% efficient lighting. 
Difficulties encountered: pilot testing of guarantee programs encountered various problems. Furthermore, 
there exists the quality-price dilemma: the lower prices lamps have a very short life, because of which 
the buyers are not interested to buy again. The higher priced lamps have a very good quality, but the 
first-time investment is the main barrier, even though people know that they will earn their investment 
back. This is however not different from other countries (including developed countries). The aware-
ness is still limited (Nadel et al 1999) 
Follow up: it is planned to undertake a second phase of the project, focussing more on: CFL annual test-
ing, result publication and certification, labelling, bulk procurement (mass consumption), increase 
technology levels with some manufacturers including raw materials (feasibility studies, payback pe-
riod calculations, investment), research on how to improve the technology in China. 
 
Five important options have been described below. A variety of implementation bottlenecks 
is in place in China: low quality lamps with no control; loss of consumers’ trust; high prices 
for good quality products; break-down with fluctuating voltage; consumers are interested in 
money savings at the moment of purchase, not after 1 or 2 years; aesthetic disadvantages for 
households; current sufficient power supply.238 Specifically for India, the subsidised 
electricity price is a large barriers, since it extends the pay-back period (Kedia 1997).  
                                                   
233  China: 90% of the lighting installed in new shopping malls is energy efficient (GLO, 1998) and also most other 
new commercial centres are using EE lighting where possible (hotels, offices, restaurants, big shopping centres) 
(Interviews (JV) 2000: 10). 
234  It is not clear whether EE lighting is included by plant owners in major renovations. 
235  Initial costs and aesthetic characteristics play a large role in residential consumers’ decision making. 
236  Interviews (JV) 2000: 10 
237  Interviews (JV) 2000: 9, 10, 12 
238  Interviews (JV) 2000: 9, 12 
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EE Fluorescent Lamps (instead of conventional incandescent lamps): The incandescent 
lamps use 35-38% of lighting electricity consumed in India and China. The energy efficient 
alternative is the new Fluorescent Fixture, the circular fluorescent lamp and the Compact 
Fluorescent lamp (CFL) (Nadel et al 1991) (Nadel and Yu 1999). The savings potential 
when replacing a conventional incandescent lamp with a CFL are assumed to be 75%, based 
on various estimations239. The costs of implementing fluorescent lamps per saved kW in 
India were estimated at half of the costs of building a new peak load plant (in 1990) (Nadel 
et al 1991). The largest barrier to the large-scale adoption of these lamps is the low quality 
produced240,241 (China). The introduction in commercial offices has been relatively 
successful but is difficult in households. 
EE Tube Fluorescent lamp (instead of conventional tubular lamp): A conventional 40W 
fluorescent tube lamp242 can be replaced by 36W (T10) or a 32W (T8) lamp, and T5 lamps 
are the state-of-the art series. 10% of electricity can be saved with each better model, and 
36% can be saved when replacing a 40W lamp with a T5 (Nadel et al 1997).243 Total 
savings in India (2004/5) could be as high as 50-80 PJ-e using fluorescent fixtures244. The 
costs per saved kW are very low compared to building new peak power capacity, and lower 
than CFL implementation. The promotion and implementation is expected to be easier since 
90% of all fluorescent lamp energy is used in the commercial and industrial sectors (Nadel 
et al 1991). 
EE High Intensity Discharge lamps: Different types of HID lamps245 are (from least to most 
efficient): mercury vapour, metal halide, high and low pressure sodium (Levine et al 1995). 
Replacing mercury vapour lamps by metal halide or sodium lamps could give 40% savings. 
It requires the investment in a new fixture, but the pay-back period is less than 1.5 years 
(Levine et al 1995) (Nadel et al 1997). Still, policies might be necessary to increase sales to 
a significant level246 since the domestic market was stable (not growing!) in the second half 
of the 1990s (CALI 1998). 
Improved ballasts: Electronic ballasts can replace magnetic247 ballasts and save energy, 
have a quick start, low noise level and long life. The initial costs are higher (Nadel and Yu 
                                                   
239  60-75% savings per unit of light output (Levine et al, 1995); 80% (a 25W incandescent lamp is equivalent to a 
5W CFL) (Interviews (JV) 2000: 8); 75% (Kedia, 1997); 75% (Nadel et al, 1997), a 16 Watt CFL emits the same 
light as a standard 60 Watt incandescent lamp (Nadel et al, 1991). 
240  For China’s situation, two categories of lamps’ quality: 1) more expensive, 30-50 RMB (approx. 4-7 dollars in 
the year 2000), maximum life 8000 hours; 2) low quality lamps, cheap, minimal 10 RMB, short life minimal 
2000 hrs (compare to incandescent lamps of 5 RMB and maximum 1000 hours life (Interviews (JV) 2000: 8)). 
Quality of lamps is improving and good lamps are becoming cheaper. The current pay-back period for CFLs is 
2400 hours using the electricity price of the end of the 1990s (Interviews (JV) 2000: 9); or according to Nadel et 
al (1997) less than 2 years when the lamp operates at least 3 hours per day and the electricity price is 0.5 
yuan/kWh. 
241  Consumers who had a bad experience previously, are not likely to try another lamp, even though a lot of lamp 
products have increased their quality (Interviews (JV) 2000: 9) 
242  46% of lighting electricity is consumed by fluorescent tube lamps in China in the end of the 1990s while the 
number of lamps only accounted for 20% of the total (Nadel and Yu, 1999). In India, this share was similar 
(54%) in the beginning of the 1990s (later data not available). The Indian commercial and industrial sectors use 
75% of their lighting electricity for fluorescent lamps (Nadel et al, 1991). 
243  Interviews (JV) 2000: 8 
244  Replacing TLD lamps, circular fluorescent lamps, and incandescent lamps. 
245  In India (1990), about 10% of lighting electricity was used for HID lamps (Nadel et al, 1991). This figure equals 
around 16% for China in the end of the 1990s (Nadel and Yu, 1999). Mercury vapour lamps are often used for 
industries and road lights. 
246  Interviews (JV) 2000: 10 
247  Relatively cheap, has a lower weight and can be used in voltage fluctuations in the range of 160-250 V (Inter-
views (JV) 2000: 7). 
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1999). 25-45 PJ-e could be saved in 2004/5 via this replacement or 85% per replaced lamp. 
Similar to the previous options, the costs per saved kWh are lower than the supply costs of 
new power capacity. The Indian production suffered from quality control in the start of the 
1990s (Nadel et al 1991). 
The Government policy in China involves: articles in the Energy Conservation law devoted 
to EE lighting,248 support to the Green Lights Program (see Box 6.3) and the development 
of new standards. Mandatory standards exist which focus on performance and safety.249 
Voluntary standards are planned to be developed, which could be connected to an energy 
saving logo. They are currently available for ballasts only and under development for 
CFLs.250 Monitoring is one of the basic problems251. 
6.5.2.2 Energy Efficient air-conditioning and refrigeration in China 
Figure 6.25 and 6.27 showed that refrigerators and air conditioners are important domestic 
electricity consumers252. Important electricity saving options are: improved compressors253; 
Variable Speed Drive254,255; Improved Heat exchange (refrigerators) and Cool storage (air 
conditioners)256. 
The existing standard of both appliances are easy to reach257,258 for manufacturers in China 
and are therefore being updated. Another barrier is that the product price increases with 
extra EE measures.259 The 1995 savings potential is estimated at minimum 25% for 
refrigerators and minimum 20% for air conditioners (see Table 6.16)260. 
                                                   
248  Interviews (JV) 2000: 12 
249  Interviews (JV) 2000: 10 
250  Interviews (JV) 2000: 9 
251  EE standards are difficult to integrate in building codes because there is a wide range of building codes. Volun-
tary policy with constructors could be prepared. There are draft guidelines available for hotels and shopping cen-
tres, but they are not put into the pipeline because the approval process consumes a lot of energy (Interviews 
(JV) 2000: 10). 
252  6% of residential and 20% of commercial electricity demand in 1995. Refrigerators in China account for 50% of 
residential consumption (CHEAA, 1997). Together around 8% of national electricity use in 1995. For India (in 
1990) refrigerators (13% in households) and airconditioners/ fans/ coolers (45% in households). The commercial 
sector consumed 32% of its electricity for airconditioning. 
253  State-of-the-art compressors are 5-13% more efficient than the ones used in Chinese airconditioners (Nadel et al, 
1995). 0.9-1.4 TWh could be saved in the year 2004/5 for the Indian situation (Nadel et al, 1991) which is very 
limited. 
254  VSD is said to be the most important option for airconditioners. This is valid especially for commercial aircondi-
tioners (40% of total airco-electricity use (Xin, 1999)) since variable speed is necessary for continuous operation. 
In China, only 3% of airco’s include VSD whereas of the Japanese market 80% is equipped with VDSD. This 
can be explained by the higher standard of living in Japan and therefore the affordability of more expensive 
products (Inverviews (JV) 2000: 13,15,16). 
255  For refrigerators, implementing the VSD seems a more plausible option for the near future. After the production 
of the CFC-free refrigerator, the VSD is said to be the second big change in refrigerator manufacturing (Inter-
views (JV) 2000: 16). 
256 Focal point for certain Chinese refrigerator improvement projects. Chinese manufacturers generally adopt this 
kind of technologies, and it must therefore partly be considered as part of the BAU (Interviews (JV) 2000: 13). 
An airconditioner with cool storage can reduce electricity consumption by 25% (Zhang Zhirong, AD workshop 
1999). Likewise, improved insulation and door gaskets are necessary (Nadel et al, 1991). 
257  The refrigerator standard was 1.6 kWh per day; all Chinese refrigerators were more efficient than that, and 1/3 
even consumed less than 80% of that amount (CHEAA, 1997). 
258  The 1996 standard is 2.65 in China, while the best split airco in Japan has an EER of 3.2 (Interviews (JV) 2000: 
15). The 1996 standard is however similar to the ISO-5251 (BECon, 1999). 
259  Interviews (JV) 2000: 13, 24 
260  Nadel et al (1991) say (for India) that a room airconditioner of EER9 could save around 1.5 TWh in 2004/5, 
HVAC efficiency improvements 2-4 TWh and a moderate and high efficiency refrigerator could save 3-5 and 4-
6 TWh respectively in that year. 
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Table 6.16 The electricity consumption of conventional refrigerators and air conditioners, compared 
to improved (VSD) and new appliances261  
 Conventional Retrofit with 
VSD 
New appliance without VSD 
CHINA, 1995, Refrigerator 1.2 kWh/day 0.9 kWh/day 1 kWh/day 
INDIA, 1990, new Refrigerator* 1.5 kWh/day  0.7 kWh/day (New Korean 1990) 
0.4 kWh/day ^ 
CHINA, 1995, Comm. Airco 1 kW/ton 0.8 kW/ton 0.8 kW/ton 
INDIA, 1990, Comm. Airco  1.05 kW/ton  0.9 kW/ton (US, 1990) 
INDIA, 1990, Room Airco * EER 6  EER 12 (US, 1990) 
* (Nadel et al 1991)  
^ this should be possible if the size of Indian refrigerators doesn’t increase much since 1990 (Nadel et al 1991.) 
 
6.5.3 Scenarios and savings potential up to 2020 
The end-use scenarios for the residential and commercial sectors (lighting and appliances) 
are based on the following. 
- The RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU scenario for the residential and commercial sectors262 
- The end-use BPT scenario assumes that the mix of products used is the same as in the 
BAU scenario. Only the efficiency of the products reduces. 
- If the current lamps would be replaced by ones with the average western efficacy (lamp 
mix stays constant), 40% electricity use reduction would take place, 60% if replaced by 
the best practice level (Min et al 1997). 
- If the current lamp mix changes so that the maximum share of EE lighting is included, 
40% electricity reduction could take place (Nadel et al 1997). This method excludes the 
option of western level non-EE lighting. 
- In the residential market segment, a shift from incandescent to fluorescent can currently 
save 30% of electricity (IIEC 1999). 
- Cost effective measures could reduce lighting energy use by 35% in 1990 in India 
(Nadel et al 1991). Part of that potential might have been utilised since 1990, but future 
lamps will be more efficient and appropriate in more situations than in 1990.  
- In 1995 there existed a considerable savings potential for refrigerators and air condi-
tioners. Since the penetration rate of appliances is still low (compared to developed 
countries), especially in the rural areas, and a high sales growth is assumed until 2020, 
the future savings potential is large. 
- The BAU scenario for lighting and appliances assumes to include 20% of savings po-
tential263 compared to a frozen264 efficiency situation; the BPT scenario is assumed have 
an additional savings potential of 40%. This is based on the high side of the range of po-
tentials calculated by Min et al and Nadel, and much higher than the potentials men-
tioned in the previous section for appliances: those were valid for the 1990s, and better 
efficient lighting and appliance technology and high product sales can be expected for 
2020. The same assumptions are made for India since no detailed study has been carried 
out for that country. 
                                                   
261  Interviews (JV) 2000: 16 
262  The ‘domestic’ sector BAU scenario has been split into residential, commercial and agricultural subsector data. 
263  The Green Light program is aiming at 10% savings in 2010, we assume this can increase to 20% in 2020. Some 
experts mentioned that the increasing share of lighting in national electricity consumption, will be compensated 
for by lighting efficiency, which is here included in the BAU scenario (Interviews (JV) 2000: 9). 
264  Same products but efficiency per product at 2000 level. 
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Table 6.17 End-use BAU265 and Best Practice Technology power consumption in the two sectors. 
2020/ PJ-e BAU/ CHINA BPT/ CHINA BAU /INDIA BPT/ INDIA 
Households 1048 628 916 549 
Commerce 760 456 894 536 
 
6.5.4 Overview 
Electricity in the residential and commercial sectors is mainly used for lighting, air 
conditioning/ fans and refrigeration. The Chinese production of Energy Efficiency light 
sources such as CFL, linear fluorescent tubes and high pressure lamps is growing steadily. 
One of the problems is the quality of the lamps: since the manufacturers want to keep the 
price low, the quality is low and customers loose their interest. Good quality lamps are 
mainly produced by joint-ventures and/or are exported. The government is trying to solve 
the quality problems by issuing standards and labels. In both countries, the voltage 
fluctuations are reducing the expected life considerably, and simultaneously the incentive 
for potential buyers. Special CFLs for fluctuating voltage are not in the market (known for 
India) which are slightly more expensive and less efficient than other CFLs. A large barrier 
in India is the low price households pay for electricity, reducing the incentive for potential 
buyers. This is also valid for household appliances. In general, programs to increase the 
penetration rate are difficult to carry out because of the large number of users. 
Comparing the energy saving lamp’s wattage to a conventional lamp with a similar light 
output, an estimation has been made on the Best Practice technology savings potential. It is 
assumed that 20% of the current potential will be utilised under the BAU scenario, and an 
extra 40% savings can be achieved in the End-use Best Practice Technology scenario.  
For air conditioners, refrigerators and other commercial and household appliances, 
efficiency improvement options have been described, such as improved compressors, 
variable speed drive, improved heat exchange/ cool storage, for which individual savings 
potentials have been calculated. The barriers are similar to the ones mentioned above for 
energy saving lights. 
The total sectoral savings potential is assumed to be 60% compared to the frozen efficiency 
situation in which only the product number and mix changes, and not the average efficiency 
level. 20% will be utilised in the BAU scenario, and an additional 40% on top of BAU 
scenario exists in the Best Practice Technology scenario. The study has mainly been 
focussed on the Chinese situation because of the larger data set collected, and the Indian 
savings potentials are assumed to be equal to the Chinese situation. 
                                                   
265  From RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU scenario. 
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6.6 Irrigation Water Pumps (INDIA only) 
6.6.1 Current Situation (1990-2000) 
6.6.1.1 Sector Structure 
This sector has been studied for the Indian situation since the share of national electricity 
consumption is between 25-40% and the sector is growing at high speed266. In China the 
pumps for irrigation use a relatively small share of national electricity use (<5%) which is 
decreasing (see Table 6.15), and therefore other sectors have been given the priority in the 
China analysis.  
Electric water pumps consist of an electric motor which transmits mechanical energy to the 
prime mover of the pump. Water is sucked from the water via a suction pipe. A foot valve 
prevents water to exit and non-water substances to enter the suction pipe. The water exits 
the pump via the delivery pipe (Kirloskar Brothers 1998). There are two types of wells used 
for groundwater irrigation: open wells and bore wells, of which the first is only suitable for 
high water levels (using the centrifugal pumps) and the later can go as deep as 250 meters 
(using submergible pumps).267 Pumps are also used for pumping water from government 
canals (Jurrius 2000).  
In 1992, around 5 million electric water pumps were in use (and 3 million diesel water 
pumps), in 1995: 10.8 million (TERI 1997) and in 1998 12 million pumps (and 6 million 
diesel water pumps268) (Ministry of Power 1998). 
6.6.1.2 Sectoral Energy Consumption 
The energy consumption for irrigation in India is estimated at 7.4 MWh/pump year by the 
Karnataka Electricity Board and 5.3 MWh by the International Energy Initiative (Jurrius 
2000). The exact electricity consumption of pumps is not known for several reasons269 (also 
see Chapters 3 and 8). In this study, the average pump efficiency is assumed equal to 7 
MWh/yr (TERI 1997), resulting in a national electricity consumption of 84 TWh (302 PJ-e) 
in 1998. 
According to Pantoji (1998), 90% of the electric pump sets have a low efficiency. The 
Kirloskar Brothers (2000) say 80% of newly installed pumps are believed to be inefficient 
(do not meet the IS 10804 standard). At present the pump efficiency is low, the suction lift 
poor, the system bought does not match with the site or the well, the motor is inefficient, the 
pipes are undersized with too many bends, have inferior quality and there is poor 
maintenance (Kirloskar Brothers 2000). Technical potential options for improving pump 
efficiency are given in the following section. 
                                                   
266  (Kirloskar Brothers, 2000; meeting India 2000: 24; also see Table 6.15). 
267  Meeting India 2000: 19 
268  Electricity is mostly used in India due to the rural electrification program of the Indian Government. The second 
most used energy source is diesel (Jurrius, 2000). Dual fuel pumps can be used, as well as renewable energy 
pumps (Mongia et al. 1994: 897). 
269  The pumps are not individually metered and the annual operating hours vary strongly per region. A lot of pumps 
are labelled with a lower than real horse power to reduce the electricity bill in states where a flat rate system is 
used (Meeting India 2000: 24). Furthermore, it has been mentioned that higher electricity consumption by pumps 
might be presented to cover the large Transmission and Distribution losses (Ranganathan, 1998). 
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6.6.2 Technological Energy Conservation options 
The assumed current Indian average electricity consumption is 7 MWh/pump year, which 
should be compared to the Best Practice, which has been calculated at 3.5 MWh/ pump year 
in Retrofit Option 3 below.  
Replacing foot valve: The efficiency of the foot valve depends on the design270. Adopting 
BIS standard footvalves increases efficiency. It is assumed that replacement of the foot 
valve results in 9% electricity savings, which is in line with several studies described in 
(Jurrius 2000). 
Replacement of suction and delivery pipes: It is assumed that replacement of the piping 
system results in 30% savings271, which is in line with the several studies described in 
(Jurrius 2000). The problem with this option and the previous one, is that the flow often 
increases (especially with the often present oversized motors) resulting in extra low water 
tables in the wells (Sant and Dixit 1996). 
Total Retrofit and new capacity: improved foot valve, pipes, motor and pump: This 
extensive retrofit results in a pump similar to a new one (life: 10 years). It is assumed that 
the electricity savings are 50%272. This option is most beneficial because all components 
can be properly matched, whereas in option 1 and 2 increased power requirement occurs 
due to matching problems (Sant and Dixon 1996). 
COSTS of those 3 options: Considering the current subsidised electricity price (far lower 
than cost price), a discount factor of 16% and a life of 10 years, it can be calculated that 
only replacing the foot valve is an economically attractive option for the farmer. The other 
options have high investment costs, and because the electricity price is low, the Pay Back 
Period is longer than the life of the investment (Jurrius 2000). For the State Electricity 
Board, however, the investments are economically viable. Every kWh conserved results in 
less subsidy losses. It can be expected that farmers will not be interested with the current 
electricity price level, whereas the State Electricity Boards could invest profitably. There 
exist however institutional barriers (mentioned below). This option will become more 
attractive when real cost prices need to be paid by farmers. 
Renewable Energy Pumps: Renewable sources of energy driving the water pump is an 
environmentally friendly solution. Solar-PV pumps have been technically developed, but 
the cost price is higher than a conventional pump. A subsidy system existed in the 1990s273. 
Wind powered pumps still have technical problems274 but are economically viable in rural 
                                                   
270  The opening diameter should match the maximum flow, and the connection with the suction pipe needs to fit ex-
actly. The valve opens and closes to let the water enter in batches. This should be gradual and not abrupt to pre-
vent turbulence (Kirloskar Brothers, 1998). The friction in a lot of foot valves is too large. 
271  The pipe size, length and windings should all be as small as possible and match the maximum flow rate and 
therefore limit friction. The material is also of importance: galvanised iron pipes create more friction than rigid 
PVC and high density PE pipes (Kirloskar Brothers, 1998). 
272 This assumption is supported by the following experiment (in Rajasthan and in Tamil Nadu) showing an energy 
efficiency increase of 46-48% by replacing a pump of 7.5 Hp by 5 HP (Rajasthan) and from 5.0 to 3.0 HP (in 
Tamil Nadu), increasing the suction pipe top 75 mm from 50/65 mm, the delivery pipe to 75 mm from 65 mm, 
by using white PVC instead of GI, and by using a better quality foot valve compared to the local valve. (Kirlos-
kar Brothers 2000). 
273  The subsidies given in the beginning of the 1990s for PV were large but the end-user contribution was still 3 to 7 
times higher than the conventional pump investment (Gooijer, 1997). It is only given to Indian PV and high 
import tax has been put in place for foreign-made PV. It has been predicted that the price of PV will decrease 
globally, but this might not boost the Indian PV pump market since the government might by that time have 
stopped subsidies (Jurrius, 2000). 
274  Water pumps driven by mechanical wind energy have been set up in various pilot projects and generally failed 
due to improper siting and installation, lack of awareness, defective design etc (TERI, 1997). Nowadays, there 
are around 20 Indian manufacturers, but the technology still has a bad reputation. 
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areas with a relatively high average wind speed (3 m/s) and no grid available (Gupta 1997). 
Also the technology of biomass-fuelled pumps275 needs further development. Without 
subsidies, the option is not economically viable unless a lot of hours of irrigation per year 
are needed This option will have a bigger chance when the subsidies for grid electricity are 
reduced. 
Jurrius (2000) calculated that all three renewable options are far more expensive than the 
electric and diesel pumps, from the point of view of the end-user as well as the subsidy 
providing government. The potential therefore lies in areas where there is no electricity 
grid, or (in the total country) when in the future the electricity subsidy is stopped. 
6.6.3 Scenarios and Saving Potential up to 2020 
The following assumptions have been made for the end-use BAU and BPT scenarios for the 
agricultural sector: 
- The BAU consumption equals the RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU scenario; to reduce com-
plexity, it has been assumed that all electricity was used for irrigation pumps276. The 
expected growth of pump use (and the number of pumps) is high277.  
- Out of the total 50% savings potential (see Option 3 in the previous section), 20% is as-
sumed to be achieved under the BAU scenario278. This means that the BAU scenario is 
20% more efficient than the frozen efficiency scenario, and that plans, policies and 
trends need to be extended towards 2020 to reach this efficiency improvement. In the 
BPT scenario the sector could again be 30% more efficient (than the BAU scenario). In-
stitutional and implementation issues will be dealt with in Chapter 8. 
It should be taken into account that the ground water levels might be lower in 2020 and that 
the electricity input will increase for the same amount of water pumped. 
For China, the total reduction potential is assumed to be 1/3 lower than for China279, with 
10% already implemented in BAU, resulting in a 22% savings potential in BTP relative to 
the BAU agricultural electricity consumption.  
A number of barriers and policies exist regarding this sector in India, e.g. the pricing policy 
(subsidies280; no individual metering). These subjects were introduced in see Chapter 3 and 
will be dealt with further in Chapter 8. 
                                                   
275  Biomass can be turned into producer gas and then be fed into the diesel pump motor up to 70-80% of total fuel. 
Pump use can therefore be similar to electric or diesel pump, a long as sufficient biomass is availble. However, 
most of the pilot projects carried out in the 1990s were not successful, partly because the technology was not of 
sufficient quality (Mukunda et al, 1994). 
276  The 84 TWh assumed to be consumed by pumps in 1998 was slightly larger than the agricultural electricity con-
sumption from RAINS 2000 BAU scenario. This is caused by the split up of domestic into residential, agricul-
tural and commercial sectors.  
277  0.3 million units per year are assumed to be installed (excluding replacement of old pumps) since this number 
has been 0.3-0.4 million/yr from 1995-1998 and other sources are expecting 0.5-0.7 (Sant and Dixit, 1996) (Kir-
loskar Brothers, 1998), which would double the number of pumps upto 2020 (meeting India 2000:9). Additional 
pumps are needed for: meeting the existing demand (farmers have to wait 10-15 years for an electricity connec-
tion(Meeting India 2000: 9, 24)), growing demand for food products, the utilisation of available agricultural po-
tential in North-Eastern regions with sufficient water supply (KirloskarBrothers, 2000). 
278  The reason for the high BAU efficiency improvement is that the replacement of foot valves is economically fea-
sible and a large number of new pumps will be bought up to 2020, which could partly be energy efficient. 
279  No detailed information has been found for China, and since the future growth of pumps will be lower, the BTP 
potential is assumed to be lower.  
280  Political reasons for not raising electricity price for farmers to cost price: (violence from farmers and political 
party loss of votes. Price of food might rise with raised electricity price (TERI, 1997), (Jurrius, 2000). 
An Asian Dilemma 
 181
6.6.4 Overview 
This sector has been studied for the Indian situation, since the electricity used for irrigation 
accounts for 25-40% of national electricity consumption. The expected growth of the 
number of pumps is large, and since the water table is expected to decrease its height, this 
will stay an important energy using sector in the future. Retrofit options have been 
identified are: replacing foot valves, replacing suction and delivery pipes, and a total retrofit 
of valves, pipes, motor and pump. The total savings potential is 50%, out of which 10% is 
expected to be achieved in the BAU scenario, and 40% additionally in the Best Practice 
Technology scenario. These shares are lower for China since not sufficient information is 
available on the situation, and no importance seems to be given by the Chinese government. 
Bottlenecks: a) It is not clear what the life is resulting from retrofitting of pumps since 
insufficient studies have been carried out up to now. Similarly, the efficiency of the 
retrofitted pumps might reduce significantly within its life (but this could also be the case 
for non-retrofitted pumps). b) There are constraints of the practical implementation. c) Most 
farmers are not aware of the EE improving options, and if they are, they are not interested 
because of the low price of electricity. They buy cheap materials to replace broken 
components, which results in non-matching of components of the pump.  
6.7 Cogeneration of Heat & Power 
6.7.1 Current Situation (1990-2000) 
6.7.1.1 Sector Structure 
Cogeneration of Heat and Power (CHP) is an energy saving process compared to generating 
heat and power separately. The generated heat is generally used for steam or hot water 
production. The generated electricity is used for the plant’s own consumption, and excess 
electricity can be sold to the grid or sold to other users directly and transported through the 
grid as well (this so called ‘wheeling’ is not allowed everywhere). In times of insufficient 
electricity production, electricity has to be bought from the grid. The profitability of CHP 
depends on factors such as transition and investment costs, and prices of electricity, fuel and 
back-up power, and tariffs for buy-back and wheeling. (Hendriks et al 1995) 
Cogeneration can be carried out at plants level (only process heating), industrial park level 
(mainly process heating) or central level (process heat + district heating). For China it has 
been said that there is a quick recovery of costs at the plant level, whereas the central level 
is harder to be economically interesting since the price of heat is fixed and coal is still 
allowed to be used by the end-users. If end-users would be obliged to use gas, cogeneration 
would become profitable.281 
The process heat is tapped from between the High Pressure and Medium pressure turbine. 
The residential heat (district heating) is taken from after the Medium pressure, which results 
in lower temperature heat and a higher electricity output. For China, it is not known what 
the ratio is of industrial cogeneration vs. district heating.282 In the beginning of the 1990s, 
the co-generated heat was often only supplied to industrial users (Liu 1993). 
                                                   
281  Interviews (JV) 2000: 21 
282  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
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6.7.1.2 Current use of cogeneration in China and India 
The generated electricity from cogeneration in China has increased from 11 TWh (1980) to 
70 TWh283 (1995) (Yang et al 1996) The share of national thermal power generation 
capacity has varied slightly between 9 and 12% in that period284 (285 ; Heping 1998). This 
share has not increased over 12% due to existing institutional barriers: lack of access to the 
grid for surplus electricity sales, and unfair pricing for electricity sold to the grid. These 
barriers should reduce in the future since China is in the process of creating a market place 
for electricity producers, creating opportunities for cogeneration (CCICED 1999). The 
distribution of cogeneration plant sizes and it’s average use is shown in Table 6.18. 
Table 6.18 Size distribution of cogeneration capacity in China (Yang et al 1996). 
Size Capacity in 1993  Main end-user 
< 6 MW 750 MW (or 15400?) Retrofits of boiler and old power plant 
6-25 MW 4470 MW Chemical, textile, paper industry 
25-50 MW 3300 MW 
> 50 MW 6875 MW* 
Sugar mills, district heating, industrial park co-
generation 
* only 20 turbines over 100 MW (Heping 1998), mainly used for petroleum refineries, large chemical, large food 
processing, large district heating (Yang et al 1996) 
 
An interesting development is that there are only 4 manufacturers of small scale 
cogeneration at the moment, while there were many in the beginning of the 1990s. The 
economy is said to be working at a low level in these years, resulting a low interest in 
investing in cogeneration.286 However, where ever a stable heat demand is existing, and 
electricity can be supplied directly to end-users or to the grid, cogeneration can be used as 
an energy saving option (CCICED 1999). 
For India, it is not known what the generation and structure is of cogeneration plants, except 
that the largest share is situated in the sugar industry (Dadhich 1997). The Indian 
government places stress on using biomass energy sources. In 1994 a programme was 
launched on bagasse-based cogeneration for sugar mills (various experts, personal 
communication, 1998). 
6.7.2 Maximum potential electricity generation via cogeneration 
In the Rains 2000 BAU scenario for China, 209 PJ-e is generated via cogeneration, which 
increases to 603 PJ-e in 2020287. The Indian Rains 2000 BAU doesn’t give information on 
co-generation. From Dadhich (1997) it is concluded that 36 PJ-e288 was generated in the 
mid 1990s and that 100 PJ-e in 2020 in the BAU is a reasonable estimation289. 
For the Best Practice Technology scenario, calculations have been made on the maximum 
share of industrial heat demand that can be supplied by co-generated heat. The resulting 
maximum potential electricity generation from cogen is 881 PJ-e in China and 374 PJ-e in 
                                                   
283  39.6 PJ-e and 252 PJ-e. 
284  From 4 GW-e in 1980 to 25 GW-e in 1998 of plants larger than 6 MW each (Interviews (JV) 2000: 7). 
285 Interviews (JV) 2000: 17 
286  Interviews (JV) 2000: 19 
287  These figures are consistent with (Interviews (JV) 2000: 17) that says cogen accounts for 12% of total fossil-
based power capacity. 
288  Assume 2.5 GW-e and 4000 hrs per year, which is uncertain and could even be much larger for industrial 
cogeneration. 
289  Other authors have estimated potentials from 100 to 320 PJ-e, and Dadhich said that 75 PJ-e exists in the sugar 
industry, and in total 200 PJ-e cogen potential. It is in this project assumed that the sugar cogen potential will be 
utilised for a large share, and a small share in other sectors, resulting in 100 PJ-e. 
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India290, which does not include district heating (the total potential is larger). That 
calculation was based on the following assumptions: a) industrial fuel consumption for the 
cement, iron & steel and aluminium industry were taken from the industrial sectors’ BAU 
scenario developed for this project, and for other sectors the share out of 1995 fuel 
consumption was used (IEA 1997); b) the electrical and thermal (heat) efficiencies of coal-
based cogen were 15% and 65%291; c) the share of heat used in industries in the Netherlands 
that can be supplied by cogeneration292 (Hendriks et al 1995). 
The assumed maximum potential cogeneration shows almost a 50% and 400% increase for 
China and India respectively in the 2020 cogeneration compared to cogen in BAU. The 
potential district heating in 2020 has not be included in the calculation. However, the 
impact of this extra potential is small on the total BAU power generation emissions (2% and 
4% respectively, see Sections 7.2.7 and 7.3.6). The reason is that the share of cogen out of 
total thermal power generation only increases by a few % points in the BPT scenario (from 
10% in BAU to 15% in China and from 3% in BAU to 11% in India) and that the emissions 
per generated unit are lower but not equal to zero as in the renewable and nuclear fuel 
switch options.  
The share of cogeneration in the European Union was 6% of total generation and 8% of 
total capacity in 1990293. The goal is to increase this share to 18% before 2010 (Hammar 
1999) and the share in some EU countries is much larger (Netherlands: 20% of generation 
in 1990; Denmark: 50% of generation in 1999) (Hendriks et al 1995), (Hammar 1999). 
Difficulties occur since the liberalisation of the electricity sector is leading to a decline in 
cogeneration in many EU countries. In comparison to China and India, it could be reasoned 
that the their share of industrial electricity consumption is larger than in developed 
countries, which should give a higher industrial cogeneration potential. However, the large 
potentials in Denmark and The Netherlands consist for a large share of district heating. The 
demand for relatively low temperature heat is said to be much lower in India294 which 
should be similar in the south of China (warm climate). 
Alternative option: gas based cogen. Gas could replace coal in fuelling the BPT 
cogeneration for the year 2020. Since the electrical and thermal (heat) efficiencies are 40% 
and 45% -very different from a coal-based turbine- more electricity will be generated to 
produce the same amount of heat as in the coal-fuelled situation. However, the gas 
availability is limited. Gas utilised for cogeneration would otherwise fuel central power 
generation. The GHG emissions per unit electricity generated are therefore similar in both 
situations (see results of calculations in Sections 7.2.7 and 7.3.6). In most industrial 
countries, additional gas is available via import (or own supply such as in the Netherlands) 
and in that case gas-based cogeneration instead of coal-based is an emission reducing 
option. 
                                                   
290  This is in the same range as the maximum potential mentioned by Dadhich (1996): sugar industry (75 PJ-e), dis-
tilleries (42 PJ-e) rice mills and textile industry (15 PJ-e each). The maximum potential might even exceed 300 
PJ-e according to him. Other authors have concluded potentials varying from 100- 320 PJ-e (7,000 MW up to 
22,000 MW). 
291  The national average thermal efficiency in the 1990s was 60% and the government rule is that it should be larger 
than 45% and the ratio of produced heat and elec larger than 100% (Interviews (JV) 2000: 17). 
292  Bode (1999) assumes that this CHP share is also achievable in India and China, except for the share of CHP in 
the Indian Food and Tobacco industry which could be higher (75%) since the sugar industry has a large CHP po-
tential, and is in India is the largest energy user of the subsector; and the non-specified fuel (IEA, 1997) is sup-
posed to have a 25% share suitable for supply by CHP. Other shares: Iron and steel 10%, chemical 19%, non-
ferrous 20%, non-metallic minerals 2%, machinery 2%, mining and quarrying 0%, paper pulp and printing 91%, 
textile and leather 12% (Hendriks et al, 1995). 
293  This includes public utilities and autoproducers, of all sizes and all fuels. 
294  Interviews India 2001: 10 
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Box 6.4 Increased use of cogeneration in the cement sector 
 
Cogeneration in the cement sector is possible in two cases: the Long hollow rotary kiln and pre-heater ro-
tary kiln. The potential for this option is relatively low in China for the following reasons295: 
The long dry/hollow kiln is a very old type, is not being built anymore, and is slowly being phased out. In 
the end of the 1990s, 100 kilns were still working, producing only 2% of the Chinese output of cement 
and most were already equipped with cogen. 
The Pre-heater kiln is the most modern type, and is automatically equipped with a cogeneration facility. 
Two recently imported large plants are using cogeneration. The largest kiln has a 1.5 MTON annual 
clinker capacity (4 kt/day), then 7000 kW power is generated. If the kiln has a 0.7 MTON clinker ca-
pacity (2 kt/day), 2800 kW can be generated; 
Cogeneration is expected to be included into new pre-heater pre-calciner plants in the business-as-usual 
scenario and therefore not considered to be a policy option in this study.296 Globally, CHP didn’t play 
a big role in cement production in the beginning of the 1990s (Worrell et al 1995). 
 
Specific bottlenecks for increasing the share of cogeneration are: a) the Chinese government 
is of the opinion that small scale cogen can be adopted via independent investment of 
industries, as a part of industrial competition and that only large-scale cogen needs 
government support.297 However, small industrial plants cannot afford the investment for 
cogeneration, and the larger plants already use it where it is commercially attractive;298 b) 
The low price of electricity and coal reduces the interest of end-users in investing in an 
energy saving option such as cogeneration;299 c) the government put up barriers to protect 
the central power sector, e.g. maximum units of cogeneration power than can be sold to the 
grid and a relatively low buy-back tariff;300 d) industries are not interested in producing low 
temperature heat for residential use since it is difficult to receive payments (the plants are 
not receiving the 70% of total revenues that would make it economically interesting for 
them). However, the residential users are interested in hot water from district heating 
because they are not allowed to use small coal boilers in large residential areas.301 
Government policy in China: A new Chinese government policy on cogeneration is being 
made (approval by one of the institutes has already been received in Spring 2000). The 
contents of the new policy is not known.302 An existing rule is that cities with more than 
100000 inhabitants need to schedule cogeneration facilities, mainly for paper and chemical 
industries, but also other types of users.303 The Environmental Protection regulation says 
that power generators with < 200 MW have to use cogeneration. At this moment the 
sanction is not closure for the larger plants, but this is carried out with plants smaller than 
50 MW without cogeneration.304 Since small boiler houses are not allowed in residential 
areas, resulting in the necessity for district heating, which is promoted by the government. 
A simultaneous advantage is that indoor air quality and thermal comfort will be improved 
(Liu 1993 or Yang and Yu 1996) A problem is that in summer the heat demand is low.305 
Since there is sufficient electricity supply these years, the State Power Bureau is not 
approving any power plants, except for those combined with heat production.306 
                                                   
295  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
296  Interviews (JV) 2000: 1 
297  Interviews (JV) 2000: 17, 18 
298  Interviews (JV) 2000: 21 
299  Interviews (JV) 2000: 21 
300  Interviews (JV) 2000: 17 
301  Interviews (JV) 2000: 17 
302  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
303  Interviews (JV) 2000: 17 
304  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
305  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
306  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
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Cogeneration applications smaller than 25 MW per unit can be decided on by the local 
government while the bigger ones have to be approved by the central government (reason: 
to reduce work load of central government). For the small scale projects, CECIC is 
preparing a list of criteria, technical regulations including updated technical parameters, that 
the central government will give to the local government to base their approval process 
on.307 
Government policy in India: The Ministry of Non-conventional energy sources focuses on 
two areas: convincing the industry to utilise CHP where possible, and persuading the State 
Electricity Boards to provide the option for industries to sell excess electricity to the grid. 
The focus in the mid-1990s was on the sugar industry, which has a very large potential 
(3500 MW) (Dadhich 1996). The focus in India is on cogeneration using renewable sources, 
which can be seen in examples of recent projects308. Use of advanced technologies such as 
Biomass Integrated Gasification-cum-Gas Turbine Combined Cycle which would enable 
production of almost twice the useful energy from the same biomass, are also being explored. 
A revised policy document is expected in 2002.309 Within this project, no information has 
been found on the current policy is for fossil-fuelled and larger scale cogeneration. 
6.7.3 Overview 
In China, a large share of electricity is currently being generated through cogeneration. 
Government policy is to increase this type of electricity production in all sectors. In India, 
the main thrust is on cogeneration with renewable sources, e.g. using bagasse in the sugar 
industry. Cogeneration can be carried out at different levels (large scale, industrial park, 
individual plant) with either industrial process heat or district heating as thermal output. It 
has been calculated that at least 881 PJ-e could be produced in 2020 in China via 
cogeneration, and this number is at least 331 PJ-e in India. The Business-as-usual 
cogeneration has been assumed, and the resulting cogeneration potential in China is 46% 
more than in the BAU situation, and 274% for India. 
6.8 Motors & Drives  
6.8.1 Current Situation (1990-2000) 
6.8.1.1 Sector Structure 
Motors are the largest end-user of electricity in most countries in the world. They are used 
in every sector, making it a so-called cross cutting technology. The energy conservation 
potential from improving this technology can therefore not be added to the potentials of the 
individual sectors since the motors and drives are often already part of the sectoral 
conservation potential. It will be compared to the total demand side electricity conservation 
potential calculated within this project. In sectors where the options can be defined in a 
                                                   
307  Interviews (JV) 2000: 18 
308  80 MW of surplus power generation capacity has been established, and projects aggregating to 98 MW are under 
construction. A capacity of about 150 MW is under finalisation in the major sugar-producing States, Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab, Bihar and Haryana. New initiatives have also been taken in Biomass Combustion and Ta-
luka based Biomass Power Plants. A private sector biomass power project of 12 MW capacity has been commis-
sioned in Tamil Nadu and two projects are at an advanced stage of construction. A total biomass combustion capac-
ity of 26 MW is now operational. Wood based biomass gasifiers of capacity up to 500 KW have been developed for 
operation in stand-alone or grid connected mode for thermal, mechanical or rural electrification applications. An 
aggregate gasifier capacity of 24 MW has so far been installed. 
309  Meeting India 2000: 8 
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detailed way, the sectoral potential of improved motors has be added, such as improved fans 
in the clinker burning process (cement sector) (UNIDO 1998).  
Motors are used in a wide rage of applications310. Most motors are three-phase induction 
motors 311; they are popular312 in India and China because they are cheap and easy to 
maintain (Hinge et al 1997). In the EU the life of this size of motor would be 12 years (EC 
1996). The Chinese motor production has decreased by 6% per year in the 1990s (IECC 
1999) but the produced motors’ total capacity increased from 42 GW in 1985 to 60313 GW 
in 1995. In India the number of motors produced increased 8% from 1985 up to 1 million 
pieces in 1995 (Industrial Commodity Statistics 1996). Figures on the number and capacity 
of imported motors have not been found. 
A typical fact of motors (at least in the case of motors in the EU countries) is that the value 
of the electricity consumed annually is approximately 5 times higher than its purchase price. 
This makes motors very suitable for electricity consumption reduction, especially when 
realising that this holds for the total life of 12-20 years (Dessoude & Asmane 1994). 
6.8.1.2 Sectoral Energy Consumption 
This sector study will focus on industrial motor electricity consumption, since motors in for 
irrigation pumps and small motors in appliances are dealt with in Sections 6.5 and 6.6. 
Motors in India consume 74% of all industrial electricity use or 72 TWh. This share is 
similar in China, where 600 TWh is annually consumed (end of 1990s), which is roughly 
2/3314 of all electricity.315 The related annual CO2 emission in China is 172 MTon in 1997 
and the average motor efficiency was 89.3% (IIEC 1999).  
The different models can be divided into three categories316: a) J series, which are 
obsolete317; b) Y series account for 90% of the production in the 1990s, are less noisy and 
use less material, but the energy efficiency is similar to the J series318; c) YX series is the 
internationally the newest model and most energy efficient319, but less material efficient and 
more expensive and therefore not popular with consumers. The production in China is 
minimal in the 1990s (IIEC 1999).  
6.8.2 Technology options for Energy Conservation 
The efficiencies of Chinese motors are several percent points lower than European best 
efficiency standard motors (see Table 6.19).  
                                                   
310  e.g. to power fans, compressors, pumps, mills, winders, elevators, transports, home appliances, office equipment 
(EU, 1996). In China, 40% of installed industrial motor capacity is used for pumps and 10% for blowers (IECC, 
1999). 
311  Which speed is mainly determined by the frequency of power supply and the number of poles in the motor. Syn-
chronous motors are more expensive, but give a more perfect constant speed than small or medium sized induc-
tion motors. 
312  India: about 70% of all electricity use for motors in industry and 100% in agriculture and China: 90% of pro-
duced motors (Hinge et al, 1997). 
313  Seems to be incompatible with Hinge et al (1997): the production in 1996 was 40 GW. 
314  In the US this share was 57% in the beginning of the 1990s. 
315  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
316  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
317  In 1996, half of the Chinese stock of motors was the inefficient J series, because the shift to Y-series occurred 
only in the years before (Hinge et al, 1997). They are not produced anymore since 1984 (IIEC, 1999). 
318  The 5.5 kW model has an efficiency of 85% and the average is 89% in China of motors produced in the 1990s. 
319  89% for the 5.5 kW model and 92% on average; low demand and production because the Chinese government 
has set the prices high to support producers (IECC, 1999). 
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Table 6.19 Average efficiency of motors per size category in China and India and the international 
standards in 1990. 
Capacity 
(kW) 
China* (1997) ef-
ficiency320 
Capacity 
(kW) 
India# effi-
ciency 
Capacity 
(kW) 
European best effi-
ciency standard 
motors ^ 
1.1 78% 0.12 50-53% 0.75-7.5 86% 
5.5 85% 110 94% 7.5-37 90-% 
22 91.5% 315 96% 37-75 93% 
75 92.7%   >75 96% 
* (IIEC 1999)   # (Nadel et al 1991)  ^ (EC 1996)321 
 
This paragraph describes several options of efficiency improvement in the motor sector322.  
Variable Speed Drive: a Variable (or: Adjustable) Speed Drive (VSD) is a mechanism 
which regulates the power supplied by the AC motor to the application. This is useful for 
applications with a variable fluid flow (such as air, steam, water, etc)323,324. The savings that 
could be reached by implementing VSD per motor have been calculated by Elliot (1995) at 
15-40% and by EC (1996) at 25%, both for developed countries. For China, it has been 
estimated that 40 TWh electricity savings could result from implementing VSD where 
necessary,325 which is 5% of 1995 national consumption and over 8% of motor 
consumption. This potential is probably lower than in developing countries because of the 
applicability limitations326. In one example in China the VSDs installed had a pay-back time 
of 2 years327. It is not clear whether China and India can produce VSDs domestically328. An 
Indo-Dutch project (interviews India: 2000) concludes that a 20-70% saving is possible 
through the introduction of VSDs. The potential is very large since VSDs are currently not 
used to a high extent in India. 
Energy Efficient Motor: High efficiency motors have 30-50% less losses due to the 
optimised design, more generous electrical and magnetic circuits and higher quality 
materials (EC 1996). Savings can be 6% in the 0.75-7.5 kW power range (EC 1996). The 
extra investment costs are 20-25% compared to standard motors, which equals 22 ECU/kW 
                                                   
320  In China, it refers to motors produced in 1997, most of them with sizes between 5 and 55 kW (IECC, 1999). 5 
kW is a small but popular model in China (Interviews (JV) 2000 :27) 
321  Chinese motors are 3-5% lower than international standards (Interviews (JV) 2000: 27) 
322  ‘external’ factors important in the motor system efficiency, described in EC (1996): the quality of the power 
supply, power factor, transmission and distribution losses, quality of transferring the power from the motor to the 
application, load management practice, correct sizing of the motor (average and peak requirements). 
323  Traditionally the control of flow is constant due to a constant motor and is set at the level of the maximum flow 
needed in time. If at times the flow needs to be reduced, valves, dampers or vanes are used, resulting in a loss of 
energy. Variable speed drives allow the motor to reduce power and therefore regulate the flow of substance as 
per the demand at that moment. 
324  VSDs are available for all types of motors. Since they are not based on moving parts, they do not need a lot of 
maintenance, and are highly reliable and efficient. A disadvantage is that VSDs introduce harmonics in the 
current leading to voltage distortion and that the life of the standard motor reduces due to the fast switching of 
power devices. There are various types of VSDs which each have different advantages and disadvantages (EC, 
1996). 
325  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
326  Small motors have lower annual operating time and large motors do often work on a stable load. In the 
commercial sector, loads are often more variable and the operating hours should be above 4000 hours to make 
the VSD cost effective. In the industrial sector there are more stable loads and the operating hours should be 
above 7000 hours. If the price of VSD’s is reduced in the future, the applicability for lower power ranges might 
become profitable (EC, 1996; Elliot et al, 1995). 
327  The example of the Lido Energy Centre in Beijing: the steam demand varies with the season and therefore the 
combustion air flow and the water input into the boiler should be variable. Manually adjusted dampers were 
previously used to control these flows (SETC/ECIDC, 1999; Interviews (JV) 2000: 22). 
328  Most VSDs are imported from Japan (Hinge et al, 1997). 
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for the European situation. For a new application and motors with a large number of 
operating hours, this results in a pay back period shorter than 2 years (European situation). 
Average operation hours and a low or high power range result in pay-back period between 3 
and 7 years. The PBPs are shorter in commercial applications. The economic potential is 
estimated at 3% (EC 1996). It should be realised that the savings and pay-back period are 
different for application in China and India. For example, NPC (2000) says that EE motors 
cost around 50% more (Indian situation).  
China is currently not producing this type of motor. The motor manufacturing industry 
consists of thousands of small enterprises who lack technical skill to produce high 
efficiency motors, and of a few dozen large enterprises who often are in internal financial 
difficulties.329 India is producing high efficiency polyphase induction motors (1990). In 
developing countries small motors may be produced manually, resulting in a low energy 
efficiency (Nadel et al 1991). 
Motor Maintenance: Losses occurs due to poor maintenance (inspection, lubrication, 
ventilation, wear and tear in bearings and housings, load conditions, etc) and rewinding 
practices (retrofitting of burnt out motors)330 (EC 1996). Improved maintenance of the 
motor can increase the efficiency with 1-2%,331 resulting in 9-10 TWh savings in China and 
4 TWh in India (based on 1995 situation). It should be realised that improved maintenance 
results in a longer life and therefore later replacement with newer models, which reduces 
the potential in the longer term.  
6.8.3 Scenarios and Saving Potential up to 2020 
The motor capacity is generally not predicted on the long term. The following assumptions 
are made: 
- 60% of national electricity consumption, is expected to be consumed by motors and 
drives.332 In the European Union countries, typically 60-80% of the industrial and 35% 
of the commercial electricity use is consumed by motors (EC 1996). The Chinese and 
Indian situation assumed to develop towards the EU situation. 
- 15% current savings potential333 is assumed (combination of VSD, new Energy Effi-
cient motors334 and replacement of J and Y series, and improved operation and mainte-
nance), and a higher potential might exist in 2020 because new motor capacity will be 
installed and the best practice motors will keep on improving their efficiency. A savings 
potential of 25% is assumed here. 
                                                   
329  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
330  NPC was established in 1958 by government of India to train and research in the area of productivity, and to 
increase the consciousness on productivity in industry, agriculture, service, infrastructure and other sectors of the 
economy. They can undertake industrial engineering, organisational restructuring, Business re-engineering,, 
human resource management, total quality management, pollution prevention and control, energy management 
and audits, etc. NOPC has 43 productivity councils spread throughout the country (NPC no date) . 
331  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
332  Interviews (JV) 2000: 27 
333 For the EU this percentage was estimated at 16-21% (technical potential) and 8-9% (economic potential) (EC, 
1996). Hinge et al (1997) assumed 10% savings potential for that moment in China, which could be higher in fu-
ture and doesn’t include VSDs. According to IIEC (1999) the savings in ten years time could be around 20% of 
installed capacity compared to a BAU scenario, by using efficient motors for new installations as well as re-
placement of inefficient (J-series) ones. 
334 imported, since the production technology level is currently not sufficient to produce high efficiency motors or 
parts (Hinge et al, 1997) 
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- In 2020, 60% of total electricity consumption equals 5168 PJ in China and 2701 PJ in 
India, resulting in 1292 PJ and 675 PJ savings respectively, which equal 15%335 of na-
tional BAU electricity consumption.  
6.8.4 Overview 
The motor study has mainly focussed on information from China. It is difficult to find 
future estimations on issues in this sector. The number of motors used in 2020 and the 
electricity use per motor is hard to estimate. For that reason, an assumption on the share of 
national electricity is used, since motors are used in all kinds of processes in every sector. 
This share is currently high in China and India, around 70%. It is assumed to reduce to 60% 
of national consumption in 2020. Identified efficiency options that are directly connected to 
the motor are: installing high efficiency motors (optimal design, better circuits and higher 
quality material); variable speed drive; and improved motor maintenance. Altogether these 
options are assumed to have a 15% savings impact, which gives a 9% savings potential on 
national BAU electricity consumption. Since this is a cross-cutting sector, these savings 
cannot be added to the other sectors, since most sectoral efficiency measures include motor 
efficiency. It can therefore merely be used as a comparison to the total electricity savings 
potential: the savings potential due to improved motors are 9% of BAU electricity 
consumption in 2020, whereas the total savings of end-use efficiency measures can be up to 
30% (see next section’s integrated analysis).  
6.9 Integrated sector analysis of end-use BPT savings potential 
The preceding sections contained the sector analyses. Each analysis started with detailed 
product and process information, continued with technological reduction options and the 
1995 Global Best Practice situation and ended with the assumed development of the sector 
under the two scenarios. This section shows the assumptions, fuel and electricity 
consumption in both scenarios and the potential energy savings in a quantitative, integrated 
manner over all end-use sectors.  
The first and a very important parameter is the future development of production output 
(see Table 6.20). For the three heavy industrial sectors, the growth of physical output was 
used (MTon of cement produced per year, for example) whereas for the other sectors the 
definition of ‘output’ is presented as an index number. The determination of the output is 
complicated by the fact that the mix of products changes over time. The ‘output’ therefore 
refers to the energy effect the development that produced/consumed products and services 
have, assuming no efficiency improvement compared to the year 2000, but merely the effect 
of a change in amount and mix of products (the so-called frozen-efficiency development). 
An additional sector called ‘other industries’ was created (total industries (from the RAINS 
2000 BAU scenario) minus the three studied industrial sectors) in order to create a complete 
end-use overview. Detailed studies have not been carried out on that sector, but some rough 
conclusions will be drawn.  
                                                   
335 The estimation of (Interviews (JV) 2000: 27) was almost 60 PJ (15-16 TWh) annually for the year 1995, which 
equals less than 3%. 
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Table 6.20 Production growth of the individual sectors (output 2000 is set to 100). 
  China INDIA 
  Production/ Output Annual Growth 
Output 
Production/ Output Annual Growth  
Output 
Sector Year 2000 2010 2020 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 2000-10 2010-20 
Iron and Steel all 100 116 128 1.5% 1.0% 100 148 219 4.0% 4.0% 
Cement all 100 128 149 2.5% 1.5% 100 197 352 7.0% 6.0% 
Aluminium all 100 126 158 2.3% 2.3% 100 206 387 7.5% 6.5% 
Other Indus-
tries 
fuel 100 137 162 3.2% 1.7% 100 195 378 6.9% 6.8% 
Other Indus-
tries 
elec 100 200 359 7.2% 6.0% 100 182 338 6.2% 6.4% 
Domestic  
Sectors 
fuel 100 123 145 2.1% 1.7% 100 102 105 0.2% 0.3% 
 elec 100 155 260 4.5% 5.3% 100 181 332 6.1% 6.3% 
Agriculture elec 100 125 141 2.3% 1.2% 100 134 207 3.0% 4.4% 
Residential elec 100 143 219 3.6% 4.4% 100 204 340 7.4% 5.3% 
Commerical elec 100 249 599 9.6% 9.2% 100 213 500 7.8% 8.9% 
            
Transport fuel 100 170 275 5.4% 4.9% 100 203 299 7.3% 4.0% 
Transport elec 100 170 236 5.4% 3.3% 100 155 232 4.5% 4.1% 
 
After the output development was been defined, the historic energy consumption per unit of 
product (SEC) was studied and compared to the Global Best Practice, and assumptions were 
made on the future development of the SEC in the Business-as-usual scenario. The total 
energy consumption per sector resulted from that. For each group of old and new plants and 
both for electricity and energy consumption, it has been estimated how soon the average 
SEC will reach the Global Best Practice. This annual improvement rate was larger in the 
Best Practice scenario. Table 6.21 and 6.22 show the assumptions and results for both 
scenarios.  
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Table 6.21 The Total (PJ-final/yr) and Specific Energy Consumption development in the end-use 
Business-as-usual scenario.  
  CHINA INDIA 
  change in 
SEC/yr 
Energy Consumption change in 
SEC/yr 
Energy Consumption 
Sector Year 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 
Iron and Steel fuel -0.8% -0.8% 3306 3558 3645 -1.4% -1.4% 765 1009 1297 
 elec 0.0% 0.0% 341 395 437 -0.5% -0.5% 61 88 124 
Cement fuel -1.2% -1.2% 2189 2459 2530 -1.2% -1.2% 336 614 975 
 elec 0.5% 0.5% 203 270 330 0.0% 0.0% 36 76 136 
Aluminium fuel -0.5% -0.5% 62 74 88 -1.5% -1.5% 18 30 46 
 elec -0.5% -0.5% 151 180 215 -0.5% -0.5% 37 66 112 
Other Indus-
tries 
fuel -1.0% -1.0% 14007 17317 18608 -1.0% -1.0% 2370 4374 7658 
 elec -1.0% -1.0% 1815 3288 5325 -1.0% -1.0% 566 1011 1697 
Domestic 
 Sectors 
fuel -1.0% -1.0% 13630 15390 17600 -0.5% -0.5% 7588 7370 7214 
Agriculture elec -0.5% -0.5% 238 283 304 -0.8% -0.8% 318 395 563 
Residential elec -1.0% -1.0% 585 756 1048 -1.0% -1.0% 329 606 916 
Commercial elec -1.0% -1.0% 155 349 760 -1.0% -1.0% 219 421 894 
Transport fuel -1.0% -1.0% 4205 6450 9447 -1.0% -1.0% 2383 4373 5832 
Transport elec -1.0% -1.0% 102 157 197 -1.0% -1.0% 31 43 58 
Total fuel   37399 45249 51918   13461 17769 23021 
 elec   3590 5679 8615   1596 2706 4501 
 
Table 6.22 The Total (PJ-final/yr) and Specific Energy Consumption development in the End-use Best 
Practice Technology scenario. 
  change in 
SEC/yr 
Energy Consumption change in 
SEC/yr 
Energy Consumption 
Sector Year 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 2000-
10 
2010-20 2000 2010 2020 
Iron and Steel fuel -2.4% -1.9% 3306 3006 2745 -4.8% -3.1% 765 682 734 
 elec -2.2% -1.8% 341 316 292 -1.4% -1.0% 61 80 107 
Cement fuel -3.1% -2.2% 2189 1992 1850 -3.3% -1.6% 336 493 755 
 elec -0.2% -0.3% 203 252 283 -2.9% -1.3% 36 60 94 
Aluminium fuel -1.8% -1.3% 62 64 71 -3.7% -1.8% 18 24 36 
 elec -1.6% -1.2% 151 159 176 -1.9% -1.1% 37 56 91 
Other Industries fuel -3.0% -3.0% 14007 14120 12372 -3.0% -3.0% 2370 3566 5091 
 elec -2.5% -2.5% 1815 2822 3923 -2.5% -2.5% 566 868 1251 
Domestic Sec-
tors 
Fuel -1.7% -1.7% 13630 13884 13770 -1.7% -1.7% 7588 6497 5604 
Agriculture Elec -1.8% -1.8% 238 249 236 -2.5% -2.5% 318 318 394 
Residential elec -3.5% -3.5% 585 585 628 -3.5% -3.5% 329 469 549 
Commercial elec -3.5% -3.5% 155 270 456 -3.5% -3.5% 219 326 536 
Transport fuel -2.5% -2.5% 4205 5537 6961 -2.5% -2.5% 2383 3754 4297 
Transport elec -2.5% -2.5% 102 134 145 -2.5% -2.5% 31 37 43 
Total fuel   37399 38604 37768   13461 15016 16518 
 elec   3590 4789 6139   1596 2214 3065 
  
The sectoral energy consumption in the energy efficient scenario was compared to the BAU 
baseline scenario in order to calculate the reduction in energy use achieved by the measures 
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taken in the End-use Best Practice Technology scenario (see Table 6.23). It was calculated 
that 29% of Chinese BAU electricity consumption could be saved in the BPT scenario, 32% 
of the Indian BAU electricity consumption. These results are valid under the set of 
assumptions made in this chapter, regarding the end-use BAU as well as the BPT scenario. 
Table 6.23 Final Energy savings (PJ-f/yr) of the end-use Best Practice Technology scenario compared 
to the end-use BAU scenario. 
  China India 
  Savings (PJ) % of BAU  
consumption 
Savings (PJ) % of BAU  
consumption 
Sector 2020 2020 2020 2020 
Iron and Steel fuel 900 24.7% 562 43.4% 
 elec 145 33.2% 17 14.0% 
Cement fuel 680 26.9% 220 22.6% 
 elec 47 14.2% 42 30.6% 
Aluminium fuel 18 19.9% 10 21.8% 
 elec 39 18.1% 21 19.0% 
Other Industries fuel 6236 33.5% 2566 33.5% 
 elec 1401 26.3% 447 26.3% 
Domestic Sectors fuel 3830 21.8% 1610 22.3% 
Agriculture elec 68 22.3% 169 29.9% 
Residential elec 420 40.0% 367 40.0% 
Commercial elec 304 40.0% 358 40.0% 
Transport fuel 2486 26.3% 1534 26.3% 
Transport elec 52 26.3% 15 26.3% 
Total fuel 12581 25.3% 6503 28.2% 
Total elec-final 2475 28.7% 1436 31.9% 
Total primary energy 19654 26.2% 10605 29.6% 
 
Figure 6.28 and 6.29 show the share of the sectoral savings potential in the total end-use 
savings potential. The commercial and residential sectors account for the largest share of 
total savings in both countries, with the agricultural sector in India taking third position. 
Their savings potential is large due to the high expected growth in both countries (shift 
towards the tertiary sectors and current low penetration of appliances, especially in the rural 
areas) and the fact that the appliances have a lifetime shorter than the industrial sector, 
resulting in a higher potential via efficient new products and replacement.  
The savings potential of the three selected industrial sectors (cement, steel and aluminium) 
is high when related to their sectoral BAU consumptions (see Table 6.23). However, within 
the total end-use BPT savings, their contribution is limited (see Figure 6.28 and 6.29). The 
output capacity of basic manufacturing industries such as cement, steel and aluminium was 
already large in 1995 and therefore the projected growth for the period 1995-2020 is 
relatively small compared to the other sectors336. As a consequence the manufacturing 
industry’s share of BAU electricity consumption is smaller in 2020 than in 1995. For this 
reason, a lower savings potential occurs compared to the total end-use BPT savings in 2020. 
For India it must be remarked that the share of the three industrial sectors was already 
relatively small in 1995 (11% of national electricity consumption and 24% of industrial 
                                                   
336  Chinese experts have provided the estimations on future output growth. 
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consumption, see Table 6.0) because a lot of similarly sized sectors exist337. Therefore their 
savings potential out of total BAU consumption is exceptionally low in 2020.  
The savings of ‘other industries’ in total end-use savings (Figure 6.28 and 6.29) are large, 
due to a high SEC reduction assumed for the BPT scenario. The first reason for this 
assumption is that the output growth of these sectors is larger than for the studied three 
industrial sectors (cement, steel, aluminium) because a shift is expected from those basic 
manufacturing sectors to the other industrial sectors. Additional output means a higher share 
of new capacity and a higher financial return, and therefore a larger possibility for 
technology improvement and investment. The second reason for a high SEC reduction 
assumed in these sectors in China and India is that it can be expected to be higher than 
average global industrial SEC reduction in the BAU scenario, due to relatively low current 
efficiency level. The global industrial SEC has been estimated to decrease by 0.5% a year 
(Worrell et al 1997) and a 1% reduction has been assumed in this study. A similar situation 
is valid for the Best Practice Technology scenario. Global industrial annual savings range 
from 1.5 to 2.5% per year globally (Worrell et al 1997) and therefore SEC reductions of 3% 
(fuel) and 2.5% (electricity) have been assumed for the Chinese and Indian situation. The 
third reason for the high expected SEC reduction is that these sectors consume relatively 
more electricity than the three basic manufacturing industries, which results in a higher 
sectoral electricity savings potential and therefore a higher share out of the total BPT 
electricity savings potential compared to the three manufacturing sectors. It can be 
concluded that the savings options and potential of the other industrial sectors need to be 
studied in more detail.  
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Figure 6.28 The share of sectoral electricity 
savings in the total Indian electricity 
Best Practice savings 
Figure 6.29 The share of sectoral electricity 
savings in the total Chinese 
electricity Best Practice savings 
 
The World Energy Assessment (2000) gives economic energy efficiency potential 
estimations for the year 2010 compared to a frozen efficiency situation. For India the 
figures are 15-20% for the three industrial sectors, 10-70% for lighting, 25% for 
refrigeration, 10% for air conditioners, 3.5 GW industrial cogeneration (only in the sugar 
sector; this is 75% more than 2000 level338) and 25-55% via EE pump sets. For China, the 
                                                   
337  Out of the large number of industrial, electricity consuming sectors, these were the largest three consumers in 
1995 and their individual sectoral savings potential is considerable. The chemical sector also has a large electric-
ity consumption, but due to its heterogeneity it has not been selected for further study. 
338 Assuming 5000 hours/yr. This IEA assumption matches the Asian Dilemma assumption of 100 PJ (5.6 GW-e) in 
2020 in the Business-as-usual scenario, but is much lower than the 374 PJ-e (20.7 GW-e) projected in the Asian 
Dilemma Best Practice Scenario in 2020. 
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economic potentials are similar to those in India. The figures are difficult to compare with 
the potentials calculated in this project since the WEA study includes fuel savings, 
compares to a frozen efficiency situation instead of the BAU, and focuses on 2010. 
However, if the economic potential for 2010 is already high, it can be imagined that the 
sectoral savings presented in Table 6.23 are generally higher. 
6.10 Bottlenecks (general barriers) 
The barriers to energy efficiency improvement can be divided into groups: a) no (high 
quality) domestic production of energy efficient technologies; b) insufficient or incorrect 
knowledge about energy efficient measures and good housekeeping options; c) use of old 
inefficient equipment and appliances; d) insufficient infrastructure and vastness of the 
countries leading to small-scale production; e) importance of sustaining the economy at the 
local level; f) low price and partially theft of electricity; g) scarcity of investment capital; h) 
large number of users in commercial, residential and agricultural sectors; i) output growth 
might result in sustained use of old equipment; j) auto-generation of power (= captive 
power). These issues are briefly explained below, and dealt with on a sector-by-sector bases 
in Chapter 8. 
a) The energy efficient technologies which have been mentioned in the sector studies, 
cannot all be produced domestically or not with sufficient quality. For example, green 
lights can be produced but a large share of production has insufficient life, reducing the 
interest of potential consumers, and reducing market potential for high quality 
alternatives. Small to medium capacity pre-calciner plants for the cement industry can 
be produced in China, but larger and more efficient plants need to be (partially) 
imported. There are a few manufacturers of roller mills in China, but their output and 
quality is low. Import restrictions, lack of foreign currency and approval procedures are 
barriers. The government should give priority to domestically producing energy 
efficient technologies in the long term and importing machinery and knowledge in the 
short term. Energy efficient technology import could be given a simplified approval 
procedure compared to other imports. In India more than in China, domestic production 
takes place of efficient technologies, by Indian as well as joint-venture companies. 
Domestically produced high quality products could be given a subsidy and a 
standardising/labelling system to increase demand. 
b) Knowledge about energy efficient options is not always correct or sufficient. For 
example, in India as well as China, the general opinion of the cement sector is that 
blended cement has a lower quality than Portland cement. In China several cement 
experts were not aware of the option of blended cement. To some extent the government 
is responsible for awareness creation. Cogeneration in India is mainly supported in the 
form of bagasse in the sugar industry, whereas other fuels or sectors suitable for 
additional cogeneration are not given due attention.  
c) In all industrial sectors it can be seen that the life of plants and production processes is 
extended and retrofit is carried out, instead of replacing an old plant by a state-of-the art 
one. Retrofit requires lower investment capital and prevents the owner from having to 
go through approval procedures and availability of natural resources which is connected 
to constructing a new plant. Retrofit generally increases efficiency, but at a lower rate 
than new plants would. Sometimes old plants are practically completely replaced by 
new plants due to thorough refurbishment. This makes it difficult to estimate the BAU 
efficiency improvement.  
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d) The vastness of the countries and the insufficient infrastructure makes local production 
necessary and therefore reduces the average plants size. This decreases the quality of 
the output (e.g. cement from old vertical kilns), reduces efficiency as well as the number 
of technology options that are cost-effective (long pay-back time on investment because 
of the low output of the plant), such as computer controlled processes, roller mills in the 
cement industry etc. Furthermore, small plants are often under responsibility of the local 
government and not the central government, which reduces government influence 
regarding energy efficiency. The insufficient infrastructure reduces the potential of 
blended cements, of increasing the average size of plants, of increasing the number of 
integrated plants (e.g. steel), etc.  
e) Related to d) is the barrier that, for tax collection and employment reasons, the local 
governments are not inclined to close down small and inefficient production plants. The 
rules and regulations of the central government are therefore often not implemented, 
and it is very difficult to monitor and control this. For example, OHF Steel plants should 
be closed at a higher speed in India, and the closing down of small vertical kiln cement 
plants in China should be given even higher importance than it already has. The current 
policies (new OHF and small vertical kilns cannot be built, small aluminium plants and 
J-series electric motors need to be taken out of production) can not be monitored. 
f) The subsidised electricity price in India and low price in China due to over supply, 
reduce the incentive for savings, especially in the agricultural and domestic sectors. 
Investments in efficient irrigation pumps, appliances and lighting have a long pay back 
period because of the low electricity price. However, investment by parties other than 
the end-user could also be an attractive option: several sources mention that the 
additional investment in energy efficient appliances and lighting is more than 
compensated for by the reduction in new peak electricity generating capacity needed to 
be built. This shows that Demand Side Management (energy efficient products 
promoted by utilities) might be worth more attention339. 
g) Energy efficient products or technologies have a higher investment price, and 
investment capital is insufficiently available, especially for energy efficiency 
investments. It is easier to get financing for capacity or product quality increase, than 
for energy efficiency investments, also because the knowledge of energy efficient 
investment is not available with capital providers.340 Besides that, plant owners or 
customers are unwilling to replace installations that are still operating, since it is seen as 
capital destruction.  
h) The number of users of lighting products, appliances such as refrigerators and air 
conditioners, and agricultural pumps is very large. For new products, the information 
dissemination and availability of energy efficient products should be arranged with 
retailers and local sector associations. For agricultural pumps, retrofit is an important 
option, for which people need to be trained to visit millions of farmers. Furthermore, the 
current subsidy and metering system are barriers. 
i) High growth is on the one hand beneficial for energy efficiency since new capacity will 
be built which often has a higher efficiency. However, old industrial plants are often not 
be taken out of production in a situation of high growth, since all production capacity is 
needed. Previously closed old plants are often opened again, or simple (inefficient) 
production capacity is constructed in a short period of time (e.g. as happened in the 
                                                   
339  Chinese utilities have provided lamps at a discount price to households in certain provinces, but this strategy was 
stopped since there is sufficient power supply (Interviews (JV) 2000: 9). 
340  Interviews (JV) 2000: 2, 4 
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Chinese cement sector in the beginning of the 1990s, and was mentioned by Indian 
experts as a future possibility.341 
j) Due to the unreliable electricity supply, large plants generally auto-generate electricity 
(captive power plants) (CMA 1998). In this case the costs of electricity represent to a 
large extent sunk costs (except for the fuel costs) and therefore the incentive for 
electricity conservation decreases. Auto-generation takes place in all three industrial 
sectors studied342 and several other industrial sectors. The low electricity prices 
represent a major obstacle, also here, because there is (hence) hardly any incentive to 
sell surplus electricity via a free market once that is created (see liberalisation 
Transmission and Distribution, Chapter 8).  
6.11 Conclusions 
Efficiency achieved before 2000. China and India have achieved considerable end-use ef-
ficiency improvement already in the period before 1990 and between 1990 and 2000. Sev-
eral policies have been developed and carried out, such as the cogeneration promotion for 
the Indian sugar sector, the closure and retrofit of small plants in China, closure of wet ce-
ment plants and OHF steel plants in both countries, information dissemination via sector as-
sociations and government communication regarding opportunities in the industrial as well 
as residential, commercial and agricultural sectors. The industrial sector studies on cement, 
steel and aluminium show how the energy efficiency has improved over the last decade and 
an increase in attention for and production of energy efficient lighting, appliances and mo-
tors (including water pumps) can be observed. For the future, it is expected that this trend 
continues, towards more efficient use of energy in general, and electricity in particular. The 
market forces have an impact: there is an increasing demand for high-quality output in both 
countries, which drives small and probably less efficient producers out of the market. 
Uncertainties in development and data. The trend mentioned above is presented by the 
end-use Business-as-Usual scenario in this project. However, additional savings are possi-
ble, which are in this project included in the end-use Best Practice Technology scenario. 
Since both countries are changing rapidly, it is difficult to develop the scenarios. Trends of 
the last decade cannot simply be extended. An often heard opinion of experts in China was 
that the economic slowdown of 1999 and 2000 complicates long term predictions (possibly 
valid for India as well) and that currently the willingness to invest in end-use energy effi-
ciency is low due to economic difficulties and the sufficient supply of power and fuel in 
China. Experts have a very different opinion on growth and efficiency options now com-
pared to a couple of years ago when China’s annual growth in all sectors was over 10% and 
electricity was scarce. An additional factor of uncertainty is the development of the Western 
areas in China. Will this increase total economic activity in the country, or does it simply 
represent a redistribution effect for the benefit of the West while total investment will stay 
constant? Experts in India are recently of the opinion that small, inefficient plants will be 
closed in the coming years due to market forces, which will increase the average Indian ef-
                                                   
341  Interviews India 2001 
342  Sail (iron and steel cooperation, India) met 56% of its power need through captive (auto production), mostly old, 
thermal, power generation of 44 MW (Ministry of Steel 1999: 27). According to ADB (1996) all Indian Steel 
plants except one plant use captive power, because the grid power supply is inadequate and interrupted resulting 
in a low capacity utilisation . The cost of self-generated electricity is much lower, e.g. HINDALCO (aluminium, 
India) produces at Rs 0.9/kWh whereas grid electricity costs Rs 2/kWh (Meeting India 2000:19) or Rs 3-4/kWh 
(Interviews India 2001). In the year 1993/1994, around 20% of the Indian cement sector produced its own 
power, with a total capacity of 731 MW which was mainly coal based (CMA, 1994). In 1998/98 the capacity had 
grown to around 1200 MW, which was 70% diesel based, 25% coal/oil and 5% wind energy based (CMA, 
1998). 
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ficiency level, but a sudden peak in demand will open those same factories just as suddenly. 
Both countries’ governments have made various plans regarding end-use energy efficiency, 
but it is uncertain that they will all be implemented under the Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Data on the current situation and future estimations are often not available, such as penetra-
tion rates of energy efficient technologies, the ability and capacity of producing technolo-
gies domestically, the actual size and number of smaller production units within a so-called 
large scale plant. The rapid and unstable development and the lack of data result in major 
uncertainties. 
Technical options. For each of the sectors, important technical options have been identified 
that offer energy savings in addition to the BAU case. Most of the options are currently 
available on the international market. Few are still under development or in the process of 
being commercialised. The latter are not included in the Best Practice Technological sce-
nario, because the time period until availability is uncertain. The options that are currently 
available, can be divided into three groups (see Chapter 8 for detailed discussion): 1) op-
tions that seem to be available, not too complex, affordable, appropriate, and (in line with) 
current policy, which are expected to be implemented in the end-use BAU scenario. Exam-
ples: roller mills and presses in the large-scale cement plants; prebaked anodes in the 
large-scale aluminium plants; EE lights in new commercial buildings; J-series motors taken 
out of production; stable share of EAF secondary steel output and of blended cements (both 
lower than BPT potential); an increased share of cogeneration in the sugar industry (but 
smaller than the maximum potential); OHF and wet cement plants closed almost totally, 
etc. 2) options that are not expected to be adopted in a BAU situation because of barriers 
such as lack of awareness, availability (including import restrictions), appropriateness, too 
high complexity, etc. Examples are: large scale modern cement plants and roller mills 
(currently only small scale and lower quality domestic production in China); cogeneration 
up to the maximum potential (institutional barriers in China and India); energy efficient 
lighting in existing and new buildings, in residential, commercial and industrial sectors 
(difficult dissemination); near-net shape casting (high tech, also high cost?); efficient new 
irrigation pumps (policy and institutional barriers). 3) out of these, certain options are ex-
pected not to be feasible under a BAU situation for economic reasons. Examples are: retro-
fit of existing water pumps (large number of pumps means difficult implementation, and 
relatively expensive per unit energy saved); large scale modern cement plants and roller 
mills (only a limited number of plants exists now in China, India seems to have more mod-
ern plants).  
For many options it is not known to which group they belong, because information is lack-
ing with regard to the current penetration rate and why they are not further adopted at this 
moment. For example, most large aluminium plants in India have converted to prebaked 
electrodes, but some have not and it has not become clear what the exact barriers is. It is not 
known how many cement plants use roller presses and high efficiency classifiers, and if not, 
what their implementation barrier is. 
Scenarios and total Savings Potential. Despite the uncertainties mentioned above, a clear 
set of assumptions has been prepared for both scenarios. The end-use Best Practice Tech-
nology (BPT) scenario calculations show a savings potential of around 30% on top of the 
BAU efficiency improvement for the year 2020 in both countries (for a definition of the 
BPT scenario, see Section 6.1). These savings refer to the total economy’s electricity use. 
They consist of the sum of individual sector savings potentials, which were largest in the 
commercial and residential sectors with the agricultural sector in India taking third position. 
The savings potential of the three industrial sectors (cement, steel and aluminium) is large if 
compared to the BAU consumption of the three sectors, but -under this set of assumptions- 
not relative to the total BAU electricity consumption (see explanation in Section 6.9). The 
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‘other industries’ account for a large share in the BAU electricity consumption and the BPT 
savings potential because of their large growth, large electricity consumption and high esti-
mated sectoral savings potential. These sectors were, however, not studied in detail, and 
therefore this conclusion about the energy savings potential has to be handled with care.  
The general conclusion is that a large savings potential exists in especially the residential 
and commercial sectors, and the agricultural sector in India. The aggregate industrial sectors 
have a large savings potential, and the cement, iron and steel and aluminium industries are 
important focal sectors in the current situation, but probably have a decreasing share of total 
electricity consumption in the future (BAU). The industrial analysis is complex because of 
the large number of sectors consuming considerable amounts of electricity, and each of 
them using different production processes. Certainty in conclusions can only be obtained by 
studying the savings options and -potential in each and every one of those industrial sectors, 
paying due attention to the growth assumptions up to 2020, and therefore their expected im-
portance in the BAU scenario in 2020 . 
Fuel savings. This study focuses on electricity savings and emission reduction in the elec-
tricity sector. However, during the scenario analysis, simple assumptions have been made 
on the BAU and BPT end-use savings on fuels (see the final table in each sector study and 
the overview tables in Section 6.9). An important finding is that some fuel conserving op-
tions increase the consumption of electricity. Generally the total primary energy is reduced 
to a large extent, which results in substantial emission reduction. Examples of such options 
are modern pre-calciner, pre-heater kilns in the cement industry, which have more comput-
erised control, quality control and emissions control, resulting in less pollution and better 
quality output, and a lower overall energy consumption, but a higher electricity consump-
tion. Another example is the Electric Arc Furnace which produces secondary steel, having a 
low overall primary energy consumption compared to primary steel production, but a very 
high electricity requirement. 
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7. Potential Reduction of Emissions by Demand and Supply 
Side Options in 2020 In China and India 
Authors: Carolien Kroeze, Christiaan Boudri and Jaklien Vlasblom
343
 
7.1 Introduction  
In earlier chapters, we showed that emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector 
may increase considerably in China and India in the coming decades (chapter 5). We 
also showed that there is considerable potential for improving the end-use efficiency 
(chapter 6). So far, we have not yet discussed the effect of efficiency improvement on 
emissions of air pollutants. We have also not yet focused on technologies to reduce 
emissions from the electricity production sector. In this chapter we therefore analyse the 
potential effect of various options to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and sulphur 
dioxide the year 2020, relative to the Business-as-Usual scenario described in chapter 5. 
The options include the total effect of end-use efficiency improvement (from chapter 6), 
fuel switches, and technical efficiency improvement of existing and new power plants.  
This chapter presents results for the following demand and supply-side options: the 
impact of end-use efficiency improvement (EEI) on electricity supply, replacement of 
coal by renewables (REN), replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS), replacement of 
coal by nuclear power (NUC), closing small power plants (CSP), electrical efficiency 
improvement in power plants (EFF), increased application of cogeneration (COG), 
reduction of losses during transmission and distribution (T&D), technologies to reduce 
sulphur emissions (SR).  
We aim at analysing the potential effect of each individual option while assuming that 
the option at stake is implemented at maximum, while all other parameters stay the same 
as in the BAU scenario. In chapter 8 we discuss the feasibility of the options largely 
based on stakeholder analysis and in chapter 9 we combine selected options in scenarios 
to investigate their combined effect on emissions. 
7.2 China  
7.2.1 The impact of end-use efficiency improvement (EEI) on electricity supply  
As shown in Chapter 6, the potential for end-use efficiency improvement is considerable 
in China. In the BAU scenario, the total electricity use in China amounts to 8618 PJ in 
2020 (end-use). Implementation of the best practice options described in chapter 6 is es-
timated to reduce the total demand for electricity by 2475 PJ (or 29%). The BAU sce-
nario assumes that difference between end-use of electricity and gross electricity produc-
tion is 15% of the gross electricity production. Thus an end-use efficiency improvement 
of 2475 PJ would reduce gross electricity production by 2896 PJ. Here we assume that 
this will lead to a reduction in the building of new coal/oil fired power plants larger than 
200 MW (see Table 7.1). As a result, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by 43% rela-
tive to the BAU scenario and sulphur emissions by 45% (Table 7.2). 
                                                   
343  With comments from Kornelis Blok and Joyeeta Gupta. 
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Table 7.1  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and ca-
pacity factors for power plants > 200 MW in China in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for end-use efficiency im-
provement (EEI).  
Power plant 
lifetime class 
(building year) 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)1 
Electricity 
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Capacity (GW) Cap. 
factor 
(fraction) 
 BAU EEI BAU EEI  BAU EEI  
<1990 672 672 228 228 0.34 14 14 0.53 
1990-2000 2342 2342 890 890 0.38 40 40 0.70 
2000-2010 3064 3064 1225 1225 0.40 56 56 0.70 
2010-2020 8166 927 3267 371 0.40 173 20 0.60 
Total 14243 7004 5610 2714  282 129  
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
 
Table 7.2  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for 
End-use Efficiency Improvement (EEI). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for green-
house gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions 
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-EEI 
CO2 471 1435 811 
CH4 37 113 65 
N2O 2 7 4 
Total GHG 510 1554 880 
SO2 5 14 8 
 
7.2.2 Replacement of coal by renewables (REN) 
In China, about 20% of the electricity generation is produced from renewables in the 
BAU scenario in 2020. Here, we investigate the potential impact of increased use of 
renewables on emissions of air pollutants. In our best practice option, we assume that 
future use of renewables will develop as projected in the “Policy” scenario described by 
TERI et al. (1999) and in Boudri et al. (2000a). This scenario reflects the potential use of 
renewables in China and India, as constrained by technical limits, supply limits and 
sustainability. This scenario does not take into account (all) institutional barriers, 
existing (short-term) policies and cost constraints (Table 7.3). 
The electricity produced by these renewables is under the REN assumptions 1570 PJ 
higher than in the BAU 2020 case for China (Table 7.3). We assume that this electricity 
replaces coal/oil power plants larger than 200 MW and to be built after 2010. Thus for 
these power plants we assume that gross electricity production in 2020 is 1570 PJ lower 
than in the BAU scenario344. As a result, the total capacity and fuel input are also lower 
than in the BAU scenario (Table 7.4) and 37% of the electricity generation is produced 
from renewable energy. 
                                                   
344 We ignore differences between fuels in own electricity use by power plants 
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Most of the renewables used have zero or low emissions of greenhouse gases and sul-
phur dioxide. As a result, under the REN assumptions for renewables, the total emissions 
of greenhouse gases from the power sector in China are by 2020 23% lower than in the 
BAU scenario (Table 7.5). Sulphur emissions are calculated to be 22% lower. 
Table 7.3  Primary energy demand and electricity production by renewables in China in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for use 
of renewables (REN). Unit: PJ/year. 
 Demand for primary energy1 Gross electricity production 
 BAU2 REN3 BAU2 REN3 
Biomass     
Waste Fuel 75 937 17 211 
Bagasse 150 176 4 5 
Large Hydro 4743 5588 1802 2123 
Other Renewables     
Geothermal4 13 1450 5 551 
Wind 84 1331 32 506 
Small hydro 788 881 300 335 
Total 5855 10363 2160 3731 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  From TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a). 
3  This is the “Policy” scenario from TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a). 
4  The REN option assumes that all geothermal energy will be used for electricity generation, and none for heat 
production 
 
Table 7.4  Primary energy demand, electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and capacity 
factors for power plants > 200 MW in China in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for renewables (REN).  
Power plant 
lifetime class 
(building year) 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)1 
Gross electricity 
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Capacity (GW) Cap. 
factor 
(fraction) 
 BAU REN BAU REN  BAU REN  
<1990 672 672 228 228 0.34 14 14 0.53 
1990-2000 2342 2342 890 890 0.38 40 40 0.70 
2000-2010 3064 3064 1225 1225 0.40 56 56 0.70 
2010-2020 8166 4240 3267 1696 0.40 173 90 0.60 
Total 14243 10317 5610 4040  282 199  
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ.  
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Table 7.5  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for re-
newables (REN). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases (GHG) and 
Tg SO2-equivalents peryear for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-REN 
CO2 471 1435 1096 
CH4 37 113 87 
N2O 2 7 6 
Total GHG 510 1554 1190 
SO2 5 14 11 
 
7.2.3 Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS)  
In the BAU scenario the amount of gas consumed for electricity generation increases 
from 63 PJ (1.8 billion m3) in 1990 to 1006 PJ (28.7 billion m3) in 2020. In the BAU 
scenario, we assume that the conversion technology applied is Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) with an electrical efficiency of 55%. The gross electricity generated in 
2020 is therefore estimated at 553 PJ (154 TWh). 
Here we investigate the impact on increased use of natural gas, replacing coal- and oil-
fired power plants, on emissions of air pollutants. We analyse this for several assump-
tions on gas use in 2020. Our assumptions are based on the results of the interviews pre-
sented in other chapters, and on estimates from the literature. 
From interviews we learned that the use of natural gas may amout to 3 – 4 EJ by the year 
2020, from which 1 – 1.6 EJ electricity can be produced (Table 7.6). 
Other estimates for future gas availability can be obtained from the literature. EIA, for 
instance sums natural gas, coal bed methane, imported pipeline gas and imported LNG to 
result in the following numbers: a total amount of 27 billion m3 yearly is available in 
2000, 121 in 2010, and 193 in 2020; with accelerated policy the amount of gas available 
for power generation can be increased without conflicting the aim of reducing coal use in 
the residential and small industrial sectors. With accelerated policy, 30 billion m3 yearly 
is available in 2000, 180 in 2010, and 350 in 2020, of which for power generation, 5 
billion m3 in 2000, 45 in 2010, and 90 in 2020 (Logan and Zhang 1998, derived from 
EIA, DoE). This would be sufficient to fuel 85 GW of combined cycle plants in 2020, 
generating 540 TWh (Logan and Zhang, 1998). Apparently, an efficiency of 56% and a 
capacity utilisation factor of 6,400 hours per year has been assumed in these studies. 
China plans to build larg pipelines from west to east, to overcome the problem that most 
indigenous gas resources are mainly located in the West, while the highest consumption 
will take place in the eastern and southern coastal strips. Also planned are a number of 
north-south pipelines and storage capacity. If gas is used for power generation, 
considerable growth rates can be expected.  
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Table 7.6  Overview of projections for gas use in 2020 in China from interviews and literature and 
as assumed in the Best Practice Technology options, assuming that gas is used in co-
generation (GAS-cogen) or in conventional power plants (GAS-no cogen). 
Reference Gas input 
(billion 
m3/y) 
Gas input 
(EJ/year)1 
Gas based 
power 
generation 
(Gwe) 
Gross 
electrical 
efficiency 
(%) 
Heat 
efficiency 
(%) 
Gross 
electricity 
generation 
(EJ) 
Heat 
genera-
tion 
(EJ) 
RAINS-Asia BAU2 28.7 1.0  55%  0.55 0 
Interviews 80-100 3.1 – 3.9 38-76 26-39%  1-1.6 0 
Logan and Zhang 
(1998) 
90 3.5 85 56%  1.9  
BPT Options GAS-
cogen (low and 
high)  
100 
175 
3.5 
6.1 
 40% 45% 1.4 
2.5 
1.6 
2.8 
BPT Options GAS-
no cogen (low and 
high) 
100 
175 
3.5 
6.1 
 55% 0% 1.9 
3.4 
0 
0 
1 assumed heating value of natural gas: 35 MJ/m3 
2 TERI et al. (1999); Boudri et al. (2000a) 
 
Table 7.6 shows the assumptions made in the BPT GAS options. A low (GAS-low) and 
a high (GAS-high) gas availability has been chosen, with 100 and 175 billion cubic 
meters annual availability for the power sector. In the higher availability scenario, it is 
assumed that an active government policy will result in a larger share of total available 
gas to be used in the power sector, where as in the low availability scenario, the largest 
share of gas is in the domestic and industrial sectors.  
Furthermore, two cases are compared regarding gas use: conventional gas power 
generation (GAS, no cogen) and gas based cogeneration (GAS, cogen). For gas based 
cogeneration, different technologies exist, for different sizes and utilisation, and each 
have different electrical and heat efficiencies. Averages are: large scale combined cycle 
cogeneration 44% electrical and 34% heat (thermal) efficiency, small scale combined 
cycle 42% and 32% and small scale advanced gas turbines 35% and 48% respectively. 
Top hat technology involves the injection of water before the compressor and has a total 
efficiency of 62%. The large scale combined cycle is generally used for large industries 
such as the chemical and petroleum industries and for district heating with even higher 
electrical efficiency (48% electrical and 36% heat efficiency). The advanced gas turbines 
are used mainly for food and drugs industries since their focus is on heat production 
(higher temperature). In the BPT options assuming that gas is used in cogeneration, the 
average efficiency ratio is assumed at 40% electrical and 45% thermal efficiency for 
advanced, best practice technologies. 
Summarising, we investigate four Best Practice Technology options (see also Annex 
7.6): 
- GAS low, no cogen: In this option, we assume that by 2020, 3500 PJ of natural gas is 
used for electricity generation (as opposed to 1006 PJ in the BAU scenario). We as-
sume that this gas is used in conventional power plants, reducing the need for new 
coal-fired power plants to be built after 2000. 
- GAS low, cogen: In this option, we assume that by 2020, 3500 PJ of natural gas is 
used for electricity generation (as opposed to 1006 PJ in the BAU scenario). We as-
sume that this gas is used in cogeneration, reducing coal use in cogeneration as well 
as in conventional power plants. 
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- GAS high, no cogen: In this option, we assume that by 2020, 6125 PJ of natural gas 
is used for electricity generation (as opposed to 1006 PJ in the BAU scenario). We 
assume that this gas is used in conventional power plants, reducing the need for new 
coal-fired power plants to be built after 2000. 
- GAS high, cogen: In this option, we assume that by 2020, 6125 PJ of natural gas is 
used for electricity generation (as opposed to 1006 PJ in the BAU scenario). We as-
sume that this gas is used in cogeneration, reducing coal use in cogeneration as well 
as in conventional power plants. 
We consider the “GAS low, no cogen” option as our base case. In this case the 2020 
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are 11% lower than in the BAU 
scenario, and sulphur dioxide emissions 21%. For the other three cases we calculate re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 7% (GAS low, cogen), 22% (GAS high, no co-
gen), and 17% (GAS high, cogen) (Fig. 7.3; Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7  Emissions of greenhouse gases from electricity production in China in 2020 in the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased use of natu-
ral gas (GAS) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 2020-BAU GAS-low, 
no cogen 
GAS-low,  
cogen 
GAS-high,  
no cogen 
GAS-high,  
cogen 
Coal < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 51 51 51 51 51 
Coal 125-200 MW 41 41 41 41 41 
Coal > 200 MW 1328 1008 1215 672 1015 
Cogeneration (coal) 72 72 29 72 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 103 0 171 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas (PP) 63 218 0 381 20 
Total 1554 1390 1439 1216 1298 
 
7.2.4 Replacement of coal by nuclear power (NUC) 
Nuclear energy was not yet included in energy supplies in 1990. While two nuclear 
plants have recently become operational, policy plans for building more have been 
scaled down conspired to the ambitions of the early 1980s for lack of investments (Foell 
et al., 1995) 
In the BAU scenario, 46 PJ of electricity was produced by nuclear power plants in 1995, 
which is only 1% of the total national electricity capacity in that year. Nuclear energy is 
seen as a likely candidate for electricity production in the long-term in China as reflected 
in the BAU scenario. By the year 2010 the production is assumed to have increased nine-
fold relative to the 1995 level. By 2020 the share of nuclear in total electricity production 
is assumed to be 8% (Table 7.8). 
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Table 7.8  Nuclear energy development for China according to RAINS-Asia 2000 Business-as-
Usual scenario (TERI et al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a)  
Year 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Gross output (TWh) 0 13 16 117 235 
Gross output (PJ/y) 0 46 56 423 847 
Share of total power generation (%) 0% 1% 1% 8% 8% 
Input (PJ/y)* 0 122 147 1112 2228 
* according to UN-conventions: 0.38 PJ of gross electricity output = 1 PJ of nuclear input. 
 
In the Best Practice Technology option NUC it is assumed that the nuclear capacity will 
remain at the BAU level, but that the plant load factor will rise to 80%, meaning that the 
gross electricity output rises to 989 PJ in 2020. The primary energy equivalent is in that 
case 2602 PJ. We furthermore assume that this extra nuclear power will replace coal/oil-
fired power plants of at least 200 MW and built after 2010 (Table 7.9). This reduces 
2020 emissions of greenhouse gases and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in China 
by 2% relative to BAU (Table 7.10). 
We refer to this option as NUC, or NUC-base. The NUC-base option may be considered 
conservative, because we do not consider an increase in the nuclear power capacity in 
China. On the other hand, there may be arguments against nuclear power because of 
concerns with respect to nuclear waste. In two alternative cases, we therefore explore the 
effects of alternative assumptions on nuclear power in China. In the first case we assume 
that electricity production in nuclear plants would amount to 0 PJ (NUC-low) in 2020, 
and in the second case that it would double to 1700 PJ (NUC-high). The calculated CO2-
equivalent emissions are in the NUC-low case 13% higher than in the BAU scenario, 
while in the NUC-high case, they are 13% lower (Fig. 7.3). 
Table 7.9  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and ca-
pacity factors for coal/oil-fired power plants > 200 MW in China in 2020 in the Busi-
ness-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased nuclear power 
(NUC-base) (see text).  
Power plant 
lifetime class 
(building year) 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)1 
Electricity 
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Capacity (GW) Cap. 
factor 
(fraction) 
 BAU NUC BAU NUC  BAU NUC  
<1990 672 672 228 228 0.34 14 14 0.53 
1990-2000 2342 2342 890 890 0.38 40 40 0.70 
2000-2010 3064 3064 1225 1225 0.40 56 56 0.70 
2010-2020 8166 7811 3267 3124 0.40 173 165 0.60 
Total 14243 13888 5610 5468  282 275  
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For processes without direct fuel 
consumption (e.g. nuclear) these equivalents are in accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations 
Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of 
primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced.  
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Table 7.10  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased nuclear 
power (NUC) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-NUC 
CO2 471 1435 1404 
CH4 37 113 111 
N2O 2 7 7 
Total GHG 510 1554 1521 
SO2 5 14 14 
7.2.5 Closing small power plants (CSP)  
In China, smaller power plants have in general lower electrical efficiencies than larger 
power plants (Table 7.11; Annex 7-1). It is therefore interesting to investigate the option 
of replacing small power plants by more efficient larger plants. However, in the BAU 
scenario we already see a clear trend in China to replace relatively inefficient small 
plants by more efficient large plants, in line with current policies. By 2020 about 95% of 
the electricity from coal/oil-fired power plants is produced in plants with capacities over 
200 MW, while in 1990 this percentage was less than 50%. The BAU scenario reflects 
the effects of current policy plans. The Chinese government aims at closing all power 
plants with capacities below 50 MW. In the future, the government also plans to close 
power plants up to 100 MW, unless these plants convert to cogeneration of heat and 
power (Vlasblom, 2000: 17, 20). Realisation of these policy plans may be slowed down 
because of concerns about the loss of employment and tax income (Workshop China 
2000) (Vlasblom 2000). Furthermore, if the demand for electricity suddenly increases, 
the closed plants may be opened again. The BAU scenario nevertheless assumes that 
small power plants will be closed as currently planned by the government.  
In the CSP option, we investigate the impact of closing the remaining power plants with 
capacities of less than 200 MW and replace them by larger, more efficient, power plants 
(> 200 MW). As a result of the CSP assumptions, the electricity produced by >200 MW 
power plants in 2020 (5921 PJ) is 6% percentage higher than in the BAU scenario (Table 
7.11). The emissions of air pollutants from electricity production are calculated to be 1% 
lower than in the BAU scenario (Table 7.12).  
Table 7.11  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and 
capacity factors for coal/oil-fired power plants in China in 2020 in the Business-as-
Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on closing small power plants (CSP) 
(see text).  
Power plant 
capacity class 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)1 
Electricity  
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction)2 
Capacity (GW) Cap. factor 
(fraction) 2 
 BAU CSP BAU CSP  BAU CSP  
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0.27-0.30 0 0 0.45-0.50 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 543 0 164 0 0.30-0.34 8 0 0.50-0.70 
Coal/Oil 125-200 
MW 
442 0 147 0 0.32-0.36 8 0 0.50-0.70 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 14243 15085 5610 5921 0.34-0.4 282 297 0.53-0.70 
Total 15229 15085 5921 5921 - 298 297 - 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ.  
2  Differs by building year of power plant (see Annex 7-1). 
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Table 7.12  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on closing small 
power plants (CSP) (see text).. Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse 
gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-CSP 
CO2 471 1435 1422 
CH4 37 113 112 
N2O 2 7 7 
Total GHG 510 1554 1541 
SO2 5 14 14 
 
7.2.6 Efficiency improvement in power plants (EFF)   
In the BAU scenario, the electrical efficiencies345 of existing (built before 2000) and new 
(built after 2000) power plants depend on the building year and on the capacity of the 
plant (Annex 7-1). There are several options to increase the efficiencies of existing 
plants (retrofit) and new plants (by using advanced combustion techniques).  
In the EFF option we assume a) the efficiencies of existing power plants can be 
improved by 2% points on top of their assumed BAU efficiencies in 2020, and b) the 
efficiency of new plants equals 45%.  
Assumption a) We assume that the efficiencies of existing power plants can be improved 
by 2% points on top of their assumed BAU efficiencies in 2020. This efficiency increase 
can be reached through various measures, including improved operation and 
maintenance, reduction of exhaust gas temperature (should be 130 degrees but is often 
higher) (Vlasblom 2000: 20), installation of a cooling tower (most new plants have one), 
upgrading of electrostatic precipitators, on-site demand management (UNDDSMS 
1996). Some plants reheat only once, but it is difficult to install additional re-heating, 
especially in the case of a low-pressure unit. It is possible to convert to cogeneration if 
there is sufficient heat demand nearby. Except for cogeneration and the few backpressure 
plants, almost all plants have a condenser. In sensitive regions plants have retrofit 
obligations or coal input quality regulations (Vlasblom 2000: 20). The BAU scenario 
assumes closure of small power plants, and replacement of these by new and more 
efficient plants. As a result, the BAU scenario already reflects a considerable efficiency 
improvement with time. The EFF option estimates an additional potential for 
improvement for China (2%) that is lower than for India (5%), where closing of small 
power plants is not current policy (see 7.3.5).  
Assumption b) For capacity to be newly built, the Best Practice Technology option EFF 
reflects the construction of a high-efficiency coal-fired plant (based on clean coal 
technologies). In a country like Denmark with high coal quality and low temperature 
cooling water, net efficiencies can reach 48% (CERI and TERI 1995; MPS 1997; IEA 
Coal Research 1999). For China it is assumed that 45% (gross) can be reached. This is 
lower than in Denmark, because the cooling water might be of higher temperature than 
in Denmark and the operation and maintenance and quality of used materials might give 
a lower efficiency. Technologies that have to be adopted to reach 45% gross efficiency 
based on coal as a fuel, include: supercritical boilers, Integrated Gasification Combined 
                                                   
345 Electrical efficiency is defined here as 100 * (gross electricity output / primary fuel input) 
  
 208
Cycle (IGCC)346, different types of fluidised bed combustion (FBC), fuels cells, and 
Integrated Gasification Humid Air Turbine (IGHAT). The Best Practice Technology 
option EFF assumes that it is technically possible to implement these techniques by 
2020. This is confirmed by recent expectations about IGCC and pressurised fluidised bed 
combustion (workshop China 2000), and the fact that an IGCC demonstration plant is 
planned with a capacity of 200-400 MW (OECD/IEA 1999). Power plants in China exist 
with efficiencies of 39-40% (320-600 MW) (Vlasblom 2000: 17; IEA update 1998) or 
37% (Vlasblom 2000: 20). A supercritical coal plant has been built in the beginning of 
the 1990s with a gross efficiency of 42%. Additional plans are underway (OECD/IEA, 
1999).  
The EFF assumptions would reduce the fuel input to the 2020 power sector in 2020 from 
15229 PJ (BAU) to 13768 (EFF), while the electrical output is still 5921 PJ (Table 7.13). 
As a result, emissions of both greenhouse gases and SO2 are calculated to be 9% lower 
than in the BAU scenario in 2020 (Table 7.14). 
Table 7.13  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and 
capacity factors for coal/oil-fired power plants in China in 2020 in the Business-as-
Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased efficiencies of power 
plants (EFF) (see text).  
Power plant  
capacity class 
Primary en-
ergy demand 
(PJ/y)1 
Electricity  
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
 (fraction)2 
Capacity (GW) Cap. Fac-
tor (frac-
tion) 
 BAU EFF BAU EFF Plants built  
before 2000 
plants 
built after 
2000 
BAU EFF  
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0.45-0.50 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 543 509 164 164 0.32-0.33 0.45 8 8 0.50-0.70 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 442 417 147 147 0.34-0.36 0.45 8 8 0.50-0.70 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 14243 12841 5610 5610 0.36-0.40 0.45 282 282 0.53-0.70 
Total 15229 13768 5921 5921 - - 298 298 - 
1 The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ.  
2 In the EFF option 
 
Table 7.14   Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased efficien-
cies of power plants (EFF) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for green-
house gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-EFF 
CO2 471 1435 1304 
CH4 37 113 103 
N2O 2 7 6 
Total GHG 510 1554 1418 
SO2 5 14 13 
 
                                                   
346 IGCC has low emissions and solid waste and a high efficiency (above 45% possible). It can be built in smaller 
modules of 100-150 MWe. Waste heat and gases can be sold commercially (CERI and TERI 1995). Other impor-
tant options include Fluidised Bed Gasification, fuel cells, and improved methods for conventional (subcritical) 
pulverised coal power plants. Thermal efficiencies of these options range from 43-48% (CERI and TERI 1995). 
The investment costs are around 1200-1400 US$/kW under western conditions and probably cheaper in China 
(Chen et al, 1997). 
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7.2.7 Increased use of cogeneration (COG)  
Chapter 6 shows that the potential for cogeneration in industry in China is larger than 
envisaged in the BAU scenario. Here we investigate two cases for increased 
cogeneration. In both cases, the heat production is 3818 PJ in 2020, as opposed to 2613 
PJ in the BAU scenario. It should be noted that, in line with the information available on 
the scenarios, an increase in district heating has not been considered in this option. 
The two Best Practice Technology cases we investigate are based on the following 
assumptions: 
- COG-coal: in this case we assume that all heat is produced in coal-fired cogeneration 
facilities, with electrical and thermal efficiencies of 15% and 65%, respectively. The 
additional electricity produced by cogeneration is assumed to reduce the need for 
conventional coal-fired power plants, that are planned to built after 2000 (Table 
7.15). 
- COG-gas: in this case we assume that all heat is produced in gas-fired cogeneration 
facilities, with electrical and thermal efficiencies of 40% and 45%, respectively. The 
additional electricity produced by cogeneration is assumed to reduce the need for 
conventional gas- and coal-fired power plants in 2020 (Table 7.15). 
In the COG-coal case, greenhouse gas and sulphur emissions from the electricity sector 
are in 2020 2% lower than in the BAU scenario. In the COG-gas case, the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions is 1% (see also chapter 6.7). 
Table 7.15  Greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector, primary fuel input and gross elec-
tricity output for the Business-as-usual scenario (BAU) for the year 2020 for China and 
for the Best Practice Technology options for cogeneration. 
 Greenhouse gas 
emissions 
(Tg CO2-eq/y) 
Primary fuel input 
(PJ/y) 
Gross electricity  
production (PJ/y) 
 BAU COG-
coal 
COG-
gas 
BAU COG-
coal 
COG-
gas 
BAU COG-
coal 
COG-gas 
Coal < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 51 51 51 543 543 543 164 164 164 
Coal 125-200 MW 41 41 41 442 442 442 147 147 147 
Coal > 200 MW 1328 1263 1322 14243 13548 14186 5610 5332 5587 
Cogeneration (coal) 72 105 92 4019 5873 5180 603 881 777 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 30 0 0 1005 0 0 402 
Biomass 0 0 0 226 226 226 21 21 21 
Large hydro 0 0 0 4743 4743 4743 1802 1802 1802 
Other renewables 0 0 0 886 886 886 337 337 337 
Nuclear 0 0 0 2228 2228 2228 847 847 847 
Natural Gas (PP) 63 63 0 1006 1006 0 553 553 0 
Total 1554 1523 1537 28336 29495 29438 10084 10084 10084 
7.2.8 Reducing transmission and distribution losses (T&D) 
Among U.S. utilities, energy losses from transmission and distribution are typically in 
the range of 5 to 10% of the primary fuels used. In China, these losses are likely to be 
higher (see also chapter 4). China has 15 semi-autonomous power grids between which 
power exchange is low since they are only interconnected at a few points. The 
transmission lines have typical losses of over 8%. The distribution lines have much 
higher loss (responsibility of purchasing enterprise) resulting in total average losses of 
16-20% (World Bank, 1995). 
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T&D losses may result in under-utilisation of power generating capacity. The State 
Power Corporation therefore aims at upgrading the national grid network and a more 
evenly distributed power generation over the regions and current T&D networks. In 
addition, 500-1000 kV transmission lines and substation capacity is being enlarged in 
order to integrate regional and provincial power grids. Introducing efficiency improving 
technologies such as infrared and laser equipment, helicopter patrols and operating 
robotics is being suggested (Kennedy, 1997). 
In the BAU scenario, gross electricity production in China amounts to 10084 PJ in 2020, 
while the end-use of electricity amounts to 8616 PJ. The difference (1468 PJ) includes 
electricity losses during transmission and distribution, as well as some own use of elec-
tricity by power plants. In the BAU scenario, these losses amount to 15% of the gross 
electricity production in 2020. In the Best Practice Technology option T&D we tenta-
tively assume that these losses can be reduced by one-third, so that the losses amount to 
10%. This would imply that the total losses would be 489 PJ lower. This would reduce 
gross electricity production to 9595 (PJ), while the end-use stays at the BAU level. We 
assume that this will reduce the building of new coal/oil power plants larger than 200 
MW, and envisaged to be built after 2010 (Table 7.16). This would reduce 2020 emis-
sions of greenhouse gases from electricity production in China by 7% and sulphur diox-
ide by 8% relative to the BAU scenario (Table 7.17). 
Table 7.16  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, efficiency, total capacity and ca-
pacity factors for coal/oil-fired power plants > 200 MW in China in 2020 in the Busi-
ness-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on reduced losses during 
transmission and distribution (T&D) (see text).  
Power plant 
lifetime class 
(building year) 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)1 
Electricity  
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Capacity (GW) Cap. 
factor 
(fraction) 
 BAU T&D BAU T&D  BAU T&D  
<1990 672 672 228 228 0.34 14 14 0.53 
1990-2000 2342 2342 890 890 0.38 40 40 0.70 
2000-2010 3064 3064 1225 1225 0.40 56 56 0.70 
2010-2020 8166 6943 3267 2777 0.40 173 147 0.60 
Total 14243 13020 5610 5121  282 256  
1 The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents.  
 
Table 7.17  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in China in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on reduced losses dur-
ing transmission and distribution (T&D) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year 
for greenhouse gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-T&D 
CO2 471 1435 1329 
CH4 37 113 105 
N2O 2 7 6 
Total GHG 510 1554 1440 
SO2 5 14 13 
 
7.2.9 Technologies to reduce sulphur emissions (SR) 
Emissions of sulphur dioxide from power plants can be reduced by a number of add-on 
technologies, including flue gas desulphurisation and fuel desulphurisation. In the 
RAINS-Asia model, the technical potential of these options to reduce sulphur emissions 
from fuel use has been investigated (Foell et al., 1995; Amann et al., 2000). For the 
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power sector, these technologies include low sulphur fuels (coal, oil), limestone 
injection, wet flue gas desulphurisation, regenerative flue gas desulphurisation. The 
results indicate that it is technically possible to reduce SO2 emissions from the power 
sector by at least 90%. It should be noted, that several of these technologies may increase 
greenhouse gas emissions. We ignored these effects because these are likely small. 
7.2.10 Overview of options for China 
The analysis reveals the potential effect of a number of strategies to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in 
China. The calculated potentials to reduce 2020 emissions relative to the BAU scenario 
range from 0 (sulphur reduction, SR) to 43% (end-use efficiency improvement, EEI) for 
greenhouse gases and from 1% (closing small power plants, CSP) to 90% (sulphur 
reduction, SR) for sulphur dioxide (Table 7.18). The options that have the largest 
potential in reducing both greenhouse gas and sulphur emissions include end-use 
efficiency improvement (43 and 45% lower than BAU), replacement of coal by 
renewables (23 and 22%) and natural gas (11 and 21%). Reducing electricity losses 
during transmission and distribution would reduce emissions by 7 (greenhouse gases) 
and 8% (SO2) and electrical efficiency improvement of power plants 9%. Closing small 
power plants has a small effect on emissions (1%), as does replacement of coal by 
nuclear power (2%). For increased cogeneration we calculate an emission reduction of 
2%, but it should be noted that this estimate is for the electricity sector only, and ignores 
additional reductions in fuel use for heat production. 
Table 7.18  The potential to reduce emissions CO2, CH4 and N2O (GHG) and SO2 from the power 
sector in China in 2020, by selected options relative to the Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Reduction options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use of re-
newables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), closing small power 
plants (CSP), efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF) increased cogeneration 
(COG), a reduction transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction 
(SR). Unit: % of BAU 2020 emission. 
BPT 
Option 
Short description (difference with Business-as-Usual scenario for 
2020) 
Reduction in 
2020 GHG 
emissions 
(% relative to 
BAU) 
Reduction in 
2020 SO2 
emissions 
(% relative to 
BAU) 
EEI Demand for electricity is reduced by 29% relative to BAU, 
reducing the need for new coal/oil fired power plants 
43 45 
REN Use of renewables is 77% higher than in BAU, reducing the need 
for new coal/oil fired power plants 
23 22 
GAS low, 
no cogen 
Use of natural gas is 3500 PJ as opposed to 1006 PJ in BAU, 
reducing the need for new coal/oil fired power plants 
11 21 
NUC Nuclear electricity generation is 989 PJ as opposed to 847 PJ in 
BAU, due to an increased plant load factor; this reduces the need 
for new coal/oil fired power plants 
2 2 
CSP All power plants with a capacity smaller than 200 MW are replaced 
by plants with capacities of more than 200 MW 
1 1 
EFF Efficiency of existing power plants is increased by 2%, and of new 
power plants to 45% 
9 9 
COG-coal Heat production is maximized, increasing also electricity 
production in coal-based cogeneration, which reduces the need for 
new coal/oil fired power plants 
2 2 
T&D The difference between gross electricity production and end-use of 
electricity is reduced by one-third to 10% of the gross electricity 
production 
7 8 
SR Sulphur emissions are reduced by 90% by end-of-pipe technologies 0 90 
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7.3 India 
7.3.1 The impact of end-use efficiency improvement (EEI) on electricity supply 
The potential for end-use efficiency improvement is considerable in India (see Chapter 
4). In the BAU scenario, the total electricity use in India amounts to 4500 PJ in 2020 
(end-use). Implementation of the best practice options described earlier is estimated to 
reduce the total demand for electricity by 1436 PJ (or 32%). The BAU scenario assumes 
that gross electricity production in India (5168 PJ) is higher than the end-use of electric-
ity. This implies that an end-use efficiency improvement of 1436 PJ would reduce gross 
electricity production by 1651 PJ. Here we assume that this will lead to a reduction in the 
building of new coal-fired power plants built after the year 2000 (Table 7.19). As a re-
sult, greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by 45% relative to the BAU scenario and 
sulphur emissions by 43% (Table 7.20). 
Table 7.19  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, and efficiency for coal-fired 
power plants in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the 
best practice assumptions for End-use Efficiency Improvement (EEI).  
Primary energy  
demand (PJ/y)2 
Electricity  
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Power plant lifetime class (capacity class 
and building year)1 
BAU EEI BAU EEI  
Built <2000 Other power plants 854 854 290 290 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2628 2106 998 800 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 544 544 185 185 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 551 551 209 209 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1065 0 405 0 0.38 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2759 0 1048 0 0.38 
Total  8400 4054 3136 1485  
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
 
Table 7.20  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in India in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for 
End-use efficiency improvement (EEI). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for green-
house gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions. 
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-EEI 
CO2 236 899 496 
CH4 19 74 42 
N2O 1 5 4 
Total GHG 256 978 542 
SO2 1 3 2 
 
7.3.2 Replacement of coal by renewables (REN)  
In the BAU scenario for India, about 17% of the future electricity generation is produced 
from renewables in the BAU scenario. These renewables include bagasse, wind and 
hydropower. Here, we investigate the potential impact of increased use of renewables on 
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emissions of air pollutants. In our best practice option, we assume that future use of 
renewables will develop as projected in the “Policy” scenario described by TERI et al. 
(1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a). This scenario reflects the potential use of renewables in 
China and India, as constrained by technical limits, supply limits and sustainability. This 
scenario does not take into account (all) institutional barriers, existing (short-term) 
policies and cost constraints. 
The electricity produced by these renewables is under the REN assumptions 538 PJ 
higher than in the BAU 2020 case for India (Table 7.21). We assume that the this elec-
tricity replaces coal-fired power plants to be built after the year 2000. Thus for these 
power plants we assume that total electricity production in 2020 is 538 PJ lower than 
BAU. As a result, also the total capacity and fuel input are lower than in the BAU sce-
nario (Table 7.22) and about 27% of the electricity generation is produced from renew-
ables. 
Most of the renewables used have low emissions of greenhouse gases and sulphur diox-
ide. As a result, under the REN assumptions for renewables, the total emissions of 
greenhouse gases from the power sector in India are by 2020 14% lower than in the 
BAU scenario (Table 7.22). Sulphur emissions are calculated to be 11% lower. 
Table 7.21  Primary energy demand and gross electricity production by renewables in India in 
2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions 
for use of renewables (REN). Unit: PJ/year. 
 Demand for primary energy1 Electricity production 
 BAU2 REN3 BAU2 REN3 
Bagasse 1280 1567 35 43 
Large hydro 2175 3225 827 1226 
Wind + small hydro 145 490 55 186 
Total 3600 5282 917 1455 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For bagasse these are defined as the net 
calorific input (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent 
amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel consumption (wind and hydropower) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both 
grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross 
electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross 
heat produced. 
2
  From TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a) 
3  This is the “Policy” scenario from TERI et al. (1999) and Boudri et al. (2000a) 
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Table 7.22  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, and efficiency for coal-fired 
power plants in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the 
best practice assumptions for use of renewables (REN).  
Primary energy demand 
(PJ/y)2 
Electricity produced 
(PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Power plant lifetime class (capacity class 
and building year)1 
BAU REN BAU REN  
Built <2000 Other power plants 854 854 290 290 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2628 2628 998 998 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 544 544 185 185 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 551 551 209 209 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1065 1065 405 405 0.38 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2759 1343 1048 510 0.38 
Total  8400 6985 3136 2598  
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW. 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ. 
 
Table 7.23  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in India in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the best practice assumptions for 
renewables (REN). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases (GHG) 
and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-REN 
CO2 236 899 767 
CH4 19 74 64 
N2O 1 5 5 
Total GHG 256 978 837 
SO2 1 3 3 
 
7.3.3 Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS) 
In the BAU scenario the amount of gas consumed for electricity generation increases 
from 140 PJ in 1990 to 1693 PJ in 2020, based on an electrical efficiency of 55%. The 
gross electricity generated in 2020 is therefore estimated at 931 PJ in 2020. Here we 
investigate the impact on further increases in the use of natural gas, replacing coal- and 
oil-fired power plants, on emissions of air pollutants. We analyse this for several 
assumptions on gas use in 2020. 
We investigate four Best Practice Technology options: 
- GAS low, no cogen: In this option, we tentatively assume that by 2020, the natural 
gas use is has doubled relative to the BAU scenario. We assume that this gas is first 
used in cogeneration to meet heat demands; the remaining gas is used in conven-
tional power plants. This reduces coal use in cogeneration as well as in conventional 
power plants. 
- GAS low, cogen: In this option, we tentatively assume that by 2020, the natural gas 
use is has doubled relative to the BAU scenario. We assume that all of this gas is 
used in cogeneration, reducing coal use in cogeneration as well as in conventional 
power plants. 
- GAS high, no cogen: In this option, we assume that by 2020, we tentatively assume 
that by 2020, the natural gas use is four times that of the BAU level. We assume that 
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this gas is used in conventional power plants, reducing the need for new coal-fired 
power plants to be built after 2000. 
- GAS high, cogen: In this option, we tentatively assume that by 2020, the natural gas 
use is four times the BAU level. We assume that this gas is first used in cogeneration 
to meet heat demands; the remaining gas is used in conventional power plants. This 
reduces coal use in cogeneration as well as in conventional power plants. 
Annex 7-7 overview total energy input and electricity production for these four cases. 
Our BPT assumptions for India are tentative. We assume that the potential for natural 
gas use in China (3.5 EJ) exceeds that in India (3.3) only slightly. However, the 
feasibility of the GAS option may differ between these two countries. 
We consider the “GAS low, no cogen” option as our base case. In this case the 2020 
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are 14% lower than in the 
BAU scenario, and sulphur dioxide emissions 24%. For the other three cases we cal-
culate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 22, 44 and 41%, respectively (Fig. 
7.6; Table 7.24). 
Table 7.24  Emissions of greenhouse gases from gross electricity production in India in 2020 in the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased use of natu-
ral gas (GAS) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions. LPS = Large Point 
Source1 
 BAU GAS-low,  
no cogen 
GAS-low,  
cogen 
GAS-high,  
no cogen 
GAS-high,  
cogen 
Coal, other, <2000 86 86 86 0 57 
Coal, other, >2000 264 264 264 0 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 110 110 110 96 110 
Coal, LPS, >2000 384 138 203 0 0 
Cogeneration (coal) 12 12 0 12 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 28 0 28 
Oil 15 15 15 15 15 
Bagasse 2 2 2 2 2 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 105 211 59 421 361 
Total 978 837 767 546 574 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW. 
7.3.4 Replacement of coal by nuclear power (NUC)  
The nuclear capacity increased from 1.7 GW in 1992/93 to 2.2 GW in 1999 (TERI 
1999b). This is lower than targets in several policy plans. Policy targets are not realised 
because of shortage of state funds for new electricity-generation capacity (TERI 1999). 
The Indian plans for the development of nuclear power stations have been changing over 
the years. More than five years ago, the plans aimed at a nuclear capacity of 10 GW by 
the year 2000. Later, the targets were set at a more modest level of 5.7 GW by 2000 
(Foell et al. 1995). In the 9th Five Year Plan (1997-2002), the government aims at in-
creasing the total capacity during the 9th 5-year period by 0.9 GW (TERI 1999). The to-
tal nuclear capacity that is foreseen at this moment is 7.7 GW (TERI 1999). In case this 
capacity would be operational by 2010 and assuming plant load factor of 45%, electricity 
production would be 30 TWh by then. 
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The estimates on future nuclear power in the RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU scenario are 
summarised in Table 7.25. In this scenario, nuclear electricity generation increased 
between 1990 and 2000, but decreases between 2000 and 2020. Clearly, this decreasing 
trend is not in agreement with the current policy plans in India. Nevertheless, we adopt 
the RAINS-Asia BAU scenario for our analyses. 
Table 7.25  Nuclear energy development for India according to RAINS-Asia 2000 BAU (TERI et 
al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). 
 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
Gross output (TWh) 7.1 7.6 8.6 7.2 3.5 
Gross output (PJ/y) 25 27 31 26 12 
% of total electricity generation 2% 2% 2% 1% 0.2% 
Input (PJ/y)* 67 72 81 68 33 
* according to UN-conventions: 0.38 PJ of gross electricity output = 1 PJ of nuclear input. 
 
In the Best Practice Technology option (NUC) we assume that the goal of the 9th 5-year 
plan will be reached in 2010, and that the trend from 1999 to 2010 will continue until 
2020. In that case, a total capacity of 10 GW will be installed by 2020. Assuming that 
plant load factor will rise from 45% to 80%, the gross electricity generation will be 252 
PJ. Primary energy equivalent is in that case 663 PJ. Thus in the NUC option, 240 PJ 
more electricity is produced in nuclear power plants than in the BAU 2020 case. We 
assume that this will reduce the need for building new coal-fired power plants (Table 
7.26). This reduces 2020 emissions of greenhouse gases and sulphur dioxide from the 
power sector in India by 6% relative to BAU (Table 7.27). 
The potential effect of the BPT option may be somewhat overestimated because the 
BAU assumptions for India may be not reflecting most recent developments for nuclear 
power for two reasons. First, the decline in nuclear power capacity as envisaged in the 
BAU scenario may not occur in reality. Second, the assumed 45% plant load factors in 
the BAU scenario may be too low.  
We consider the NUC option as described above as our base case. In two alternative 
cases, we assumed that electricity production in nuclear plants in India would amount to 
0 PJ in 2020 (NUC-low) and increased by 750 PJ to 762 PJ in 2020 (NUC-high). In the 
first alternative (NUC-low) case the calculated CO2-equivalent emissions are 0.3% 
higher than in the BAU scenario, while in the NUC-high case, they are 20% lower (Fig. 
7.6). 
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Table 7.26  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, and efficiency for coal-fired 
power plants in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assump-
tion on increased nuclear power (NUC) (see text).  
Primary energy demand 
(PJ/y)2 
Electricity produced 
(PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Power plant lifetime class (capacity class 
and building year)1 
BAU NUC BAU NUC  
Built <2000 Other power plants 854 854 290 290 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2628 2628 998 998 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 544 544 185 185 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 551 551 209 209 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1065 1065 405 405 0.38 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2759 2128 1048 809 0.38 
Total  8400 7770 3136 2897  
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ. 
 
Table 7.27  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in India in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased nuclear 
power (NUC) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-NUC 
CO2 236 899 840 
CH4 19 74 70 
N2O 1 5 5 
Total GHG 256 978 915 
SO2 1 3 3 
7.3.5 Efficiency improvement in power plants (EFF)   
In the BAU scenario, the electrical efficiencies347 of existing (built before 2000) and new 
(built after 2000) power plants depend on the construction year and on the capacity of 
the plant (Annex 7-1). There are several options to increase the efficiencies of existing 
plants (retrofit) and new plants (by using advanced combustion techniques).  
In the Best Practice Technology option EFF we assume that a) the efficiencies of 
existing power plants can be improved by 5% points on top of their assumed BAU 
efficiencies in 2020, and b) the efficiency of new plants equals 42% (gross). 
Assumption a) The potential for efficiency improvement of existing power plants for 
India is assumed to be 5% relative to BAU trends. The BAU scenario reflects India’s 
priority to renovation and modernisation of existing plants348. One of the underlying 
reasons might be the power shortage that prevents India from closing down small and 
relatively inefficient power plants. Capacity construction in India is lagging behind plans 
(chapter 3). The renovation and modernisation is therefore carried out with the goal of 
decreasing the supply-demand gap of power (Khanna and Zilberman 1999). The present 
focus in India is on increasing the plant load factor (PLF) and not so much on the 
thermal efficiency (see Box 8.2). However, the thermal efficiency increases 
simultaneously with PLF increasing measures, such as modifications and restructuring 
                                                   
347 Electrical efficiency is defined here as 100 * (gross electricity output / primary fuel input) 
348 The costs per MW of additional power are in the range of 5 million to 1.5 million rupees compared to 40-50 
million rupees per MW new capacity constructed (Ministry of Power, 1999) 
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work of the boiler (re-powering; necessary after technical life has finished), cooling 
tower and water channel, other auxiliaries, operation and maintenance (including 
training of labourers) (Ministry of Power 1999; interviews India 2001: 4; CERI and 
TERI 1995). Renovation and modernisation may increase thermal efficiencies from 18-
25% to 25-30% (interviews India 2001) and therefore it is assumed that a 5% point 
improvement for all existing plants is technically possible. Improving the coal quality 
also has a large impact on efficiency: this could be achieved via importing high quality 
coal or via coal washing (Khanna and Zilberman 1999). 
Assumption b) For capacity to be newly built, the Best Practice Technology option EFF 
assumption equals the construction of a high-efficiency coal-fired plant (based on clean 
coal technologies). In a country like Denmark with high coal quality and low 
temperature cooling water, net efficiencies can reach 48% (CERI and TERI, 1995; MPS, 
1997; IEA Coal Research, 1999). Under good conditions, several technologies can be 
operated at these high-efficiency levels (Burgt, 1996). For India it is assumed that an 
efficiency of 42% (gross) can be technically achieved, which is an ambitious assumption 
given the fact that current Indian plants have no thermal efficiencies above 34% 
(Interviews India 2001: 4, 10). The assumed 42% is lower than the Danish case because 
of the lower coal quality (higher ash content) in India. A higher efficiency requires is 
considered not realistic because it would require import of high quality coal or 
systematic coal washing349. There are several options to achieve a 42% efficiency in 
power plants in India. For instance, supercritical boilers can have efficiencies of 37-42% 
under the Indian conditions, and first supercritical boilers are being planned (Interviews 
India 2001: 4, 6). Another option is Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 
which is technically available (but costly). A demonstration plant is planned in a retrofit 
project for the 9th and 10th plan period (CERI and TERI, 1995). IEA Coal Research 
(1999) reports on a IGCC pilot plant in 1996 and on running trials to improve the 
process. IGCC has low emissions (is attractive for coal with high ash content such as 
found in India) and solid waste and a high efficiency (above 45% possible). It can be 
built in smaller modules of 100-150 MWe. Waste heat and gases can be sold 
commercially (CERI and TERI, 1995). Other efficient technologies include Fluidised 
Bed Gasification, fuel cells, and improved methods for conventional (subcritical) 
pulverised coal power plants. Thermal efficiencies of these options range from 43-48% 
(CERI and TERI, 1995)350.  
The EFF option would reduce the coal input to the power sector in 2020 from 8400 PJ 
(BAU) to 7487 (EFF), while the electrical output is still 3136 PJ (Table 7.28). As a 
result, emissions of both greenhouse gases and SO2 are calculated to be 9% lower than in 
the BAU scenario in 2020 (Table 7.29). 
                                                   
349 In one case study, the thermal efficiency increased from 25.6 to 28.4% and the plant availability increased 
from 73 to 96% as a result of coal washing (CERI an TERI, 1995). The costs of washing coal may in some cases 
be compensated by reduced transportation costs  
350 The investment costs are around 1200-1400 US$/kW under Western conditions and probably 
cheaper in China (Chen et al., 1997). 
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Table 7.28  Primary energy demand, gross electricity productions and efficiency for coal-fired 
power plants in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the 
assumption on increased efficiencies of power plants (EFF) (see text).  
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)2 
Electricity  
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency  
(fraction) 
Power plant capacity class1 
BAU EFF BAU EFF BAU EFF 
Built <2000 Other power plants 854 745 290 290 0.34 0.39 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2628 2322 998 998 0.38 0.43 
Built <1990 Large point sources 544 474 185 185 0.34 0.39 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 551 487 209 209 0.38 0.43 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1065 964 405 405 0.38 0.42 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2759 2496 1048 1048 0.38 0.42 
Total  8400 7487 3136 3136   
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels these are defined as the 
net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net calorific value), 
expressed in PJ.  
 
Table 7.29  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in India in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on increased efficien-
cies of power plants (EFF) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year for green-
house gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-EFF 
CO2 236 899 814 
CH4 19 74 68 
N2O 1 5 5 
Total GHG 256 978 887 
SO2 1 3 3 
7.3.6 Increased use of cogeneration (COG)  
Chapter 6 shows that the potential for cogeneration in the year 2020 India is larger than 
envisaged in the BAU scenario. Here we investigate two cases for increased cogenera-
tion. In both cases, the heat production is 1616 PJ in 2020, as opposed to 433 PJ in the 
BAU scenario. 
The two Best Practice Technology cases we investigate are based on the following 
assumptions: 
- COG-coal: In this case we assume that all heat is produced in coal-fired cogeneration 
facilities, with electrical and thermal efficiencies of 15% and 65%, respectively. The 
additional electricity produced by cogeneration is assumed to reduce the need for 
conventional coal-fired power plants, that are planned to built after 2000 (Table 
7.30). 
- COG-gas: In this case we assume that all heat is produced in gas-fired cogeneration 
facilities, with electrical and thermal efficiencies of 40% and 45%, respectively. The 
additional electricity produced by cogeneration is assumed to reduce the need for 
conventional gas- and coal-fired power plants in 2020 (Table 7.30). 
In the COG-coal case, greenhouse gas and sulphur dioxide emissions from the electricity 
sector are 4% lower than in the BAU scenario in 2020. In the COG-gas case, the 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is 3%. 
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Table 7.30  Greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector, primary fuel input and gross elec-
tricity output for the Business-as-usual scenario (BAU) for the year 2020 for India. Also 
shown are results for Best Practice Technology options for cogeneration. LPS = Large 
Point Source1. 
 Greenhouse gas  
emissions 
(Tg CO2-eq/y 
Primary fuel input 
(PJ/y)2 
Gross electricity  
production (PJ/y) 
 BAU COG-
coal 
COG-
gas 
BAU COG-
coal 
COG-
gas 
BAU COG-
coal 
COG-gas 
Coal, other, <2000 86 86 86 854 854 854 290 290 290 
Coal, other, >2000 264 264 264 2628 2628 2628 998 998 998 
Coal, LPS, <2000 110 110 110 1094 1094 1094 394 394 394 
Coal, LPS, >2000 384 312 384 3824 3106 3825 1453 1180 1454 
Cogeneration (coal) 12 44 23 667 2487 1313 100 373 197 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 50 0 0 1693 0 0 677 
Oil 15 15 15 190 190 190 71 71 71 
Bagasse 2 2 2 1280 1280 1280 35 35 35 
Large hydro 0 0 0 2175 2175 2175 827 827 827 
Other renewables 0 0 0 145 145 145 55 55 55 
Nuclear 0 0 0 33 33 33 12 12 12 
Natural Gas 105 105 18 1693 1693 285 931 931 157 
Total 978 939 952 14583 15685 15515 5168 5168 5168 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
7.3.7 Reducing transmission and distribution losses (T&D)  
Like in China, transmission and distribution losses in India are considerable. To reduce 
these losses, a central agency was established (Power Grid Corporate of India) which 
will monitor and co-ordinate state power authorities and joint ventures and ensure grid 
integration (chapter 4). Regional grids are planned to be integrated into a national sys-
tem. Interregional links could save an estimated 10 GW of generating capacity in the fu-
ture (Kennedy, 2000). 
In the BAU scenario, gross electricity production in India amounts to 5186 PJ in 2020, 
while the end-use of electricity amounts to 4500 PJ. The difference (688 PJ) includes 
electricity losses during transmission and distribution, as well as some own use of elec-
tricity by power plants. In the Best Practice Technology option T&D we tentatively as-
sume that these losses can be reduced by one-third to 223 PJ. This would imply that the 
total losses, and therefore gross electricity production would be 223 PJ lower than in the 
BAU scenario, while the end-use stays at the BAU level. Gross electricity production is 
reduced to 4945 PJ by this option, and total losses to 9% thereof. We assume that this 
will reduce the building of new coal-fired power plants, to be built after 2000 (Table 
7.31). This would reduce emissions of both greenhouse gases and sulphur dioxide by 6% 
(Table 7.32). 
It should be noted that in this BPT option we only consider technical losses of electricity 
and do not consider economic losses as a result of use of electricity for which no pay-
ment is received (see discussion on feasibility of options in chapter 8). 
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Table 7.31  Primary energy demand, gross electricity production, and efficiency for coal-fired 
power plants in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the 
assumption on reduced losses during transmission and distribution (T&D) (see text). 
Primary energy 
demand (PJ/y)2 
Electricity 
produced (PJ/y) 
Efficiency 
(fraction) 
Power plant lifetime class (capacity class and 
building year)1 
BAU T&D BAU T&D  
Built <2000 Other power plants 854 854 290 290 0.34 
Built >2000 Other power plants 2628 2628 998 998 0.38 
Built <1990 Large point sources 544 544 185 185 0.34 
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 551 551 209 209 0.38 
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1065 1065 405 405 0.38 
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2759 2173 1048 826 0.38 
Total  8400 7815 3136 2914  
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW. 
2  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents.  
 
Table 7.32  Emissions of air pollutants from electricity production in India in 1990 and in 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and under the assumption on reduced losses dur-
ing transmission and distribution (T&D) (see text). Units: Tg CO2-equivalents per year 
for greenhouse gases (GHG) and Tg SO2-equivalents per year for sulphur emissions.  
 1990 2020-BAU 2020-T&D 
CO2 236 899 844 
CH4 19 74 70 
N2O 1 5 5 
Total GHG 256 978 920 
SO2 1 3 3 
7.3.8 Technologies to reduce sulphur emissions (SR)   
Emissions of sulphur dioxide from power plants can be reduced by a number of add-on 
technologies, including flue gas desulphurisation and fuel desulphurisation. In the 
RAINS-Asia model, the technical potential of these options to reduce sulphur emissions 
from fuel use has been investigated (Foell et al., 2000; Amann et al., 2000). For the 
power sector, these technologies include low sulphur fuels (coal, oil), limestone injec-
tion, wet flue gas desulphurisation and regenerative flue gas desulphurisation. 
According to Foell et al (2000) and Amann et al. (2000) the results indicate that it is 
technically possible to reduce SO2 emissions from the power sector by at least 90%. It 
should be noted, that several of these technologies may increase greenhouse gas 
emissions. We ignored these effects because these are likely small. 
7.3.9 Overview of options for India  
The potential effect of a number of strategies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
(CO2, CH4 and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in India were analysed. 
Their potentials to reduce 2020 emissions of air pollutants relative to the BAU scenario 
range from 0 (sulphur reduction, SR) to 45% (end-use efficiency improvement, EEI) for 
greenhouse gases and from 4% (cogeneration, COG-coal) to 90% (sulphur reduction, 
SR) for sulphur dioxide (Table 7.33). The options that have the largest potential in 
reducing both greenhouse gas and sulphur emissions include end-use efficiency 
improvement (43 and 45% lower than BAU), replacement of coal by renewables (14 and 
11%) and natural gas (14 and 24%) and efficiency improvement of power plants (9%). 
Emission reductions are also calculated for improved transmission and distribution of 
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electricity (6%), and replacing coal by nuclear power (6%). Increased cogeneration is 
calculated to have a moderate effects on emissions from the electricity sector (4%) but it 
should be noted that our emission estimates only consider electricity production, and do 
not consider the reduced fuel input for heat production. 
Table 7.33  The potential to reduce emissions CO2, CH4 and N2O (GHG) and SO2 from the power 
sector in India in 2020, by selected options relative to the Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Reduction options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use of 
renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), efficiency improvement 
of power plants (EFF) increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction transmission and 
distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR). Unit: % of BAU 2020 emission. 
BPT Option Short description (difference with Business-as-Usual 
scenario for 2020) 
Reduction in 
2020 GHG  
emissions 
(% relative 
to BAU) 
Reduction in 
2020 SO2  
emissions 
(% relative 
to BAU) 
EEI Demand for electricity is reduced by 32% relative to 
BAU, reducing the need for new coal-fired power 
plants 
45 43 
REN Use of renewables is 47% higher than in BAU, 
reducing the need for new coal-fired power plants 
14 11 
GAS low- 
no cogen 
Use of natural gas is doubled compared to BAU, 
reducing the need for new coal-fired power plants 
14 24 
NUC Nuclear electricity generation is 252 PJ as opposed to 
12 PJ in BAU, reducing the need for new coal-fired 
power plants 
6 6 
EFF Efficiency of existing power plants is increased by 5%, 
and of new power plants to 42% 
9 9 
COG-coal Heat production is maximised, increasing also 
electricity production in coal-based cogeneration, 
which reduces the need for new coal/oil fired power 
plants 
4 4 
T&D The difference between gross electricity production 
and end-use of electricity is reduced by one-third to 
9% of the gross electricity production 
6 6 
SR Sulphur emissions are reduced by 90% by end-of-pipe 
technologies 
0 90 
 
7.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we analysed the potential effect of a number of strategies to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power 
sector in China and India. From our analysis we may draw the following conclusions 
with respect to emissions of greenhouse gases. 
For China, we calculated that the options analysed may reduce 2020 emissions of air 
pollutants relative to the BAU scenario between 1 and 43% (Table 7.33). The options 
that have the largest potential in reducing emissions include end-use efficiency 
improvement (43% lower than BAU), replacement of coal by renewables (23%) and 
natural gas (11%). Reducing electricity losses during transmission and distribution 
would reduce emissions by 7% and electrical efficiency improvement of power plants 
9%. Closing small power plants has a small effect on emissions (1%), as does 
replacement of coal by nuclear power (2%). For increased cogeneration we calculate an 
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emission reduction of 2%, but it should be noted that this estimate may underestimate the 
total potential for cogeneration, as discussed in chapter 6. 
For India, the reduction options are calculated to reduce 2020 emissions relative to the 
BAU scenario by 4 to 45% for greenhouse gases (Table 7.33). The options that have the 
reduction potential include end-use efficiency improvement (45% lower than BAU), re-
placement of coal by renewables (14%) and natural gas (14%) and electrical efficiency 
improvement of power plants (9%). Emission reductions are also calculated for im-
proved transmission and distribution of electricity (6%), and replacing coal by nuclear 
power (6%). Increased cogeneration is calculated to have a moderate effects on emis-
sions from the electricity sector (4%) but it should be noted that this estimate may under-
estimate the total potential for cogeneration, as discussed in chapter 6. 
The potential for end-use efficiency improvement is largest in industry, as also discussed 
in chapter 6 (Table 7.34). 
Table 7.34  The potential to reduce emissions CO2, CH4 and N2O (GHG) from the power sector in 
China and India in 2020, by selected Best Practice Technology options relative to the 
Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Reduction in 2020 GHG 
emissions (% relative to BAU) 
Best Practice Technology Option 
China India 
End-use efficiency improvement (EEI)1 in   
- cement, iron & steel, aluminium industry 4 3 
- other industrial sectors 25 14 
- residential sector 8 12 
- commerce 5 11 
- agriculture 1 5 
Total EEI 43 45 
Replacement of coal by renewables (REN) 23 14 
Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS low, no cogen) 11 14 
Replacement of coal by nuclear power (NUC) 2 6 
Closing Small power plants (CSP) 1 - 
Efficiency improvement in power plants (EFF) 9 9 
Increased use of cogeneration (COG-coal) 2 4 
Reduction of losses during transmission and distribution (T&D) 7 6 
1 See also chapter 6 
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Figure 7.1  The electricity sector in China: demand for primary energy for electricity production 
(top) and electricity production (bottom). Results are shown for 1990 and for 2020 for 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are 
implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), in-
creased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), closing 
small power plants (CSP), efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF), increased co-
generation (COG), a reduction transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur 
reduction (SR). 
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Figure 7.2  Emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector in China: emissions of greenhouse 
gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) and sulphur dioxide (bottom). Results are shown for 
1990 and for 2020 for the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different 
best practice options are implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI), increased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear 
power (NUC), closing small power plants (CSP), efficiency improvement of power 
plants (EFF), increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction transmission and distribution 
losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR).  
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Figure 7.3  Emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) from the electricity sector in China 
in 2020: Emissions of are shown for different assumptions on future gas use (top), nu-
clear power (middle) and cogeneration (bottom). See text for explanation.  
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Figure 7.4  The electricity sector in India: demand for primary energy for electricity production 
(top) and electricity production (bottom). Results are shown for 1990 and for 2020 for 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are 
implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), in-
creased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), effi-
ciency improvement of power plants (EFF), increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction 
transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR). 
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Figure 7.5  Emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector in India in 2020: Emissions of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) and sulphur dioxide (bottom). Results are 
shown for the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice 
options are implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement 
(EEI), increased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), 
efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF), increased cogeneration (COG), a reduc-
tion transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR).  
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Figure 7.6  Emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) from the electricity sector in India 
in 2020: Emissions of are shown for different assumptions on future gas use (top), nu-
clear power (middle) and cogeneration (bottom). See text for explanation.  
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ANNEX 7.1 DETAILS ON POWER SECTOR IN 2020 FOR CHINA AND 
INDIA – BUSINESS-AS-USUAL 
 
Table A7.1.1 Power sector in China in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et 
al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a). NB: This is Table A5.7.5 from chapter 5.  
 Primary energy demand1 (F) Electricity produced Efficiencies2 Capacities 
 Total Coal Oil Electricity (E) el.eff (ef) Capacity 
(C) 
cap.factor 
(cf) 
 PJ PJ PJ PJ fraction GW fraction 
Built before 1990            
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0  0   0.27  0 0.45 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0  0   0.30  0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 92 89 4  28   0.31  2 0.50 
125 – 200 MW 145 139 6  46   0.32  3 0.50 
>= 200 672 645 27  228   0.34  14 0.53 
Cogeneration 164 164 0  25   0.15  3 0.31 
Built: 1990-2000            
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0  0   0.27  0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0  0   0.30  0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 451 433 18  135   0.30  6 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 297 286 12  101   0.34  5 0.70 
>= 200 2342 2248 94  890   0.38  40 0.70 
Cogeneration 585 585 0  88   0.15  7 0.40 
Built: 2000-2010            
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0  0   0.28  0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0  0   0.30  0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 0 0 0  0   0.34  0 0.70 
125 – 200 MW 0 0 0  0   0.36  0 0.70 
>= 200 3064 2941 123  1225   0.40  56 0.70 
Cogeneration 796 796 0  119   0.15  8 0.50 
Built: after 2010            
<= 50 MW low pressure 0 0 0  0   0.27  0 0.50 
<= 50MW high pressure 0 0 0  0   0.30  0 0.50 
50 – 125 MW 0 0 0  0   0.31  0 0.60 
125 – 200 MW 0 0 0  0   0.32  0 0.60 
>= 200 8166 7840 327  3267   0.40  173 0.60 
cogeneration 2475 2475 0  371   0.15  24 0.50 
Totals            
Coal/Oil 15229 14620 609  5921     338  
Cogeneration (coal) 4019 4019 0  603       
Natural Gas 1006    553   0.55    
Nuclear 2228    847   0.38    
Geothermal (PP) 13    5   0.38    
Waste Fuel 75    17   0.23    
Bagasse 150    4   0.03    
Wind 84    32   0.38    
Large Hydro 4743    1802   0.38    
Small hydro 788    300   0.38    
Total 28336 18639 609  10084       
            
For comparison: total 
from RAINS-BAU sce-
nario 
27161 17396 584  10084       
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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Table A7.1.2. Power sector in India in 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario. (based on TERI et 
al., 1999; Boudri et al., 2000a) NB: This is Table A5.8.5 from chapter 5.  
INDIA-2020 Demand for primary energy (F)1  
(PJ) 
Gross electricity production 
(PJ) 
Efficiencies2 
(fraction) 
  Total Coal Oil  Total Coal Oil   
Coal           
Built <2000 Other power plants 874 854 19  297 290 7 0.34  
Built >2000 Other power plants 2687 2628 59  1021 998 23 0.38  
Built <1990 Large point sources 556 544 12  189 185 4 0.34  
Built 1990-2000 Large point sources 563 551 12  214 209 5 0.38  
Built 2000-2010 Large point sources 1089 1065 24  414 405 9 0.38  
Built > 2010 Large point sources 2821 2759 62  1072 1048 24 0.38  
 Cogeneration 667 667   100 100  0.15  
All fuels Coal 8400    3136     
 Cogeneration 
(coal) 
667    100     
 Oil 190    71     
 Natural gas 1693    931   0.55  
 Nuclear 33    12   0.38  
 Bagasse 1280    35   0.03  
 Wind 129    49   0.38  
 Large hydro 2175    827   0.38  
 Small hydro 16    6   0.38  
 Total 14583    5168     
 Total BAU-EU 14582    5416     
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Electrical efficiency = (gross electricity output / fuel input)*100 
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ANNEX 7.2 SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
CHINA 
Table A7.2.1.  Demand for primary energy for electricity production1 in China in the year 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options 
are implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement 
(EEI), increased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power 
(NUC), closing small power plants (CSP), efficiency improvement of power plants 
(EFF) increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction transmission and distribution 
losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR). Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS-
low, no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 1723 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 738 543 543 543 543 543 0 509 543 543 543 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 517 442 442 442 442 442 0 417 442 442 442 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 2221 14243 7004 10317 10814 13888 15085 12841 13548 13020 14243 
Cogeneration 1190 4019 4019 4019 4019 4019 4019 4019 5873 4019 4019 
Biomass 89 226 226 1113 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Large hydro 812 4743 4743 5588 4743 4743 4743 4743 4743 4743 4743 
Other renewables 371 886 886 3662 886 886 886 886 886 886 886 
Nuclear 0 2228 2228 2228 2228 2602 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 
Natural Gas 63 1006 1006 1006 3500 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Total 7724 28336 21096 28918 27400 28354 28192 26875 29495 27112 28336 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass 
these are defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons 
multiplied by the net calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for 
processes without direct fuel consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in 
accordance with the convention adopted in United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing 
facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 
0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy 
equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
 
Table A7.2.2  Electricity production in China in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BAU) and when the different best practice options are implemented. Best practice 
options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use of renewables 
(REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), closing small power plants 
(CSP), efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF), increased cogeneration 
(COG), a reduction transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur 
reduction (SR) Unit: PJ/year. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS-
low, no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 486 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 221 164 164 164 164 164 0 164 164 164 164 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 166 147 147 147 147 147 0 147 147 147 147 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 755 5610 2714 4040 4238 5468 5921 5610 5332 5121 5610 
Cogeneration 123 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 881 603 603 
Biomass 3 21 21 216 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Large hydro 308 1802 1802 2123 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Other renewables 141 337 337 1392 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 
Nuclear 0 847 847 847 847 989 847 847 847 847 847 
Natural Gas 35 553 553 553 1925 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Total 2237 10084 7188 10084 10084 10084 10084 10084 10084 9595 10084 
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ANNEX 7.3 SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN CHINA 
 
Table A7.3.1.  Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in China in 2020 the Business-as-
Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are implemented. 
Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use 
of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), closing small 
power plants (CSP), efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF), increased 
cogeneration (COG), a reduction transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and 
sulphur reduction (SR). Unit: Tg CO2/year. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS-
low,no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 148 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 64 47 47 47 47 47 0 44 47 47 47 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 45 38 38 38 38 38 0 36 38 38 38 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 191 1227 604 889 932 1197 1300 1106 1167 1122 1227 
Cogeneration 20 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 97 66 66 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 4 56 56 56 195 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Total 471 1435 811 1096 1278 1404 1422 1309 1405 1329 1435 
 
Table A7.3.2  As Table A.7.3.1, but for CH4. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
  BAU EEI REN GAS-
low,no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 5 4 4 4 4 4 0 3 4 4 4 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 15 95 47 69 72 92 100 85 90 87 95 
Cogeneration 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 5 5 
Biomass 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 0 6 6 6 22 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Total 37 113 65 87 106 111 112 103 111 105 113 
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Table A7.3.3 As Table A.7.3.1, but for N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 1990 
 
BAU EEI REN GAS-
low, 
no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 0.9 5.7 2.8 4.2 4.4 5.6 6.1 5.2 5.5 5.2 5.7 
Cogeneration 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Biomass 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 2.3 6.8 3.8 6.3 5.5 6.6 6.7 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.8 
 
Table A7.3.4 As Table A.7.3.1, but for total of CO2, CH4 and N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS-
low, 
no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal < 50 MW 161 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 69 51 51 51 51 51 0 47 51 51 51 
Coal 125-200 MW 48 41 41 41 41 41 0 39 41 41 41 
Coal > 200 MW 207 1328 653 962 1008 1295 1406 1197 1263 1214 1328 
Cogeneration 21 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 105 72 72 
Biomass 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 4 63 63 63 218 63 63 63 63 63 63 
Total 510 1554 880 1190 1390 1521 1541 1418 1523 1440 1554 
 
Table A7.3.5 As Table A.7.3.1, but for SO2. Unit: Tg SO2 /year. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS-
low,no 
cogen 
NUC CSP EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal < 50 MW 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal 50-125 MW 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Coal 125-200 MW 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Coal > 200 MW 2.0 12.8 6.3 9.3 9.7 12.5 13.6 11.6 12.2 11.7 1.3 
Cogeneration 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.1 
Biomass 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 4.9 14.5 8.0 11.3 11.4 14.2 14.4 13.2 14.2 13.4 1.4 
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ANNEX 7.4 SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
INDIA 
 
Table A7.4.1.  Demand for primary energy for electricity production1 in India in the year 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options 
are implemented. Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement 
(EEI), increased use of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power 
(NUC), efficiency improvement of power plants (EFF) increased cogeneration 
(COG), a reduction transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur 
reduction (SR). Unit: PJ/year. LPS = Large Point Source2. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 465 854 854 854 854 854 745 854 854 854 
Coal, other, >2000 0 2628 2106 2628 2628 2628 2322 2628 2628 2628 
Coal, LPS, <2000 1907 1094 1094 1094 1094 1094 961 1094 1094 1094 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 3824 0 2408 1373 3194 3460 3106 3239 3824 
Cogeneration 0 667 667 667 667 667 667 2487 667 667 
Oil 112 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 
Bagasse 318 1280 1280 1567 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
Large hydro 581 2175 2175 3225 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175 
Other renewables 1 145 145 490 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Nuclear 67 33 33 33 33 663 33 33 33 33 
Natural Gas 140 1693 1693 1693 3387 1693 1693 1693 1693 1693 
Total 3591 14583 10237 14849 13825 14583 13670 15685 13997 14583 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
2  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW. 
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Table A7.4.2 Electricity production in India in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BAU)and when the different best practice options are implemented. Best practice 
options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use of renewables 
(REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), efficiency improvement of 
power plants (EFF), increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction transmission and 
distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR) Unit: PJ/year. LPS = Large 
Point Source1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 107 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 
Coal, other, >2000 0 998 800 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 
Coal, LPS, <2000 572 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 1453 0 915 522 1214 1453 1180 1231 1453 
Cogeneration 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 373 100 100 
Oil 32 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Bagasse 9 35 35 43 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Large hydro 221 827 827 1226 827 827 827 827 827 827 
Other renewables 0 55 55 186 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Nuclear 25 12 12 12 12 252 12 12 12 12 
Natural Gas 77 931 931 931 1863 931 931 931 931 931 
Total 1043 5168 3516 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168 4945 5168 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
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ANNEX 7.5 SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN INDIA 
 
Table A7.5.1  Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in India in 2020 the Business-as-
Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are implemented. 
Best practice options include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use 
of renewables (REN), natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), efficiency 
improvement of power plants (EFF), increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction 
transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR). Unit: Tg 
CO2/year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 43 79 79 79 79 79 69 79 79 79 
Coal, other, >2000 0 244 195 244 244 244 215 244 244 244 
Coal, LPS, <2000 177 101 101 101 101 101 89 101 101 101 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 354 0 223 127 296 321 288 300 354 
Cogeneration 0 11 11 11 11 11 11 41 11 11 
Oil 9 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Bagasse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 8 95 95 95 189 95 95 95 95 95 
Total 236 899 496 767 766 840 814 862 844 899 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
 
Table A7.5.2 As Table A.7.5.1, but for CH4. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. LPS = Large Point 
Source1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 3 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 
Coal, other, >2000 0 19 16 19 19 19 17 19 19 19 
Coal, LPS, <2000 14 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8 8 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 28 0 18 10 24 26 23 24 28 
Cogeneration 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bagasse 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 1 11 11 11 21 11 11 11 11 11 
Total 19 74 42 64 67 70 68 71 70 74 
1 Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
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Table A7.5.3 As Table A7.5.1, but for N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. LPS = Large Point 
Source1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Coal, other, >2000 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.0 0.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.7 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.4 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 1.4 5.4 3.5 5.1 4.4 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.4 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW. 
 
Table A7.5.4 As Table A7.5.1, but for total of CO2, CH4 and N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
LPS = Large Point Source1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, no 
cogen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 47 86 86 86 86 86 75 86 86 86 
Coal, other, >2000 0 264 212 264 264 264 233 264 264 264 
Coal, LPS, <2000 192 110 110 110 110 110 97 110 110 110 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0 384 0 242 138 321 348 312 325 384 
Cogeneration 0 12 12 12 12 12 12 44 12 12 
Oil 9 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Bagasse 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 9 105 105 105 211 105 105 105 105 105 
Total 256 978 542 837 837 915 887 939 920 978 
1 Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
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Table A7.5.5 As Table A7.5.1, but for SO2. Unit: Tg SO2 /year. LPS = Large Point Source
1. 
 1990 BAU EEI REN GAS 
low, 
no co-
gen 
NUC EFF COG-
coal 
T&D SR 
Coal, other, <2000 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Coal, other, >2000 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.1 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.1 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 0.9 3.3 1.9 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1 0.3 
1  Large Point Sources are defined in RAINS-Asia as electricity producing facilities with a capacity of more 
than 500 MW 
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ANNEX 7.6 FUEL USE AND ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN CHINA 
FOR THE BPT GAS OPTIONS 
Table A7.6.1.  Demand for primary energy for electricity production1 in China in the year 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options 
are implemented for natural gas use. Unit: PJ/year. 
 2020-BAU GAS-low,  
no cogen 
GAS-low, 
cogen 
GAS-high, 
No cogen 
GAS-high, co-
gen 
Coal < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 543 543 543 543 543 
Coal 125-200 MW 442 442 442 442 442 
Coal > 200 MW 14243 10814 13033 7204 10888 
Cogeneration (coal) 4019 4019 1600 4019 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 3500 0 5808 
Biomass 226 226 226 226 226 
Large hydro 4743 4743 4743 4743 4743 
Other renewables 886 886 886 2094 2094 
Nuclear 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 
Natural Gas (PP) 1006 3500 0 6125 318 
Total 28336 27400 27201 27624 27290 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
 
Table A7.6.2 Gross electricity production in China in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are implemented for 
natural gas use. Unit: PJ/year. 
 2020-BAU GAS-low, 
no cogen 
GAS-low, 
cogen 
GAS-high,  
no cogen 
GAS-high, co-
gen 
Coal < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 164 164 164 164 164 
Coal 125-200 MW 147 147 147 147 147 
Coal > 200 MW 5610 4238 5126 2795 4268 
Cogeneration (coal) 603 603 240 603 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 1400 0 2323 
Biomass 21 21 21 21 21 
Large hydro 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Other renewables 337 337 337 337 337 
Nuclear 847 847 847 847 847 
Natural Gas (PP) 553 1925 0 3369 175 
Total 10084 10084 10084 10084 10084 
 
Efficiencies used in the calculations for conventional power plants: 
- coal-fired: 40% electrical efficiency 
- gas-fired: 55% electrical efficiency 
Efficiencies used in the calculations for cogeneration 
- coal-fired: 15% electrical efficiency, 65% thermal efficiency 
- gas-fired: 40% electrical efficiency, 45% thermal efficiency 
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ANNEX 7.7 FUEL USE AND ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN INDIA 
FOR THE BPT GAS OPTIONS 
 
Table A7.7.1 Demand for primary energy for electricity production1 in India in the year 2020 in 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options 
are implemented for natural gas use. Unit: PJ/year. 
 BAU GAS-low,  
no cogen 
GAS-low, 
cogen 
GAS-high, 
no cogen 
GAS-high, co-
gen 
Coal, other, <2000 854 854 854 0 569 
Coal, other, >2000 2628 2628 2628 0 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 1094 1094 1094 958 1094 
Coal, LPS, >2000 3824 1373 2017 0 0 
Cogeneration (coal) 667 667 0 667 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 963 0 963 
Oil 190 190 190 190 190 
Bagasse 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 
Large hydro 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175 
Other renewables 145 145 145 145 145 
Nuclear 33 33 33 33 33 
Natural Gas 1693 3387 952 6773 5809 
Total 14583 13825 12330 12221 12257 
1  The demand for primary energy reflects primary energy equivalents. For fossil fuels and biomass these are 
defined as the net calorific input of fossil fuels or biomass (equal to the input in tons multiplied by the net 
calorific value), expressed in PJ. An equivalent amount of primary energy for processes without direct fuel 
consumption (wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, etc.,) are in accordance with the convention adopted in 
United Nations Statistics. For electricity producing facilities (both grid connected and non-grid connected) 
this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 0.38 PJ of gross electricity produced. For heat producing 
facilities, this is: 1 PJ of primary energy equivalent = 1 PJ of gross heat produced. 
 
Table A7.7.2 Gross electricity production in India in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual 
scenario (BAU) and when the different best practice options are implemented for 
natural gas use. Unit: PJ/year.  
 BAU GAS-low, 
no cogen 
GAS-low, 
cogen 
GAS-high, 
no cogen 
GAS-high, 
cogen 
Coal, other, <2000 290 290 290 0 193 
Coal, other, >2000 998 998 998 0 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 394 394 394 342 394 
Coal, LPS, >2000 1453 522 767 0 0 
Cogeneration (coal) 100 100 0 100 0 
Cogeneration (gas) 0 0 385 0 385 
Oil 71 71 71 71 71 
Bagasse 35 35 35 35 35 
Large hydro 827 827 827 827 827 
Other renewables 55 55 55 55 55 
Nuclear 12 12 12 12 12 
Natural Gas 931 1863 1333 3725 3195 
Total 5168 5168 5168 5168 5168 
 
Efficiencies used in the calculations for conventional power plants 
- coal-fired: 40% electrical efficiency 
- gas-fired: 55% electrical efficiency 
Efficiencies used in the calculations for cogeneration 
- coal-fired: 15% electrical efficiency, 65% thermal efficiency 
- gas-fired: 40% electrical efficiency, 45% thermal efficiency 
- gas-fired: 40% electrical efficiency, 45% thermal efficiency 
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8. Stakeholder Analysis of the Electricity Options for China and 
India 
Authors: Joyeeta Gupta and Jaklien Vlasblom351 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter tries to inject a sense of reality to the results generated in the previous chap-
ters. On the basis of the literature, earlier research, and stakeholder interviews it exam-
ines the perspectives of the interviewees in relation to the feasibility of the supply and 
the demand side policy and technical options for modernising the electricity sector and 
reducing the related greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants. It shows that only 
some of the options appear to be feasible and that some are likely to happen autono-
mously. It explicitly includes the issue-linkages made by stakeholders in assessing the 
key issues per country. It identifies the key feasible options per country and assesses the 
major bottlenecks affecting other promising options. The chapter is structured as follows. 
It presents a brief overview of the different stakeholder processes and the results of the 
discussions with the stakeholders. It then analyses the results in relation to the country 
concerned.  
8.2 China 
8.2.1 The process 
In relation to China, we first undertook a literature survey in 1998-99. The key 
organisational problems identified were the size, centralisation, lack of clear distribution 
of responsibilities, changing administrative structure, ownership, 500 laws, and 
difficulties in communication. The key resource and technological problems included the 
poor quality coal, long distance transport, poor PLF, transmission losses, poor 
maintenance, and lack of information on appropriate technologies. The financial issues 
included the complex pricing system and the subsidies. The social issues included the 
poor energy literacy and the fact that commercial electricity was unaffordable to rural 
consumers. Several recommendations have been made in the literature and some policies 
based on these recommendations have been adopted.  
The workshop in 1999 concluded that climate change was a northern problem (see 
Chapter 10) and the focus of international cooperation should be on coal technologies 
(washing and dressing, desulphurisation, liquefaction, IGCC) and nuclear technologies. 
The potential for gas was seen as uncertain and renewables could only provide an 
additional amount of electricity.  
Interviews in 1999 revealed that the key areas of cooperation should be defined 
technically and not politically or socially, and that supply management should focus on 
coal, nuclear and large hydro, renewable is additional, domestic technologies generally 
and only high tech imports, clean coal technologies, IGCC, nuclear and wind turbines.  
In the workshop in 2000, interviewees concluded that, as a contribution to the climate 
change issue, their first choice was large hydro, and second nuclear. They stated that 
                                                   
351  With comments from Carolien Kroeze and Kornelis Blok. 
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population, resources and environmental protection are the three cardinal national 
policies in China. The feasibility of options should not be highlighted in terms of a one-
time issue but in terms of time-steps and time-sequences. So the researchers were 
advised to introduce a dynamic element into the assessment of the feasibility of the 
options. Given the short-term excess of supply over demand, the government could now 
consider going in for retrofitting, discussing what quality of coal can be used and 
shutting down small scale power plants. These options are now feasible and need to be 
included; however, the issue of unemployment as a result remains a key bottleneck. In 
terms of transmission and distribution, the focus should be on improving the rural 
network. It was also concluded that implementing many of the proposed options will 
involve challenging the existing political interests, stakeholder interests and may result 
in a breakdown of the institutions in the country. This is likely to be a major challenge 
for the government. In the past, the central government protected certain interests, those 
of the large producers and the small farmers; now in the transition phase there is no 
organisation protecting the interests of those affected. This will be a major additional 
institutional challenge for the country, especially if there is the desire to guarantee a 
peaceful transition.  
8.2.2 Supply side options 
The following section analyses the key views of the stakeholders in terms of the supply 
side options in order to identify the feasible options. Chapters 3 and 7 conclude that there 
are many policy and technological options for China. How feasible are these options for 
China? 
In discussing fuel switching, the first key issue is how important is coal in the context of 
China. Coal is the most abundant domestic energy source, and it will continue to play a 
dominant role in the total supply picture, not only for electricity generation but also for 
industry. In 1992, coal production was 1,130 million tons representing nearly 30% of 
world production. The attractiveness of coal is based on a vast resource base and low ex-
traction costs. Coal supplies are, however, hampered by inadequate infrastructure, and 
the railway system presents a chronic bottleneck in the coal supply system. Plans for fur-
ther expansion of the railway system are ambitious, but transport may remain as much of 
a problem for the coal supplies system over the next decade as it was in the 1980s (Foell, 
et al. 1995). The coal output has increased from 32 million tonnes in 1949 to 1.36 billion 
tonnes in 1995 making China the world leader in coal production (IEA 1996). More than 
half of China’s recoverable reserves (estimated at 114 billion tonnes) consist of anthra-
cite and bituminous coal. At the moment 75% of coal produced is higher quality coal 
(e.g. bituminous coal). China is a net exporter of coal. The main coal exports are to Ja-
pan, which has provided loans for improvements of railroads and ports for coal export 
from Shanxi, and North- and South Korea. The main reserves of coal in China are lo-
cated in the North, and especially in Shanxi province. This coal is relatively easy to mine 
and therefore the main mining activities are located in the North. Coal from the South 
has a higher sulphur and ash content than coal from the North and is therefore not suit-
able for many uses (IEA 1996). The large users of coal are the industry and the electric-
ity companies. These are mainly located in the south. This leads to intensive coal trans-
portation from the north to the south and the east. Due to the high level of rocks and dirt 
transported with the coal the transportation is much higher than if cleaned coal would be 
transported. However, only 20-25% of the coal can be seen as ‘clean’. The high transpor-
tation costs increase the coal price. Roughly 50% of the coal is transported by rail. The 
major transport lines from north to south are from Zhengzhou to Wuhan and from 
Xuzhou to Nanjing and from east to west from Datong to Qinhuangdoa. 
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Most interviewees felt that coal was likely to be a central part of the electricity future 
because of the (a) availability of coal, (b) and relevant technologies, (c) the lack of 
feasible alternatives, and (d) the costs.  
Fuel switch to renewables:  
Chapter 7’s BPT scenario assumes that it is possible, within certain technical limits, to 
increase the generation of electricity from renewables by 1026 PJ than in the 2020 BAU 
situation; leading to a decrease in GHG emissions of 15% and sulphur emissions of 13%. 
Is this feasible? 
Large-scale hydropower stations construction in China started from the 1950s and it has 
been increasing at an annual rate of 12.8% over the past 40 years. Hydro power is an 
important source of electricity in China, especially in mountainous areas such as in the 
central and western parts of the country. However, the large distances between the power 
plants and the demand sites and the high environmental impacts of building new plants 
slow down the growth of this sector. With the ‘Three Gorges Dam’ on the Yangtze river, 
the largest dam in the world will be located in China. It will include 26 hydro plants (700 
MW each). Together they will have a capacity of 18 GW in the year 2009. The project is 
controversial as more than 1 million people have to be relocated and the environmental 
impacts are very extensive. The US Export-Import Bank has decided not to provide 
finance to any American company involved in the project. However, on 8 November 
1997 the first phase of the project was completed and the river was dammed. The State 
would like to attract more investors interested in building hydro plants (Livernash 1995). 
Interviews and the workshops indicate that a fuel switch to large hydro is seen as the key 
option for the country. There was some acknowledgement of the social consequences of 
the large hydro option, but there was in general consensus that this was a most essential 
decision for China. In the workshop, this was selected as the first priority of the 
participants.  
Biomass resources include the following main types: straw, firewood and excrement, or-
ganic materials and water plants. The total biomass resource in China is around 650 mil-
lion tonnes coal equivalent (tce) annually of which 308 million tce is from rural discards 
(e.g. stalks), 130 million tce is firewood and the rest is city waste and excrement (Dai et 
al. 1998: 113). The main use of biomass in rural areas is for cooking and space heating 
and not for electricity production. Although 92 small-scale rice husk generators were in 
use in 1994 the high costs of new, high efficiency generators prevents its widespread in-
troduction. In urban areas the amount of municipal waste is high. Until now this was 
openly dumped or simply landfilled leading to pollution and health problems. As the ur-
ban population in China is growing the amount of municipal waste will increase substan-
tially. The refuse landfill biogas power generator and incinerators could be a solution to 
this problem (Dai et al. 1998: 155). Electricity production from biomass can be eco-
nomically viable, however. At the moment three energy crop plantations are being de-
veloped in Yunnan Province and some plans are made to co-fire existing sugar mills 
with bagasse and wood from year-round power production, and to build stand alone 
biomass-fired facilities (Perlack 1998). 
China has rich wind resources. The total exploitable wind energy potential is estimated 
at 42 GW on the basis of gross electricity output, or 110 GW on the basis of primary en-
ergy equivalent. Wind energy potential is mainly distributed in south-eastern coastal re-
gions, Xinjiang, Gansu, the northern part of Inner Mongolia and the north-eastern part of 
China with an annual average wind energy density of 150-300 W/m2 and 4,000-8,000 
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hours of duration of wind speed above 3m/s.352 Wind power is the most commercialised 
renewable energy in China.  
Wind power generation in China began in 1980’s. The government regards wind energy 
as one of the main energy sources for remote areas. 353The commercialised development 
of wind power generation started at the beginning of the 1990’s. By the end of 1997, the 
total installed capacity of grid connected wind turbines reached 166MW. Most of the 
wind power produced in China now is from large grid connected wind farms. However, 
the total electricity output of wind is only 1% of the total power production in China. 
Chinese wind farms belong to the most advanced in the world. They are even more 
commercially exploited than the wind farms in the US and India. The total technical po-
tential in China is estimated at 250 GW while the market potential is estimated at 1.4 
GW. 
China produces its own turbines, with a capacity between 50 and 300 kW. More than 
130,000 of the nationally produced turbines are already sold. Their total capacity is 17 
MW. Some 13.4 MW of the turbines used at the large scale farms are tested in 14 testing 
sites. They are bought from the US, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Denmark. Large 
new projects are planned. Negotiations with US manufacturers for about a total capacity 
of 100 MW are in progress. Four large scale projects (costs estimated at US $ 240 
million) are planned until mid 1999. The largest wind energy potential can be found in 
the coastal areas and on the islands off the coast. The wind energy potential can exceed 
200 W/min. The second largest wind energy potential can be found in Inner Mongolia 
and the northern Gansu province.  
Fuel switch to wind is possible in theory in Tibet and coastal areas but the key barriers 
are (a) the difficulty of transmitting from wind rich areas to wind poor areas, (b) the 
inadequate nature of the technology transfer, (c) the difficulty of storing wind energy, (d) 
and the costs of generation. However, there are at present several wind turbines being 
built and these are an indication that wind energy will have a role to play, if not 
significant. 
China is rich in small hydropower resources. The theoretical reserve of small hydro-
power resources is estimated to be 150 GW, of which the exploitable capacity is over 70 
GW, with an annual power generation of 200-250 TWh. By the year 1991, the entire 
country’s installed capacity of small hydropower stations had reached 13.4 GW, with an 
annual power generation of 37.1 TWh. The development of small hydropower in China 
is linked to the construction of water conservation facilities. A fuel switch to small hydro 
is possible, but was not given much importance by the participants of the workshop and 
the interviewees.  
Fuel switch to natural gas:  
The BPT gas scenarios are based on a high and a low gas availability scenario, and its 
use in either CCGT technologies or cogeneration. These assumptions lead to a reduction 
                                                   
352  Wind energy is concentrated in the northern and western part of China and along the coast. In the Xinjiang 
province, Northwest China, it was announced that 66 wind turbines would be installed, making it the largest 
site in Asia. Wind energy is suitable for both the less developed areas in the country and for large scale pro-
duction linked to the transmission and distribution system. 
353  By the end of 1997, 20 types of small wind machinery had been tested in field sites and put into mass pro-
duction, the largest capacity of which is 300 kW. By the end of 1997, 140,000 small wind turbines were in 
operation in China, with a total installed capacity of 17MW. As a result of the constraints of geography and 
resources conditions, the strong support of the local government and the demands of the herdsmen, small 
size wind generators are located mainly in Inner Mongolia, which has about 120,000 small wind turbines, 
i.e., about 85% of the total.  
  247
of emissions by 7-22% as compared to the BAU scenario which was already based on a 
relatively high use of gas. Is such a scenario likely? 
The gas production increased from virtually zero in 1949 to 17.6 billion m3 in 1995 
(IEA 1996; see Annex 1). Also gas exploration is mainly government owned and man-
aged. Even import and export quantities are planned by the State. Many government or-
ganisations are responsible for gas production and import and export. Natural gas still 
makes up only some 2% of domestic energy production in China. It is under-utilised and 
currently efforts are made to develop large fields, both offshore and in the Northwest. 
China’s largest gas field explored is the Yancheng 13 field. The proven reserves of this 
field are 1.3 billion m3. It started production in 1996. One joint venture, between 
CNOOC, Arc Co. and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Corporation, produces 
natural gas in the South China Sea. Recently the discovery of a natural gas field of about 
3 trillion cu.m gas reserve in Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin was reported (Lococo 2000). 
Existing pipeline infrastructure suffers from a number of severe problems: ‘most pipe-
lines, built in the 1960s and 1970s, are ageing, and use out-of-date-technology; the ma-
jority of them have a low utilisation rate; coverage is patchy, with most lines linking a 
specific reserve to a specific market, rather than forming a network; and there is no stor-
age to speak of the management of peak loads’ (Matters 1999). Another obstacle is that, 
to import gas, China will need to build many thousands of kilometres of pipelines to 
bring gas from Siberia, Sakhalin or Central Asia, or to construct LNG regasification ter-
minals. Both options are expensive (Matters 1999). Furthermore, the pipeline recently 
constructed from Ordos Basin to Beijing makes it clear that, to attract foreign investors, 
sufficient gas-fired power generation has to be allowed, in order to yield an attractive re-
turn on investment. As Michael Williams from Shell pointed out, residential use alone 
would have too low growth rates of about 10% per year. If gas is used for power genera-
tion, growth rates of 30 to 50% can be achieved (Matters 1999). 
Fuel switch to gas may be attractive only in the coastal areas as these areas are very far 
from the coal belt and as there are gas options close at hand. In the inland region this was 
seen as problematic because of the increased dependence on imported gas. However, 
with the discovery of new gas fields in China, there is a possibility that this source can 
be optimally utilised. The key bottleneck is capital. Note that there exists a competition 
between end-users of gas, namely households, and industrial users.  
Fuel switch to nuclear:  
In the BPT scenario for fuel switch to nuclear it is assumed that the plant load factor of 
existing and planned plants is increased to 80% leading to a 2% reduction of emissions 
of GHGs and sulphur dioxide. Is this feasible? 
For participants at the workshop in Beijing in 2000, the option of fuel switch to nuclear 
was seen as promising, but not substantial. They felt that this option had to be further 
explored and developed and that the issues of safety problems of nuclear plants were 
compared with the safety problems of using coal; participants emphasised that from their 
point of view it did not make sense to raise the issue of safety only in relation to nuclear 
plants. Other interviewees explained further that the key bottleneck in this field was the 
lack of technology transfer in this field, and the lack of capital.  
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Closing small power plants:  
The BPT scenario which includes additional closing down of small power plants in rela-
tion to the BAU scenario indicates that this provides a 1% reduction in air pollutants in 
2020. Is this feasible?  
The government has an existing policy of closing down small coal mines and small 
generation units. Some of these closures are pushed through since these are government 
owned. However, sometimes provincial governments do not wish to close down these 
small operations because of the multiple purposes they serve in the provinces including 
employment. Furthermore, many questioned the legitimacy of this policy since closing 
down small power plants also implies a high technology turnover and this may not 
necessarily be economically or environmentally viable. However, given that the 
government sees this as an essential step it is probably feasible for it to implement this 
measure under current political circumstances.  
Efficiency improvement of existing power plants:  
According to the BPT scenario, GHG and sulphur emissions can be reduced by 9% in 
2020 in relation to the BAU scenario by retrofitting existing plants and using modern 
technologies in new power generating capacity.  
Workshop participants, however, saw operation and maintenance as unimportant options 
with minimal results. They claimed that most large thermal plants were being operated at 
high standards and the small inefficient plants were being closed down. On the other 
hand interviewees argued that the claim that the plants are operating at full efficiency 
may not be valid. In recent years (1997-2000), although energy production increased, the 
demand fell drastically, partly because of the recession in Asia, partly because of 
domestic reforms.354 At the same time there is also a hidden demand because poor 
people in rural areas cannot afford electricity.355 There is also an expectation that the 
quality of demand-supply gap will change in future. In the cities the gap will be in 
electricity while in the countryside the gap will be in high quality energy.356 In this 
period, the concern was not so much the generation of electricity per se, but the issue of 
environmentally friendly generation of electricity.357 This was considered a key 
opportunity especially given that China was presently going through a situation where 
the supply was larger than the demand. Instead of investing in new facilities, this was the 
time to invest in renovation.  
There was support from interviewees and workshop participants on the need for 
advanced combustion technologies, including IGCC. In relation to access to better fuels 
and technologies, certain problems persisted. However, a key problem with using coal 
was that the coal had to be transported over long distances (generally from the North to 
the South/South East), or the electricity and both way there were major losses.358 Others 
argued that the bottlenecks included that (a) foreign technologies have not been very 
forthcoming, (b) some of the technologies imported were not very appropriate for 
China,359 (c) were expensive,360 and (d) there was greater need to develop local 
                                                   
354  Meeting 3, 4, 8, 10, 1999. 
355  Meeting 3, 8, 1999. 
356  Meeting 7, 1999. 
357  Beijing Workshop, 1999.  
358  Meeting 5, 1999. 
359  Meeting 4, 6, 1999. 
360  Meeting 1, 3, 5, 1999; Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
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technologies and to make them commercially viable.361 The central government however 
feels very strongly the need to import state of the art modern technologies.  
Increased use of cogeneration:  
Electricity production via cogeneration is assumed to increase from 209 PJ-e in 1995 to 
603 PJ-e in the Rains 2000 BAU scenario. In the BPT scenario, the maximum coal-based 
industrial cogeneration is calculated at 881 PJ-e (excluding district heating) which is a 
46% increase in cogeneration but which leads to merely 1-2% decrease in GHGs in 
2020. The low BPT potential is partially caused by the high cogeneration expected to be 
installed under the Rains 2000 BAU scenario and partially by the decreased share of 
industrial fuel consumption in BAU 2020 resulting in the decreased importance of the 
heat demand that can be covered by industrial cogeneration (see section 6.7.2). A gas-
based scenario has been calculated as well, which has an even lower emission reduction 
potential due to limited availability of gas (see Chapter 6). Is the implementation of this 
potential feasible? 
The government is stressing the importance of cogeneration, via the regulation that cities 
with more than 100,000 inhabitants need to encourage cogeneration, mainly for paper 
and chemical industries. Furthermore the environmental protection regulation says that 
small power generators have to be closed down or install cogeneration. Small boiler 
houses burning coal are not allowed in certain urban areas and therefore district heating 
is an ideal option. Since there is sufficient electricity supply in recent years, the State 
Power Bureau is said to be approving only new cogeneration plants. A new cogeneration 
policy is on its way.362 The requirement of power purchase agreements may lead to 
increased cogen.  
There are several inhibiting factors for the increased adoption of cogeneration. The 
potential for selling electricity to the grid is restricted, probably to protect the inefficient 
state-owned central power plants, but also because of the administrative inertia. The 
amount of units sold to the grid is restricted per location, and the buy-back price is low. 
The current oversupply of electricity is a disincentive. The state investments in cogen 
have reduced by a factor 4 (Yang et al 1996). There is a low district heating demand in 
summer and the industrial sectors are in current financial problems which results in a 
low priority for cogeneration during investment decisions.363 The planned privatisation 
of the supply and T&D sectors will increase the possibilities for increased use of 
cogeneration. 
Reducing transmission and distribution losses:  
The BPT scenario assumes that with modernisation transmission and distribution losses 
could technically be reduced by 1/3 (from 15% to 10%) leading to a 7% reduction in 
emissions of GHGs and a 8% reduction in SO2 as compared with the BAU situation. 
However, interviewees and workshop participants were less enthusiastic about the 
potential for seriously modernising the T&D sector. The rural area T&D lines account 
for a large share of T&D distances due to the vastness of the country. This increases the 
national average losses (in developed countries, the rural network also has significantly 
higher losses than industrial and urban T&D lines). Upgrading is possible but expensive.  
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362  Interviews (JV) 2000: 17, 18 
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Technologies to reduce Sulphur emissions:  
In the BPT scenario, it is claimed that 90% of the SO2 emissions can be reduced as 
compared to the BAU scenario. Local air pollution plays a major role in influencing 
policy, which will be an incentive to reduce emissions (see Chapter 3).  
Coal washing is a key policy option, but the price is a big barrier and at present there are 
no investors investing in coal washing in China since they do not see any clear returns in 
this field. By 2005, domestic desulphurisation equipment will become available. It is 
expected that by 2010, 40 GW of production capacity will be equipped with 
desulphurisation technology; the current policy is already that new plants need to be 
equipped with FGD. Coal washing will be relevant for the remaining 170 GW. The FGD 
technology will be limited to generation capacity in heavily populated areas and this may 
lead to an increase in the price of the electricity delivered. For new plants, this is 
permitted. For old plants, there is no policy to encourage these to include the cost of 
FGD in the price of the electricity delivered; and this has been a disincentive for this 
sector. Washed coal leads to decreased sulphur emissions in the plants and this will be a 
disincentive for plants owners to adopt flue gas desulphurisation.364  
8.2.3 End-use efficiency options 
Cement: In the BPT scenario, it is possible for China to save 47 PJ of energy, equivalent 
to 14% of the electricity consumption. Is this feasbible?  
Cement has been a fast growing industry in China, but its rate of growth is assumed to 
decrease because a large production capacity is now available. An low annual growth 
rate will result in insufficient increases in output to carry out additional infrastructural 
plans. Government policy is to close down the small inefficient mills and to prohibit the 
construction of such mills. However, local governments often do not support this central 
government policy because of tax payments from the enterprises and local employment. 
Furthermore, although the quality of the cement is low, the price is also low, making it 
suitable for construction in rural areas. On the other hand such cement is not allowed as 
material for urban construction. The government has a passive policy of encouraging 
blending of cement with additives. Capacity addition for output growth often occurs via 
retrofitting existing plants, not via new construction, because of financial, administrative 
barriers and resource constraints. When new plants are built, they are generally large 
scale and use new, imported, technology. Smaller scale new technologies (precalciner 
plants) are domestically produced. Roller mills and presses are to a limited extent 
produced domestically and of low quality. New imported plants often use the traditional, 
less efficient, ball mills, because they are cheaper and have less input material 
requirements. The use of modern technologies will probably be limited to the very large-
scale cement sector and the medium sized operations may not be able to access such 
technologies, unless the liberalisation process accelerates considerably. 
Iron and steel:  
The BPT scenario indicates that the iron and steel sector can reduce its electricity 
consumption by 33% in 2020 as compared to the BAU scenario.  
As one of the world’s largest producers of steel, the iron and steel sector is now focusing 
less on growth and more on the quality of the sector. This may well be because the world 
                                                   
364  However, some experts argued that recent research also shows that FGD may be less effective than coal 
washing, and this needs to be taken into account. 
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market for steel has dropped temporarily. But this was also used as an opportunity to 
close down at least 100 small plants which will be implemented by shutting down power 
supplies and revoking bank and production licenses (Zhengzheng 2000a: 1). The 
government policy is that all plants producing less than 300,000 tonnes annually will be 
closed down.365 The government will also spend 50 billion yuan for technical 
upgradation of the sector to increase the value added products such as hot and cold rolled 
thin steel plates, galvanised steel plates, stainless thin steel plates and cold-rolled silicon 
steel (Zhengzheng 2000b). The government policy has been successful to reduce the 
share of OHF steel production (high energy consumption) and encourages an increased 
share of integrated steel plants (iron and steel are often produced in separate locations). 
The 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005) is expected to forbid small electric furnaces with a 
capacity of 5 tonnes, small mills, BOF converter furnace, small coke ovens, small blast 
furnaces with a capacity of 100 cubic metres and perhaps also alloy furnaces with a 
capacity of 1800kW. This is however a policy recommendation and is not written into 
the law. The policy promotes certain technologies such as large-scale metallurgical units 
and new efficient technologies. Cogeneration, improved steel casting and an increased 
share of secondary steel production are the most important options in the iron and steel 
sector. Waste heat and gases is already used to a certain extent (top gas recovery 
technology in blast furnaces, and heat re-use for various applications). But there is no 
government policy in relation to cogeneration. Continuous casting technology will be 
used to the maximum extent in the BAU scenario. As in India, there is only limited 
waste steel (scrap) that can be reused in an electric arc furnace, the share of EAF is 
decreasing in recent years even though scrap is imported. The steel slag and other waste 
products from iron and steel production are used for cement and brick production. Much 
of the needed technologies are produced indigenously and China even exports these 
technologies. 
The price of electricity as a part of the total costs to the industry is difficult to quantify 
also because each state has different policies. However as these companies try to cope 
with commercialisation, there will be incentives to reduce their energy costs. At the same 
time some of them have their own captive power plants (such as Anshan and Bastom). 
These iron and steel plants do not have any incentive to reduce their energy unless they 
can sell electricity to the grid. After the reduction of OHF share, the next governmental 
focus is on continuous casting (which is therefore assumed to occur in the BAU 
scenario). Near net shape casting would be even more efficient, and should be promoted 
in plants where the correct products are manufactured and this state-of-the-art casting is 
appropriate. It needs to be imported currently. This is in line with the government policy 
to improve the quality and complexity of steel products so that import of these types of 
steel can be reduced. The share of secondary steel production via EAF has reduced in 
recent years due to low scrap availability. Increased collection after use and recycling via 
EAF instead of primary steel plants should be organised where possible. The government 
is currently planning increased import of scrap. The EAF plants can be improved so that 
electricity can be conserved. Waste gases and heat from primary steel plants should be 
utilised to a higher extent and in a more efficient way. For that, the share of integrated 
steel plants should be increased (iron and steel production are often in separate locations, 
resulting in heat loss and low waste utilisation). Since capacity addition often takes place 
in existing plants, and there is a trend towards integration of local plants into bigger 
ones, it is not clear what the efficiency of this ‘new’ capacity and how large the BAU 
efficiency improvement potential is. The Energy Management Centre and Iron & Steel 
                                                   
365  However as interviewees put it, the closing down of small factories is resisted by the owners and state 
governments who do not want unemployment and reduction of the state’s income. 
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bureau gather information on successful investment projects. This information is 
disseminated to the government and enterprises. The banks are not receiving 
recommendations, and since no knowledge is available on energy efficiency, loan 
applications for investments are being judged on their overall profitability and not on the 
financial benefits of energy savings. Thus, what can be concluded is that there are policy 
measures being taken and that a lot of structural change is taking place. Whether the 
sector is ripe to modernise and compete will depend on the institutional changes taking 
place in the country.  
Aluminium:  
The BPT scenario for aluminium for 2020 can lead to a reduction of 18% electricity use 
in relation to the BAU situation. Is this feasible? 
In order to avoid the high price of electricity and ensure continuous supply, many 
aluminium factories have their own captive industries. At the same time the sector is 
being gradually liberalised and this will give an incentive to save costs and energy and to 
get ISO 14000 standards. But the process of liberalisation will take a long time. The 
large mills are in government hands and tend to obey government policies. The medium 
sized mills are in the hands of the government or the private sector. These try to bypass 
government policy. The government has said that if the smaller aluminium companies 
cannot increase their production to 50,000 tonnes annually in three years, they will be 
closed down. However the growth in this sector will be limited by lack of domestic 
resources of bauxite which is presently imported. 10 large key, state owned plants exist 
in China, which might be privatised during recent reforms. This might improve the 
efficiency due to entering the competitive market and reduction of government 
protection. Electricity conservation has not been given high priority by plant owners, 
since due to the strategic importance of the sector, the government has given assurance 
of electricity supply even in periods of scarcity. Current government policy requires that 
small soderberg plants either close down or convert to prebaked electrode technology. A 
70% special loan is provided by the government. The policy should involve new plants 
or capacity addition to be equipped with prebaked anodes. A 1998 policy gives rewards 
to enterprises who reach very low energy intensity levels and each company receives a 
maximum intensity target. Small plants are under local authority whereas large plants are 
under the bureau of non-ferrous metals. 
Household and commercial sectors:  
The adoption of BPT measures can lead to an additional reduction of 40% of electricity 
use in relation to the BAU scenario (see Chapter 6). Is this feasible?  
Lighting, refrigeration and air conditioning have potential to save electricity. There are 
no current regulations in relation to energy conservation in buildings but with the high 
growth of building construction, the associated energy use is likely to be high. Various 
projects and research institutes focus on the issue of building energy use. 
Energy efficient lamps were introduced in China two decades ago but the programme did 
not take of because the cost was ten times as much as other lamps. In 1996-97, there was 
an electricity shortage in the country and the government encouraged CFLs. This worked 
well but has slowed down since the electricity demand is lower than the supply. The 
Green Lights Programme encourages this through a variety of strategies and activities. 
The government itself is setting up standards and labelling programs. The government 
wants to use the market mechanism for the energy efficient lighting market, and doesn’t 
give any subsidies or develop promotion programs. Joint ventures exist which produce 
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high quality lamps but they are mainly exported. Commercial buildings in urban areas 
generally use energy efficient lighting, but there is no rule or regulation that obliges the 
use of such lighting in building standards.366 
For household and residential appliances, the government is improving its existing 
standards. Since a large share of airconditioners and refrigerators are produced by only a 
hand-full of manufacturers, it seems possible to reach agreement between the 
government and these sectors. In recent years the focus has been on producing CFC-free 
refrigerators, and the next focus might be on implementing Variable Speed drives. This 
is also a good option for commercial airconditioners. Improving compressors is another 
important option that should be focused on. Efficient appliances that are selling well in 
Japan, have a low market share in China because of the difference in standard of 
living.367  
Motors and drives:  
Under a BPT scenario, motors and drives could be so modernised that the national 
electricity consumption decreases by 15% in 2020. Is this feasible? 
Accessing information on motors and drives was not very easy. The SETC and SDPC 
support high efficiency motors and their speed adjustment via VSD. Standards and prod-
uct certification are being developed. Several foreign funded projects are ongoing with 
full or partial focus on EE motors: US EPA, US DOE, World Bank and EMCs (Energy 
Management Centres), GTZ and EU (IECC 1999). The necessary strategies according to 
the China Energy Efficiency Program of IECC (1999) are as follows: a Premium Quality 
Motor Brand should be developed with the manufacturers, end-users and government 
working as a team. Mechanisms should be developed so that energy efficiency invest-
ments can be made from identified financial resources. More focus should be on devel-
opment of standards and testing. The benefits regarding the energy, financial and opera-
tional should be demonstrated (IECC 1999). 
Implementation barriers specific for the motors sector include368 (EC 1996) (IIEC 1999): 
a) Lack of information on the function and needs of the driven system, on the available 
energy efficiency improvement options and the electricity consumption per individual 
end-user (fan, pump etc); b) Consumers are not aware of energy efficiency and its bene-
fits or often do not believe the claims made by manufacturers of energy efficient tech-
nologies due to previous unsatisfactory experiences. Furthermore, they are not interested 
in energy costs since there are also many other factors such as brand names and aesthetic 
appeal concerning energy equipment purchases (IECC 1999); c) The market structure is 
sometimes not beneficial for selling energy efficient motors. The decisions on motor re-
placement are often not made by someone with sufficient knowledge on energy efficient 
motor option. Furthermore, the main sales channels are often not interested in energy 
savings since they do not have to pay the electricity bills, and are therefore only inter-
ested in selling as many products as possible; d) conventional practice is to rewind old 
motors (replace wire and bearings), instead of buying a new motor. Rewinding results in 
prolonged life of old inefficient motors, the motor becomes 1% less efficient every time 
it is rewound, and there is a reduced chance of replacement by EE motors; e) A reliable 
repair service needs to be ensured; f) It is easier for a company to pay the higher annual 
(electricity) bill than receiving approval for a high investment (for an EE product); g) 
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Lack of internal incentives: investment is often another department’s bill than the annual 
costs, and therefore the investment/purchase department is not interested in helping the 
other department. Internal rewards for EE investments are often lacking; g) The manu-
facturing industry in China has a poor financial performance and there is a low product 
differentiation (IIEC 1999); h) the need to import Variable Speed Drive (VSD) from Ja-
pan. 
8.2.4 Institutional Context 
If one examines the key options, it is clear that the key bottleneck in relation to most of 
the options is the rate and nature of the structural changes the country is undergoing and 
what this means for the competitiveness of national industry and for the access to foreign 
technologies, capital and market. However, the key institutional challenges remains:  
The legitimacy of decision-making and the implementation deficit: Unlike India, China is 
a highly centralised economy and as such the central government has much more influ-
ence on the provincial policies than India. On the other hand, the government is trying to 
decentralise and allow for a free internal market that functions on a range of incentives. 
Until the 1990s the demand for electricity was increasing faster than supply. This created 
an urgent need for increasing the supply of electricity.369 This coincided with a period in 
which China was looking for ways and means of modernising the country and the fol-
lowing key issues can be highlighted. The size and diversity of the country were and still 
are key issues. China is a very big country and there are many imbalances between the 
income in the urban and the rural areas, between the eastern parts and the western parts 
of China. 370 The country is just too big to have good implementation and monitoring.371 
The very size of the country implies that the Chinese authorities in the pre-1990 period 
sought to have strict lines of control and that the central government had complete au-
thority over the provincial governments. The central government made the policy which 
was then implemented without question by the provincial and local authorities. However, 
the reality at least in the field of energy is that “local government is very good at playing 
games with the central government. This is understandable; because they also have their 
local priorities, and they may feel that the national goals are not in line with local aspira-
tions and they have a record of tacitly disobeying orders by not implementing.” 372 A key 
challenge in this period was that the government owned all production and most distribu-
tion capacity.373 This meant that all plants suffered from the normal problems of public 
run bodies, and were neither running at full efficiency, nor using market prices. Most of 
these enterprises also faced serious financial problems. The administrative and the busi-
ness functions were combined and this hampered the sector.374  
The issue of decentralisation in China and the enforcement of central government 
policies in provinces was a key issue. However, according to interviewees, the move 
towards decentralisation is followed by a return to centralisation followed by a move 
towards decentralisation and so on. The government is afraid to decentralise because of 
the possible impacts on its power. As a result, the process of centralised control is 
                                                   
369  Meeting 3, 4, 1999. 
370  Meeting 11, 1999. 
371  Meeting 3, 1999. 
372  Meeting 2, 1999. 
373  “All electric plants are state owned; the very large ones are in the hands of the state, the medium ones in the 
hands of the province and only the small ones are in the hands of local and private owners” - Meeting 3, 
1999. Large transmission grids are government owned. Small grids are province or local government owned. 
The grid is of poor quality. – Meeting 5, 1999.  
374  Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
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eroding and hence the ability to monitor and enforce, and at the same time the 
institutions of decentralisation have not been fully developed in a way that the market, 
the press and civil society can function as correcting forces in the process of 
development. This implies that it is very difficult to predict if indeed central government 
policy will get implemented at state government level or not. This is what we were told 
also repeatedly in relation to closure of coal mines, small power plants, small iron and 
steel, cement and aluminium plants. A second conclusion is that because of the 
centralisation process, the government is not able to harness the diversity of view and the 
regional knowledge to make context specific decisions that may be right in different 
circumstances.  
Another key challenge in the process of policy and law making in China at present is that 
the government is trying to define issues in technical and economic terms and is trying to 
avoid political and social debates. This implies that the policies are focused in terms of 
technology but not always in terms of social support. Until now, the people have in gen-
eral followed central government policy, see for example the developments in the Three 
Gorges Dam. But as the society moved towards a market and information economy, 
there will be an increasing role for civil society to play and it may become more and 
more difficult to impose decisions on people. This is a risk that may mean that policies 
that appear feasible now may not be so in a couple of years. As one of the stakeholders 
pointed out, in the transition stage, the key challenge for the government is to guarantee 
legitimacy of its policies. This is going to be difficult, experts fear.  
There will be different rates of development for different regions in China and this dis-
balance may in itself create new problems. Some parts of the country are already advanc-
ing fast, but other parts may take up to the next forty-fifty years according to interview-
ees. This makes it all the more complicated if the central government decides to adopt 
standard policies for all provinces.  
Policies that aim at substantial change are also affected by organisational inertia. Even 
though there are clear signs of change in government, interviewees argue that it will take 
many years before the change is actually implemented. Government run companies may 
take as much as 20 years to create a new working structure. This would be very much in 
line with the privatisation process in other parts of the Western world and although in 
Russia the process was initiated quickly, the actual impacts of the institutional change 
have still to be seen. 375 Such institutional reform also implies high transaction costs and 
there is doubt about how far such reform should go.376 There are also initial teething 
problems since many government established companies are also struggling finan-
cially.377 Although the communication sector has been reformed the energy sector still 
has to be reformed. 378 The problem is that “although the institutional structure in the en-
ergy sector has changed every five years over the last thirty-forty years, I do not think 
that those changes meant very much more than a change in form. However, the changes 
last year were very drastic; and could signal a major change in our society. The federal 
government decided within a period of three months or so to cut down the federal staff 
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by 50%”.379 Another problem is that the bureaucrats do not always know much about the 
issues. They seek some technical expertise from different institutions; but they do not 
have much understanding on the issues. 380 Restructuring the market is another bottle-
neck.381 
The key instrument used in China has been command and control based instruments. In 
general, either experts, academicians or the departments/ministries make suggestions 
about the contents that should be included in a law, and the People’s Congress decides 
whether to accept the proposal or not. In making such proposals the experts, scholars and 
the departments may draw heavily on foreign laws and policies.382 A law made at the 
federal level applies to the provincial and local level automatically. It is not necessary for 
the provincial level to draft a new law. However, at the provincial level, it is possible for 
the Province to develop a tougher law. 383When there is a conflict between different min-
istries, the conflict is discussed by the ministries. Although the scholars may have pre-
pared a tough law, it may not be the case that the view of the scholars will eventually 
prevail in the event of such a conflict. In relation to environment, even though the pro-
posal may have been in favour of the environmental issues, the end result may be that 
economic aspects prevail.384 In general, however, there are few conflicts between the 
laws negotiated. This is because the laws are all discussed by the special legal bureau 
under the State Council which is expected to coordinate the laws and ensure that they are 
internally consistent.385 Recent court decisions indicate that Chinese courts are passing 
judgements to protect the environment, although implementing their decisions is very 
difficult.386 
The Chinese environmental law is a body of laws that includes nine sectoral laws and 
several natural resource laws. In general, the air pollution laws aim to limit local and 
regional problems, but not global problems except in relation to CFCs. Chinese law 
makes use of standards, environmental impact assessments, and an instrument which 
implies that when a project is being constructed, the environmental protection measures 
are built into the design and objectives of the project. The laws include licenses to 
discharge pollutants and zoning especially in the case of acid pollution laws. However, 
taxes and subsidies may not be regulated by law. These may be dealt with by 
administrative orders/ regulations. In the past there was a fee that was to be paid by 
companies. These fees were put into a fund. The fee payers had the right to have access 
to this money if they were going to invest in environment friendly technologies. But this 
is no longer the case.387 Laws are often imported from abroad and may lack the domestic 
support. Environmental laws in particular were referred to as “soft law”.388  
Standards are an important tool for improving the efficiency of household appliances, 
but these standards cannot easily replicate international standards since many of the 
                                                   
379  Meeting 12, 1999. The ministry of fuel industry was there from 1950-1954; Ministry of Electric Power 
(1954-1958), Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (1958-1979), Ministry of Electric Power 
(1979-1982), Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (1982-1988), Ministry of Energy (1988-
1993), Ministry of Electric Power (1993-1998), State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) since 1998 
– Beijing Workshop 1999. 
380  Meeting 2, 1999. 
381  Meeting 4, 1999. 
382  Meeting 11, 1999. 
383  Meeting 11, 1999. 
384  Meeting 11, 1999. 
385  Meeting 11, 1999. 
386  Meeting 12, 1999. 
387  Meeting 11, 1999. 
388  Meeting 5, 1999. 
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producers are small scale producers. There is a minimum obligatory standard and a 
higher voluntary standard.  
Privatisation and ownership:  
The government has adopted the policy of increasing privatisation and corporatisation of 
power plants and other industry. This policy is gradually being implemented. However, 
the process of implementation is influenced by the number of permissions required (see 
Chapter 3). The lack of information among government officials in a number of issues 
areas and in particular in terms of legal arrangements such as power purchase 
agreements is a key bottleneck. Furthermore, this is also affected by the issues 
mentioned above. 
In order to invest in modern technologies, companies need to have access to loans and 
finances. Chinese companies do not have much equity and have difficulty securing 
loans, and they are as yet young and do not have the ability to secure loans. However, 
even though low interest loans from the World Bank are accessible, they are seen as less 
attractive because of the hard conditionalities. 
Prices and subsides:  
In a functioning market, the price sends signals to consumers and producers. Producers 
tend to compete with each other to satisfy the consumers. The key technical and techno-
logical problems were that the state aimed at resource self-sufficiency and used nation-
ally available fuels, poor quality coal and did not have access to modern technologies 
and techniques because it was a relatively closed economy. During this period, the com-
bination of low efficiency, externalisation of environmental costs, administered price and 
the inherent financial crises of the state run production and distribution enterprises, 
meant there was little surplus for investment purposes and to modernise the sector. 389 
- The lack of viability of the state owned production units; 
- The cross- subsidies in which industry subsidies households, leading to closure of 
many industries. 
The revised pricing policy also faces critical problems. First, the pricing system for old 
plants is different than for new plants. For old plants the marginal costs are used for 
determining the delivery price to the net (i.e. administered costs). For new plants full 
costs are used. 390 This leads to different prices of delivery to the grid. Second, there are 
also different tariffs for different residences, hotels, industries and agriculture. Industry 
pays the highest rate and households lower rates.391 This is similar to the situation in 
India, but is completely different to the situation in most western countries where 
industry is subsidised in order to help it be competitive nationally and internationally, 
but households have to pay the market price. Third, rural consumers are being charged 
much more than urban consumers because (a) they are further down the grid system, (b) 
to encourage villagers to move to the towns and (c) because some local governments 
over charge for the costs.392 A fourth problem is that the price elasticity of electricity is 
very low (about 0.3) in China.393 
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8.2.5 Analysis for China 
The challenges faced by transition economies, are common to most parts of the world; 
but the solutions are not easy or straightforward. The interviews and workshop indicate 
that some of the possible options for China. 
a) The implementation process faces several problems. The lack of financial 
investment makes implementation difficult. Second and most critically, privatisation 
brings unemployment and unemployment implies instability.394 Third, in the 
implementation process, the government for the first time had to fight against vested 
interests; only this time the vested interests are other parts of the same government 
or recently privatised industry. Interviewees claim that it was difficult to make 
policies aimed at the large polluters because of their political power and so 
measures were focused on individual citizens in the urban areas, since “it is the 
people who have to pay for the measures and not the government. This is possible, 
because we are as you call it a totalitarian country. The government just orders and 
the people have to obey. Thus all cars will have to have catalysators and electrical 
injection in Beijing.”395 In general, the large companies may have larger bargaining 
power when it comes to ensuring that the negotiation of new laws take their 
concerns into account, and the individual and the smaller consumer had fewer 
opportunities to negotiate; it was, however, easier for the state to implement laws 
aimed at the larger companies than at the individuals and the smaller companies. 
Thus, although the larger companies had greater bargaining power, they cannot 
really avoid the law when it is actually passed. “In contrast, there were examples of 
small companies polluting into rivers which led to the large scale destruction of 
animals and contamination of agricultural products. Although there were laws 
passed to control the emissions from such companies, these companies were very 
‘mobile’. When the inspector arrived, it would appear as if the companies had 
closed down, and as soon as the inspector had left, there would be suddenly a re-
opening of the factory. The small sources of pollution - small entities - do not have 
much money and they try and avoid the laws”.396 Fourth, the lack of stakeholder 
involvement in policy design and formation also leads to lack of stakeholder 
commitment to implementation. This was not only because of the vastness of the 
country, but also because these laws did not have any degree of legitimacy in that 
they did not develop from perceived social needs, but were borrowed from foreign 
countries.397 There was some disagreement between the interviewees as to whether 
the law is automatically, implemented, in fact, by the people. According to one 
interviewee, the implementation of the law depends on the degree of support by the 
local people to whom it is applied. According to the other interviewee, the people 
implemented the law. There was also discussion about how people tried to evade 
laws. For example, the new Beijing law that cars should be installed with 
catalysators led to many quick purchases of new cars before the law entered into 
effect. Another interviewee claimed instead that the law in relation to cars was easy 
                                                   
394  “The implementation failure is partly to do with lack of money; partly because you cannot do anything if 
every state owned body is making losses and if the implementation of such policies will lead to bankruptcy 
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to implement because only few people owned cars.398 Fifth, the privatisation goals 
are also expected to have serious impacts on the gap between the rich and the poor. 
In conclusion, “In a command and control economy, the bottleneck is not 
necessarily the process of policy making, but the process of policy implementation. 
“You must not forget, the Chinese government is not monolithic.”399 
b) An umbrella policy for the country as a whole is necessary combined with 
decentralisation of the policy-making and implementation process. This is because 
first different regions in China have different energy related problems. Some are 
close to sources of clean coal, some are far away, some have access to electricity 
and some do not. In the urban areas, there is in general no shortage. In some 
provinces industry faces an energy deficit. 400 Second, this will ensure that policies 
are more in line with the wishes of the provinces and municipalities and may lead to 
a greater compliance pull. This would imply that SEPA should have branch 
organisations in the provincial and local levels. This development is already 
ongoing for the banking sector and the state administration of industry and 
commerce.401 
c) It appears necessary to separate the suppliers from distributors. The cost of 
producing should be separate from the price of distribution,402 and the policy to 
reform and privatise the electricity sector should be pursued with some degree of 
caution.403 This would help to address the pricing problem to some extent. On the 
one hand, private enterprises have to pay much larger interest in order to borrow 
from the international market; and their only goal is profit as opposed to 
development of the country. This may mean that the government should try and 
encourage state run corporations to compete with each other as is currently being 
experimented with in the telecommunication sector.  
d) A short term solution, is to invest in renovation of the components of existing plants 
with both nationally developed and imported technologies. China should try and 
develop the sector from the many small plants to a few large stations. According to 
interviewees, the current excess capacity should be utilised to make such reparations 
without an additional development cost to the economy.404 The efficiency of these 
facilities should be raised to about 40%. The average efficiency is about 30% now. 
There are some examples in which this efficiency increase was achieved by 
technology changes with investments from the ADB. It would be good is we could 
first try and raise the average efficiency to 35%. This could be done partly by 
retrofitting and development of new plants. This 5% efficiency increase would have 
large impacts on electricity prices and environmental pollution (including CO2).405 
e) Independent power production (IPP) is only possible for the industries’ own use at 
present. They are not allowed to sell the excess to the grid network. However, since 
the efficiency of these plants is usually much higher than in the power sector and as 
they have the financial capacity, it may be necessary to allow them to supply the 
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grid in times of excess and to buy back in times of shortage; this however means an 
effective open market for electricity.406 
f) The results of prioritising policy options in the energy sector carried out in the 
Beijing workshop indicates the following:  
Table 8.1  The results of prioritising policy options jointly carried out by the Beijing Workshop 
participants, May 2000 
Options Priority for 
participants 
When Barriers  Comments 
Large-hydro 1 Now Environmental and 
social concerns 
 
Gas 3 Now Energy supply se-
curity / costs 
 
Coal washing 4 As soon as 
possible 
Lack of incentive 
for investors 
Not necessary when there is 
FGD; but is FGD more ef-
fective? 
Nuclear 2 Now Cost/ environment  
CFB  Now   
PFBC  5-10 years  
Clean 
coal 
IGCC  10-20 years  
Is the effort worthwhile? 
Supercritical 
boilers 
 Now Import of compo-
nents 
 
Renewables   Cost 
 
Esp. important for rural ar-
eas 
Transmission  Now  Important in combination 
with large hydro 
Operation and 
maintenance 
   No priority for plants above 
300 Mwe, international 
standards are met for avail-
ability but not efficiency 
Rural distribution    Solved in 2-3 years 
Closing small 
power plants 
  Unemployment Is done 
 
g) Nationally, the most important industrial sectors in which energy efficiency 
improvements can be obtained are the iron and steel industry, chemical industries 
and cement industries. In urban areas, electric buses, lead free cars, solar power for 
heating,407 and a mix of solar and pv appear to be economically viable options.408In 
rural areas, the high price of electricity at present implies that clean and efficient 
biomass and renewable energy has more potential than conventional energy because 
the transmission and distribution costs can be avoided. 409 Wind technology appears 
to be a viable alternative in the west of the country. A National Workshop has 
concluded that there is need for reform of the rural electricity management systems 
and grid and that rural and urban pricing should be the same.410 
h) The technologies identified as relevant for importing include low Sulphur and 
unleaded fuels, catalysators for cars and public transport,411 clean coal and exhaust 
cleaning technologies (FGD and ESP in electricity production and in chemicals 
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industry IGCC technology, 412 safe and advanced nuclear technology,413 wind 
turbines and parks, 414 natural gas technologies,415 investments in the power grid, 
416and technology for producing paper from straw. 417 Among the technologies that 
were not needed were technology for monitoring emissions are not needed.418 
Furthermore foreign biomass technology was not always appropriate or relevant 
although biomass gasification is an area where technology cooperation can focus on. 
But the technologies should be low cost and clean, and of medium size to provide 
energy to households in a village. Combined/hybrid systems are also very 
interesting for rural areas. If the imported technologies are to be successful, they 
must be low maintenance systems. When importing technologies it is wrong to say 
that the rural people cannot use the technologies; you must import technologies that 
rural people can use. The focus thus should be to import technologies that are 
usable. On the demand side the focus in rural areas is on cooking stoves; and on the 
electricity conservation options related to the transmission and distribution 
network.419 
i) The fear of unemployment at the individual and the state level needs to be dealt with 
since this is a critical aspect of the social instability the government appears to be 
afraid of. Initial experience shows that many of the laid off workers went to 
universities, or were employed by the private sector because the private sector 
thinks these people have a valuable contribution to make since they understand the 
government very well. Some people were prematurely retired, and the normal 
recruitment rate was slowed down.420 This means that there is need on the one hand 
of establishing social security programmes, on the job education and employment 
agencies that can help such people find other employment opportunities in the 
country. 
j) There also needs to be a modus operandi developed to gradually involve the 
stakeholders in the decision making process. The key problem for the Chinese 
system is the implementation of the laws. They argued that it was necessary to have 
“policies from above, strategies from below”. 421In order to address this major 
bottleneck, it is necessary to develop an incremental approach that takes the 
economical, technological and financial situation into account. It will require a lot of 
patience before the laws can be effectively implemented. 422 
k) The capital shortage423 can to some extent be developed by making use of the 
international cooperative mechanisms. On international instruments, the views were 
divided. While some were uninformed on the issue, and when it was explained to 
them, vehemently opposed the notion of credits,424 Some were in favour of CDM on 
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a project basis,425 while others opposed CDM on the grounds that baselines would 
be difficult to draw,426 and argued that it was necessary to wait for the results of the 
pilot projects first before taking any decisions.427 but opposed emission trading as it 
is currently defined in Kyoto Protocol because of the lack of certainty that China 
would benefit at all under such a scheme.428 There was support for technology 
cooperation through ODA and GEG.429 It was clear that win win options would 
imply meeting China’s key developmental needs through international 
instruments.430 In general, there was disappointment about the lack of technology 
transfer under Article 4.5 of the FCCC.431 
The following table summarises the key options, barriers, existing support, and the 
policies needed to improve the feasibility of the options for China. 
Table 8.2 Identifying the political and economic feasibility of technological and other options to re-
duce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions: China. 
Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve feasi-
bility of the option 
1. Rationalise pricing - System of cross sub-
sidies; 
- Variable tariffs for 
different sectors; 
- High prices for rural 
households; 
- Industry, commerce 
will support such 
changes because it 
may reduce costs and 
increase profits for 
them; 
- Domestic political 
will; 
- Support from inter-
national community; 
- Article 2 of the 
Kyoto Protocol; 
- Support for rational 
pricing combined 
with price support/ 
ration system for the 
poorest sectors of 
society; 
 
2. Improve legitimacy of 
decision-making and re-
duce the implementation 
deficit 
- The government de-
centralises and cen-
tralises out of the 
angst of losing con-
trol, this does not 
make the role of cen-
tre and state clear; 
this compounds the 
problem of institu-
tional inertia; 
- The stakeholders and 
provinces are not ac-
tively involved in the 
decision-making 
process; but as China 
liberalises the sup-
port of these stake-
holders is necessary 
for policy and law 
implementation; 
- Vested interests want 
large fossil-fuel, nu-
clear and hydro pro-
jects; but there may 
- In principle the Gov-
ernment wants a 
peaceful transition 
and does not want to 
shake society by 
sudden changes; 
- Government wants 
large projects and no 
retrofitting especially 
because current elec-
tricity supply is 
higher than demand; 
large projects can be 
controlled or directed 
by the state; 
- To develop a step-
by-step approach to 
decentralisation in 
which good relations 
between the centre 
and state are fos-
tered;  
- To develop a step-by 
step approach to in-
volve stakeholders 
and provinces so that 
tailor-made, not uni-
form policies for dif-
ferent regions can be 
made; 
- To develop a step-
by-step approach to 
monitor and enforce 
legislation; 
- To translate this into 
guidelines for CDM 
projects in electric-
ity; 
 
                                                   
425  Meeting 3, 7, 11, 1999. 
426  Meeting 5, 1999. 
427  Meeting 7, 10, 1999. 
428  Meeting 3, 4, 5, 7, 1999. 
429  Meeting 5, 1999. 
430  Meeting 7, 1999. 
431  Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve feasi-
bility of the option 
be latent social op-
position 
3. Improving the transi-
tion from state owned to 
corporatised bodies and 
privatisation 
- The bulk of the elec-
tricity producers and 
distributors and large 
end-users were state 
entities; the transi-
tion to privatisation 
is proving difficult;  
- The process of de-
veloping power pur-
chase agreements not 
well developed; 
- The domestic private 
sector is still in a 
nascent stage and has 
to learn the rules of 
privatisation; 
- The government is 
also trying to find a 
peaceful and gradual 
method to encourage 
privatisation; 
- Companies do not 
have much equity, so 
securing loans is dif-
ficult especially as 
the financial market 
is also trying to lib-
eralise; 
- Government support 
for privatisation; 
- Growing awareness 
of the risks of fast 
privatisation; 
- Awareness of risks 
of increasing unem-
ployment as a result 
of privatisation; 
- Separate generators 
from distributors ; 
- Create power ‘pur-
chasing pools’ and 
support existing ex-
periments in the 
field;  
- Develop a frame-
work for the privati-
sation process on the 
basis of the existing 
challenges faced; 
- Reduce the red tape 
and the need for 
many licenses (sim-
plified investment 
procedures), instead 
encourage transpar-
ency and the public 
and press can moni-
tor developments; 
- Make simple rules 
for loans to starting 
companies 
4. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
f. Cement 
g. Iron and steel 
h. Aluminium 
i. Households and 
commercial equip-
ment; 
j. Motors and drives  
4.  
f. Inadequate informa-
tion and high cost of 
technology and in-
puts for small-scale 
industry; resistance 
to closure from small 
industry; 
g. capital shortage; dip 
in international mar-
ket; lack of scrap; in-
stitutional inertia; 
h. lack of resources in 
small-scale sector; 
difficulties in corpo-
ratisation process; 
i. cost of equipment to 
households and com-
merce; 
j. lack of information 
and the price of 
VSD; tendency to 
rewind motors rather 
than buy new motors 
4. 
f. Technologies avail-
able internationally; 
and large scale sector 
supports modernisa-
tion; government 
policy to close down 
small producers; 
g. Technologies avail-
able nationally and 
internationally; Gov-
ernment support for 
increasing quality of 
steel and not quan-
tity; closure of small 
plants; 
h. Government support 
for closure of small 
plants; 
i. Technologies and 
products available 
domestically; 
j. -  
4 
For all options: 
- rules for participa-
tion in CDM and 
technology transfer;  
- guidelines to support 
small-scale projects; 
plants and products 
via subsidies/ 
GEF/CDM 
6. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
g. Large hydro 
h. Small hydro 
i. Wind 
j. Gas 
k. Nuclear 
l. Biomass 
 
h. (Latent) social, envi-
ronmental and seis-
mic risks;  
i. Technical difficul-
ties; 
j. Cost of wind power; 
difficulty of storing 
wind energy; diffi-
culties in transmit-
h. Strong political will; 
i. Technical potential  
j. Large technical po-
tential and political 
will;  
k. International interest 
and willingness to 
invest in modern 
technologies; 
h. Explore options for 
small hydro in large 
hydro regions in an-
ticipation of major 
potential social prob-
lems in the future; 
i. Develop start subsi-
dies for small hydro; 
j. “ 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve feasi-
bility of the option 
 ting from wind rich 
to wind poor areas; 
k. Location of local gas 
resources; aging gas 
pipes; distance from 
demand; costs of 
generation; 
l. Lack of technology 
and capital; (latent) 
social and environ-
mental risks; 
m. Lack of awareness; 
n. High costs 
l. Political will high; 
low risk perception 
of social and envi-
ronmental risks; 
m. Availability of bio-
mass and potential 
n. Some solar pro-
grammes encouraged 
 
k. Explore opportuni-
ties to replace coal 
by available gas 
l. Explore opportuni-
ties (to take into ac-
count nuclear waste 
and risks) 
m. Make focused bio-
mass policies  
For all options: 
- Develop rules for in-
clusion and exclu-
sion for GEF/ CDM 
projects on the basis 
of above discussion; 
n.  Develop start subsi-
dies for solar. 
 
7. Efficiency Improve-
ment in coal plants (EFF) 
c. Existing plants 
d. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boilers) 
c. Lack of resources in 
the few remaining 
small plants; 
d. Joint venture restric-
tions and lack of 
capital; foreign tech-
nologies not forth-
coming, inappropri-
ate or expensive; 
c. Political support for 
closing small plants; 
some support for ret-
rofitting large plants 
as long as supply ex-
ceeds demand 
d.  Political support for 
efficient coal tech-
nologies and IGCC. 
- Develop rules for 
CDM and for exist-
ing investments of 
the World Bank, 
ADB and make dif-
ferent baselines for 
the two options; 
8. Increasing Cogenera-
tion (COG) 
 
- Difficulty in selling 
to grid, administra-
tive inertia; 
- Lack of knowledge 
in some sectors;  
- Increasing govern-
ment support; 
- Simple rules for 
power purchase 
agreements; 
- Recommendations 
for CDM/ GEF. 
9. Reduction of technical 
losses in transmission and 
distribution (T&D)  
- Lack of capital;  
- A number of remote 
rural areas to be con-
nected to the grid 
- Technologies avail-
able in domestic and 
international market; 
- Political willingness; 
- Recommendations 
for GEF and tech-
nology cooperation; 
- Explore non-central 
grid options; 
 
8.3 India 
8.3.1 The process 
The research in India took an iterative process. As mentioned in Chapter 2, we organised 
an initial workshop in December 1997 in New Delhi. This was followed by a literature 
survey and institutional analysis in 1998, an internet discussion in 1999, interviews in 
2000 and 2001. The purpose of these discussions at different levels of interaction was to 
ascertain the views of as many experts in the field as possible in relation to what are the 
key issues for India and to resolve some of the key dilemmas that arose in the 
discussions.  
At the 1997 workshop, experts argued that when countries have limited resources, the 
key challenge is to direct the resources in a direction that can yield the best long-term 
results in terms of setting an autonomous process into motion. The key challenges for the 
supply side were whether the focus should be on old plants or new generation, 
generation or distribution, few large or many small generation units, and whether power 
plants should be located near coal fields or spread out. What was clear was that the 
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emphasis should be laid on high conversion efficiency, better combustion technology, 
management information systems, coal beneficiation and energy efficiency technologies. 
In relation to the demand side, the questions were whether the focus should be on large-
scale or small scale industry? The sectors that needed attention were clearly cement, 
sugar, aluminium, iron and steel, motors and drives, and water pumps. The key 
challenges in relation to the decision-making context was the bureaucratic control of 
policies, the lack of clarity between the division of responsibilities at the centre and the 
state, the lack of political will, scarce financial resources, the political fear of phasing out 
subsidies, the subsidies, cross-subsidies and the administered pricing policy, and the 
phasing of privatisation policy. In particular, although the state of electricity policy in 
India appeared dismal, in general there were many success stories from which lessons 
could be drawn. These included the Indian missile programme, the non-conventional 
energy programme, bagasse cogeneration, the cement industry and energy policy in 
Andhra Pradesh.  
These initial issues were the guiding factor in undertaking the literature survey in 1998 
and 1999 which was supplemented by the presentations of the participants at the 
workshop.  
An analysis of the literature survey revealed that since India is in a state of dynamic 
change and political instability, the problems being faced are continuously changing. At 
the same time, some parts of the country are further than other parts of the country. The 
literature and institutional analysis revealed that in the supply sector there was need for 
organisational reform (which is underway), pricing reform, the need for new 
technologies, and renovation and modernisation. The key issues to modernise the sector 
were bankruptcies of the SEBs, bureaucratic inertia, low plant load factor, ownership 
issues; poor operation and maintenance, renovation, use of new technologies, subsidies 
to agricultural sectors, higher prices for industry, few takers for privatisation, problem, 
of guarantees, bureaucratic procedures, theft and inadequate demand side management. 
The analysis of the demand side revealed that there is no clear sectoral policies to advice 
specific sectors, although they have dedicated ministries and banks and a new Energy 
Conservation Law. Though many changes have been undertaken, the literature advises 
that we should be careful in being optimistic, since many of these changes may end up 
being more changes in form than fact. 
Following the literature survey, we prepared a semi-structured questionnaire for an 
internet survey that we distributed to Indian experts via the internet. These experts 
responded by saying that while a vision of a decentralised small scale electricity and 
energy system was most desirable for a country like India, a large-scale centralised grid 
system appeared more feasible in the short-term. Heavy industry and agriculture are the 
most important sectors. They suggested that the key criteria for evaluating technologies 
in the short-term should be economic access, but in the long-term the criteria should be 
environmental and social feasibility and user friendliness. The key options identified 
were in the end-use efficiency improvement sector, energy conversion, transmission and 
distribution, the plant load factor and efficiency improvements at the plant level.  
In March 2000, interviews were conducted with some 50 experts from specialised fields 
to complete the picture regarding the feasibility of options. From these interviews, a 
picture seemed to emerge as to the priorities for the country. First, the focus should be on 
supply, then demand. In supply, focus should be on distribution, renovation, 
concentrated generation, coal based technologies, plant availability factor, not plant load 
factor. In demand focus should be on the small scale sector, water pumps and 
commercial lighting. Key bottlenecks emphasised that domestic loans were expensive, 
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there were problems with privatisation and implementing laws and standards are 
difficult. In relation to CDM, it was stated that it should be additional and there were 
strong views on base-lines (CII, TERI, CSE). This chapter presents the results of these 
stakeholder interviews which were then tested and verified with stakeholders in New 
Delhi in February 2001.  
8.3.2 Supply side options 
The following section analyses the key views of the stakeholders in terms of the supply 
side options. It aims to identify the feasible supply side options and criteria for 
evaluating these. For most interviewees, the electricity supply in India will need to 
increase by about 7–9% every year over the next fifteen to twenty years. Chapter 7 
concludes that there are many fuel switch options for India including a switch to 
renewables, gas, nuclear, the closing down of small plants, improving the efficiency of 
plants, increased use of cogeneration, reduction of technical losses in transmission and 
distribution and technologies to reduce sulphur emissions. The question is: how likely is 
it that the Government will want to takes these options seriously?  
In a discussion on fuel switching, it is first important to understand the perceptions relat-
ing to the role of coal in the Indian economy. India has 1% of proven coal reserves in the 
world. 85% of the coal is non-coking coal; 15% is coking coal.432 The key argument for 
using coal as the major source of energy is the abundant large supply of coal in India433 
and the issue of energy security and self reliance. Energy security is not just a key na-
tional preoccupation, it is also a provincial preoccupation and led to long-distance trans-
port of coal to generation units in different states so that the states can be self-reliant in 
power production. There is now a move towards pithead production in combination with 
a well-functioning national grid, which reduces the transportation and related emis-
sions.434  
                                                   
432  The largest coal deposits are in Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Ma-
harahtra. The coal industry has about 500 mines. Coal provides about 62% of the total electricity needs in 
India. In 1996-97 Coal India Limited produced about 251 Mt of coal, the SCCL about 29 Mt, and the others 
about 6.3 Mt. By 2007, it is expected that these numbers will grow and the total will be about 432 Mt. This 
will still mean that there is a shortfall of 190 Mt by 2006. Under the present law, only the government can 
mine the coal.  
433  Meeting India 2000: 40, 45; and Meeting India 1997. 
434  Meeting India 2000: 17, 21 
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And yet coal is being imported435 because it is cheaper since (a) the freight charges for 
coal are the highest in the world to subsidise passenger transport, (b) it is on average of 
better quality (higher calorific value), (c) with the move towards pithead production, 
many states do not want to be dependant on other states for the coal and so coastal states 
were encouraged to look for alternatives, and (d) the inability of the Ministry of 
Railways to move as efficiently on the issue as the Ministry of Power.436 But coal 
imports are seen as relevant only as a short term measure and as partly strategic – why 
use the coal when you can import it?437  
Fuel switch to renewables:  
The BAU scenario indicates that about 17% of the future electricity use is produced from 
renewables. In the BTP scenario renewables (bagasse, large hydro and wind and small 
hydro) contribute 538 PJ more in 2020. Is this feasible? 
Switching to Renewables: A grand-scale fuel switch to renewables is a dream of many 
NGOs who argue that this is the only way forward. The advantages are it (a) uses local 
resources, (b) has less environmental impacts in general, (c) is renewable, and (d) in 
some areas is already competitive. Although there are no doubts that renewables are 
useful, the critical bottlenecks are (a) the cost and hence the affordability for a country 
like India (see also 3.6), (b) the poor quality implementation and awareness at least in the 
wind energy sector,438 (c) the small-scale nature leading to standards not being 
maintained, (d) the question of who bears the cost of the evacuation lines to the gird – 
the producer or the distributor?439 However, these issues can be tackled by reducing the 
hidden and actual subsidies to the thermal power sector, if renewables are made 
                                                   
435  India has large coal supply and hence coal is considered the key source of energy in India. However, since 
both ‘Coal India’ and its relationship with the Indian Railways is seen as poor, and they have a poor per-
formance record, limited capital and a weak credit rating, and since coal-fired plants lead to high environ-
mental pollution, the problem is being addressed by importing superior coal. However, imported coal implies 
a drain on foreign exchange reserves, transportation and unloading problems, and the problem that local coal 
can no longer be used. The cost of imported coal may compare favourably when compared to local coal if 
the local coal has to be transported over significant distances in India. South African and Australian coal 
suppliers are likely to get several contracts for coal to power companies in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat. The Financial Times Global Private Power Update (1998, 2-4) reports that there are several 
such schemes underway in India, although there are also allegations that these schemes are being allowed 
partly through bribes. Importing coal is very expensive, given also that it is not very smart to import when 
there are reserves in the country. This calls for better strategies for the exploitation and transportation of lo-
cal coal (Narayan 1998). Such strategies include (a) the development of specific railway lines, (b) increasing 
the average speed of goods trains in India and (c) dedicated coal movement (Narayan 1998. Since 1993 the 
sector is gradually being privatised and 14 private sector parties have been allocated rights to invest. Al-
though the market price of coal is higher than its economic costs, the transport company – Indian Railways 
has had a profit while the mines have had losses. There is also inter-grade price differentials which imply 
that the better coal is cheaper than the poorer quality coal (Srivastava 1997: 946).  
436  Meeting India 2000:6, 12, 16, 20, 21, 22, 36 
437  Meeting India 2000: 21, 22, 23 
438  “At the same time renewable energy programmes have suffered because of shoddy quality and poor 
implementation and awareness. It has seen such a high growth; the tax incentives have led to a flurry of 
investments and these were poorly planned. The problem is the supply of renewable energy tends to be small 
scale in nature and so the standards are not maintained. It will be attractive mainly in areas where there is a 
non availability of the grid and there is good demand. As prices lower, there may be opportunities. Incentives 
will have to lead to lower costs. But this was inevitable. In a country where the electricity sector was 
growing by 6%, renewables were doubling. I think the key mistake that has been made is that the incentives 
should have been on the basis of capacity utilisation rather than capacity installations”(Meeting India 2000: 
20).  
439  The argument is that the evacuation lines should be paid by the company, otherwise it is not viable for the 
grid (Meeting India 2000: 20).  
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compulsory in urban areas, if incentives are based on capacity utilisation and not 
capacity installation and with more awareness programmes.440  
There is enormous potential for switching to biomass and there is considerable activity in 
this field. Bagasse based cogen is already taking off (see cogen section). Biomass 
fermentation (gobar gas) has been successful in India (see Box 8.1) and the challenge is to 
make it an important part of rural living. Developing biomass for electricity generation is 
a possibility and is not very expensive. 
 
Box 8.1 Success story on gobar gas  
 
For example, in Rani Ka Talaab, there is a ‘gaushala’ on the road from Himmatnagar to Udaipur, 
where there are 240 cattle and there are gobar gas plants. They can produce 0.5 kWh per cattle per 
day; in total this amounts to 130 kWh. If you have 20 bulbs in a village 2 kW is enough for this 
village. Further after the slurry comes out of the plant, they mix it with cow urine and allow it to 
ferment and then they mix this with the solid wastes from the farms and this leads to the formation 
of fertilizers through aerobic decomposition and this fertilizer has 16 micronutrients in it and can 
be sold for 40,000 Rs per cow per annum. – (up to Rs 5 per kg). The milk from the cow can be 
sold for 20,000-25000 Rs per cow per annum and if a person has three cattle he can make Rs 5000 
per month. Source: Meeting India 2000 
 
Hydro has provided about 25% of the commercial electricity in India. India has a poten-
tial of 205 GW. However, the share of hydro has been declining. The government has 
decided to undertake studies of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of mega 
and small dams before deciding on any new dams (Approach paper to 9th Five Year 
Plan). India has only used about 15% of the available hydro potential as compared to 
Europe which has use 98% of the potential and North America which has used 83%. 
However, the use of hydro energy is not uncontroversial any more, and discussions about 
developing this energy get lost in political and environmental concerns (Ranganathan 
1997: 435). The Teesta in the North-East can generate about 31000 MW of power. The 
advantages of large hydro are that it provides clean power at relatively cheap costs, espe-
cially over the life time of such a plant. The disadvantages are that (a) there is a long ges-
tation period, (b) India has a track record of not completing large hydro, (c) there are 
huge population movements involved, and (d) there are severe negative environmental 
impacts and possibly increased methane emissions. In the past, the rehabilitation issue 
has been critical and the rehabilitation package small and poorly executed. For some ex-
perts, an improved rehabilitation package could increase the potential of large hydro.441 
In the particular case of the Teesta, the opportunities are good in that it is not an over 
populated region and this can provide large quantities of cheap,442 non-polluting power 
to a region that could use some development.443 However, the location is in a forest and 
seismic area, the region is so undeveloped, that the power will have to be transported 
long distance (possibly over Bangladesh) to central India, and there are security risks and 
the risk of loss of biodiversity.444 While some argue that the development of the Teesta 
will in one blow reduce the international pressure on India to reduce greenhouse gas 
                                                   
440  Meeting India 2000: 3, 6, 8, 40 
441  “200 crores for rehabilitation is a very small addition to a bill of 1000 crores and this makes large hydro very 
competitive over a fifteen year period” (Meeting India 2000: 21). 
442  “At this moment, hydroelectricity from Koyna dam costs 60 paisa per unit, coal is Rs 1.60, and Enron 
charges Rs. 3.00 from its gas based unit” (Meeting India 2000: 23).  
443  Meeting India 2000: 3, 20, 23, 43, 45, 46 
444  Meeting India 2000: 23, 36, 40; and Meetings in 2001 
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emissions, others argue that this is short-sighted and a more integrated approach needs to 
be taken.  
Wind power is growing very fast in India. India was the third largest wind energy pro-
ducer in the world (Haider 1998) with 95% contributed by the private sector (Rajsekhar 
et al. 1999: 669). But wind energy has declined since 1995. This is because (Rajsekhar et 
al. 1999): (a) the fiscal attractiveness has decreased. A 100% depreciation of investments 
in wind energy is no longer attractive since all companies have to pay a minimum alter-
nate tax of 12.9% since 1996, (b) the location of the power plants was not optimum, 
since the law allows plants at places where the wind is as low as 18 km per hour which 
means that these plants can barely operate at 20% (capacity utilisation factor). (c) The 
wind turbines were not adapted to be suitable for connection with the existing grid sys-
tem. (d) There are 22 clearances needed to convert agricultural land into wind power 
land and this has also been a bottleneck, (e) there are few good sites, (f) there was lack of 
professionalism in the sector;445 and 446 (g) there was damage from the cyclones in 
Saurashtra and Orissa, and it remains expensive. India imports wind turbines and also 
exports wind turbines to Germany and Australia! Wind technology is being produced by 
VESTAS, Mohan Meakan’s etc.447 
Mini-micro hydro power is one of the earliest renewable energy sources which has been 
in existence in the country since the beginning of the 20th century. The development of 
hydro power in the country was stepped up only after independence, by which time, the 
technology for large hydro was available and efforts of all state governments/SEBs were 
mainly on the large multipurpose projects. During the earlier five year plans, though ru-
ral electrification was given priority, no comprehensive plans for development of small 
hydro were drawn up. It was only during the Eighth Five Year Plan, that the Ministry of 
Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES) proposed that the status of small hydro be 
upgraded and additional funds be allocated for this purpose. The total installed capacity 
of such projects in India was 144.28 MW (September 1997) and another 241.87 MW 
was under construction (MNES 1998).  
Small hydro power generation is important because (a) it is competitive with grid ex-
tended power in remote areas, (b) there is potential in Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh and (c) it does not have negative environmental and social impacts like submer-
gence of land, rehabilitation and resettlement of people, etc.448 The issue is one of lack of 
political will and entrepreneurship. 
India is rich in solar resources and while PV is a very important opportunity, it needs 
high purity of silicon which is energy intensive and there are extraction issues; and in the 
production there is high energy use (see Chapter 3) (see Box 8.2).449  
                                                   
445  The problem in this sector is that the financial incentives given were picked up by unscrupulous investors 
who thought they can get a 100% depreciation and they invested in poor sites and poor technology. 
446  Meeting India 2000: 3, 22, 36, 40, 46 
447  Meeting India 2000: 8 
448  Meeting India 2000: 42, 47 
449  Meeting India 2000: 35 
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Box 8.2 The Rural Photovoltaic market in India 
 
by Shirish Sinha 
 
Introduction 
The Indian Photovoltaic (PV) technology programme, like many other renewable energy technology 
programmes originated as a result of the oil crisis in the early 1970s. The PV programme was ini-
tiated in 1975 by the Government of India, under the aegis of the Department of Science and 
Technology. Initially the programme was confined to the application in sectors such as telecom-
munication, defence and space. However, after the creation of the Department (and now Ministry) 
of Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES) in 1982, the focus of the programme shifted to rural 
applications like lighting, water pumps and community services. The costs were shared between 
the central and state agencies, whereby MNES paid for the cost of the PV modules and the state 
agency bore the expenditure on Balance of Systems (BoS) and local works. DNES started solar 
streetlights, home lighting systems, and power packs in 1985-86, however, the solar lantern pro-
gramme started in 1991-92.  
 
In line with the economic liberalisaton in the country, policy level changes were brought in 1992 to-
wards market orientation. Along with small hydro and wind energy technologies, PV technology 
was identified for promotion on a commercial basis. Commercialisation of technology essentially 
meant that the direct cost subsidies were removed, and fiscal incentives were provided to the 
manufacturers, and low-interest loans to the users. The programme in the country received a major 
boost in 1992 when the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (IREDA) estab-
lished a revolving fund began offering affordable credit for the purchase of PV systems.  
 
Following these policy level changes, the PV programme is being implemented since 1993 with two 
distinct approaches: (a) a socially oriented dissemination programme, implemented by the state 
nodal agencies with MNES subsidies (in case of certain states, additional state government subsi-
dies are also provided); and (b) a commercially oriented scheme implemented by IREDA with fi-
nancial assistance from international agencies. 
 
In addition to these programmes, there have been few limited attempts by the manufacturers to market 
these systems in the urban and rural markets, which are either not/partially electrified or face se-
vere power cuts for long periods of time. There have been few innovative applications (like power-
ing of traffic light signals, advertisement boards, petrol pumps, police kiosks, etc.) which have also 
been attempted in the last few years, however these are still very limited, both in terms of numbers 
and location.  
 
The PV programme has made rapid development in terms of the number of systems installed in the 
last 3-4 years (since 1995 onwards). The focus has shifted from streetlights to domestic lighting 
systems. The number of solar lanterns has doubled in less than 2 years. The following table indi-
cates the progress made in dissemination of PV systems. 
 
Progress of PV systems (cumulative). 
 
PV systems December  March October
 March March December 
  1988 1996 1996
 1997 1998 1998 
 
Streetlighting 20000 30569 31042
 31149 33196 33633 
Home lighting 1000 42845 45524
 47824 70144 85350 
Solar lanterns 0 88920 89718
 101531 177998 198482 
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Power plants (kWp)  20 923.3 949.2 949.2
 955.2 1012.2 
PV pumps - - p
 1816 2481 2787 
 
Source: Ramana (1998); MNES (1999) 
 
Solar photovoltaic systems with an aggregate capacity of more than 35 MWp have been installed in 
the country so far for different applications. Nevertheless, the applications in the sectors - tele-
communication, defence, railway signaling, etc. - continue to be prominent; constituting nearly 
60.4% of the total PV systems installed.  
 
PV industry in India – an overview 
Today India is the world's second largest producer of PV modules based on crystalline silicon cells. In 
1998-99 nine companies were engaged in regular manufacture of solar cells and twenty-one in the 
production of PV modules. In addition to these more than 50 companies are involved in manufac-
turing of different components of PV systems. Several of these companies are also involved in as-
sembling and marketing of PV systems. The annual production of solar cells and modules has in-
creased from 1 MW respectively in 1991-92 to 8.2 MW of solar cells and 11 MW of PV modules 
in 1997-98.  
 
There are 4 traditional players in the Indian market for cell production: 
-  BHEL (Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited) started its activity in the Indian PV market in 1983 , ini-
tiated by the co-operation with Siemens in the field of semiconductors. 
-  CEL (Central Electronics Limited) is involved in the Indian PV market since 1977. The company 
has a strong focus on quality cell production to serve its own module production and also to sell 
them to other module producers. 
-  RES (Renewable Energy Systems) has close technology co-operation with Siemens and has con-
siderably invested in the extension of their cell production line 
-  TATA BP Solar produces cells mainly for their own module production. TATA BP modules are 
certified from ISPRA, the European Certification Unit for PV modules proving the high quality of 
the TATA BP modules. 
 
Today PV is a mature technology. This is also proven by the fact that module producers offer a war-
ranty of up to 20 years for their products. The demand for solar cells in India is very high and can-
not be covered from the Indian cell production capacity. Therefore the Indian PV industry is heav-
ily dependent on imported wafers (the raw material for solar cells) and solar cells. This puts an 
enormous constraint to the further expansion of the PV market. Capital is needed to invest in the 
expansion of the wafer and cell production lines to meet the demand of the Indian module produc-
ers.   
 
The structure of the Indian PV market has also changed from early demonstration projects which fo-
cussed on the promotion of technology, to emphasis on products and applications, and conse-
quently on payment for services. Today the technology is considered one of the safest and most re-
liable alternative power generation technologies that can be used for a variety of applications in 
different modes. The solar energy market in India can basically be distinguished through two seg-
ments. The URBAN market is characterised largely by systems which will be connected to the lo-
cal electrical grid and where relatively large systems (of 1 kWp and over) will be marketable. The 
RURAL market is where most systems sold will be of the standalone type (that is, not connected 
to a regional electrical grid) and where the typical size of the system will be in the 50-100 Wp 
range, reflecting the relatively limited lighting and small appliance (for example, a radio) needs of 
households in remote areas. 
 
From the point of view of financial institutions, these two market segments offer very different oppor-
tunities and challenges. Since a typical financial institution is likely to have a greater physical 
presence in urban areas, interacting with potential customers in these areas is more straightforward 
than in rural areas. In addition, clients in urban areas are more likely to be familiar with the loan 
operation of financial institutions and will more easily be able to provide references and guaran-
tees. Urban customers will generally be wealthier, but, at the same time, the size of the systems 
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they will be interested in will be larger and much more costly than typical systems in rural areas. 
Although the urban market should be a natural catchment area for local banks and financial institu-
tions, the fact that many urban households in India are already electrified complicates the purchase 
decision process. As such, financial institutions need to work closely with PV installation compa-
nies to clearly identify customers in this potentially very lucrative market segment. 
 
The rural market in India, although vast in terms of its potential size, provides a great many challenges 
for financial institutions. Most financial institutions in India do not have branches or field agents in 
rural areas which complicates the process of soliciting potential rural customers. Rural customers 
will want to purchase relatively small, and hence relatively inexpensive systems which enhance 
the percentage cost of processing any loan application and makes repayment collection expensive. 
Lending in rural areas is often regarded by financial institutions as a high risk issue because cus-
tomers are less well known to the lending officials and because of the difficulty applicants have in 
providing collateral. Financial institutions hesitate to give loans to customers purchasing what they 
perceive to be “high-tech” equipment which does not represent proven applications as there is a 
perceived lack of professional and unbiased technical advice to financial institutions. 
 
Financial incentives for PV systems are available in two forms: upfront cost subsidy on the equipment 
as approved by MNES, and soft loans from IREDA under the World Bank line of credit. Depend-
ing upon the application, the cost subsidy or the interest rates varies. Except, in the case of PV 
pump and power plant if the systems qualify for subsidy under MNES programme, then soft loans 
from IREDA cannot be availed of.  
 
The main barriers in promoting PV systems in India include: high initial investment cost, high unit 
cost of repair and maintenance, negative demonstration effect of PV demonstration projects, lack 
of services after sales facility, wrong positioning of PV systems in the market, lack of awareness 
and absence of credit facilities, the fact that Indian consumers are in a “transitory phase”, and the 
lack of market promotion by manufacturers. Of those barriers, the most important barrier of course 
has been the high cost of the PV systems. Despite this, there has been tremendous increase in sales 
of PV systems. However, there are two other barriers, which if properly addressed can indirectly 
help in reducing the other barriers. These two barriers are the financial sectors approach towards 
investing in developing credit infrastructure in rural markets for financing PV systems, and the 
manufacturer’s approach towards investing in repair and maintenance infrastructure in the rural 
markets.  
 
In the meanwhile, there are some innovative approaches in the promotion of PV systems in rural mar-
kets. For example, the Solar Electric Lighting Company (SELCO) in Karnataka, has addressed the 
two above mentioned barriers by having an effective after sales service mechanism in the rural 
markets and by making credit available to the buyers by having a tie-up with rural banks, coopera-
tive banks and rural branches of public sector banks. Barefoot Solar Engineers of SWRC in Leh 
(Ladakh), Rajasthan, and UP Hills. SWRC has initiated the concept of Barefoot Engineers, youth 
from local villages where a project is being implemented and are trained in installation and main-
tenance of systems. SWRC operates largely with the central government programme. The Rama-
krishna Mission Solar PV programme, is another programme which has utilised its existing infra-
structure for setting-up an effective after sales service mechanism. It also carries out the central 
government PV programme. 
 
Not all problems associated with financing solar energy in India fall at the door of the customers nor 
are they the result of a lack of enthusiasm amongst individual financial institutions for lending to 
the PV market. Many financial institutions have a positive lending policy towards PV. However, 
often in these cases they end up providing very few loans for customers interested in buying a PV 
system. This is because of a) a lack of information flow within the financial institution about the 
positive policy towards PV and why it represents a promising business proposition for the bank, b) 
a lack of training of lending officials on what PV actually is and why it should be regarded as an 
important business sector for the bank, c) a poor understanding of the Government incentives 
available to banks and purchasers of PV systems which could greatly help to promote business 
lending by the bank in this sector, and d) poor interfaces between financial institutions and local 
companies working in the PV sector which could help establish the required closer links to a wide 
customer base. Such barriers hinder the development of the PV market since they result in inade-
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quate loan capital being made available to businesses in the PV market and their potential custom-
ers. Yet, there are straightforward solutions for overcoming and minimising these problems which, 
when implemented by a financial institution, will open the door to turning the PV market into a 
real business proposition for those involved. 
 
At present, the Renewable Energy Bill has adopted the target that 10% of the total in-
stalled capacity of power in 2012 should be achieved by renewables (i.e. 12,000 MW).  
This is to be made possible through the creation of a National Renewable Energy Fund 
financed by a cess on fossil fuel. Given the over-achievement in this sector in the 8-5 
year plan, there is hope that this will give renewables a major incentive.450 
Fuel switch to natural gas:  
The BAU scenario sees an increase of natural gas used for electricity from 140 PJ in 
1990 to 1693 PJ in 2020. The BPT scenario visualises a doubling of gas use by 2020 (in 
the low gas availability case) and four times in the high availability case. Is this feasible?  
India has 1% of the worlds oil production and 0.6% of the proven reserves451. Since the 
domestic production of fuel oil only accounts for half the level of consumption, India 
imports oil and gas. This leads to a huge drain in financial resources. There are opportu-
nities in that gas is available nationally in Bombay High and in Tripura, and from nearby 
countries such as Turkmenistan, the Middle East and Bangladesh. 
India has at present few gas fired stations. NTPC has a few gas plants where they reuse 
the gas after it comes out of the turbine and Enron has put up a gas plant. The advantages 
of natural gas are that it is a much cleaner fuel and there are fewer GHG emissions 
associated with it. However, the disadvantages are that (a) natural gas is available only in 
limited quantities in India and in distant locations like Tripura, (b) gas, unlike coal, is 
seen as a ‘mother fuel’ which has many alternative uses in the agricultural and other 
sectors (c) importing gas is a tricky business because the international prices fluctuate 
and costs valuable foreign exchange452 (d), the consumer is unlikely to want to pay for 
the additional costs, (e) there are security risks associated with transportation pipes 
through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh (neighbouring countries) and the volatile 
state of Assam, and (f) Bangladesh allegedly does not want to export to India. Gas 
imports are confused in the regional peace politics. The situation is so complicated that if 
the market starts to function, which is expected, and if the regional conflicts continue, 
which is also expected, gas may go out of business.453 All this indicates that gas is likely 
not to play a major role in the near future, although perhaps the rich cosmopolitan cities 
may invest in gas in preference to other sources of electricity. The Delhi Electricity 
Board is considering this option.  
Switching to nuclear:  
                                                   
450  Interviews 2001 
451  There are more oil resources deep down in the territorial waters but investors are not forthcoming because 
the exploration is financially risky, the approval processes long, and there is lack of reliable data (Wade-
Gery 1998). Wood Mackenzie estimates that India has oil reserves of about 5.4 million barrels. The adminis-
tered price mechanism (APM) also leads to huge distortions in this field (Wade-Gery 1998). Most natural 
gas reserves and production facilities are located offshore in two major areas close to the Western coast 
(Bombay High and South Basin). The gas fields are connected to the 1,900-km pipeline system running 
through the western and northern parts of the country. Most of the natural gas is used in the chemicals indus-
try for fertiliser production (Foell, Amann et al. 1995). 
452  This is a common problem with all imported commodities. It only makes the price of imported gas high in 
comparison to domestic resources. 
453  Meeting India 2000: 1, 3, 6, 20, 22, 35, 36, 40, 45, 46 
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In the BAU scenario nuclear increases till 2000 and decreases till 2020 and will 
contribute a mere 0.2% of national electricity as compared to 2.4% in 1990. This is 
because of lack of implementation and costs of nuclear. In the BPT scenario it is 
expected that 240 PJ of electricity is produced in addition in 2020. Is this feasible? 
This appears to be a feasible option in that (a) India has large thorium reserves, (b) 
technology for fast breeder reactors, (c) political support, (d) the greenhouse gas 
emissions are limited and (e) appears to be in line with policy intentions.454 However, 
some argue that nuclear energy has despite the political support only grown to a very 
limited extent in the past, because of its long gestation period, low PLF, very high costs 
and social resistance and hence is unlikely to grow further.455 
Efficiency improvement of existing power plants:  
The BAU scenario assumes that the efficiencies of existing (pre 2000) coal fired plants 
and new plants depend on the capacity of the plants. In the BPT scenario it is assumed 
that the efficiencies of existing plants can be improved via retrofitting by 5% points; new 
plants at best Practice Technology level could have a 42% efficiency. In order to assess 
the feasibility, we first examine the central role of coal in the Indian economy. 
Retrofitting old power plants is seen as an important option for a number of reasons. 
From the 85.7 GW installed capacity in India, 34.1 GW need upgrading and this can lead 
to a capacity increase of 6 GW. The advantage of renovation and modernisation are (a) 
increasing the generation of electricity, (b) reducing the emissions per unit of electricity 
generated. Retrofitting can also reduce the emissions of SO2, NOx and fly ash. Energy 
efficiency can be increased by more efficient boilers, NOx can be decreased by using low 
NOx boilers. (c) This is less expensive than setting up a new power plant, according to 
Indian sources, (d) it implies optimal use of existing resources (i.e. low capital)456 and (e) 
does not lock India into a technological trajectory for the next fifty years.457 This is seen 
as a highly feasible option. However, retrofitting is not always possible because you 
cannot change the basic boiler and steam engine; only the peripherals (otherwise it 
would be similar to constructing a new plant); it all depends on the plant type.458  
As argued in Chapter 3, the plant load factor is a key problem in terms of the efficient 
use of the existing capacity; as opposed to efficiency of the technology because extended 
use of an inefficient plant reduces the overall efficiency. However, according to 
interviewees it is not so much the plant load factor that is critical, but the plant 
availability factor. If there is no demand, then the plant is available but not used. Plant 
availability is determined by (a) coal availability, (b) maintenance of the plant and (c) 
optimal use of the plant. The PAF of NTPC is 90%, of the SEBs is 70%.459 
 
Box 8.3 The Badarpur Success Story 
 
In 1992, the NTPC took over the Badarpur Plant. The Badarpur station consists of 3 X100 MW and 2 
X 210 MW coal fired units with a total installed capacity of 720 MW. The PLF there has increased 
from 65% to more than 78.74% and there is an increase in production by 320 million units per 
                                                   
454  Meeting India 2000: 12, 22, 36, 43 
455  Meeting India 2000: 3, 21, 40; and Meetings India 2001 
456  “Since 1990 we are giving a boost to new power plants, but for each MW installed capacity we spend 3.54 
crores. Renovation costs Rs 1.5 crores per MW. It is pure politics, corruption and Uncle Sam. We are a poor 
country and we have to maximise the production of our units” (Meeting India 2000: 35).  
457  Meeting India 2000: 1, 3, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 35, 40; and Meetings India 2001 
458  Meeting India 2000: 17 
459  Meeting India 2000: 35, 40  
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year. Badarpur is a success story in terms of renovating and modernising a sector.460 In 1995 
NTPC took over the Thalcher Thermal Power Station which had a PLF of 18.5% and brought it to 
55.8% in 1998-99 (NTPC 2000: 32). Please note that improving the PLF improves the efficiency 
of a plant and that this is distinct from improving the efficiency of a technology in use. 
 
In terms of the use of new technologies, some argued in favour of IGCC (coal 
gasification),461 supercritical boilers, fluidised bed combustion boilers which can use 
coal with even 70% ash (New Delhi Workshop 1997; NTPC, TERI, Meeting India 2000: 
1, 3, 16, 22, 26, 45, 46). However, the critical issues were the costs of these 
technologies.462  
Increased use of cogeneration in the generation sector: 
The BPT scenario for heat production in cogen is 1616 PJ as compared to 433 PJ in the 
BAU scenario, which for coal-based cogen corresponds to 374 PJ-e power generation in 
the BPT scenario compared to 100 PJ-e in the BAU. How feasible is this? The potential 
for cogeneration in the BPT scenario is that it can increase by 274% for 2020 as 
compared to the BAU scenario. How likely is this?  
Cogeneration in the power generation sector is still in an early stage. Cogen is however 
set to take off in the sugar sector because (a) there is large potential in this sector, (b) 
there is considerable awareness in this sector, (c) there has traditionally been some cogen 
in this sector, (d) the technologies are available domestically,463 (e) the market is opening 
up,464 (f) and politicians, experts and scientists see the need for cogen.465 
However, the key bottlenecks in this sector are (a) lack of incentives, (b) the difficulty of 
arranging power sales agreements and the legislative hassles (Meeting India 2000:), (c) 
the price paid by the SEBs is not attractive,466 and 467 (d) the feasibility of grid 
extension,468 and (e) the lack of equity in the cooperative sector,469 (f) the lack of 
appropriate technologies (Dadhich 1997:98).470 The Rural Electrification Corporation is 
willing to examine the potential for cogeneration from rural areas especially in the 
context of power sales agreements with the grid.471 
                                                   
460  Meeting India 2000: 1, 3, 21 
461  Some argue that the combined cycle was not seen as relevant for coal rich in ash or economically viable for 
India (Meeting India 2000: 16, 20).  
462  Meeting India 2000: 3, 40, 46 
463  The technologies in this sector are available indigenously. The machinery for this sector is totally indigenous 
produced by Triveni, ABB and BHEL. The only technologies that may be needed are modern turbines 
(Meeting India 2000: 38).  
464  Meeting India 2000: 36 
465  Meeting India 2000: 22 
466  For cogeneration to be come effective, the price at which electricity is purchased by the SEBs has to be 
developed and it is necessary to have an efficient market. The SEB is only offering the average cost and that 
is a problem. The most potential is in the sugar industry where there are many autonomous developments 
under way (Meeting India 2000: 8). 
467  Meeting India 2000: 36 
468  Meeting India 2000: 5 
469 Meeting India 2000: 15, 27, 30, 41 
470  The cooperative sector has the problem they do not have equity and so lenders will not lend if the balance 
sheet does not show profits. For the cooperative sector – this is a big problem, because they do not have 
enough equity, The profits are shared between the farmers and there is no equity against which they can 
borrow to invest in such cogen schemes (Meeting India 2000: 15, 27, 30), cheap imported sugar in the period 
1998-2000 (Meeting India 2000: 30), the reluctance of the SEBs The problem is that the SEBS are not 
talking. It normally costs these plants 800 kWh per tonne of product at Rs 4.50 pre kWh which is 3500 Rs. 
Of electricity costs, Cogen costs them 1.60 to 1.88 that is 1600 – much cheaper. The pay back is also much 
quicker, only three years; the problem is capital. 
471  Meeting India 2000: 5 
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The opportunities for cogen in other sectors appear to be rich. There is apparently some 
scope for cogeneration in the Aluminium industry. Bauxite is mined and there is a 
calcination process to make it into alumina and then there is a smelting process to make 
aluminium. No heat is required for smelting, but heat is required for calcination. So there 
is potential for cogen. In the Indian aluminium sector activities are taking place where 
the alumina and aluminium production take place in one plant (the first step requires heat 
and the second requires electricity). At the IMMPA plant, 50 MW of power is used also 
to produce steam. At Belgaum, Hindal is also considering the possibilities. BALCO has 
integrated plants.472 HINDALCO is generating 40 MW of cogen since 1999 and they are 
selling steam to other plants.473 The opportunities for cogen using other fuels than 
renewables as well as in other sectors appear to be rich. The paper and pulp industry as 
well as (petro) chemical industries have large potentials since they need heat as well as 
electricity.  
Reducing transmission and distribution technical losses:  
In the BPT scenario, the technical transmission and distribution losses are assumed to be 
reduced by 1/3 compared to the BAU scenario. How feasible is this?  
The key issue is upgrading the quality of the transformers and connecting the regional 
grids. HUDC, BHEL and BARC together developed a HVDC. There are plans to 
modernise this system, and it looks like these are well on the way. Power grid is the key 
actor in this field. It mostly buys technology from international sources, because the 
R&D cannot compete in this sector. However, it has financed a chair in IIT Delhi to 
encourage research in this field.474 There is also potential to increase the reliance on 
various sources by going for a regional grid with Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Bhutan. However, this may be a more challenging issue because of the current political 
difficulties between the countries. 
Technologies to reduce sulphur emissions:  
Although India has low sulphur coal, in the BPT option it is possible to reduce the 
sulphur emissions by 90%. How important is this for India?  
Indian coal is low in sulphur. There is need for coal washeries to decrease the ash 
content (Haider 1998). By the year 2000 no less than 70 million tonnes of coal is 
expected to require washing (Narayan 1998). At present there are discussions on the 
need for coal washing which (a) increases the caloric value and thus reduces the 
transportation costs and related emissions, (b) reduces negative impacts on the power 
plants, and (c) reduces ash. These advantages have been recognized and the Ministry of 
Environment requires coal washing from 2001 when the coal is to be transported for 
more than 1000 km.475 However, there are few private sector initiatives to undertake coal 
washing. Furthermore, coal washing has less benefit when the plants are near the pit 
heads.  
The coal ash can be used for making bricks and is thus a productive resource, and to 
substitute brick making from fertile soil for brick making. One can also grow forests on 
the land-filled ash as was done in Maharashtra. There may also be other uses which are 
being researched by the Ash Utilisation Mission in the Department of Science and 
                                                   
472  Meeting India 2000: 16 
473  Meeting India 2000: 19 
474  Meeting India 2000: 12 
475  Meeting India 2000: 3 
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Technology.476 The problem is that the bricks have to be transported far to the users and 
the net gains are limited.477  
8.3.3 End-use efficiency options 
As Chapters 4 and 6 show there is plenty of unexplored potential for reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases in India in the demand side sectors examined.  
Cement:  
According to the BPT scenario, the electricity use in cement factories in India can be 
reduced by 31% as compared to the BAU scenario for 2020. To what extent is this 
feasible?  
The large scale cement sector has evolved very dynamically over the last ten years and 
most of the large plants use the dry process and the few that use the wet process are 
constrained because the poor quality limestone needs water to be beneficiated. Most of 
the technologies are modern and imported. The drivers for growth in this sector are (a) 
economic growth, (b) shifting preference towards cement for housing and industries, (c) 
population growth, (d) growing per capita consumption, (e) the availability of loans from 
IDBI and other banks, (f) the motivation in the sector, (g) relatively easy access to Indian 
and foreign technologies, (h) the liberalisation of the sector and the decontrol policy, (i) 
the need for the sector to remain globally competitive and to have ISO 140000 
certification (Sarathy and Chakravarty 1999: 341; 478).  
However, there are some bottlenecks and the growth of the cement sector is affected (a) 
by the current depression in the consumption sectors, (b) falling prices because of the 
mis-match between production and demand, (c) the current financial melt down in 
neighbouring countries depressed the exports, (d) lack of availability of power in the 
states of Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan (CMA 1999), (e) poor coal 
and terms of supply from Coal India limited and hence coal imports are higher than those 
purchased in the local market,479 (f) and at least 20% of current production uses 
electricity from captive power plants (CMA 1999). At the same time, the large scale 
Public Sector Undertakings are not doing very well and may be closed down. The small-
scale cement plants that are inefficient in relation to large-scale plants, however, have 
probably a role to play in the local economies of spread out regions. Modernising the 
small-scale sector will be more difficult. Recent interviews in 2001 indicate that the 
small scale sector may have difficulty competing with the large scale sector and that the 
market may drive them out of business. 
In particular, the options of high efficiency motors, adjustable speed drives, closed 
circuit milling (roller mills and high efficiency classifiers), process management 
systems, replacing old cyclone pre heaters, adding new heaters with new pre-calcination, 
improved housekeeping, grate cooler modification, waste heat recovery and conversion 
of wet to dry processes are economically viable if the transaction costs are not taken into 
account. The other options are more expensive, but some are not yet commercial. For 
these reasons, one could argue that when the temporary recession in the market ends, 
there are enough incentives for the already very efficient large-scale cement industry to 
continuously modernise their generation process. This will be enhanced if with the 
                                                   
476  Meeting India 2000: 20, 21 
477  Meeting India 2000: 20 
478  Interviews 2000 
479  Interviews 2000 
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liberalisation of the economy, the interest on bank loans comes down and if power 
purchase agreements can be made with those that generate their own power. The 
technological improvements in the BPT sector may well be possible with some 
institutional support for the large-scale industry; but less so for the small-scale industry.  
Iron and steel:  
In the BPT scenario it is estimated that India can save 14% of its electricity use in com-
parison to its BAU scenario by adopting a combination of technical measures (see Chap-
ter 6).  
The iron and steel sector can be divided into the large and the small scale sector (see 
Chapter 4). It appears that the feasibility of the modernisation of the large-scale iron and 
steel sector over a twenty year period is quite high. The driving factors are (a) expensive 
energy,480 (b) company ideas and image, (c) liberalisation and privatisation,481 (d) envi-
ronmental concerns and (e) export demand.482  
At the same time, there are other short-term constraints. First, liberalisation calls for a 
mental transition and this is challenging. SAIL still suffers from budgetary constraints, 
cost overruns and delays; and delayed production means delayed returns.483 Second, 
those that have captive power plants (e.g. SAIL and TISCO) are not allowed to sell to 
the grid, and there has been no incentive to either improve the production of power or to 
be efficient with the power. SAIL has now been advised to off-load its captive power 
plants and to focus on core-business.484 Third, laying off employees especially in SAIL 
which has heavy over-employment485 is not easy especially when alternative 
employment or social security is not well arranged. Fourth, the internal and external 
depression leading to the dumping of steel has not helped the financial situation in the 
market (Department of Steel 1999: 11; 486).487 This was also a result of reduced customs 
duties that accompanied liberalisation. These duties have been increased as a partial 
measure against dumping and a complaint has been filed with the WTO on the issue.488 
Fifth, the depression in South-East Asia has reduced the demand for Indian steel 
(Department of Steel 1999: 11). Sixth, competitiveness may also lead to negative side 
effects if companies that used to spend on the local people and schools for their children 
stop to do so. Sixth, loans from IDBI are expensive (12-16% interest rate) and the cash 
flows inadequate.489 This has less influence in the export market because excise is then 
not paid; but in the domestic market it makes steel more expensive than dumped steel. 
“Dumping sets the bench mark for my market.”490 Eight, the overall economic slowdown 
in the country, the lack of investments by government and private sector, the cost 
escalation in inputs as a result of deregulation, reduction in the import duties, increase in 
the excise duties on steel, etc. have slowed down the impulse for modernisation 
(Ministry of Steel 2000: 17). Furthermore, the use of EAF technology is constrained by 
the lack of scrap in developing countries. Finally, there is a vision that government does 
                                                   
480  Meeting India 2000: 2 
481 Meeting India 2000: 2, 4, 20 
482  Meeting India 2000: 2, 3 
483  Meeting India 2000: 2 
484  Meeting India 2000: 31 
485  Meeting India 2000: 6 
486  Meetings 2000: 2, 3, 6 
487  The price of hot roll coils in the international market was 350$ in 98. In ‘99 it suddenly dropped to 170$ in 
the CIS countries (Meeting India 2000: 31 ).  
488  Meeting India 2000: 31 
489  Meeting India 2000: 2, 3 
490  Meeting India 2000: 31 
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not know quite how to provide the sector with the support it needs491 while the 
government emphasises that they want the sector to demonstrate efficiency before they 
will provide support.  
Aluminium:  
In the BPT scenario, it is expected that the electricity use of the aluminium sector will be 
19% less than in the BAU scenario.  
The projection is that the automobile and construction industry will grow considerably 
and an annual growth rate of 6-7% is conceivable.492 The market for energy efficiency 
increases in the large-scale aluminium sector is set to grow because of (a) the large 
availability of bauxite, (b) the growing home and global market,493 (c) the liberalisation 
of the market, (d) the availability of technologies in the international market, (e) price 
liberalisation, (f) the high profit margin, (g) the export potential. (h) The high energy 
intensiveness of the industry is reason for the sector to economise on energy 
consumption.494 and 495 
The key bottlenecks are the (a) lack of water, (b) lack of quality power, (c) cheaper 
foreign aluminium at Rs 1850 per tonne,496 (d) the non-availability of scrap,497 and 498 (e) 
the competition from plastic as a substitute,499 (f) privatising loss making companies is 
difficult,500 (g) collapse in the best Indian company – NALCO because of poor 
maintenance, non adherence to standard operation procedures and poor work culture, (h) 
collapse in world aluminium consumption, (i) low consumption due to the financial 
crises in the SEBs, and (j) recession in the construction sector (Department of Mines 
1999). The inventory overhang that persists globally decreases the incentives to improve.  
In order to deal with these bottlenecks, the new companies are investing in captive power 
plants using imported coal (and this begs the question – are they not repeating the same 
mistakes made in other sectors?). However, the need for constant electricity supply and 
the inability of the supply sector to guarantee this is the key incentive for captive 
generation.501 NALCO is now also selling power to the grid and earns Rs. 200 crore 
annually.  
Water pumps:  
The BPT scenario indicates that a technical saving of abut 40% exists in relation to the 
BAU scenario. This is quite substantial given that the sector consumes between 25% - 
40% of Indian electricity.  
Indian water pumps have a high electricity consumption because (a) the pricing is based 
on the horse power of the pump (which hides the actual consumption of energy, and 
                                                   
491  Meeting India 2000: 2 
492  Meeting India 2000: 44 
493  Hindalco claims to be the cheapest producer in the world and “we will be benchmarking ourselves against 
global best practices with the ability to monitor results on an ongoing basis in the pursuit of value creation” 
(Birla reported in Hindalco 1999: 5).  
494  Every tonne of aluminium uses 1400-1600 kWh. 
495  Meeting India 2000: 16, 44 
496  Meeting India 2000: 44 
497  Recycling is limited because of lack of scrap, which mostly goes to the small foundries where there is no 
quality control (Meeting India 2000: 19, 44). The aerospace industry needs high quality aluminium. 
(Meeting India 2000: 44). 
498  Meeting India 2000: 16, 19 
499  Meeting India 2000: 16, 19 
500  Meeting India 2000: 44 
501  Meeting India 2000: 44 
  
 280
frequently the horse power labels are false),502 (b) the non-availability of regular hours of 
electricity mean that the pumps are switched on all night and when the farmer hears the 
pump, he has to get up and go to the field,503 (c) the pumps are inefficient, the pipes have 
losses of up to 20%, the foot valves are faulty, and the use of three-phase equipment by 
farmers.504  
 
Box 8.4 Water pumps: The farmer’s perspective 
 
“Look at it from the farmer’s view point. He thinks he is promised electricity for 12 hours, but he only 
gets it for 6 hours, so he needs a higher HP to get the water he needs and that is his rationale; then 
he has it labelled as 5HP in order to avoid paying more for the electricity he may not get. But if 
you were to make standards, and the farmer purchased the pump according to the specifications 
and it did not work because the voltage was fluctuating or because there was too little water, or be-
cause the water level is different, that would be a waste. Most companies use better standards than 
ISI because they allow for voltage fluctuations; these standards are only advisory. Only if a bank 
loan is given, the banks insist on an ISI mark. But ISI tube lights, for example, won’t work in a vil-
lage because they get lower voltage.”505  
 
Indian water pumps may have a higher electricity consumption attributed to them 
because (a) farmers divert the electricity for the pumps for small industrial uses such as 
threshing and household uses,506 and 507 (b) till recently distribution losses were largely 
being attributed to the water pumps,508 (c) some farmers in Haryana even pay more than 
they get because the electricity supply is available for only few hours in a day.509  
Theoretically, the problem can be addressed via (a) more effective national standards 
which have a low transaction cost,510 (b) loans linked to national standards, (c) linking 
price to quantity and reducing subsidies,511 (d) renovating existing pumps which have a 
life of 20-25 years.512 Replacing a 65mm size foot valve costs Rs 210. An 80 mm foot 
valve Rs 290. A five Hp pump costs Rs 27000; a 7.5 hp pump costs Rs 35,000.513 Other 
options include: (e) producing pumps that can cope with fluctuating energy supply,514 
but these also have less energy efficiency, (f) converting to one phase equipment which 
would reduce pilferage and allow for investments in new pumps, transformers and the 
re-design of the poles,515 and (g) pre-paid cards or remote metering.516 
However, one should be aware that the incentive for farmers is low as long as (a) farmers 
are provided electricity in the middle of the night at unpredictable hours and for an 
                                                   
502  Meeting India 2000: 9, 13, 24, 26 
503  Meeting India 2000: 9 
504  Meeting India 2000: 13 
505  Meeting India 2000: 24 
506  Electric pump sets are either for monoblock systems which can only be used for pumping, or there are 
electrical pump sets in which there is a coupling between the motor and the pump and the coupling can be 
used for all other purposes as well, and here there is tremendous use of electricity for a variety of other 
unrecorded uses (Meeting India 2000: 13 ).  
507  Meeting India 2000: 5, 9 
508  Meeting India 2000: 5, 13 
509  Meeting India 2000: 9 
510  Meeting India 2000: 5 
511  Meeting India 2000: 9 
512  Meeting India 2000: 9 
513  Meeting India 2000: 13 
514  Meeting India 2000: 13 
515  Meeting India 2000: 13 
516  Meeting India 2000: 36 
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unpredictable duration,517 (b) when there is no reduction in tariff for non-peak hour 
use,518 (c) when the SEBs are mostly financially weak and cannot lend to the farmers, (d) 
because IREDA and REC will only lend when the system becomes viable,519 (e) state 
government loans permit farmers to buy pumps from state manufacturers because they 
want to encourage the local industry,520 (f) farmers prefer to go to local assemblers521 
especially when modern and new pumps get damaged because of the faulty voltage 
system.522 Governments too are in the process of phasing out subsidies, but they are 
affected by (a) populism and vote purchase by ministers,523 (b) competition with 
neighbouring states who do not want to phase out the subsidies,524 (c) the difficulty in 
adopting one standard for different contexts,525 (d) the difficulty of implementing 
standards,526 and most importantly the absence of a mission oriented approach backed by 
political will,527 and 528 and (e) since most SEBs do not receive any compensation for 
subsidising the sector.529  
There are solar pumps that can pump 20-30 litres per day, but the panel costs 2-2½ lakhs 
and is not affordable for the individual consumer. IREDA, through REDA and PEDA are 
experimenting with such pumps.530 IREDA lends to Nagarjuna Finance at 2.3% interest 
to finance solar pumps without batteries in shallow wells and this works well. The 
problem is that sometimes a neighbour invests in a tube well and the water level falls, 
making the investment non viable.531 Wind pumps are not easy because the locations are 
few and the wind energy is only available for a fraction of the time mostly in the 
monsoon when the water pumping is not needed,532 although this appears to offer 
potential.  
With a bit of education (not propaganda!), the Indian farmer - “don’t underestimate him” 
- will be willing to pay for the electricity if it is of good quality and is predictable.533 and 
534 There are a number of initiatives on the way and the sector is in movement.535 The 
                                                   
517  Meeting India 2000: 5 
518  Meeting India 2000: 5, 9 
519  Meeting India 2000: 9 
520  Meeting India 2000: 24 
521  Meeting India 2000: 9 
522  Meeting India 2000: 9 
523  Meeting India 2000: 24 
524  Meeting India 2000: 9 
525  Meeting India 2000: 13 
526  Meeting India 2000: 21, 22, 24 
527  The politics of prices is also confusing. “If diesel prices go up there is no mass agitation; but if electric prices 
go, everyone is up in arms. The politicians find this a convenient handle to create a problem. They don’t say 
the same about diesel because they cannot control the operator” (Meeting India 2000: 24).  
528  Meeting India 2000: 13, 22, 36, 45 
529  Meeting India 2000: 38 
530  Meeting India 2000: 13, 24 
531  Meeting India 2000: 14 
532  Meeting India 2000: 24 
533  It was discovered that contrary to expectations, farmers are willing to pay a higher price for better services. 
In Rajasthan, farmers could get a fast connection if they paid ten times as much as was normally expected 
from them. The programme was a success (Haider 1998). However, when the state Haryana tried to 
rationalise prices, farmers agitated leading to violence and a loss of property. The chief minister withstood 
the demands of the farmers (Pachauri 1998b). 
534  Meeting India 2000: 6, 24 
535  Rajasthan has a nursery scheme. I started it when I used to work for REC. In this scheme, if someone wanted 
to jump the queue and get an electric connection earlier he would have to pay he would have to pay the 
extension charge and Rs 1.32 paisa per unit. But the scheme was stopped as the State Assembly said that 
only the rich farmers would benefit at the cost of the poor. But even at this moment it is the rich farmers who 
benefit. There are also some experiments in other states. In Gujarat a ‘deposit scheme’ was started in 1998; 
in Andhra Pradesh a ‘Own your transformer’ scheme was launched in 1999 (Meeting India 2000: 24 ).  
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tariff system is likely to be reformed soon through the change in responsibilities to 
SERCs. Experiments in relation to remote meters are also being undertaken.536 
Technologies are available nationally.537 Farmers are wlling to spend more.538 
Box 8.5 The treader mill story: Lessons for CDM? 
 
One company, International Development Enterprises, targets the marginal farmers in high water table 
areas and sells them easy to run and cheap treader mills. 1.4 million manual, eco-friendly treader 
mills have been sold. Like the water pump issue, here too the transaction costs of running such 
system would appear to be extremely high. This body instead has encouraged 18 manufacturers 
who can make profits through sales, and tries to establish a network of producers, 47 distributors 
and 600 dealers, 75 grass roots organisations and they train 650 repairers. Every member is en-
couraged to make some profit in the process. Sometimes, they sell through the government (IDE 
2000; 539).  
 
Household and commercial sectors:  
The BPT scenario assumes that an additional 40% saving in electricity use is possible 
over and above the BAU scenario for 2020.  
The key drivers for increased investment in energy efficient goods in the household and 
commercial sector are (a) the growing middleclass and industry sector that can afford 
such equipment, (b) the high energy demand of these items combined with the low level 
of energy availability, (c) the rising price of energy, (d) the number of new entrants with 
new products (Philips, Phoenix and Surya manufacture CFls in India), (e) and the new 
trend to portray a modern image. However, these (a) drivers are slow and there is not 
adequate momentum, (b) the domestic sector has low quality fittings and fixtures, (c) the 
CFLs, air conditioners, heaters and coolers are not standardised, (d) the pricing is still 
distorted, (e) the voltage is not yet stable and can damage expensive goods and (f) the 
potential to avoid payment for electricity is at present high. This could be accelerated by 
government incentives and regulations/standards. For example, the Andhra Pradesh 
Government has made it compulsory for certain buildings to use solar hot water systems. 
Such schemes need to be developed everywhere. It may be possible to try and encourage 
the commercial sector to try and use renewable sources of energy for lighting and 
airconditioning.540 The availability and usage of energy efficient lamps cannot result in 
success without the following improvements: (a) good quality EE lamps, (b) stable 
voltage,541 (c) good consumer management (removing dust that results in depreciation of 
illumination), right location, and use only when necessary.  
The Bombay Efficient Lighting Large-Scale Experiment (BELLE) aimed to introduce 
CFLs in Bombay through a leasing programme which reduces the up-front costs of the 
consumers and guarantees a market for the producers (Sastry and Gadgil 1996). 
However Belle failed. Gadgil and Sastry (1994) argue that a traditional cost benefit 
analysis could not have revealed that the project was doomed to fail because it did not 
take the institutional behaviour into account. BELLE was not able to access the foreign 
currency needed although the project has been successfully replicated in other countries 
like Mexico and Guadeloupe.  
                                                   
536  Meeting India 2000: 24 
537  Meeting India 2000: 24 
538  Meeting India 2000: 3; and Meeting India 1997 
539  Meeting India 2000: 10 
540  Meeting India 2000: 3, 36, 46 
541  A bulb that should last for 960 hours at 240 volts may last only 3000 hours at 240 or 250 volt supply (NPC 
2000).  
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Motors and drives: 
The BPT scenario assumes that substantial electricity savings of 15% relative to national 
electricity consumption in the BAU scenario is possible. Motors use 60% of Indian 
electricity and there is scope for improvement, at the management and technical level. 
The key reason for the high electricity consumption per unit product is that the motors 
are rarely used efficiently. If the application requires 50 mw motor, the user often uses a 
100 mW motor to be sure that sufficient power is obtained. This leads to energy losses, 
and proper information dissemination is necessary. The variable speed drive is an 
important option for industries and commercial offices with variable loads. Savings can 
be large and the pay-back period is short in variable load situations, so this is an 
important option to promote. Information needs to be provided on the applicability of 
this option. Furthermore, high efficiency motors exist, which are not popular with users 
because they are more expensive, but large savings can potentially be achieved. Since 
the costs in India of this motor are 50% higher than less efficient ones, it is not known 
how long the pay-back period is of this investment. However, under the current 
circumstances of the high electricity price for industries, electricity use reduction could 
save substantial money. But the voltage fluctuations can damage expensive motors. A 
last important option is the improved operation and maintenance of motors.  
Another problem is that the motor is made by one party, the compressor by another and 
the user tries to match what is readily available and this often leads to problems.542 A 
variable speed motor gives the consumer the opportunity to use the electricity according 
to his production needs. However, if the base load is constant, there is no need for 
variable speeds. But if there is a drastic change in the base load, then the variable motors 
issue becomes viable. Thus there are differences depending on the industry and the place 
and location of these motors.543  
This sector does not look as if it is already considering the problem or motivated to 
address it. There are no incentives and the sector appears not to face any major 
challenges in terms of competitiveness.  
8.3.4 Institutional context 
For any of these BPT options to become a reality, some institutional conditions need to 
be met. “There have been no shortage of ideas and policy papers; but every election 
means loss in the reform process. However, the momentum is building up”.544 Key 
policy issues are privatisation and ownership, pricing and subsidies, the organisational 
structure and non-collection of revenues in relation to distribution. 
Privatisation and Ownership:  
In order for the generators and transmitters to be willing to invest in the process and 
technology, they need to be financially viable and accountable. Till recently, the 
generation and distribution sector was mostly in the public sector. Since 1991, the 
market has been opening up and privatisation is the big buzz word in many developing 
countries. In particular the State Electricity Boards are not doing well. Most SEBs are 
financially bankrupt because they (a) cannot collect the revenues, (b) subsidise the 
agricultural sector at the request of the state government but without being compensated 
by the government, (c) are utilities, not a generators like NTPC, and hence subject to 
                                                   
542  Meeting India 2000: 11 
543  Meeting India 2000: 15, 41 
544  Meeting India 2000: 36; and Meeting India 1997 
  
 284
many influences (d) are integrated organisations with three functions combined,545 (e) 
faced sometimes lack of demand because of a poor functioning industry as in Bihar, 
West Bengal, Sikkim, Orissa and the North-East, (f) faced over-employment and (g) 
corruption.546 However, “it is a fallacy to assume that all government sector 
organisations are inefficient. Even when you look at the SEBs, the fault is much more 
with the state government than with the SEB. How can you endlessly run an operation if 
you are providing free electricity to agriculture?”547 Further they are much older than the 
PGCI and the NTPC, have older technology and it is not fair to critique them with 
today’s knowledge.548  
There is need for privatisation to (a) meet the shortage of funds to invest in modern 
technologies, (b) break the monopoly trend and to increase the efficiency, and (c) finance 
the deficit. (d) There is also a clear global trend towards privatisation; and pressure from 
the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. This means that the tariff must meet 
the cost of supply; and that the subsidies must gradually go down. This also means that 
the cost of supply must go down leading to increased efficiencies.549  
However privatisation is not easy. When the Orissa SEB was to be restructured, it was 
unclear how much the SEB was worth; there was not enough data. For many the Orissa 
SEB was undervalued. The negative aspects are the private sector is unlikely to invest in 
bankrupt companies, and is unlikely to support projects that are non-profitable such as 
coal washing, or distribution to rural areas. Private enterprises also want simple rules and 
there are still a number of bureaucratic rules. Furthermore private generators want 
guarantees that the distributors will buy from them and financial guarantees from the 
state governments in the even the distributors cannot afford to pay. This is a risk 
enterprise (see Box 8.6). 
Many emphasise that it is not a question of ownership (public or private);550 it is the 
context that is relevant.551 Privatisation in Tripura would not add much.552 Maharashtra 
and Karnataka SEBs are making profits.553 The National Thermal Power Corporation is a 
public sector undertaking producing 30% of India’s electricity and is very efficient. Its 
average plant load factor is very high. It has very motivated personnel, is making profit 
even though the SEB is not often able to make payments. They maintain flue gas 
statistics, undertake afforestation.554 NTPC, REC, PFC, PGI are doing well, are globally 
                                                   
545  “If we look at the issue of privatisation, the issue is not one of structure or ownership. The problem with the 
SEBs was that as an integrated organisation there was no separate accountability for distribution, 
transmission and generation. The moment you segregate these three functions, you get more transparency 
and more accountability. Then you can what the true reasons are for malfunctioning board. If you combine 
the three functions, the director tends to camouflage the losses in one sector through action in other sectors. 
As a result, although there were large distribution losses, the SEBs pretended that these were agricultural 
subsidies making the agricultural sector the scapegoat. In the case of Delhi which has 44 % distribution 
losses, they don’t have an agricultural sector to blame. It was only when the SEBs were unbundled in Orissa, 
Haryana (not privatised), Andhra Pradesh (not privatised) and UP that they realised that only 20-25% was 
agricultural subsidies, and here the major culprit is the water pumps” (Meeting India 2000: 5).  
546  Meeting India 2000: 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 20, 22, 34, 35, 37, 43 
547  Meeting India 2000: 12 
548  Meeting India 2000: 21 
549  Meeting India 2000: 3 
550  The discussions in India inevitably brought up the issue of privatisation. Does privatisation, in itself, ensure 
that companies are performing well or not. The interviews revealed that that is not the case. There are Public 
Sector Undertakings that are doing very well, and there are private sector bodies that are doing badly. The is-
sue thus was not so much ownership but context and work culture. 
551  Meeting India 2000: 1, 3, 5, 6, 20, 43 
552  Meeting India 2000: 20 
553  Meeting India 2000: 6 
554  Meeting India 2000: 1, 22 
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wired and have high morale.555 Instead of going blindly for privatisation, it is necessary 
to find the way to insist on accountability and to ensure that pricing is possible 
independent of political pressure.556  
 
Box 8.6 Case study of NOIDA Power Company. 
 
The NOIDA power company was set up in 1992 to transmit and distribute electricity to consumers in 
the Greater NOIDA area in the state of Uttar Pradesh. But the company went through a number of 
initial challenges such as political instability in the capital, postponed government decisions, lack 
of guarantees (apart from ENRON and SPECTRUM no new company has received guarantees). 
The company distributes mostly to industry, rural and domestic consumers; and since the opening, 
it has been able to reduce distribution losses by 40%. It uses authenticated billing and tamper proof 
meters with in-built memory and it conducts an energy audit 2-3 times a month. But at the same 
time, it is difficult to monitor the rural consumers and it continues to get visits from strong politi-
cal lobbies.557  
 
Pricing and subsidies:Transport of Indian coal is priced high to subsidise passenger 
transport. This makes the prices of coal expensive. Then industry and commerce pay 
more to subsidise household and agricultural consumption.558 This makes Indian 
industries non-competitive and they start to either invest in captive power plants (not 
good), but this may be an incentive to invest in cogeneration (good). The subsidies are 
also mostly misused. “In India everything is done in the name of the poor whether it 
reaches the poor or not. I think that many of the subsidies will be gradually phased out, 
although withdrawing these subsidies will call for tremendous political will.”559  
 “The problem is our government has thus far focused on too many issues, and has not 
specialised in any issue; it has also not been immune to political interference. This means 
that the government is overburdened. In order to restore the credibility and the financial 
viability, the quality of the electricity, the CERC was created. We also have the function 
of promoting a developmental role, promoting new capacity; we are also independent in 
that we do not have a ‘charged budget’ this means if we propose a budget the Parliament 
can either say yes or no. We also function as an appellate authority. If a case is decided 
before us. It is decided. You can only appeal at a High Court.””. 
However, it is expected that the SERC will adopt market prices and if the public accepts 
it, it is fixed. If the public does not, then the decision of High Court will be non-
contestable. This means that as long as the pricing is rational, the Court will support it. 
This is different from in the past, when the SEB could not object if the political authority 
in the state did not want to raise the prices. Already prices have been revised in Orissa 
and Andhra Pradesh.560 
At the same time, the government is also subsidising some forms of clean energy. The 
MNES provides subsidies on the equipment cost for projects using state-of-the-art 
technology and soft loans for the modernisation of projects using relatively established 
technologies for bagasse-based cogeneration. The MNES also provides a one-time 
subsidy of up to 30% of the project cost, as an incentive to promoters of biomass 
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combustion. Grid-connected solar photovoltaic (PV) applications were promoted through 
a scheme launched in 1995 by the MNES. The scheme aims at augmenting and 
supplementing grid power by installing PV power projects in the range of 25-100 kWp 
for rooftop systems. Under this scheme, two-third of the total project cost was provided 
to the implementing agencies subject to a maximum of 20 million rupees per 100 kWp 
capacity. The MNES has been subsidizing small aerogenerators (wind battery chargers) 
for more than a decade to demonstrate and propagate. The MNES provides subsidies of 
40-50% of the total cost on the following types of wind pumps: modified 12PU500, 3-m 
geared type, and AV-55. 
The Ninth Five Year Plan of the Government of India recognizes that renewable energy 
technologies have so far relied heavily on central subsidies provided either directly 
through the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) or through 
centrally sponsored schemes. The need is to shift from capital subsidies to interest 
subsidies, and gradually phase out subsidies to move towards private entrepreneurship 
and community participation (Government of India 1997). 
Investments can be financed by profits or loans. Profits are down in the SEBs and Indian 
loans are more expensive than foreign loans. This is all set to change with the 
liberalisation agenda and this may make investment in energy efficiency technologies 
financially more viable.  
The Government of India decided in March 2001 that it will bring down interest rates 
charged by the Power Finance Corporation and the Rural Electricity Corporation to 
reflect the new market conditions. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. 
Protection of the small-scale sector:  
Although the large scale iron and steel, aluminium and cement sector may be able to take 
measures to modernise in a competitive world, the small scale sectors face major 
problems. The options are to leave them to their fate and see if they can survive, to close 
them down as is being done in China, or to provide some kind of support. The 
Government of India has chosen to have a policy to support the small-scale sector. In 
line with this policy this section briefly examines the options for this sector. There are at 
least 2.5 million SMEs in India and about 358 clusters. There is considerable potential to 
provide these industries some tailor made advise to improve their energy consumption.  
However, there is not enough incentive for this sector to modernise by itself because (a) 
they are small-scale, sometimes one man shows, (b) there are few opportunities to access 
loans at low costs, (c) access and knowledge of relevant technologies is low, (d) the 
market in which they operate is not sensitive to energy efficiency issues. While there is 
some government support for this sector at present, with liberalisation, this sector will 
have to increasingly compete with the large scale sector and this in itself may lead to 
closure of take-overs.561 
Key social problems in transmission distribution: 
Transmission and distribution losses are as high as 24%. The peak losses are 10%. “I 
believe that this means that about 10% of the losses are because of industrial theft.”562 
The transmission issue is relatively simple.  
The key problem in the distribution sector is (a) low tension wires to the homes making 
tapping easy, (b) poor and tamperable meters,563 (c) poor meter reading, (d) poor 
                                                   
561  Meetings in 2001. 
562  Meeting India 2000: 29 
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billing,564 (e) theft by industry, urban households and slums.565 Theft costs 15-20,000 
crore Rs. Annually.566 
There are already several incentives that will lead to such developments in the field. 
These are (a) the unbundling of the SEBs which has led to the identification of the 
problem,567 and (b) the fact that the generation units need to be self-sufficient will be a 
strong incentive to deal with the issue of metering and billing.  
However, (a) the sheer size of the problem, (b) the differing speed of the unbundling 
process, (c) the need to develop high quality, low price, and easy to maintain systems, 
(d) the need for cheap loans to invest in the systems, (e) the poor credit rating of the 
SEBs,568 may be major bottlenecks in the system.  
The options include pre-paid metres which would help the financial health of the SEB, 
reduce the army of linesmen, billers and collectors and the middle man (in total of 1.5 
million) could be eliminated in the proceess. Further, instead of dealing with individual 
consumers, the SEBS should deal with groups; i.e. building owners, colony 
representatives.569 However, it is not quite so easy to take policies that lead to 
unemployment. Other options include high voltage lines- with the transformer in the pole 
and not in the house.  
The government sees this as so critical that the hief Ministers and/ or Power Ministers of 
the different states decided in Delhi in March 2001 that power thefts are to be eliminated 
within 2 years. This is to be achieved through full metering of all consumers by Decemer 
2001, improving the quality of supply through the ADPD programme, creating 
commercial viability in distribution within 3 years by privatisation of distribution, or 
handing over distribution to local bodies, governments and users to ensure accountability 
at local level. Not all decisions in India are implemented, but there appears to be 
considerable political will at central and state level to achieve economic viability in the 
distribution sector.  
 
Box 8.7 Case study of Delhi’s Electricity Board 
 
Delhi imports 80% of the electricity from the central utilities and still has a 10% deficit in peak hours. 
The problem for Delhi is that 50% of its electricity is stolen as about 1/3 rd of Delhi has unauthor-
ised connections, done in collusion with linesmen and politicians. This leads to poor billing and 
inadequate revenues. In revamping the system, Delhi’s Electricity Board is to break up into three 
business centres for generation, transmission and distribution, then it will corporatise under the In-
dian Companies Act and then if necessary privatise. It is to have tamper-proof meter systems 
within five years, avoid the debt trap that Orissa is getting into, and retrofit all existing plants. 
These are, of course, plans.570  
                                                                                                                                                
563  “You can tamper with metres, though making holes, using magnets, bypassing the meters. But electronic 
metres are tamper proof; there are no moving parts; you can only by pass them. But the metre records if it 
has been bypassed. One can also hook the line and draw directly” (Meeting India 2000: 24). 
564  Meeting India 2000: 12, 20 
565  Meeting India 2000: 21 
566  Meeting India 2000: 46 
567  First T&D losses have been masked as agricultural subsidies. Secondly, the farmer rarely gets electricity and 
only in non-peak hours when the electricity should in any case be cheaper. At the same time, farmers have to 
invest in diesel generators that costs money to augment the poor electricity supply. (Meeting India 2000: 6). 
568  They will need loans for these and their credit rating is not very high; the GOI lends to the state government 
at 11-12 %, the World Bank is cheaper in comparison. This is the area in which they can bring down their 
losses to 12% and very quickly. (Meeting India 2000: 46). 
569  Meeting India 2000: 43 
570  Meeting India 2000: 34 
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Bottlenecks in investing in modern technologies: 
The key challenges in energy efficiency in end-use are that Indian industry has thus far 
been reluctant to take measures because it was (a) protected and could easily make a 
profit of 30% in the local market for lack of real competition, (b) was using captive 
power plants and the sunk investment costs were not calculated and so there was no real 
incentive to save energy, (c) was uninterested in improving the sector, (d) faced high 
interest loans, and (e) difficulties with Power Purchase Agreements.571 However, in the 
1990’s, industry is in the state of flux. ASSOCHAM (1999) argues that Indian industry 
is facing problems because of (a) the rising costs of domestic taxes and critical inputs 
such as power, water, transport and finance, (b) the transition process also causes 
organisational changes which also brings increased costs, (c) there is a lack of awareness 
of issues of relevance in WTO, (d) the ‘Made in India’ brand does not automatically 
raise consumer confidence, (e) the labour laws are outdated, (f) many sick and inefficient 
Public Sector Undertakings are being supported unnecessarily, and (g) industrial 
licensing still exists in some sectors. While some interviewees are hopeful that, the 
Indian industry will rise to the occasion and compete with the international competitors 
for the domestic and international markets (e.g. the computer sector), others fear that the 
older industries are too set in their ways and may not be able to change.572 Thus in the 
interim period, some measures have been taken in some sectors, but it has been a slow 
and messy period. These have all increased the incentives for Indian large-scale industry 
to try and undertake some energy efficiency measures. With the adoption of the new law, 
the incentives have been increased. However, individually, the companies have had 
different experiences.  
8.3.5 Rural issues 
India has the largest rural electrification programme in the world.573 “It is better to have 
done it than not. In balance we have achieved a lot through this programme. We have 
electrified more and achieved more for rural India than China has achieved in rural 
China.”574 However, the rural electrification programme has far to go before rural 
development is achieved. 
There is need to provide electricity to the rural areas, because there is latent energy 
demand for it, because there is need to generate resources in these areas to make them 
self-sufficient through creating employment, leading to income generation and to support 
educational and health activities in the long-term.575 The two key options are grid based 
electricity and non grid based electricity. Grid based electricity calls for extension of the 
grid. Non-grid based electricity calls for use of decentralised renewable systems of 
electricity generation.  
                                                   
571  Meeting India 2000: 29 
572  Meetings India 2001 
573  “Let us then revisit the definition of electrification. There may be a lot of criticism of the one pole electrified 
concept which has been revised now. The electric pole must now be in the populated area of the country. 
This definition means a change in the figures, but we have not checked on these. But you have to begin 
somewhere… our initial idea was to bring some electricity to as many villages as possible … where the 
demand increases we have to augment the supplies and so we try and deal with the issue. We did not have 
the luxury of saying lets pick a village with the highest potential of using the electricity and then electrify it 
totally before we go ahead. (Meeting India 2000: 5). 
574  Meeting India 2000: 22 
575  Meeting India 2000: 9 
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In the remote areas however, grid extension becomes an unviable proposition and there 
are alternatives such as biomass, solar, small hydro and wind. The Ministry of Non-
Conventional Energy Resources and their lending operation IREDA focus on these 
areas.576 Some argue that non-grid renewable energy is economically viable for remote 
areas because it is cheaper than grid electricity if the grid still has to be extended. 
However, once the grid is extended, then the viability decreases. 
However, the argument that non-grid renewable energy is economically viable for 
remote areas is not always acceptable partly because there are (a) not that many remote 
areas,577 (b) the poor cannot afford to pay that much,578 and (c) by definition a place that 
is remote does not have other infrastructure and is thus unable to sell any surplus 
produce and thereby generate income, (d) renewable energy is not user friendly like 
electricity and maintenance is difficult.579  
The extension of electricity and energy facilities in rural areas will progress 
autonomously at a slow pace. There are no incentives in place to accelerate this rate of 
growth. Such acceleration is only possible through additional resources.  
To some extent, this may be promoted by the adoption of the resolution of the Chief 
Ministers Conference on March 3rd, 2001, and by the decision of the Chief Ministers of 
the provinces to connect all villages to the grid by 2007 and all households by 2012. 
8.3.6 Analysis of the options for India 
 “India has one billion people so everything gets exaggerated, whether it is the 
requirement for food, cars, energy etc. We are a capital short nation. We are 
technologically inadequate. When you put the three together, you see that we have 
competing alternatives for all our resources and everything has a place. There is place for 
a bullock cart and jet aircraft. Every argument is valid because there are multiple 
contexts.”580  
For most interviewees the climate change problem was not a problem created by India 
and hence the responsibility lay elsewhere (see discussion in Chapter 10).581 However, 
they were quick to point out that it is the only country in the world with a dedicated 
ministry for renewables and abundant renewable resources.582 However, as long as 
MNES is not integrated with the Ministry of Power, it will be marginalized for lack of 
funds.583  
For some India is on the brink of becoming an international leader and has no financial 
constraints. For the majority, India is a capital starved country, rich in coal and with a 
                                                   
576  Meeting India 2000: 5 
577  But, renewable energy is site specific and the costs are site specific. Solar energy is very expensive in New 
Delhi, because electricity is so cheap. Of course people argue that renewable energy will be cheap in remote 
village; but how does one define a remote village. For cost effectiveness of renewable energy is related to the 
non-availability of renewable energy in a location even if it is “electrified”(Meeting India 2000: 8). 
578  “I also think that this notion of asking the villager to be environmentally and energy conscious is a bias. Only 
0.01% of the Delhi urban consumer has energy efficient lamps in the house. This is because they think the 
upfront investment to be too high. Nor does New Delhi Municipal Corporation actively search for 
alternatives for street lighting. If the rich and relatively well informed resident in Delhi is difficult to move, 
why should we try and pass the burden to the villager?”  
579  Meeting India 2000: 8 
580  Meeting India 2000: 45 
581  Meeting India 2000: 8, 36 
582  Meeting India 2000: 8 
583  Meeting India 2000: 22 
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low per capita coal consumption584 and these are the conditions under which India needs 
to operate. “Politicians are arguing as if we are a capital rich country. We are not; we are 
a capital starved country, we have to extend our resources as much as possible.”585 The 
major policy problems are that there is at present (a) economic stagnation in the 
economy, (b) political delays because of lack of stability of governments, (c) the 
transition period has been difficult because the actors have had to define a new role for 
themselves. 
The key options for India can be summed up as follows on the basis of the analysis in 
this and foregoing chapters.  
First, the critical issue is getting pricing, billing, metering and collection functional. The 
key argument made by several actors is that the weak link in the entire process of energy 
conservation and production was the distribution sector. If the distribution sector could 
be made financially viable, there would be enough funds flowing into transmission and 
generation to support operation and maintenance, renovation and retrofitting, and even 
invest in modernisation and capacity increase. Financial viability of the distribution 
sector would also imply that all consumers, industry and households would have to pay 
their correct dues. This would be in itself an incentive for these consumers to invest in 
energy conservation equipment, since that would be financially viable. If there is a 
regular, reliable flow of electricity, this would also imply that industry and households 
would have little reason to have to invest in stabilisers, diesel generators, invertors etc, 
and instead these resources could be used to focus on energy efficient apparatus. Hence, 
the argument was made that the first area to focus on was the distribution sector. This 
means that there has to be a focus on billing, metering and collection.586 The 
establishment of the CERC, the unbundling of the SEBs, and the decisions of the Chief 
Ministers in March 2001 are first steps towards focusing on the issue of getting 
distribution viable.587 and 588 
                                                   
584  Meeting India 2000: 3, 8, 20, 21, 22 
585  Meeting India 2000: 35 
586  Meeting India 2000: 24 
587  In 1994-95, we wrote a report (Planning Commission Report on the Power Situation of the Country for 25 
years)and we concluded that India needs to increase its power generation so much that priorities should be 
(a) hydro (b) coal, (c) gas), (d) nucelar and (E) non conventional energy. (Meeting India 2000: 23). I think 
there are three priorities in India: (a) focus on concentration of generation; (ii) focus on system losses, (iii) 
rationalise prices (Meeting India 2000: 23).  
588  Meeting India 2000: 12, 20, 24, 29, 40, 46, 47 
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Make 
distribution 
viable: ensure 
proper billing, 
metering and 
collection
Increases revenues for generators 
by recovering dues
Increases costs for non-pay ing 
industries
Decreases costs for paying 
industries
Increases cost for agriculture while 
improving the quality of supply
Increases cost for households
Increases revenues for distributors 
by recovering dues
More money available for 
operation and maintenance and 
investments in energy efficient 
technologies 
Incentive to invest in energy 
efficient technology and co-
generation
Makes industry more competitive, 
leads to more profits which can be 
invested in better energy 
technologies and co-generation
Incentive to invest in energy 
efficient pumps and co-generation 
(in sugar industry)
Incentive to invest in energy 
efficient household equipment
More money available for 
operation and maintenance and to 
spend on improving the national 
grid
Increases quality and quantity of 
generation and hence less GHG per 
unit of power
Decreases demand for power 
generation and less GHG per unit 
of product produced
Decreases demand for power 
generation and less GHG per unit 
of product produced
Decreases demand for power 
generation and less GHG per unit 
of product produced
Decreases demand for power 
generation and less GHG per unit 
of services consumed
Reduces T&D losses and thereby 
less GHG by power delivered
 
Figure 8.1 Priorities in investment. 
 
The second issue that was raised by many interviewees was the need to think of how the 
limited resources of India, as a whole, could be extended so that there is efficient and 
environment friendly decisions taken. Thus, unlike Europe where there is enough 
capacity and the focus may need to be on closing down the old plants, an effective case 
was made to actually renovate and modernise existing plants to the extent possible to 
extend life and performance of these plants. This would call for proactive identification 
of the opportunities for renovation and modernisation. This would allow for capacity 
increase at nominal costs. The resources thus saved could be used to buy better quality 
equipment for other types of plants; and would provide some breathing space. The 
example of Badarpur shows that retrofitting and renovation can improve the plant load 
factor of a plant and give a new lease of life to a plant at much lower costs (see Box 8.3). 
Note that merely extension of the annual production hours does not increase technical 
efficiency. It results in financial savings that can help increase efficiency in the supply 
sector. 
The third issue is the issue of accountability of individual generators and end-use plant 
owners. Making the various organisations accountable with proper balance sheets is a 
key objective. Whether this is to be achieved through privatisation, corporatisation or 
through other incentives was left in the open. However, this was seen as necessary for 
the various organisations to become responsible in the process of decision making and to 
be able to invest in technologies. 
The fourth issue is the need to develop simple power purchase agreements so that power 
can be bought from private generators, captive plants, from cogeneration units and from 
renewable energy plants.  
These four policy options will increase the viability of the remaining technical options. 
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Fifth, the key issue of how to deal with coal. Clearly India has large coal reserves and 
gas is limited. The issue was then how can the coal fired plants be optimised and how 
can the additional capacity build on available resources within India without leading to 
debt or financial crises. After all each country has to live within its own means. Piecing 
together the views of the different groups, the key question then is “how to keep coal 
based electricity generation within reasonable limits; about 7-8000 tons. And use the best 
technologies in this field. The rest will need to be augmented through renewables, hydro 
and nuclear.”589 In relation to coal, the key policy options are pithead generation (even 
perhaps coal gasification in the mines). In the area of coal fired plants, two sub-options 
are seen as feasible and important. (a) the need to renovate existing plants, and (b) the 
need to invest in the latest technologies for new generating capacity. The former is 
needed to save resources and use existing capacity in an efficient manner.  
Sixth, the issue of fuel switch or augmentation. There were some experts who were 
clearly of the opinion that it was vital for India to develop the large hydro sources. The 
one site in Arunachal Pradesh can augment India’s capacity by 50% in one effort, 
reducing the need for coal and nuclear. Others argued that large hydro is no longer a 
viable option even for a poor country like India and instead, the option of developing all 
the small hydro available in the country should be developed. The large hydro issue is 
going to be controversial.  
Seventh, the issue of efficiency improvement in end-use. There was also a clear message 
that if the domestic price market would stabilise and if the new Energy Conservation Bill 
entered into force there would be enough incentive for the demand side industries to try 
and improve their behaviour.  
Eighth, the need for technical improvements in transmission and distribution. With 
transmission being able to secure additional revenues through the billing process, the 
process of developing the national (and subsequently) the international grid will become 
more viable. This will make it possible to increase the plant load factor in several states 
so that the capacity of utilisation is improved.590  
Finally, there was need for ensuring that cogeneration opportunities were exploited to the 
maximum.591  
                                                   
589  Meeting India 2000: 22 
590  Meeting India 2000: 24 
591  Meeting India 2000: 46 
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Table 8.3 Identifying the political and economic feasibility of technological and other options to 
reduce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions: India 
Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
1. Decrease economic 
distribution losses 
(theft): Billing, meter-
ing, and collection 
 
- Loss of bribes for 
the billers, lines-
men, metre read-
ers; 
- Cost of tamper-
proof and/or re-
mote control me-
ters;  
- Technology is 
available; 
- Political will is 
visible; 
- Tamper-proof me-
ters to profit mak-
ing local distribu-
tion centres; and/or 
- Remote metering 
in combination 
with demanding 
accountability 
from the distribu-
tion centres 
2. Rationalise power 
pricing 
- social resistance 
from agriculture 
and households; 
- incentive to in-
crease electricity 
theft; 
- populism policy of 
politicians 
- industry, com-
merce and rail-
ways will support 
such changes be-
cause it may re-
duce costs and in-
crease profits for 
them; 
- support from in-
ternational com-
munity; 
- Article 2 of the 
Kyoto Protocol; 
- Support for ra-
tional pricing 
combined with 
price support/ ra-
tion system for the 
poorest sectors of 
society 
- Convince agricul-
ture and house-
holds that the qual-
ity of supply will 
improve and they 
will save on volt-
age stabilisers, die-
sel generators, me-
chanical failure 
and loss of income 
and comfort be-
cause of power 
shortage.  
3. Improving economic 
efficiency in govern-
ment spending 
- Vested interests 
want large fossil-
fuel and hydro pro-
jects;  
- Foreign investors 
want to promote 
technology transfer 
on the basis of 
their interests 
- Realisation at 
Planning Commis-
sion and Parlia-
mentary level that 
it is cheapest to 
retrofit existing 
plants and use the 
savings for state of 
the art plants; 
- Social and political 
support for renew-
ables; 
- To translate this 
into guidelines for 
CDM projects in 
electricity; 
- To demand trans-
parency in making 
and contracts with 
large companies; 
4. Reducing other bot-
tlenecks in investing in 
energy efficient 
technologies: 
improving the financial 
health of the SEBs, 
accountability in 
government, and 
through corporatisa-
tion, privatisation, and 
other means; cheaper 
loans; 
- The electricity 
boards and some 
public sector un-
dertakings were 
bankrupt and could 
not invest in en-
ergy efficiency and 
operation and 
maintenance; it 
was difficult to 
evaluate their 
value when they 
- Political will to-
wards privatisa-
tion; 
- Growing aware-
ness of the risks 
and challenges of 
privatisation; 
- Liberalisation pro-
vides incentive for 
reducing interest 
rates on loans and 
investing in energy 
- By developing 
rules for evaluat-
ing a formally 
bankrupt company 
and for the bidding 
process; or send a 
dedicated team to 
rebuild the organi-
sation on commer-
cial terms com-
bined with rules of 
accountability; 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
were privatised; 
- Loss of employ-
ment for laid off 
workers; 
- Private companies 
were not interested 
in low revenue 
sectors (e.g. coal 
washing; distribu-
tion to rural 
consumers;)  
- Private sector 
wants guarantees 
that electricity is 
purchased from 
them and Govern-
ment does not 
want to give 
counter-
guarantees. 
- Loans and tech-
nology expensive; 
- Power purchase 
agreements diffi-
cult, bureaucratic 
red tape; 
efficient technolo-
gies; 
- Simplify the power 
purchase rules but 
do not go out of 
the way to get the 
electricity; For ex-
ample, wind power 
investors should 
invest in lines to 
the grid and not 
the other way 
around. 
6. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
g. Cement 
h. Iron and steel 
i. Aluminium 
j. Water pumps 
k. Households and 
commercial 
equipment; 
l. Motors and drives  
6.  
g. Inadequate 
information and 
high cost of 
technology and 
inputs for small-
scale industry; 
h. Current capital 
shortage; dip in in-
ternational market; 
lack of scrap; insti-
tutional inertia; 
captive generation; 
i. “ 
j. lack of regular tim-
ing and quality of 
supply; cost of 
technology; sub-
sidy on electricity; 
k. costs of equip-
ment; low electric-
ity prices and theft 
l. lack of incentives 
in small-scale units 
and poor quality 
electricity 
6. 
g. expected economic 
growth with in-
creasing demand; 
technologies avail-
able and accessible 
for large-scale sec-
tor; motivates sec-
tor; small-scale sec-
tor facing pressure 
from market; 
h. liberalisation, pri-
vatisation, company 
self-image and ex-
port demand; 
i. “ 
j. farmers want qual-
ity power; 
k. high cost of energy 
to commercial sec-
tor and industry;  
l. - 
  
6. 
- revisit the policies 
for the small-scale 
sectors and en-
courage energy 
efficiency through 
incentives; 
- rules for participa-
tion in CDM and 
technology trans-
fer;  
- guidelines to sup-
port small-scale 
projects; plants 
and products via 
subsidies/ 
GEF/CDM/  
7. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
h. Large hydro 
i. Small hydro 
h. Social, environ-
mental and seismic 
risks; long gesta-
tion time 
h. Huge technical po-
tential available in 
North-East India; 
some political in-
h. Explore options 
for small hydro in 
large hydro re-
gions; 
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
j. Wind 
k. Gas 
l. Nuclear 
m. Biomass 
n. Solar 
 
 
i. Few entrepreneurs 
willing to take on 
this kind of pro-
ject; lack of politi-
cal support 
j. Subsidies linked to 
generation capac-
ity encouraged do-
it-yourself people 
who made mis-
takes;  
k. Limited domestic 
gas available; high 
cost of imported 
gas and limitations 
because of re-
gional peace poli-
tics; is a lock-in 
technology; 
l. Social and envi-
ronmental risks; 
costs high if waste 
disposal is taken 
into account; is a 
lock-in technol-
ogy; 
m. Lack of incentives 
n. High costs 
terest; 
i. Potential in the 
Himalayas; 
j. Political support 
and investors 
available; 
k. International inter-
est and willingness 
to invest in modern 
technologies 
l. Politicians argue 
that this may be 
necessary;  
m. Some programmes 
in place 
n. Some programmes 
encouraged 
through policy 
 
i. Develop start sub-
sidies for small 
hydro; 
j. Link subsidies to 
generation not ca-
pacity and then 
phase out subsi-
dies; 
k. Explore opportuni-
ties to import re-
gionally available 
gas 
l. Examine the safety 
and waste issue 
carefully; 
m. Increase incen-
tives; 
n. Develop start sub-
sidies for solar. 
 
For all options 
8 Develop rules for 
inclusion and ex-
clusion for GEF/ 
CDM projects on 
the basis of above 
discussion; 
 
 
8. Efficiency Im-
provement in coal 
plants (EFF) 
c. Existing plants 
d. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boil-
ers) 
c. Lack of resources 
at the State Elec-
tricity Boards and 
disinterest in cap-
tive power plants; 
d. Lack of capital for 
modern state of the 
art technologies 
and lack of inves-
tors; poor quality 
of coal 
c. Political support 
for retrofitting ex-
isting plants; see 
point 3 above; pol-
icy on power pur-
chase agreements; 
d. Political support 
for super critical 
boilers and IGCC. 
- Develop rules for 
CDM and for ex-
isting investments 
of the World Bank, 
ADB and make 
different baselines 
for the two op-
tions; 
9. Increasing 
Cogeneration (COG) 
 
- Lack of support 
through PPAs (see 
point 5); 
- Lack of knowledge 
in some sectors;  
- Lack of payment 
by distribution sec-
tor; 
- Increasing gov-
ernment support; 
- Support in sugar 
sector 
- Simple rules for 
PPA; and regular 
payments by 
SEBs;  
- Recommendations 
for CDM/ GEF. 
10. Reduction of tech-
nical losses in trans-
mission and distribu-
tion (T&D)  
- Lack of investment 
and loans expen-
sive;  
- Separate grids 
 
- Technologies 
available in do-
mestic and interna-
tional market; 
- Political willing-
ness to integrate 
grids 
- Liberalise the 
banking sector to 
reduce interest 
rates (also neces-
sary for other op-
tions); 
- Recommendations 
for GEF and tech-
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Options Barriers Existing support Policies to improve 
feasibility of the option 
nology coopera-
tion.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis of the technical, economic and political feasibility of the 
various options to modernise the electricity sectors in China and India, this chapter 
reaches the following conclusions.  
First, there are some key similarities between the situation in both countries: 
- Since 1990, both governments are deep in the process of restructuring their 
economies and industries, and in particular the electricity producing and some of the 
key electricity consuming sectors. Both countries had (and have) mostly state owned 
electricity companies and the heavy large industry was also concentrated in state 
hands. Both had a system of administered prices and cross-subsidies. Both had 
limited accounting systems in these enterprises. The combination of state ownership, 
administered prices, cross-subsidies and centralisation has led to a situation where 
individual utilities are unable to raise the resources to modernise their plants and 
invest in energy efficient technologies. This has given an impetus for institutional 
change in the electricity sector in both countries. 
- Given the implementation deficit in China and in India based on arguments 
presented in Chapters 3, 4 and the current Chapter, it becomes increasingly clear that 
the Business-As-Usual scenarios developed in Chapter 5 may over-estimate the de-
coupling of electricity growth and emissions. Furthermore, based on arguments 
regarding the problems faced by economies in transition, we could also argue that it 
is unclear how the liberalisation process will work out in its finer details. Both 
countries have adopted different pathways to reach the final destination with some 
common ingredients. However, the assumption that the future will develop along a 
neatly unfolding pattern is highly unlikely; there are likely to be many trend-breaks 
and surprises in the process. For example, interviews in India in 2000 revealed a very 
optimistic approach to the liberalisation process and there was much hope that India 
could compete domestically and internationally with the foreign competitors; after 
all the soft-ware sector is able to compete. Interviews in 2001, revealed that the end 
of the first decade of liberalisation and the analysis of it had made many stakeholders 
nervous about the flexibility of the older sectors to be able to change their ways and 
adapt to modern circumstances.  
- In both countries, there is a realisation of coexisting competing realities where very 
developed parts of the countries co-exist with very poor and underdeveloped parts. It 
is increasingly becoming clear that it will not be possible to take the entire national 
in one step towards the 21st century but that different sectors and different states will 
modernise at different periods of time and will need different solutions tailor-made 
to the needs of the different cultures, contexts and circumstances of the people. The 
problem is not so much the lack of information and ideas for the people in command, 
but the appropriateness of the ideas for the circumstances of the different regions of 
the country and the communication of these ideas to the individual actors especially 
in the field of energy efficiency. 
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- There is a clear conception that the electricity needs of both countries need to be 
primarily met by the abundant coal reserves available in the country. The difference 
in approach is that while both governments are attracted by the notion of developing 
large hydro and nuclear, in India the potential for social unrest at present is higher 
and the government takes this into account. However, in interviews, Indian 
stakeholders are very open about the pros and cons of the different choices. In China, 
the possible social unrest in relation to mega projects such as large dams and nuclear 
power stations is not seen as an actual threat and the government thinks it may not 
need to take that possibility into account in making its choices. 
- Both governments have leadership aspirations and would like to see themselves as 
energy efficient leaders and investors in renewable energy in the global contexts. But 
the question is the affordability of the full implementation of this option. While 
China is much richer than India and in many ways can take centralised decisions, 
India is poorer and has to face the competitive demands of society. The question of 
buying state of the art technologies from the developed countries, that the developed 
countries themselves do not use en masse is then the sore point for these countries.  
- Both governments have active policies for rural electrification and while rural China 
has paid more for electricity than rural India, both are planning to provide some 
support to the rural households for electricity, while rationalising the system as a 
whole. 
Second, there are key differences between the countries: 
- Policy recommendations for China need to be defined in technical terms, not politi-
cal terms if they are to be seen as viable by the Government; for India policy options 
need to be defined in terms of the social context in which they are to be implemented 
if they are to be seen as viable by the government.  
- Electricity theft is a key problem in India, but is not a problem in China; 
- The division of responsibility between centre and state is far clearer in India than in 
China and China seems to go through a phase of decentralisation followed by cen-
tralisation sending out unclear messages to the sectors; 
- Stakeholders in India are active and communicate clearly; stakeholders in China are 
cautious and careful under the current political circumstances. This influences the 
choice of the government in relation to shifts to large hydro and nuclear power 
plants. 
- The government in India has far fewer resources and tries to think of ways to stretch 
these resources as far as possible (at least on paper); the Government of China tends 
to think in terms of big projects and very sophisticated technologies. This means that 
China prefers to focus on new plants and modern technologies, while India wishes to 
also focus on retrofitting existing plants and investing in energy efficient technolo-
gies.  
- The Chinese Government has taken decisions to close down the small-scale produc-
ers in a number of sectors because these are by definition inefficient; the Govern-
ment of India supports the small-scale sectors and producers, although this support 
may be gradually eroding and the small-scale sectors may be left to the mercy of the 
market.  
 
Third, there are specific policy recommendations to accelerate the feasibility of 
reasonably feasible options for both countries as identified by the stakeholders:  
- For China, this includes: 
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§ Support for rational pricing system and gradual removal of subsidies coupled 
with price support for the poorest people; 
§ Developing a step-by-step approach to decentralisation, involvement of 
provinces and stakeholders in decision-making to develop tailor made policies 
for each province as opposed to uniform policies with a system for monitoring 
and enforcement; 
- In relation to privatisation:  
§ Separate power generators from distributors and make simple rules for power 
purchase agreements; 
§ Develop simple rules for companies experimenting with privatisation; and 
encourage transparency so that the press and public can monitor developments; 
- In relation to fuel-switch: 
§ Develop short-term start subsidies for small renewables; 
§ Examine the gas alternative in greater detail but taking into account the long-
term technological lock-in aspects; 
§ Taking into account the risk issues and the nuclear waste issue to explore the 
feasibility of nuclear; 
§ Explore the potential for small hydro in place of large hydro as a way to 
anticipate and prevent future problems with respect to large hydro; 
- In relation to technology cooperation on concessional terms: 
§ Prepare priority areas for technology cooperation. Interviewees and the research 
indicate that the following technologies could be of use in the following sectors: 
cement (pre-calciner, preheater cement plants, roller press and roller grinders), 
iron and steel (improved steel casting), aluminium (pre-baked anodes), motors 
and drives (large-scale high efficiency motors and drives, variable speed drives), 
renewables (wind turbines), gas (modern gas technologies), nuclear (safe and 
advanced technologies),592 biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass 
gasification; combined hybrid systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency 
improvement in coal plants (retrofitting technologies, coal gasification, IGCC, 
super critical boilers), cogeneration technologies, transmission and distribution 
and desulphurisation technologies (technologies for coal washing); 
§ Develop guidelines for base lines for different types of projects; retrofitting, 
small scale and large scale. 
- For India, this includes: 
§ Promotion of tamper-proof/ remote control power metering along with 
accountable/ profit-making local power distribution centres to guarantee 
collection of accurate electricity dues. 
§ Support for rational power pricing combined with price support for the poorest in 
society and subsidies for renewable energy; 
§ Public relations campaign to convince agriculture and households that the price 
increase in power will be accompanied with better quality of services making 
                                                   
592  This does not mean that this research promotes nuclear technologies; we are merely reflecting what the 
stakeholders communicated to us during the interviews. 
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voltage stabilisers, inverters, diesel generators, loss of income and comfort a 
problem of the past. 
- In relation to privatisation:  
§ Make guidelines as to when the privatisation process is really necessary and 
economically viable; such that it does not lead to a devaluation of government 
resources, to a concentration of private projects in lucrative areas leaving 
government with the non-economically viable areas, and only when it is 
necessary to improve the functioning of the company.  
§ Make policies to ensure that contracts with large investors in critical areas are 
subject to public scrutiny so that corruption in contracts is minimised; 
§ In relation to technologies needed: technologies identified included: IGCC, 
supercritical boilers, fluidised bed combustion boilers which can use coal with 
70% ash and specific technologies for the different sectors (see also Chapter 10).  
- In relation to fuel-switch: 
§ Develop short-term start subsidies for small renewables; 
§ Examine the gas alternative in greater detail in the context of peace politics and 
foreign exchange issues, and taking into account the long-term technological 
lock-in aspects; 
§ Taking into account the risk issues and the nuclear waste issue to explore the 
feasibility of nuclear; 
§ Explore the potential for small hydro in place of large hydro as a way to 
anticipate and prevent future problems with respect to large hydro; 
- In relation to technology transfer: 
§ Prepare priority lists/ or menu of choices for the projects that need priority in 
technology transfer accompanied with concessions (GEF/CDM/bilateral aid/ 
technology transfer at concessional terms). Interviewees and the research indicate 
that the following technologies could be of use in the following sectors: cement 
(technologies for the small-scale sector), iron and steel (improved steel casting, 
EAF), aluminium, motors and drives (large-scale high efficiency motors and 
variable speed drives), renewables (wind turbines), gas (modern gas 
technologies), biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass gasification; combined 
hybrid systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency improvement in coal plants 
(retrofitting technologies, IGCC, super critical boilers; high conversion 
efficiency technologies; better combustion technologies for high ash content 
coal), cogeneration technologies, transmission and distribution and 
desulphurisation technologies (technologies for coal washing). This could 
include rules and baselines for retrofitting existing power plants; rules and 
baselines for investors in new clean coal plants and other end-use sectors; lists of 
technologies needed in the cement, aluminium, iron and steel sectors; conditions 
under which clusters of small projects in relation to water pumps, household and 
commercial equipment and motors and drives can be implemented; areas of 
focus in relation to renewable energy, fuel switching and cogeneration and 
transmission and distribution. 
§ Fifth, the following table sums up the technical potential to reduce the rate of 
growth of GHG emissions of various options and compares them to the 
stakeholder priorities in Chaine and India. 
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Table 8.4 Feasibility of options.  
Options Technical  
potential to reduce emis-
sions 
Stakeholder  
priority China 
Stakeholder priority 
India 
Rationalise pricing Indirectly high, since this 
helps to yield savings that 
can be used for reinvesting 
in energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment 
High for government, 
industry and com-
merce 
Improve legitimacy of de-
cision-making and reduce 
the implementation deficit 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing the implementation of 
government policy 
High for stake-
holders; but to be 
implemented step 
by step 
Although important, 
not a key issue from 
this research 
Improving the transition 
from state owned to corpo-
ratised bodies and privati-
sation; improving account-
ability and the financial 
health of utilities 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing accountability and 
profits and increasing re-
sources for investment in 
energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment and industry 
High 
Decrease distribution 
losses from theft 
Indirect high, by increas-
ing the revenues that can 
be reinvested in energy ef-
ficient technologies 
N/A High  
Improve economic effi-
ciency in government 
spending 
Indirect high, by focusing 
resources in an economic 
way on electricity sectors 
N/A; possibly an 
important issue; 
but did not 
emerge as such 
High; hence the need 
to focus on retrofit-
ting 
End-use efficiency im-
provement (EEI) 
Very high Low Low in small scale 
sectors 
Replacement of coal by  
renewables (REN) 
High Large hydro high, 
other  
renewables low 
Large hydro  
controversial, other 
renewables high 
Replacement of coal by 
natural gas (GAS low, no 
cogen) 
High High Low 
Replacement of coal by 
nuclear power (NUC) 
Low For government 
high 
Controversial 
Closing Small power plants 
(CSP) 
Low For government 
high 
Low 
Efficiency improvement in 
power plants (EFF) 
High Low High 
Increased use of cogenera-
tion (COG-coal) 
Low Low Although seen as im-
portant, policies are 
slow 
Reduction of losses during  
transmission and distribu-
tion (T&D) 
Medium Low High 
Note: The technical potential evaluated as high, low, etc. are derived from the quantitative analysis 
done in Chapter 7. 
 
The above table reveals that: 
- For China, the end-use energy efficiency improvement option, the efficiency im-
provement in power plants option and the (technical) losses in transmission and dis-
tribution have very high technical potential to reduce emissions. The government 
may wish to give these options due consideration and see if they cannot be priori-
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tised given their high potential for reducing emissions and their relatively non-
controversial nature.  
- For India, energy efficiency improvement in the end-use sector could benefit from 
greater prioritisation.  
- Since gas is a cleaner source of energy, the government may wish to examine the po-
tential of better social relations with its neighbouring countries. 
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9. Best Practice Technology Scenarios 
Author: Carolien Kroeze593  
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 presented a number of Best Practice Technology (BPT) options to reduce the 
emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector in China and India and analysed 
their potential individual effect on emissions. Chapter 8 discussed the feasibility of these 
options and the preferences of stakeholders in China and India. In the following we will 
combine selected BPT options, and quantify their combined effect on emissions in new 
scenarios. The choice for options in these combinations will be partly based on the 
stakeholder analysis presented in chapter 8. In these new scenarios we assume that the 
selected BPT options are fully or partly implemented. In most cases we will assume 
maximum emission reduction by options considered. We therefore refer to these new 
scenarios as Best Practice Technology (BPT) scenarios. These scenarios illustrate the 
combined technical potential of selected options to reduce emissions, and vary in their 
extent to which possible economic and political limitations are accounted for.  
9.2 Description of BPT scenarios 
Of the nine options594 to reduce emissions presented in chapter 7, we conclude that end-
use efficiency improvements and fuel switch have the largest technical potential impact 
on both greenhouse gas and sulphur emissions. Closing small power plants, on the other 
hand, hardly reduces emissions in 2020 relative to Business-as-usual (only analysed for 
China). This is caused by the expected closure of small power plants in the Business-as-
Usual (BAU) Scenario in China. Technologies to reduce sulphur are effective in avoid-
ing SO2 emissions, but hardly affect greenhouse gases.  
The options that have the largest technical potential to reduce emissions, are not neces-
sarily viewed by stakeholders as the most promising options for modernising the 
electricity sector (chapter 8). The stakeholder analysis identified a different set of options 
for China than for India. Some stakeholders seem to focus on replacing coal by 
alternative fuels, while others seem to give priority to efficiency improvement in 
electricity supply. It is interesting to note that end-use efficiency improvement may have 
a potentially large effect on emissions, but does not seem to be the most important option 
according to stakeholders China. In India, end-use efficiency improvement is 
increasingly considered an important option, but not yet implemented at large. 
Here, we present results for four Best Practice Technology (BPT) scenarios in which we 
assume implementation of different combinations of BPT options for emission reduction 
strategies (Table 9.1). The options included in the scenarios are selected from the list of 
BPT options with a relatively large technical potential to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
                                                   
593  This chapter has been written with comments from Joyeeta Gupta, Jaklien Vlasblom, Kornelis Blok, and 
Christiaan Boudri 
594  The nine options include (a) The impact of end-use efficiency improvement (EEI) on electricity supply, (b) 
Replacement of coal by renewables (REN), (c) Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS), (d), Replacement 
of coal by nuclear power (NUC), (e) Closing small power plants (CSP), (f) Efficiency improvement in power 
plants (EFF), (g) Increased use of cogeneration (COG), (h) Reduction of losses during transmission and dis-
tribution (T&D) and (i) End of pipe technologies to reduce sulphur emissions (SR). 
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gases. Note that there is no difference between China and India with respect to the op-
tions selected in the combinations. We define four scenarios: 
- In the Mixed Options scenario (BPT1) we combine BPT options that we consider the 
most promising, given their technical potential to reduce emissions and the views of 
stakeholders.  
- In two alternative scenarios we explore the consequences of policies reflecting a 
strong preference for Efficiency Improvement (BPT2) and Fuel Switch (BPT3), re-
gardless of the feasibility of individual options.  
- For reasons of comparison we also quantify the Theoretical Maximum potential to 
reduce emissions in a scenario in which efficiency improvement and fuel switches 
are combined (BPT4). This scenario must be considered unrealistic because it com-
pletely ignores the practical, economic and political feasibility of reduction options. 
Table 9.1  Overview of Best Practice Technology (BPT) scenarios for 2020 for China and India. 
The table shows to what extent BPT options are included in the scenario. BPT options 
include end-use efficiency improvement (EEI), increased use of renewables (REN), 
natural gas (GAS) or nuclear power (NUC), closing small power plants (CSP), effi-
ciency improvement of power plants (EFF) increased cogeneration (COG), a reduction 
in transmission and distribution losses (T&D), and sulphur reduction (SR). No = Not 
Included, Full = 100% implemented, In Part = Part of the BPT option is implemented 
 Scenario BPT 1 
“Mixed Options” 
Scenario BPT 2 
“Efficiency Im-
provement” 
Scenario BPT 3 
“Fuel Switch” 
Scenario BPT 4 
“Theoretical 
Maximum” 
EEI In Part1 Full In Part2 Full 
REN In Part3 No Full Full 
GAS No No Full In Part4 
NUC No No Full No 
CSP No No No No 
EFF Full Full No Full 
COG No No No No 
T&D Full Full No Full 
SR No No No No 
1 75% of potential 
2 40% of potential 
3 No extra growth in large hydro 
4 Natural gas is used to replace coal that is not avoided by other options 
9.3 A “Mixed Options” Scenario (BPT1) 
9.3.1 BPT Options included  
The Mixed Options Scenario (BPT1) combines BPT options that we consider the most 
promising, given their technical potential to reduce emissions and the views of stake-
holders. Thus the scenario includes options that were calculated to have a potentially 
large effect on emissions (see chapter 7) and/or were selected by some stakeholders as 
priority options (see chapter 8). We excluded options that are considered controversial in 
either China or India. The following assumptions are made in this scenario for China and 
India: 
- Demand for electricity in 2020 can potentially be 30% lower than in the BAU sce-
nario, reducing the electricity produced in large coal (and oil) fired power plants to 
be built after 2000 (BPT option EEI). In this scenario, we assume that 75% of this 
potential is realised. 
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- Use of renewables is higher than in the BAU scenario in 2020, except for large hy-
dropower, which is kept at the BAU 2020 level. The renewables replace the electric-
ity produced in coal/oil fired power plants to be built after 2000. Renewables include 
wind, bagasse, waste fuel, small-scale hydropower and geothermal energy (BPT op-
tion REN, but excluding large hydropower). 
- The efficiencies of coal/oil-fired power plants are improved. We assume that the 
electrical efficiencies of existing power plants are 2% (China) or 5% (India) higher 
than in the BAU scenario for 2020, and that coal/oil-fired power plants to be built af-
ter 2000 have efficiencies of 45% (China) or 42% (India) instead of 40% or less 
(BPT option EFF). 
- The losses due to transmission, distribution and own use of power plants are reduced 
by one-third relative to the 2020 BAU level (BPT option T&D). 
In our scenario we combine efficiency improvement (end-use and supply-side) and coal 
replacement by renewables (excluding large hydro). We select these options for the fol-
lowing reasons. End-use efficiency improvement is included, because of its large techni-
cal potential to reduce emissions. However, we assume that only part of the potential to 
improve end-use efficiency is realised, because of the high costs of full implementation 
of this potential and because not all stakeholders seem to give high priority to end-use ef-
ficiency improvement. We also selected options aiming at efficiency improvement in 
power plants and in electricity transmission and distribution in the scenario, although we 
realise that this option is more likely for India than for China. And we selected fuel 
switch by renewables as an option, but excluded large hydropower because several 
stakeholders in India stressed the implications of large dams for the environment and lo-
cal population, making this a controversial option. For the same reason we excluded a 
switch to nuclear power from this scenario. We also did not include a switch to natural 
gas, because a fuel switch from coal to other fossil fuels may not be considered a long-
term solution to climate change. Closing small power plants is considered a priority op-
tion by stakeholders in China, but has a low technical potential to reduce emissions rela-
tive to the Business-as-Usual scenario, because China is already implementing this op-
tion so that there are hardly any small power plants left in the BAU scenario in 2020. For 
India closing small power plants is not considered an option because all electrical capac-
ity will be needed in the future to meet the growing demand for electricity.  
9.3.2 Emissions in 2020  
The Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario indicates that electricity production may increase 
by a factor of five in India and China, while emissions of greenhouse gases are calcu-
lated to increase by a factor of three (China) and four (India) between 1990 and 2020 
(chapter 5).  
In the Mixed Options Scenario (BPT1), the demand for electricity in 2020 is calculated 
to be lower than in the BAU scenario, because of end-use efficiency improvement. Also 
the efficiency of electricity production and distribution is improved, so that the demand 
for primary fuels is reduced by 22% (China) and 27% (India) relative to the 2020 BAU 
scenario (Fig. 9.1 and 9.3). The use of renewables is larger than in the BAU scenario, so 
that the share of coal in electricity production is reduced considerably. 
The net effect of this combination of BPT options is that emissions of greenhouse gases 
and sulphur dioxide are reduced by 59% in China relative to the BAU scenario in 2020. 
In India emissions of greenhouse gases are reduced by 47%, and emissions of sulphur 
dioxide by 43% relative to the BAU scenario (Table 9.2; Fig 9.2 and 9.4).  
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9.4 Other scenarios   
As discussed in chapter 8, stakeholders in China and India have different priorities. Chi-
nese stakeholders seem to give priority to replacing coal by other fuels (renewables, 
natural gas and nuclear power), while stakeholders in India focus more on efficiency im-
provement (in particular with respect to electricity production and distribution). To ex-
plore the effects of such differences in views, we define two alternative scenarios that 
focus largely on efficiency improvement (BPT2) or fuel switch (BPT3).  
Our fourth scenario (the Theoretical Maximum Scenario) must be considered a hypo-
thetical case and explores the potential maximum reduction by BPT options. Since it 
completely ignores the feasibility of options this scenario must be considered unrealistic. 
9.4.1 Options included in the Efficiency Improvement Scenario (BPT2)  
Scenario BPT2 combines end-use efficiency improvement to efficiency improvement in 
power plants and during transmission and distribution. The following assumptions are 
made in this scenario for China and India: 
- Demand for electricity in 2020 is 30% lower than in the BAU scenario, reducing the 
electricity produced in large coal (and oil) fired power plants to be built after 2000 
(BPT option EEI). 
- The efficiencies of coal/oil-fired power plants are improved. We assume that the 
electrical efficiencies of existing power plants are 2% (China) or 5% (India) higher 
than in the BAU scenario for 2020, and that coal/oil-fired power plants to be built af-
ter 2000 have efficiencies of 45% (China) or 42% (India) instead of 40% or less 
(BPT option EFF). 
- The losses due to transmission, distribution and own use of power plants are reduced 
by one-third relative to the 2020 BAU level (BPT option T&D). 
9.4.2 Options included in the Fuel switch Scenario (BPT3)  
Scenario BPT3 combines coal (and oil) replacement by renewables, natural gas and nu-
clear power. In addition, we assume some end-use efficiency improvement. The follow-
ing assumptions are made in this scenario for China and India: 
- Demand for electricity in 2020 can potentially be 30% lower than in the BAU sce-
nario, reducing the electricity produced in large coal (and oil) fired power plants to 
be built after 2010 (BPT option EEI). In this scenario, we assume that 40% of this 
potential is realised. 
- Use of renewables (including large hydropower) is higher than in the BAU scenario 
in 2020. The renewables replace the electricity produced in coal/oil fired power 
plants to be built after 2000. Renewables include wind, bagasse, waste fuel, small 
and large-scale hydropower and geothermal energy (BPT option REN). 
- Use of natural gas is 3500 PJ (China) and 3387 PJ (India), as opposed to 1006 PJ 
(China) and 1693 PJ (India) in the BAU scenario in 2020, replacing the electricity 
produced in coal (and oil) fired power plants to be built after 2000 (BPT option 
GAS). 
- Electricity production in nuclear power plants is higher than in the BAU scenario 
due to an increased plant load factor (China), or increased capacity following recent 
policy plans (India) and replaces coal/oil based electricity (BPT option NUC). 
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9.4.3 Options included in the Theoretical Maximum Scenario (BPT4)  
Scenario BPT4 is as scenario BPT2, but also assumes additional fuel switch. Coal (and 
oil) is assumed to be replaced by renewables and natural gas. The following assumptions 
are made in this scenario for China and India:  
- Demand for electricity in 2020 is 30% lower than in the BAU scenario, reducing the 
electricity produced in large coal (and oil) fired power plants to be built after 2000 
(BPT option EEI). 
- The efficiencies of coal/oil-fired power plants are improved. We assume that the 
electrical efficiencies of existing power plants are 2% (China) or 5% (India) higher 
than in the BAU scenario for 2020, and that coal/oil-fired power plants to be built af-
ter 2000 have efficiencies of 45% (China) or 42% (India) instead of 40% or less 
(BPT option EFF). 
- The losses due to transmission, distribution and own use of power plants are reduced 
by one-third relative to the 2020 BAU level (BPT option T&D). 
- Use of renewables (including large hydropower) is higher than in the BAU scenario 
in 2020. The renewables replace the electricity produced in coal/oil fired power 
plants to be built after 2000. Renewables include wind, bagasse, waste fuel, small 
and large-scale hydropower and geothermal energy (BPT option REN). 
- The remaining coal and oil used in power plants in 2020 in China and India is as-
sumed to be replaced by natural gas. Because of the assumed efficiency improve-
ment and a shift to renewable fuels, the amount of coal to be replaced is lower than 
the assumed available gas in BPT option GAS. 
9.4.4 Emissions in 2020  
We calculated fuel use and emissions of greenhouse gases and sulphur dioxide in 2020 
for all scenarios (Table 9.2: Fig. 9.1 – 9.4). In the Efficiency Improvement Scenario de-
mand for electricity and fuels is reduced considerably relative to the BAU scenario, and 
in the Fuel Switch Scenario to some extent. The Fuel Switch scenario assumes replace-
ment of coal by other fuels, while the Efficiency Improvement Scenario does not. In both 
scenarios there is still a need for coal in electricity production in 2020: in the BPT sce-
narios 15- 45% of electricity is from coal fired power plants, while in the BAU scenario 
this is about 60% (Fig. 9.1 and 9.3).  
For the Efficiency Improvement Scenario and Fuel Switch Scenario we calculate emis-
sion reductions ranging from 52 – 63% relative to the BAU scenario (Table 9.2). These 
reductions are comparable (somewhat higher) to those calculated for the Mixed Options 
Scenario (BPT1). These three scenarios are very different in their assumptions on reduc-
tion options, indicating that there are different strategies possible for realising relatively 
large emission reductions in China and India. However, the options differ in their politi-
cal and economical feasibility. 
In the Theoretical Maximum Scenario coal is completely replaced by other fuels (Fig. 9.1 
and 9.3) except for some coal used in cogeneration. We calculate large reductions in 
emissions (77 – 92% relative to the BAU scenario; Table 9.2) for this scenario. The cal-
culated emissions are even lower than the 1990 level. Such large technical potential re-
ductions are typical for almost all countries, both in developed and developing world re-
gions. However, such scenarios do not take into account the costs or other barriers in im-
plementing reduction options. To what extent potential reductions calculated for scenario 
BPT4 can be considered feasible is a more challenging issue than the conclusion that it is 
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technically possible to achieve large emission reductions. The other three scenarios 
(BPT1, BPT2 and BPT3) may be considered more realistic, although ambitious.  
9.5 Discussion and conclusions  
In this chapter, we analysed the effect of combinations of reduction technologies in four 
“Best Practice Technology” scenarios. The results of our calculations are presented in 
Table 9.2, Figures 9.1 - 9.4 and annexes 9.1 - 9.4. From our analyses, we can draw the 
following conclusions. 
First, as with many of the developed countries in the world, it is technically possible for 
China and India to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions very substantially by adopting 
a highly energy efficient and renewable energy pathway (scenario BPT4). The key bot-
tleneck in adopting such a pathway is the enormous expense of large-scale renewable 
energy and new efficient technologies. Given that most developed countries themselves 
find such a pathway too expensive for them, it is arguably inconceivable that China and 
India could adopt new technologies to the extent typically assumed in theoretical maxi-
mum emission reduction scenarios. On the other hand, both countries have policies in 
place to encourage small (and large) renewables and some environmental NGOs argue 
that if the flexibility mechanisms are used to only encourage renewables and end-use op-
tions, this in itself will provide considerable momentum to the development of renew-
ables and the price of renewables may come down considerably in the process. This all 
depends on the willingness of the influential countries in the developed and developing 
world to take on a courageous position on climate change and to withstand the strong 
lobbies of the vested interests in the fossil fuel world (see also chapters 8 and 10). 
Second, our calculations of three different scenarios (BPT1, BPT 2 and BPT 3) for emis-
sions in the year 2020 indicate that there are many different strategies for realising rela-
tively large emissions reductions (to about half the level of the BAU scenario by 2020) 
for China and India. In each strategy we focus on different combinations of policies and 
we show that in the medium-term there are several possibilities for achieving emission 
reductions. Some of these are relatively inexpensive and may be encouraged by a range 
of policy measures.  
Third, one of the most promising combinations of policies is reflected in the Mixed Op-
tions Scenario (BPT 1). This scenario includes reduction options that have a relatively 
large technical potential and are given priority by stakeholders and are in general non-
controversial in one or the other country. One of the most promising options is energy 
efficiency improvement in the end-use sectors, which is calculated to have a consider-
able technical potential to reduce emissions (see Chapters 6 and 7) and which appears to 
get an increasing degree of priority in India (see Chapter 8). This scenario does not re-
flect the differences in feasibility between the two countries. The results indicate that 
greenhouse gas and sulphur dioxide emissions can be reduced to about half the level of 
the BAU scenario in both countries.  
Fourth, without prejudice to the first conclusion above, we find that even in scenarios re-
flecting ambitious assumptions on energy efficiency improvement and fuel switch, a 
substantial portion of the electricity in China and India in 2020 is generated from coal 
fired power plants. Feasible options for end-use efficiency improvement combined with 
feasible fuel switch options may not be sufficient to avoid building new coal-fired plants 
after the year 2000. It must therefore be considered unrealistic that either country will be 
able to reduce its reliance on coal to zero in the coming decades, although it may become 
smaller than BAU trends suggest. 
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Finally, a word of caution. It should be noted, that we did not study the long-term effects 
of the reduction options (after 2020), which may be different than shown here. This is 
because some of the options developed in the period till 2020 may lock these countries 
into long-term technological trajectories. There may also be a larger potential for nuclear 
plants than assumed in our scenarios, but we have not gone beyond nuclear policy as 
given in the plans of the government.  
Table 9.2  Emission reductions achieved in the Best Practice Technology (BTP) scenarios for 2020 
for China and India. Results are shown for the Best Practice scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed 
Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”) and BPT4 
(“Theoretical Maximum”). Units: percentage reduction relative to BAU scenario. 
 Scenario BPT 1 
“Mixed Opti-
ons” 
Scenario BPT 2 
“Efficiency  
Improvement” 
Scenario BPT 3 
“Fuel Switch” 
Scenario BPT4 
“Theoretical 
Maximum” 
China     
Greenhouse gases 59 52 54 83 
Sulphur dioxide 59 54 63 92 
India     
Greenhouse gases 47 53 53 77 
Sulphur dioxide 43 52 59 81 
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Figure 9.1  The electricity sector in China: demand for primary energy for electricity production 
(top) and electricity production (bottom). Results are shown for 1990 and for 2020 for 
the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: 
BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), 
and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). 
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Figure 9.2 Emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector in China: emissions of greenhouse 
gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) and sulphur dioxide (bottom). Results are shown for 
1990 and for 2020 for the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice 
Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), 
BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). 
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Figure 9.3  The electricity sector in India: demand for primary energy for electricity production 
(top) and electricity production (bottom). Results are shown 1990 and for2020 for the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: 
BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), 
and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). 
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Figure 9.4  Emissions of air pollutants from the electricity sector in India: emissions of greenhouse 
gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) (top) and sulphur dioxide (bottom). Results are shown for 
1990 and for 2020 for the Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice 
Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), 
BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”) and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). 
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Annexes to Chapter 9. 
 
ANNEX 9-1: SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
CHINA 
 
Table A.9.1-1. Demand for primary energy for electricity production in China in the year 2020 in the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: 
BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), 
and BPT4 (“Theoretical Maximum”). Unit: PJ/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 543 509 509 543 0 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 442 417 417 442 0 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 14243 4385 5630 3636 0 
Cogeneration 4019 4019 4019 4019 4019 
Biomass 226 1113 226 1113 1113 
Large hydro 4743 4743 4743 5588 5588 
Other renewables 886 3662 886 3662 3662 
Nuclear 2228 2228 2228 2602 2228 
Natural Gas 1006 1006 1006 3500 3017 
Total 28336 22082 19664 25106 19626 
 
 
Table A.9.1-2  Electricity production in China in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), 
BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), and BPT4 (“Theoretical 
Maximum”). Unit: PJ/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 164 164 164 164 0 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 147 147 147 147 0 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 5610 1805 2365 1367 0 
Cogeneration 603 603 603 603 603 
Biomass 21 216 21 216 216 
Large hydro 1802 1802 1802 2123 2123 
Other renewables 337 1392 337 1392 1392 
Nuclear 847 847 847 989 847 
Natural Gas 553 553 553 1925 1659 
Total 10084 7528 6839 8926 6839 
 
 
  315
ANNEX 9-2: SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN CHINA 
Table A.9.2-1. Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in China in 2020 the Business-as-Usual 
scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Op-
tions”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), and BPT4 
(“Theoretical Maximum”). Unit:Tg CO2/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 47 44 44 47 0 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 38 36 36 38 0 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 1227 378 485 313 0 
Cogeneration 66 66 66 66 66 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 56 56 56 195 168 
Total 1435 580 687 660 235 
 
Table A9.2-2. As Table A.3, but for CH4. Unit:Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 4 3 3 4 0 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 3 3 3 3 0 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 95 29 37 24 0 
Cogeneration 5 5 5 5 5 
Biomass 0 1 0 1 1 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 6 6 6 22 19 
Total 113 48 55 59 25 
 
Table A9.2-3. As Table A.3, but for N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal/Oil < 50 MW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal/Oil 50-125 MW 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Coal/Oil 125-200 MW 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Coal/Oil > 200 MW 5.7 1.8 2.3 1.5 0.0 
Cogeneration 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Biomass 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.4 1.4 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Total 6.8 3.9 3.3 3.7 1.8 
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Table A9.2-4. As Table A.3, but for total of CO2, CH4 and N2O. Unit:Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal < 50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 50-125 MW 51 47 47 51 0 
Coal 125-200 MW 41 39 39 41 0 
Coal > 200 MW 1328 409 525 339 0 
Cogeneration 72 72 72 72 72 
Biomass 0 2 0 2 2 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 63 63 63 218 188 
Total 1554 631 746 722 261 
Reduction (% of BAU) 0 -59 -52 -54 -83 
 
Table A9.2-5. As Table A.3, but for SO2. Unit: Tg SO2 /year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal < 50 MW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal 50-125 MW 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Coal 125-200 MW 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Coal > 200 MW 12.8 3.9 5.1 3.3 0.0 
Cogeneration 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Biomass 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 14.5 5.9 6.7 5.3 1.2 
Reduction (% of BAU) 0 -59 -54 -63 -92 
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ANNEX 9-3: SUMMARY TABLES FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN 
INDIA 
 
Table A.9.3-1. Demand for primary energy for electricity production in India in the year 2020 in the 
Business-as-Usual scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: 
BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), 
and BPT4 (”Theoretical Maximum”). Unit: PJ/year.  
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 854 745 745 854 0 
Coal, other, >2000 2628 2106 1510 216 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 1094 961 961 1094 0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 3824 0 0 0 0 
Cogeneration 667 667 667 667 667 
Oil 190 190 190 190 190 
Bagasse 1280 1567 1280 1567 1567 
Large hydro 2175 2175 2175 3225 3225 
Other renewables 145 490 145 490 490 
Nuclear 33 33 33 663 33 
Natural Gas 1693 1693 1693 3387 3141 
Total 14583 10626 9399 12353 9312 
 
Table A.9.3-2. Electricity production in India in the year 2020 in the Business-as-Usual scenario 
(BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Options”), 
BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), and BPT4 (“Theoretical 
Maximum”).Unit: PJ/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 290 290 290 290 0 
Coal, other, >2000 998 905 650 82 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 394 394 394 394 0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 1453 0 0 0 0 
Cogeneration 100 100 100 100 100 
Oil 71 71 71 71 71 
Bagasse 35 43 35 43 43 
Large hydro 827 827 827 1226 1226 
Other renewables 55 186 55 186 186 
Nuclear 12 12 12 252 12 
Natural Gas 931 931 931 1863 1727 
Total 5168 3760 3365 4507 3365 
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ANNEX 9-4: SUMMARY TABLES FOR EMISSIONS IN INDIA 
Table A.9.4-1. Emissions of CO2 from electricity production in India in 2020 the Business-as-Usual 
scenario (BAU) and for the Best Practice Technology scenarios: BPT1 (“Mixed Op-
tions”), BPT2 (“Efficiency Improvement”), BPT3 (“Fuel Switch”), and BPT4 (“Theo-
retical Maximum”). Unit: Tg CO2/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 79 69 69 79 0 
Coal, other, >2000 244 195 140 20 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 101 89 89 101 0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 354 0 0 0 0 
Cogeneration 11 11 11 11 11 
Oil 15 15 15 15 15 
Bagasse 0 0 0 0 0 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 95 95 95 189 175 
Total 899 473 418 415 201 
 
Table A9.4-2. As Table A.3, but for CH4. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 6 5 5 6 0 
Coal, other, >2000 19 16 11 2 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 8 7 7 8 0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 28 0 0 0 0 
Cogeneration 1 1 1 1 1 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 
Bagasse 1 1 1 1 1 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 11 11 11 21 20 
Total 74 41 36 39 22 
 
Table A9.4-3. As Table A.3, but for N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 
Coal, other, >2000 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cogeneration 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 5.4 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.1 
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Table A9.4-4. As Table A.3, but for total of CO2, CH4 and N2O. Unit: Tg CO2-equivalents/year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 86 75 75 86 0 
Coal, other, >2000 264 212 152 22 0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 110 97 97 110 0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 384 0 0 0 0 
Cogeneration 12 12 12 12 12 
Oil 15 15 15 15 15 
Bagasse 2 3 2 3 3 
Large hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 105 105 105 211 195 
Total 978 518 457 458 225 
Reduction (% of BAU) 0 -47 -53 -53 -77 
 
Table A9.4-5. As Table A.3, but for SO2. Unit: Tg SO2 /year. 
 BAU BPT1 BPT2 BPT3 BPT4 
Coal, other, <2000 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
Coal, other, >2000 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 
Coal, LPS, <2000 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 
Coal, LPS, >2000 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cogeneration 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bagasse 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Large hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other renewables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Natural Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 3.3 1.9 1.6 1.4 0.6 
Reduction (% of BAU) 0 -43 -52 -59 -81 
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10. Climate Change and International Instruments595  
Author: Joyeeta Gupta596 
10.1 Introduction 
The Asian Dilemma refers to the dilemma between the need to increase electricity pro-
duction to meet economic growth requirements and the concern for climate change. The 
previous chapters have considered one of the horns of the dilemma in detail; this chapter 
turns to the other horn of the dilemma: the concern for climate change. It examines the 
evolving national foreign policy on climate change in both countries and then analyses 
the policy and its domestic foundations. It then examines the perceptions of the flexibil-
ity mechanisms (introduced in Chapter 1) under the climate convention and the willing-
ness of both countries to use these mechanisms to promote measures to decrease the rate 
of growth of emissions from the electricity producing and consuming sectors.  
10.2 China 
10.2.1 Foreign policy on climate change 
Since 1972 China has been participating in international environmental negotiations. In 
1990, in response to the growing importance of the climate change problem, the 
government established a National Climate Change Coordination Committee to help 
with the preparations for the climate change negotiations. Chinese diplomats have time 
and time again made clear in the international context that climate change cannot be seen 
as a priority in the developing countries. They have argued that the developed countries 
should take the first steps in emission reduction and that under Article 4.7 the 
implementation of their commitments is subject to assistance from the developed 
countries. The reasons for arguing that the developed countries should reduce their 
emissions are two-fold. First, that this is the basic agreement in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change since China, is a developing country and its 
per capita income is very low reducing its capacity to act; its per capita emissions are 
very low and its historical emissions have been low, reducing its responsibility to act. 
Official documents state: “Like other developing countries, China’s per capita energy 
consumption level and the emitted sulphur dioxide are much lower than the world 
average at present … According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
China is under no specific obligation to limit the emissions of carbon dioxide. However, 
mindful of the responsibility for protection of the global climate, China follows the 
principle of attaching equal importance to economisation on energy and expansion of the 
energy industry, striving to raise its energy utilisation efficiency and readjust its energy 
structure. While appropriately developing nuclear power, China spares no effort to 
develop hydro electric power and to strengthen research into and exploitation of 
geothermal power, solar energy, wind energy, oceanic energy and other new energy 
sources, so as to reduce the greenhouse gas emission” (Information Office of the State 
Council 1996: 13-14). Interviewees mentioned that China’s contribution to the global 
                                                   
595 This chapter draws heavily on an article in press: Gupta, J. (2001). India and Climate Change Policy: Between 
Diplomatic Defensiveness and Industrial Transformation, Energy and Environment, forthcoming. 
596 With contributions from: Kornelis Blok and Jaklien Vlasblom. 
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problem can be seen in terms of the 1 child policy and the process of de-linking the 
economic growth rate and energy use growth rates.597 
The Chinese Government was quite positive about the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and ratified the agreement in January 1993. However, it 
opposed the discussions on Joint Implementation, although they reluctantly agreed to the 
pilot phase in 1995. Since Article 4.5 of the Convention mentions the commitment of 
developed countries to transfer technologies to developing countries, China presented a 
list of technologies that it thought would be suitable for it at the second meeting of the 
parties in Bonn (see 10.3.3). There was, however, not much international response to this 
request. The Chinese also insisted on tougher targets for the developed countries and in 
1997 were relieved that the Kyoto Protocol included such targets. However, the 
inclusion of the flexible mechanisms was not received with much enthusiasm. Although 
China has been traditionally opposed to Joint Implementation (for reasons see Gupta 
1997: 116-131), it finally accepted it reluctantly with the rest of the developing countries 
in December 1997 as part of the newly defined Clean Development Mechanism. 
Although it was accepted, officials and other interviewees complained that they felt that 
the agreements under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
were being grossly modified. They argued in a workshop on the subject that Article 4.5 
on technology transfer was not being given any substantial push and that they felt 
unhappy about the nature of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Nevertheless, 
in the following meetings of the Conference of the Parties, China participated in the 
process of developing rules for the CDM.  
With the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it became amply clear that the US 
government would be unwilling to ratify the Protocol until key developing countries 
took meaningful action. This put pressure on China, and when the issue of ‘voluntary 
commitments’ of developing countries was once again opened for discussion in the 
fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, China, along with the rest of the G77 
refused to discuss this issue.598 The reasons for opposing ‘voluntary’ measures, was that 
as with the rest of the developing countries, China does not believe that a commitment 
can be voluntary, and believes that this will lead to divide and rule of the developing 
countries. Officials also believe that they are not ready to take on serious reduction 
measures that can quantified. China has not yet submitted its national communications to 
the secretariat. In the meanwhile, China is in no hurry to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
waiting for other countries to do so. 
At the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention, China 
participated actively in the development of rules and modalities for the flexible 
mechanisms. They have argued that while sinks should be excluded as projects under the 
CDM, nuclear projects should be permitted. The reason for excluding sinks is the lack of 
clarity regarding the method to account for credits. Furthermore, although China in 
theory could benefit from extensive afforestation, they do not prioritise such projects. 
Chinese negotiators also argued against fungibility of the credits gained under the three 
mechanisms, saying that the credits should be kept separate (Tangen et al 2000). 
In relation to the future, when Chinese experts were asked, when would China be willing 
to take on quantitative (reduction) commitments, we were told that China can only 
consider reduction measures once it is a middle-level developed country (a reference 
                                                   
597  Meeting 7, 1999; Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
598  Argentina, a G77 member, and Kazakhstan, a non-G77 country have however stated their willingness to take 
on voluntary commitments, but these have not been formally concretised. 
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clearly to the fact that Spain, Portugal and Greece among others have been allowed to 
increase their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol).599 This is also because of the lack of 
public support for such an esoteric global issue - they argued that although people “are 
aware of this issue and its consequences”; “they accept the fact of climate change”. 600 
According to a survey by ADB (1997), climate change is 10th on the list of priorities; the 
first being water pollution followed by fresh water depletion, air pollution, deforestation, 
solid waste, soil erosion, biodiversity loss, wildlife loss, fish depletion, desertification 
and then climate change. “The priorities in China are first local, then regional, and last 
global”.601 
Most interviewees were of the view that it would be at least 50 years before China would 
have the average income of the developed countries, i.e. if current growth rates of about 
7 percent continue, China is expected to be among the middle income group of the 
developed countries by 2050, since the latter group would have also become richer.602 In 
2050 the Chinese per capita GDP is expected to be US$30,000 and in 2100 it is expected 
by Chinese scholars that the per capita GDP will be comparable with the west.603 Of 
course, this number hides the internal disparities and it is expected that “the urban areas 
may reach a high level of development in the next 20 years, but when you look at the 
rural areas, you will see that in terms of development very few of these areas have 
developed beyond the situation they experienced in 1949. In fact after 1978, the gap 
between the rich and the poor has been increasing. I believe that the people under the 
poverty line would probably include about 50 million people. There are an additional 
number of millions of people who are poor; but the poor are not necessarily concentrated 
in the rural areas. There are some very rich people in the rural areas. In the Eastern and 
Northern part, there is a greater degree of poverty”.604  
It is against this background that the Chinese argue that taking environmental measures 
seriously is difficult, until the country as a whole has developed considerably.605 And 
taking measures on climate change is particularly complicated. While some argue that 
taking measures before 2050 is out of the question, one interviewee stated that China 
will probably develop in such a way that in 2040 CO2 reduction measures can be seri-
ously achieved.606 However, they do not like to be put under pressure. At the same time, 
Chinese officials argue that: “Historically and at present much of the GHG emissions are 
from developing countries. However, in most of these countries, as in China, the emis-
sion per capita is very low compared to the developed countries. Therefore it is unrea-
sonable of the US to ask China to take the first step. China has taken action. The Chinese 
economic growth is high. The increase in GHG emissions is not as high as the economic 
growth. So, China has de-linked the economic growth and GHG emission rates while 
most other countries have not. I believe China has made great effort to reduce GHG 
emission. This should be understood clearly by the US” (Workshop China 1999). 
Then why does China participate in the international treaty on climate change? This is 
because China has a history of participating in international environmental treaties and 
even human rights treaties, and China has signed and ratified several international 
                                                   
599  Australia, Iceland and Norway have also been allowed to increase their emissions but they are very rich 
countries. 
600  Meeting 4; see also 1, 7, 11, 1999. 
601  Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
602  Meeting 1, 2, 11, 12, 1999. 
603  Meeting 7, 1999. 
604  Meeting 12, 1999.  
605  Meeting 4, 11, 1999 
606  Meeting 9, 1999. 
  
 324
agreements and they are implementing these in good faith.607 The government wishes to 
implement the spirit of the treaty even if it may be difficult to implement the specific 
clauses.608  
The above presents a brief summary of the key positions of China in the negotiations and 
their reasons for doing so. But does this imply that China has made no contribution to 
addressing the climate change problem whether directly or indirectly?  
The following section analyses China’s contribution but in particular in relation to the 
electricity sector. 
10.2.2 Analysis of the policy and its domestic foundations 
China is in a state of transition from a centrally planned economy towards a (German – 
type) market economy.609 But, this transition is expected to take the form of an evolu-
tionary process and not a revolutionary process like the one in Russia.610 This evolution-
ary process has a domestic and an international dimension. This means that China is not 
only in the process of defining its role in international politics but also in the process of 
identifying a bloodless route towards democracy and the free market. For example, at the 
international level China will gradually become a member of the WTO and will open up 
the banking, insurance and agricultural sectors.611  
China has a special status in the Group of 77 developing countries, although it attends 
the meetings of this group in international negotiations. China is not a member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, which consists of most of the larger developing countries. At 
the same time, China is the only developing country that is a permanent member of the 
Security Council. However, given its special status in the G77 and its participation in the 
Security Council, it seemed to be an interesting issue to understand how Chinese stake-
holders tend to perceive their role in international relations, and whether they see them-
selves as developed or developing. This is critical in order to understand the kind of na-
tional policies they are likely to support in relation to the climate change issue, especially 
since the obligations at this moment are divided along the lines of developed and devel-
oping countries. Without exception, the answer from our interviewees and at the Beijing 
Workshop was that China is a developing country since it has a very low per capita in-
come level,612 since it is technologically and economically backward;613 and since it 
shares the same structural features as other developing countries.614  
Although climate change is not an immediate and visible problem, the problem was phi-
losophically interesting since it raised questions about existing production and consump-
tion patterns. “The problem lies in what can we do, what is the way?”615 While “we are 
all talking about sustainable development; that is easier said than done”.616 Some stated 
that their vision of the future was to search after an alternative path, a sustainable devel-
opment path. “Our vision for the future development of our country is to find a better 
way than the developed countries, to increase our economic growth, but not at the ex-
                                                   
607  Meeting 12, 1999. 
608  Meeting 2, 1999. 
609  Meeting 5, 1999; Beijing Workshop, 1999 
610  Meeting 1, 3, 1999. 
611  Meeting 1, 1999. 
612  Meeting 1, 1999. 
613  Meeting 2, 7, 1999. 
614  Meeting 4, 11, 12, 1999. 
615  Meeting 4, 1999. 
616  Meeting 2, 1999. 
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pense of the environment; but that is not cheap, so we will have to make some conces-
sions”.617 However, few had any concrete definition of this path except to support the 
possibility of using technology transfer as a way to partially reduce the growth in emis-
sion levels. There is “also a feeling of helplessness, especially when confronted by the 
messages from the media and tv about the way other people live. People receive a con-
flicting message which is difficult to reconcile” .618 While this confusion was clearly ex-
pressed by the interviewees, the participants at the Beijing Workshop were more clear 
that in their view sustainable development meant development and where politically and 
economically feasible the adoption of better technologies.619 
Although there is some divergence in position on what sustainable development is, it is 
clear that the jargon of sustainable development has been adopted in national policy. Na-
tional priorities are, in general, decided and defined by the government. In response to 
our question regarding what people thought the key national priorities should be, we re-
ceived either cautious personal critical responses620 or we were told what the Govern-
ment sees as national priorities.621 Furthermore, there were those who argued that the 
Government gave importance to environment, while the people felt development was 
more important,622 and there were those who felt that the government only pays lip ser-
vice to environmental issues.623 Although the president is cited as having stated that de-
velopment and environmental protection should be pursued simultaneously,624 although 
policy documents talk about the need for sustainable development, the absolute top eco-
nomic priority appears to be economic growth.625 The top political priority appears to be 
social stability626 that results from political, economic and environmental security, al-
though there may be difference of opinion about how these can be achieved. One inter-
viewee explained that: “Although social stability is not a problem now, but I think that in 
this transition period we have to be very careful to avoid the risk of social instability. As 
you know we have a new government since 1998. They are pushing forward the policies 
of economic reform. These policies have led to millions of unemployed people and laid 
off workers. This is a new situation and can lead to instability. The government now re-
alises the need to consult these people and listen to them”.627 “Environment is not the 
first priority even at the different government levels in our country. Of course people talk 
about it and researchers see it as very important; but it is still only one issue in our list of 
priorities and basic needs. Development precedes environmental issues.”628 In the area of 
energy policy, “both central and state governments say it is important to have environ-
ment friendly energy policy; they are looking at the issue with a sense of responsibility, 
on paper everybody agrees; at least on the necessity of taking action”.629  
                                                   
617  Meeting 2, 4, 7, 11, 12, 1999. 
618  Meeting 7, 1999; Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
619  Beijing Workshop 1999. 
620  Mostly by our interviewees in meetings 2, 4, 6, 12, 1999. 
621  Meeting 5, 7, 11, 1999; and at the Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
622  Meeting 1, 11; However, there were some questions raised as to whether these were indeed the priorities of 
the people. While some explained that public policy analyses is a new area of research and researchers are 
still struggling to find a way to undertake such analysis,622 - Meeting 2, 1999. 
623  Meeting 12, 1999; see also other meetings generally, but not the Beijing Workshop, 1999. 
624  Meeting 1 and all other meetings generally, 1999. 
625  Meeting 5, 7, 9, 1999. 
626  Meeting 4, 10, 1999. 
627  Meeting 4, 1999. 
628  Meeting 4, 1999. 
629  Meeting 2, 3, 1999. 
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In relation to the focus on urban versus rural issues, most mentioned urban issues630 al-
though some argued that rural issues are strategically important in China since 800 mil-
lion people live in these areas. The living conditions and the income level are very low in 
these areas. They argue that it is vital that the government investigates into ways and 
means to provide the rural areas with appropriate forms of energy.  631 Rural energy is be-
coming gradually more and more important; the central government is paying more and 
more attention to this issue. Unfortunately the budget is quite small. 632  
Our analysis corresponds to the analysis of Tangen et al (2001) who argue that the driv-
ing domestic factors that influence the Chinese positions are the fear that quantitative 
commitments may reduce the growth potential of China, that climate change is seen as a 
foreign policy issue and is influenced by policies in other foreign policy domains and the 
lack of comprehensive data and institutions justifies defensive strategies in the climate 
change arena. 
10.2.3  Issue-linkages 
We did not explicitly ask our interviewees about issue-linkages, since experience sug-
gests that most interviewees are not familiar with the concept and this leads to leading 
questions. But we tried to derive the key issue linkages that were made by the interview-
ees and in the workshops. The most clear issue linkage is the link between climate 
change and the questions it raises about what sustainable development is. A positive is-
sue linkage is that although climate change is not seen as important, energy policy is 
seen as very important. This, of course, cuts both ways; since although it means that the 
growth of emissions will be tempered by decisions to promote energy efficiency and 
adopt modern technologies, the sheer volume of growth and the need to use coal may 
lead to very substantial emissions. Again the priority given by the government to global 
and regional environmental issues appears to be an “imported” priority, a priority taken 
on board either to be in line with dominant modern thinking or to try and create a better 
image for China abroad (especially since China is coming under considerable criticism 
on human rights issues). “The government decision to prioritise environmental protec-
tion is also influenced by the ideas and concepts coming from abroad”.633 In particular 
the Olympic games to be held in Beijing has spurred the desire of the officials to try and 
meet some Western local pollution standards. In this area, they are supported by the local 
people who are negatively affected by the effects of local pollution. 634 Although there 
appeared to be some potential to link climate change with acid deposition, there was 
some feeling that acid rain did not contribute much to urban air pollution and so neither 
acid deposition nor climate change were that serious, especially since the plants are lo-
cated to the east and west of Beijing. The wind in winter is mainly from the north and in 
summer from the south. So, the plume is never directly over the city. 635 On the other 
hand, it is quite clear that the Government has enacted an air pollution law to deal with 
the problem of acid deposition.636  
What is abundantly clear from the interviews is that sustainable development is still a 
fairly elusive concept to operationalise in China, the government moves from tendencies 
                                                   
630  Meeting 1, 1999. 
631  Meeting 6, 1999. 
632  Meeting 6, 1999. 
633  Meeting 2, 1999. 
634  Meeting 1, 2, 12, 1999. 
635  Meeting 3, 1999. 
636  Beijing Workshop, 1999 
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to decentralise to an automatic tendency to centralise and the fear of social tension and 
insecurity as the society changes makes it cautious about commitments. This is in addi-
tion to the fact that being in a state of transition it has less confidence about how the 
business-as-usual scenario will develop and what it will mean for greenhouse gas emis-
sions.  
10.2.4  Reaction to the Flexibility Mechanisms 
Does China need foreign technologies? In certain areas such as nuclear technology and 
clean coal technologies China could use international technologies. However, the chal-
lenge according to stakeholders was how to identify these in terms of their appropriate-
ness for the country and context.  
The Chinese Government prepared a list of technologies which it submitted in 1996 to 
the climate change secretariat. This included: 1. Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
(IGCC), 2. Direct Reduction (energy saving in all sectors), 3. CFB Coal Gasification for 
Ammonia Synthesis, Vapour Emission Control Systems; Biomass Gasification and Puri-
fication, Fuel forest-fired power generation in South China, Fuel cells, Smelting Reduc-
tion, Poultry/livestock, No tillage for man-made forest, etc. Forest ecosystem manage-
ment systems, Wasteland afforestation, Solar hot water heater, Rice husk energy transfer 
instrument, Pony tail pine protection. This list was discussed at our workshop in Beijing 
and some of these were highlighted as critical especially coal gasification technologies. 
Interviewees added in relation to technologies suitable for rural areas that there was need 
for technology cooperation in relation to (low cost and clean, and of medium size) bio-
mass gasification units for rural areas, combined/hybrid systems. These systems should 
be low maintenance systems, usable and appropriate for the villagers, and there should 
be focus on the transmission and distribution network. Interviewees from the end-use 
sectors pointed out that there are some industrial processes for which energy efficient 
technologies need to be imported, e.g. large scale precalciner preheater cement plants, 
roller presses etc, but since domestic alternatives are available, and import difficulties 
exist, the choice for import is often only made only in the case of a joint venture. China 
produces mainly technologies for small-scale plants; large scale process technologies 
need to be imported. The domestic alternatives are generally less efficient, but it can be 
expected that this will improve in the future. Residential products such as efficient (and 
CFC free) refrigerators and green lights are being produced in China after foreign manu-
facturing technologies were obtained. The resulting products are often less efficient than 
the imported alternatives, because the manufacturers try to keep the cost price low. 
Chinese stakeholders were very upset with the lack of technology transfer under Article 
4.5 of the Convention and the lack of response to the list they had submitted to the secre-
tariat. They stated that until now all technology transfer was on a commercial basis and 
they felt that the developed countries had not fulfilled their commitments. Workshop 
participants even argued that in commercial technology transfer: “ In most cases there is 
only transfer of equipment but no knowledge transfer. So, the developing countries are 
not able to produce the technologies themselves at lower costs than when importing 
them. This is seen for instance in the nuclear and wind sectors. Tell your friends that 
even transfer of technology on a commercial basis has a long way to go. Furthermore, 
the GEF projects in China have also not been successful”. 
In relation to the Clean Development Mechanism, there are mixed reactions. His-
torically the Chinese have opposed JI/AIJ/CDM. But once CDM was adopted, there 
was anger because: “In the past CDM was actually CDF (Clean Development 
Fund) but as there are no funds they just changed the name to CDM (Clean Devel-
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opment Mechanism). The international community must understand that we will 
not give credits. The same applies to emissions trading. In emissions trading there is 
also the problem with the definition of the base lines. All definitions are lacking”. 
The resistance towards giving credits is gradually crumbling and now the policy is 
to oppose the fungibility of the three mechanisms and to keep a distance from emis-
sion trading partly because of the practical concerns in setting up such a system. At 
the same time China tries to keep its position in line with the G77 position on the 
flexibility mechanisms.  
Stakeholders believe that there is a role for CDM in the clean coal (electricity) sector, 
renewable energy sector, retrofitting of power plants, nuclear plants, wind turbine and 
gas based power plant technologies. 
Such CDM projects should focus: 
- on being based on an evaluation of the pilot projects in AIJ and GEF; 
- on clarity; “There is not just a language problem, but a communication problem. 
These instruments could be used for clean production processes, but I still believe 
that before these are used we need to evaluate the results of the pilot studies”;  
- less on selling technologies, but on establishing joint venture production facilities for 
producing items such as wind turbines; 
- need for clarity on baselines and additionality; 
- should not create new local pollution; 
- should not be at commercial rates; 
- should be simple and straightforward; 
- should not lead to technological dependence; 
- should be appropriate for the context in which it is set. 
However, the general view was: “We do not have experience and do not understand the 
other mechanisms. So when you ask us what we think about these, we cannot respond to 
your questions. Personally, each mechanism needs certain conditions if you wish to im-
plement them”. 
At the Workshop it was also stated that “We need help in the software in developing 
regulations and instruments, and knowledge cooperation on input-output issues. Because 
China has only experience in top-down vertical control policy-making we have to learn 
from the experiences of other countries in managing on a horizontal basis”. 
China has benefited considerably from international programmes. Since 1990, UNDP 
has supported an industrial energy conservation programme in Beijing to serve as a 
demonstration centre and as a first link in a chain of such centres in major provinces and 
municipalities, research in utilisation of fly ash from coal combustion which has resulted 
in significant cement savings and a cleaner environment, and funded part of the Chinese 
Coal Programme (OECD 1996). In the last decade the GEF has supported (US$ 50 mil-
lion) energy conservation programmes in township and village enterprises (TVEs), en-
ergy efficient refrigeration, methane recovery from municipal wastes, renewable energy 
commercialisation and development, etc..637 GEF funds could be used to overcome mar-
ket and non-market barriers that stand in the way of speedy implementation of alterna-
                                                   
637  According to Johnson et al. (1996: 7) the role of GEF can be improved if would advance global environ-
mental priorities; support national priorities and be part of the national climate policy; maximise the amount 
GHG reductions per unit of GEF funding; “Where technical or market risk represents a current binding con-
straint to the adoption of high-efficiency technologies, the GEF can play a critical role in supporting technol-
ogy transfer through the purchase of technology rights, joint Chinese International Pilot Project Development 
Programmes, and the implementation of Demonstration projects. 
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tive energy conversion processes for the long-term. Thus the GEF could play an impor-
tant role in supporting technology transfer through purchase of technology rights, estab-
lishing international co-operation pilot projects programmes, technical demonstration 
projects, supporting projects that study institutional, information, and policy constraints 
(Johnson et al 1996). There have also been significant foreign direct investment projects 
in China.  
However, foreign investment has been relatively slow in China. According to experts, 
this could be redressed through:  
- improvement of the investment environment for foreign investors (less red tape and 
formalities);  
- better preferential tariff policies; 
- the need for measures to help domestic parties repay foreign debt; 
- public incentives to spur commercialisation should be designed to expand demand 
for targeted renewable energy technologies. Instead of direct incentives to technol-
ogy suppliers, the focus should be on demand based incentives; and 
- strong emphasis should be placed on developing the marker infrastructure (Geng 
1997: 159-162; Taylor and Bogach 1998: 8-9; Johnson et al. 1996). 
10.3 India 
10.3.1 Foreign policy on climate change 
Prior to 1990, climate change was an unknown scientific and policy problem in India. 
With the establishment of the intergovernmental negotiating committee on a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1990, the issue reached the domestic agenda. 
Preparation for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
coincided with those for the FCCC and this enhanced the visibility of the subject for the 
negotiators, environmental organisations and the media. During this period, the data on 
the emissions and impacts were very sketchy, speculative and varied from source to 
source (Nath638 1993: 37, ADB 1994: 76, Gupta 1997 analysing the data of Mitra 1992a, 
WRI 1994). 
Against this background, climate change was clearly, at best, only a pseudo agenda item. 
It was on the agenda because of the international negotiations, but there was limited 
social discussion of it or press coverage. There were a handful of people who were 
informed on the subject but the lack of data and the information vacuum were such that 
it was unclear for the government what its position should be. The only consensus in that 
period appeared to be that at a per capita level, the emissions of India were minimal 
(interviews, Dasgupta639 1994: 133). At the Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change 
in 1989, the Indian representative pointed out that it was counter-productive to have 
targets for countries that were still trying to raise the living conditions for the masses. He 
also agreed that it would be counter-productive if there were no mechanisms to involve 
the developing countries in the process (Prasad 1990). In the early days of the 
negotiations, the Government also proposed that the developed countries needed to take 
action to reduce their own emissions, and should pay the ‘agreed fixed incremental 
costs’ of measures taken in developing countries to reduce the rate of growth of 
greenhouse gases. At the time, the Government was wary about publishing inaccurate 
estimates. It was taken by surprise by the reportedly high emission levels of India (WRI 
                                                   
638 The then environment minister of India. 
639 The then ambassador of India negotiating the climate change convention. 
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1990), but when Agarwal and Narain (1991; 1992) criticised the WRI report, the 
government went from defensive and reactive to proactive with talking in terms of a 
methane conspiracy and demanding differentiated responsibilities for countries (Agarwal 
and Narain 1995: A11). The Government of India, however, did prepare a draft 
negotiating text in 1991, but the non-paper was not accepted by the developed countries 
(Agarwal et al 1999). The position of India was that the Convention should include 
technology transfer of ‘clean’ technologies as opposed to ‘cleaning’ technologies, and 
these should be made ‘available, accessible as well as acceptable’. “The mere availability 
does not mean automatic accessibility to it. Unless backed by adequate financial resources, 
accessibility would be meaningless. Similarly, mere accessibility does not mean automatic 
acceptability. To be acceptable, technology must be transferred free of strings such as 
export inhibiting riders and conditionalities” (Nath 1993: 71; Rao640 1992: 3). But 
interviewees were afraid that such technology always came with strings attached or that 
there would be technology dumping. There was also consensus on the need for 
technology transfer of clean technologies via an independent multilateral fund, suggested 
initially by Rajiv Gandhi at a Commonwealth meeting. This was also the reason that 
Government of India initially resisted the establishment of such a fund with the Global 
Environment Facility (which was not seen as independent of the existing institutions).641 
Government officials appeared to be relatively satisfied with the outcome of the 
negotiations – The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. There 
were some irritations regarding the lack of concrete commitments in relation to emission 
reduction in the developed countries, technology transfer and the adoption of the GEF as 
the interim operating entity of the financial mechanism (see Gupta 1997).  
Nevertheless, pressure from Indian environmental groups was building, pressure from 
foreign groups was also very evident and by 1995, the Government of India had prepared a 
green paper calling on the developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 
20% by 2000 in relation to 1990 levels (Agarwal et al 1999). A former Chairperson of the 
G-77, Prof. Mwandosya (1999) of Tanzania, records that at the first meeting of the Parties 
to the Climate Convention in 1995, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) had 
presented its draft Protocol calling for 20% reductions by the developed countries. The G-
77 was at this time divided on the issue, because the oil exporting countries did not wish to 
support this argument and many of the larger and more developed countries were also 
afraid that such a demand would immediately lead to renewed pressure from the North to 
take action in the South. At this point, the Indian Ambassador drafted a text and lobbied 
for support within the G-77. Within a couple of days 100 countries had decided to support 
the position. The oil exporting countries, that had opposed the AOSIS position, were afraid 
of isolation by the so-called ‘green G-77’, and this was fairly instrumental in leading to the 
adoption of the Berlin Mandate calling for a process to identify quantified goals within 
specified timeframes for the developed countries. At the second meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties, there was a lot of disappointment with the outcome, especially in relation to 
technology transfer.  
The ambiguous intrusion of the concept of ‘joint implementation’ (JI) in the FCCC 
caught the government also by surprise.642 There was a diversity of opinion among the 
social actors, but most were sceptical about it in the early days of the discussion. 
Following the adoption of the pilot phase of JI referred to as Activities Implemented 
Jointly (AIJ) at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention in 
                                                   
640 The former prime minister of India. 
641 For details regarding the initial resistance to the GEF, see Gupta 1995. 
642  See for details regarding the confusion on JI, Gupta 1997: 116-131. 
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1995, an international conference was organised in New Delhi. The then minister of 
Power stated that although AIJ projects looked promising the pilot phase should include 
projects in different economic sectors and in different regions so that one can learn from 
the collective experience (Venugopalachari 1997). The Conference concluded: “For AIJ 
to work, it must provide measurable benefits, both economic and ecological. From the 
perspective of developing countries, poverty eradication and meeting basic human needs 
are among the top national priorities. AIJ in developing countries, must, therefore, yield 
positive economic, environmental and social outcomes locally as well as environmental 
benefits globally” (Conference statement 1997).  
At the third meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 
was adopted. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was not experienced as a very positive development by Indian officials 
and some ENGOs. This may have been because the negotiations were mostly between 
the European Union and the rest of the developed world, and only after were the 
developing countries involved. The partial involvement of the developing countries and 
the fact that the Protocol included emission trading, based on grandfathered property 
entitlements to the atmosphere, albeit temporary, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) which was a new name for Joint Implementation but was agreed to 
without the completion of the pilot phase annoyed the negotiators. “But there is arm 
twisting by the West- The CDM was expected to be a non compliance fine and now it 
has turned out to be quite different”. Beyond that the insistence of the US senate that it 
would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol without ‘meaningful participation’ by key 
developing countries annoyed the government of India. “We will ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol unless there are unwarranted linkages to meaningful participation and any 
consideration of contingency on domestic actions. What was the need for such 
linkages?” said an annoyed foreign affairs official. Another official explains: “The 
reality of the 1992 agreement has been deformed by the 1997 agreement; in Kyoto the 
whole approach appears to have been compromised, the first world appears to be saying, 
we will not expend any sweat, lets make money and sell technology. The common but 
differentiated approach seems to have lost meaning and unsustainable patterns of living 
seem to be the dominating approach.” This meant further, that when the issue of 
‘voluntary commitments’ of developing countries came up again in 1998 at the fourth 
meeting of the parties in Buenos Aires, India, China and the rest of the G-77 refused to 
accept it as an agenda item. The government is trying to respond in relation to the rules 
and modalities of the Clean Development Mechanism in the subsequent meetings. The 
Government has not yet submitted its national communications to the international 
secretariat, nor has it ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The lack of ratification should be seen 
in the context of the fact that barring Romania none of the developed countries have 
ratified the Protocol and the most ratifications from the South have come from the island 
states. In the mean while some of the non-governmental organisations are actively 
promoting a pragmatic approach towards the Protocol, while others are still actively 
pursuing the equity agenda (e.g. CSE 1998) 
10.3.2 Analysis of the policy and its domestic foundations 
At the domestic political level, the climate change issue has been minimally discussed. 
The political situation in India has not been entirely stable and the politics of stability 
and liberalisation have taken precedence over environmental issues. Although, the politi-
cal structure is fairly stable, the last decade has witnessed a number of unstable coalition 
governments. In 1989, the National Front Government came to power and collapsed in 
1990; followed by a breakaway National Front Government with the support of Con-
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gress which collapsed in 1991. This was followed by a Congress Government which 
stayed in power for five years. In 1996, the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power for a 
period of 13 days, and since they failed to prove a majority, a United Front (coalition) 
Government came to power for two years, after which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
led coalition came to power. However, they fell in 1999. A new BJP led National De-
mocratic Alliance then reemerged as the next government and this party has since been 
in power. With a fresh scandal in March 2001 and the resignation of some cabinet minis-
ters it is uncertain how stable the current government is. The constantly changing gov-
ernments has led to a preoccupation more with the politics of staying in power than the 
politics of taking decisions in relation to key issues that concern the country, and has led 
to the postponement of policy decisions. 
The environment ministry does not have much clout within the domestic context of the 
country, and there has been an implicit agreement in the early days that the government 
can represent the North-South issues, but should not in any way get involved in 
discussions on energy, transport and agriculture. Government policy documents do not, 
in general, give climate change any importance.  
The domestic science on the issue continuously lags behind the agenda items that are 
being discussed at the international negotiations or those issues that are making global 
news in relation to climate change. In the initial years, there were several scientific 
controversies. These included those between The Centre for Science and Environment 
(1991) and the World Resources Institute, Parikh’s (1992) criticism of the IPCC 
(Houghton et al. 1990) scenarios, irritation regarding EPA, IPCC and WRI research on 
methane emissions from cows and rice cultivation and deforestation (Agarwal et al 1992, 
Mitra 1992a and b), the lack of distinction between survival and luxury emissions. 
However, the research in the West has multiplied while that in India has increased but 
not adequately to keep in touch with all the issues in the climate negotiations and in the 
work of the International Panel on Climate Change (Kandlikar and Sagar 1999). This 
explains to some extent why the Government of India has not yet submitted its national 
communications under Article 12 of the Convention and this is partly because the data 
on the emissions and sinks is not yet of quality that the government is confident about it. 
In 1990 a greenhouse inventory for India was prepared which has subsequently been 
refined and updated and a current update is being undertaken under the ALGAS (Asia 
Least-Cost Greenhouse Gas Abatement Strategy) programme financed by the Asian 
Development Bank, the Global Environment Facility and the United Nations 
Development Programme (www.ccasia.teri.res.in). Not being as familiar with the issues 
and data in relation to emissions and sinks, it seemed much more safe to define the issue 
in terms of words that Government of India did understand and could sell to the Indian 
public. Furthermore, the climate change issue was an imported policy item, and there 
was and is not much domestic support or attention paid to the issue.  
Another key problem in India is the problem of ideological vacillation and the dilemma: 
“How to develop and at what cost”. Although in the process of liberalising the economy, 
there remain serious doubts within the country about the ideological starting point for the 
negotiations (Gupta 2000). This makes it very difficult to have a fall back ideological 
stance that can help negotiators come up with a clear position through logical reasoning 
from that ideological stance.  
A third and probably the most critical reason is, as another former ambassador of India 
put it, “we can’t implement most of the environmental agreements and so we should be 
careful about taking on commitments. We need to have a hawkish rather than a dovish 
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posture. We know that we have to clean up our coal and we have to try and get action in 
the country. But we cannot guarantee that it will happen and we cannot make it happen”. 
At the same time, the government needed to respond to the issues that were being 
discussed in the negotiations. On cross-cutting issues relevant in other negotiations the 
government tends to have clear-cut positions, sometimes even bordering on the 
proactive. On climate change specific issues, the response of the government is 
essentially defensive. This is because of the wide and complex array of issues on the 
table, the speed at which the permutations and combinations of these issues change, and 
the lack of a dedicated team with a critical mass that can work on the different issues. 
This is not to say that there are not enough experts in and outside India who cannot 
define clear negotiating positions for the negotiators. In fact this has annoyed both 
expatriates, local scientists and NGOs. However, as government officials put it, there is 
no real reason to exclude the input; the problem is more that there is just not enough staff 
that can be dedicated to work on the issue and to coordinate, collect and collate the views 
of stakeholders within the country. There are occasional meetings of the national climate 
change committee, but these are too short and too formal to be able to substantively 
analyse the diverse issues and to make clear policy recommendations. And this is also 
not happening because the climate change issue is not on the domestic political agenda, 
but is merely, as mentioned earlier, a pseudo agenda item. As a result, the negotiators 
only have some guidelines and some bottom lines and on the basis of these they must 
negotiate. Some, ENGOs and stakeholders are not satisfied with this view. They believe 
that the government could even delegate some of the tasks outside the government and 
could learn to trust the input of non-governmental officials. “The government of India 
does not know the interests of the people of India. They represent elite interests of a 
hierarchical society”. “The notion of interrogating the government on climate change – is 
useless. The government will have an immediate political response: the developed 
countries are trying to stop us from developing”. Even one foreign office official said, 
that the office is very conservative and it has rarely consulted the stakeholders.  
Third, although most political scientists will be surprised to hear it, the Government of 
India like many other developing countries, goes to negotiations without a clear idea of 
what its national interests are. At the most, the national interests are defined in abstract, 
diplomatic terms. These are based mostly on precedent and personal ideology. They are 
not “assessed by public debate” or the result of “fine-tuned professionalism”. “The 
bottom line is that economically it should not hurt India and politically it should be 
sellable to the people”. Unlike negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
other defense issues, accountability to the Parliament is ex post. This means that: “They 
don’t know what their baselines are and what to oppose. They learn to live without 
understanding the issues”. 
Against this background, the negotiations are not easy to undertake and national policies 
do not make much reference to the climate change problem, as such. The Eighth Five 
Year plan (1992-1997) did not mention climate change. The Conservation Strategy 
(Govt. of India 1992) however did call for coping mechanisms to deal with climate 
change and a Coastal Zone Regulation Notification was passed in 1991 requiring states 
to prepare national climate change policies. The Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) does 
integrate the issue of CO2 emissions in its discussions on energy policy but does not 
make any major recommendations except on the need to improve the efficiency of the 
demand and supply side of energy and to promote renewable energy and nuclear energy. 
The Environment Ministry does not really make any specific policy in this area. The 
Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) aims, inter alia, at “ensuring environmental stability 
of the development process through social mobilisation and participation of people at all 
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levels”. However, there are many new bills before Parliament. This year the Indian 
Parliament is to consider three relevant bills – the Electricity Bill 2001, the Energy 
Conservation Bill and the Renewable Energy Bill. If these Bills are passed, it is likely 
that much of the earlier reforms will get a major impetus.  
10.3.3  The foreign policy aspects 
Given that in the early days there was very little domestic coverage and interest in the 
issue, why did India participate in the negotiations? According to interviews (Gupta 
1997), this was because of a political recognition of the problem, solidarity with the 
developing countries, and because the articles in the FCCC were very much in line with 
the government position at the time. While the FCCC did mention policies and measures 
(such as energy efficiency) it did not include specific commitments for developing 
countries. At the same time, the climate issue was seen as a way to discuss global inequity 
(Chengappa 1992: 31).  
Partly, because of a lack of knowledge of the internal details of the issue, the climate 
change problem is not seen so much as a problem of emissions and sinks, but as a 
problem of production, consumption and trade patterns. In this they have been supported 
by Indian scientists and non-governmental organisations. Thus as Parikh et al. (1991: 37) 
concluded: “We have seen that unless dramatic new technologies become available, the 
present consumption patterns of the rich are not sustainable. ... As more and more people 
become rich and emulate this lifestyle the burden on earth would be unbearable”. They 
have thus never really focused on the issues of emission reduction and sink 
enhancement. Instead they have focused on the issues of North-South relations and 
global inequity. “When it comes to trade, our national interests are determined through 
economic issues. But on ecological issues, we take an ideological position, we don’t like 
that but it is a matter of negotiation! There are many logical reasons why the government 
would have chosen to do so”; says an interviewee. 
There is a broadly shared view that the problem is indeed one of North-South relations; 
and there is a fear that the perceived global inequitable economic order (with its falling 
prices for raw materials, tariffs in the developed countries, eco-labelling, the financial 
system etc.) will be replaced by an inequitable environmental order (Rao 1993 1994). 
This is not just extrapolation of a trend in the economic sphere to the environmental 
sphere, but is supported by evidence in relation to a range of other environmental 
regimes (Agarwal, Narain and Sharma 2000). Thus there is perceived unfairness in the 
ozone regime (Nair 1997), in the CITES regime (Bajaj 1996), in the waste regime 
(Bhutani 1996), the biodiversity regime (Shiva 1993), in the UNCED regime (Chatterjee 
and Finger 1994) and in relation to the GEF (Agarwal et al 1992:25-26; and Gupta 1995, 
97). There is increasing fear that the climate change regime too will be cast in such a 
way as to prevent India from developing while allowing the powerful countries a 
decadent life-style. This fear has been enhanced by the fall of the Berlin Wall which is 
perceived as having weakened the position of the developing countries and having 
created a competitor in the former East Bloc, rather than a source of support (Fernandes 
1991: 83-85). An Indian ex-prime minister claims that efforts are “being made by some 
countries to create a two-track world, in which a handful of affluent countries will 
monopolise access to technology and sophisticated weaponry, while the rest of the world is 
hemmed in by all manner of restrictive regimes and conditionalities” (Rao 1994: 399). As 
a representative of the foreign office put it: “We are not fighting for equity because it is 
morally right, but because we want stability”. Apart from this, there are serious domestic 
factors that shape the government’s current and evolving negotiating position.  
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Second, there is a strong perception that the international negotiation processes are not 
fair and that getting into substantive discussions may only weaken the position of the 
country. “It is not conceivable to think of an architecture that is fair. The only tool poor 
countries have is to embarass other governments - it makes for good copy in the papers. 
If you see a consensus emerging - you may need to defend the few points that protect 
your domestic interests. And as long as you have those points right and have the staying 
power - you may be able to influence the process”. It is not just the role of economic, 
scientific and political power that is considered of importance in the negotiations, but 
also the way the negotiations are conducted and the difficulties developing countries 
have in actually continuously monitoring the progress and representing their views 
during a range of formal and informal meetings during the negotiations. The whole 
notion of annual meetings of the Conference of Parties with several preparatory meetings 
while essential to deal with international problems casts an enormous strain on the 
resources of developing countries that have to be continuously alert on a number of 
issues in relation to a number of different regimes. Besides, the meetings tend to go on 
long after the closing time, and sometimes are round-the-clock and small delegations just 
cannot cope with these circumstances.  
Third, while there may be potential for developing countries to pool their assets, and 
while there are some efforts made by the Latin American and Caribbean Group, the 
African group, the oil exporters (OPEC) and the AOSIS group to meet and make 
regional positions, the Asians have not yet been able to pool their resources to be able to 
develop a South and South-East Asian position. This may be because of the existing 
distrust of neighbouring countries from a security perspective, but it is also because of 
the distrust of the knowledge base, experience and skills of the smaller countries and the 
distrust of the larger neighbours. The end result is that the human resources are not 
pooled and Asia has no real perspective on the negotiations. India, if it wanted to, could 
take the initiative to develop such a group. But, it is not interested to do so; as one 
official put it: ‘we are Indocentric’.  
Fourth, reversing its policy of the 70’s, the government no longer really wishes to 
coordinate with other developing countries in the context of the G-77. Interviewees 
explained that “India has long championed the leadership cause without any benefits, 
instead it should carve out a niche for itself”. Most interviewees from the establishment 
supported this view; only a few from outside felt that India had the capacity to respond 
alone and to function efficiently in the process.  
All this indicates, that at the moment the government is trying to function alone in the 
process and this is likely to be most problematic since the government apparently is 
unable to release sufficient resources to develop a national policy and well-defined 
foreign policy on the issue.  
India has a high CO2 emission level in relation to its national income because energy 
intensive sectors are growing fast (iron and steel, aluminium etc.), the commercial 
energy is based mostly on coal, the coal is of inferior quality and finally, the small-scale 
sector has a major contribution to the national economy and is relative to the large-scale 
sector inefficient (Skutsch et al 1993). At the same time, while the per capita income has 
increased by 1.6% since 1950 to 1990, the per capita carbon emissions have increased by 
3.6% annually to 0.22 tC because of the growth of the energy intensive sectors in India 
(Srivastava 1997: 942). However, our models show that there is stabilisation of 
emissions since 1995 and that a decoupling is expected in the period 2000-2020. We 
calculate for our BAU scenario that annual energy-related carbon emissions in India may 
increase from 0.2 t C per person in 1990 to 0.5 t C per person in 2020. In China, per 
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capita emissions increase from 0.6 t C to 1.0 t C per person in 2020. These per capita 
emissions are low compared per capita emissions in industrialized countries like the 
USA (more than 5 t C per person in 1990) and OECD Europe (2.6 t C per person in 
1990) (Van Aardenne et al., submitted). 
10.3.4 Current perceptions of the flexibility mechanisms and technologies 
The first question is: does India need GHG technologies? Interviews and research reveal 
that at present, the share of domestic equipment in the production of power is 66%. The 
domestic industry is supplying the bulk of the equipment needed in India. It can also 
supply up to 400 KV AC and high voltage DC, and is hoping to upgrade the technology 
to 800 KV. India produces steam and hydro turbines, industrial and power boilers, state 
of the art transformers (from REC ratings of 25, 63,100 KVA to high voltage ranges), 
switch gear and control gear (also for export purposes), state of the art capacitors 
(without PCBs), motors, cables (up to date with international technology), insulating 
materials, induction and arc furnaces, etc. (http://www.nic.in/indmin/elec1pro.htm).643 
Although there are technologies available, the key issue is are these technologies used, 
do they compare with the international technologies and what is perceived as necessary? 
At a workshop in December 1997, the participants emphasised that in general India had 
access to high quality technologies in most fields and did not need new technologies if 
the time-horizon was till 2020. Beyond that period, the technologies that India needed 
were:  
1. High conversion efficiency, combined cycle plants 
2. Better combustion technology for high ash content coal 
3. Coal benefication 
4. A good management information system 
5. Transmission and distribution technologies 
6. Energy efficient technologies. 
 
At present several companies (Vestas in wind energy,644 British Petroleum645 in inter 
alia, solar energy, Shell646 in renewables and gas), and countries investing in India are 
                                                   
643  Nevertheless, state governments have been making requests for assistance in the area of power plants. The 
state of Uttar Pradesh has been seeking collaboration to prepare a captive power plant in the Uttar Pradesh 
State Industrial Development Corporation Industrial Areas. State governments are making their requests 
known via the site http://www.nic.in/indmin/projinf.htm. The Government of Gujarat had opened bidding on 
four projects on a lignite based power project at Surka/Kharsaliya 375 MW; Small Thermal/Liquid fuel fired 
power plants (5 x 100 MW), coastal imported coal based power stations (2 x 500 MW), and Pipavav 
Gas/Naptha Thermal Power Station 615 MW (http://www.gujaratindustry.gov.in/pol-pow.html). Via its 
internet sites, the Government of India is actively soliciting private investment in several projects.  
644  Vestas (Denmark), the world’s leading manufacturer in wind technology, offers wind turbines from 225kW 
to 1650 kW. It has an assembly plant in Madras, India. It has installed 138 MW in India of which 113 in 
Tamil nadu), 23 in Gujarat, 1.5 in Karnataka, 0.6 in Madhya pradesh and Maharashtra. According to the 
company there is a potential for wind power of 20,000MW. Vestas is planning to invest further in India. Its 
interest in the Indian market was evinced in 1984. Its first contract was signed in 1985 and executed in 1986. 
Since then it has successfully built a few more projects. In 1991, it developed a technology transfer process 
and in 1992 India was producing wind turbines domestically. By 1997 630 wind turbines had been installed 
in India (Andersen 1998).  
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exploring potential CDM opportunities. Interviewees also tended to emphasise the point 
that in general access to foreign technology was only a matter of financial resource, but 
that in general: 
a) the large-scale, globally competitive sector, would be able to access such 
technologies commercially, and would only participate in CDM if there was a major 
discount on the technologies; 
b) the large scale domestic sector would have an incentive to modernise if the price of 
electricity and the billing system forced them to keep the costs in mind and if 
domestic competition forced them to innovate; however, the bottleneck would 
remain capital;  
c) the small-scale locally oriented sectors needed tailor made technologies for their 
specific context and these could be domestically available; the bottleneck was 
financial resources and information; 
d) the small-project sector (light bulbs, water pumps, etc.) would need some kind of 
financial support but not necessarily additional technology transfer.  
While initially there was considerable resistance to the concept of Joint Implementation, 
industry and some non-governmental organisations appear to be favourably inclined to-
wards it. On October 26th, 1999 the Governments of India and the United States signed a 
Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Related Environmental Aspects. Less than 
a year later, in March 2000, the Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and U.S. 
President Bill Clinton prepared a “Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Envi-
ronment Between India and the United States”. The two countries agreed that they “in-
tend to work together and with other countries in appropriate multilateral fora toward 
early agreement on the elements of the Kyoto mechanisms, including the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism, which could offer opportunity for mutually beneficial partnership 
between developed and developing countries. They recognize, in particular, that the 
Clean Development Mechanism could provide important opportunities for economic 
growth and environmental protection”. The two countries decided to set up a Joint Con-
sultative Group on Clean Energy and the Environment. This Group is responsible for 
identifying, initiating, monitoring public and private collaborative projects in research, 
development, transfer, demonstration and deployment of appropriate technologies and 
review policies in the areas of clean energy, renewable energy, energy efficient and 
power sector reform, exploring and expanding opportunities for commercial develop-
                                                                                                                                                
645  British Petroleum, has a long and relatively successful history in India. In 1989, BP signed a contract with 
TATA to assemble photovoltaic cells in India. The initial deal was successful and in 1996 full-scale solar 
cell manufacture began in India. The alliance now provides ¼ of the total solar photovoltaic production in 
India. According to BP, there is an untapped market in rural telecommunications, lighting and televisions, 
microwave transmitters, navigation aids, obstruction lighting, offshore platforms, railway signalling. BP sees 
huge potential in the market especially given the scattered nature of the villages in India and the lack of grid 
connections. However, the key problem is the commercial viability. Rural consumers are paying only 5 cents 
/kWh although the costs of delivery are 16 cents/kWh. Costs can come down but that depends on the volume 
of production (Evans 1998).  
646  In 1993, Shell and Bharat Petroleum established a agreement to market lubricants and LPG. The project was 
quite successful. Shell is drilling for oil in Rajasthan and off-shore in Bombay High. Shell is planning to bid 
for a tender in Chennai. Shell and Saudi Aramco have decided to invest in downstream opportunities in the 
oil industry India, where 50% of the ownership would be in local hands and 50% shared by Shell and Saudi 
Aramco (Loader 1998). Shell International Gas Ltd also plans to invest 2 billion in a power plant and liquid 
gas scheme in Gujarat. They have signed a bid with Essar which runs a 515 MW power plant at Hazira. They 
will construct a terminal that will handle 2.5 million tonnes of fuel imported form the middle east. Shell is 
investing in renewables as well. 
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ment and cooperation in clean energy, and enhancing cooperation on the climate change 
issue that arise in the context of the Climate Convention.  
On June 28th, 2000, there was a summit between India and the EU (2000), and this sum-
mit concluded: “We are deeply concerned about growing environmental degradation … 
we shall address the global environmental issues of mutual concern, including climate 
change in accordance with the principle of common and differentiated responsibility. We 
shall institute a joint working group on environment to promote common initiatives in 
the environmental field to explore the potential for joint collaborative projects, facilitate 
transfer of technologies, develop opportunities for investments in the public and private 
sectors, launch an environmental awareness programme and facilitate co-ordination on 
multilateral environmental issues”. 
On September 15th, 2000, a Protocol of Intent was adopted between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India which states 
that the US Agency for International Development and the United States Department of 
Energy will support the Indian Ministry of Power and the National Thermal Power Cor-
poration to develop advanced power generation technologies in India, including testing 
the feasibility of integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) demonstration power 
plants to establish the most suitable IGCC technology for Indian coal, the possible finan-
cial structures and to develop a time bound implementation plan.  
A side-impact of the liberalisation process is the increasing interest being taken by the 
private sector to capitalise on all available opportunities to modernise their production 
processes and to compete internationally. As a result, in the last three years, Indian in-
dustry and the cooperative federations have been increasingly interested in the concept 
of the Clean Development Mechanism, and there is now even a regular journal called 
Global Climate Change: Emerging Green Opportunities, which is published by the Con-
federation of Indian Industry. Visits to a number of energy intensive sectors (like the 
aluminium, iron and steel and cement sectors), sectors that see potential in CDM (like 
the sugar sector in relation to cogeneration). Furthermore, these high-powered political 
visits have pushed the issue of climate change and the CDM onto the agendas of a num-
ber of ministries including the Power Ministry and there is increasing knowledge on the 
CDM and growing enthusiasm. Research NGOs and business NGOs are increasingly 
functioning as middlemen to bring toegther potential host and investor parties. TERI, for 
example, facilitates project development under its initiative called TREAT (TERI’s Re-
pository of Environmental Activities and Technologies).  
Those in support of developing projects for CDM stated that they would support CDM 
projects if: 
a) the terms of the offer were good, i.e. the technology is available at reduced rates; 
b) if the political long-term implications were dealt with, and if the long-term growth 
aspects were not curtailed, if there was clarity that as long as India’s per capita 
emissions are below a certain level, no caps on emissions would be applied; 
c) if the agreements were clear; 
d) if there was a thorough understanding of how the base line should be drawn; 
suggestions included that the base line should be drawn on the basis of the best 
technology available in India in relation to specific sectors for new projects, and 
should be the average technology used in a sector in relation to retrofitting of 
projects; 
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e) if CDM could also just raise the resources and the technologies could be accessed if 
necessarily in the domestic market. 
There were some who felt that with access to loans and the need for India to be globally 
competitive, CDM did not have much to offer.  
Those opposing CDM felt that: 
a) CDM was used to make India purchase foreign technologies; 
b) The participation of India would somehow compromise India and may lead to a 
situation in which the long-term growth of India would be curtailed; 
c) CDM was a quick fix solution that would involve India in contract based 
commitments; 
d) Improved market mechanisms will lead to technology improvement; there is no need 
for quick fixes; 
e) That instead of CDM, there should be emission allowances for countries based on 
equity and emission trading should be the rule. 
Interviewees and the literature suggest that certain projects are suitable for CDM 
support: Supercritical boilers, coal gasification technology, renewable energy, attention 
to the small-scale sectors and the small-technology sectors like water pumps (which 
however will need simple monitoring and crediting rules) which may not need 
technologies but financial and institutional support from CDM. Tata Energy Research 
Institute (2000) recently concluded that priority areas that could benefit from CDM 
projects include integrated gasification combined cycle technologies (at 30 US$ per 
tonne CO2), pressurised fluidised bed combustion (at 1 US$ per tonne CO2) and 
renovation and modernisation projects in the coal power generation sector (30 US $ per 
tonne CO2); grid connected wind (31 US$ per tonne CO2) and solar thermal power 
projects (at 168 US $ per tonne CO2), wind pumps for agriculture (20 US $ per tonne 
CO2), continuous digestors for the pulp and paper industry (11 US$ per tonne CO2), dry 
quenching technologies for the iron and steel industry ( 10 US $ per tonne CO2) and the 
replacement of industrial motors (14 US$ per tonne CO2). The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (2000: 6) advocates CDM projects in relation to bagasse based cogeneration, 
biomass based power plants, energy efficiency improvement projects in the paper 
industry, conversion of soderberg aluminium smelters to prebaked cell technologies in 
the aluminium industry, etc.  
In attracting foreign investment what has been India’s experience? India has benefited 
from multilateral projects although some may have been controversial. The World Bank 
has in the past financed large scale coal-fired plants and large hydro, and there is now a 
change in the thinking process to examine the impacts of individual projects on the 
society as a whole. Barnett (1993) argues that these new programmes need to stress: 
“development of the local human capabilities over the long term, rather than the short-
term expedients of the project cycle which emphasises the short-term, the sale of 
hardware and the use of expatriate staff”. The World Bank has invested in more than 13 
projects in India on the power generation, power grid improvement and transmission 
lines, efficiency improvement projects and hydro projects (Lok Sabha Unstarred 
Question No. 1827, dated 4.12.96.). The World Bank group has four types of efforts. It 
supports reform initiatives in the central and state electricity boards, provides direct 
financing, mobilises co-financing, and catalyses private financing. Specifically in 
relation to coal, it supports pricing and financing, rehabilitation, production and 
profitability of ventures, encourages private sector participation, environmental and 
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social integration. At present it is engaged in a US$530 million bank project with 
US$530 million co-financing from the Export - Import Bank of Japan to rehabilitate the 
coal sector. It is undertaking an environmental and social mitigation project of US$ 63 
million and a sector study on environmental issues in the power sector. To reduce the 
dependence on coal, the World Bank is encouraging large hydro, LNG imports, 
renewable energy and solar thermal projects on the supply side, and on the demand side 
it is encouraging better coal pricing, reform of the state power sector and reform of the 
bulk power tariffs. India receives financial assistance for power projects from the IBRD, 
the IDA, IFAD, ADB and OPEC, with IBRD, ADB and OPEC providing the most 
assistance.  
India has also received considerable bilateral assistance and investments from Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, USA, Sweden, Switzerland, Iran, U.A.E., Kuwait Fund, Abu Dhabi Fund, 
Saudi Fund. India gets a substantial portion of the funds from the middle-east countries 
(Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 906 dated 27.11.96). The Government of the 
Netherlands (1997) promotes (1995-1997) collaborative research between TERI and 
ECN (INO 23801) on renewable energies, provides financial grants to IREDA (1995-
1998), three wind farms in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. British aid 
aims at reducing poverty, improving investment infrastructure, focuses on institutional 
issues such as financial support to the electricity boards in India, and for example, the 
privatisation of the electricity boards in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh (Foulkes, G. 1998). 
Barclays Bank has financed the Dabhol Power Company in Maharashtra and a few other 
projects (Wade-Gery1998).  
However, foreign investments in the electricity sector are not as substantial as the 
government had hoped that they would be. This is because while many foreign 
companies have been able to play a major role within India in different sectors over the 
last five decades, the power sector has been in government hands.  
In order to attract the long term investor, it is necessary that investors in large projects 
are sure that there will be political stability and continuity and that the project is likely to 
function for the next twenty years at least. They need to be seen as a long-term player in 
the process. The investor’s fortunes are tied to those of the host country’s; there is need 
for synergistic and not anatagonistic meetings between the parties; the transaction costs 
need to be as low as possible; and there needs to be simple procedures. Investors 
(Foulkes, G. 1998; Wade-Gery 1998) need: a coherent policy and a stable legal and 
regulatory framework, a stable political framework, a foreign investment code which 
implies that contracts will be honoured, a fair system of repatriating profits, concessions 
in taxation, ability to sell a project at a later stage, exchange convertibility, and the 
confidence that state electricity boards can succeed.  
On the other hand, India has a relatively large middle class; a stable political and legal 
system; has been ranked the third most promising developing country over a ten year 
investment horizon by a survey of 274 companies carried out by the export import bank 
of Japan (reported by http://www.nic.in/indmin/india.htm); has a large and fast growing 
electricity sector, a growing entrepreneurial class, growing capital markets, a stable debt 
repayment history, recent economic reform, the expectation that the rupee may become 
fully convertible, well-established legal and institutional frameworks, the fact that 
government and business speak in English (USAID 1995). Barclays Bank has been in 
India for 17 years financing energy sector activities. According to their assessments the 
Asian power sector will offer more investment opportunities than any other sector. India 
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has a relatively stable legal and political system. But there is too much red tape; it 
compares well with South-east Asia, but poorly with Latin America. 
10.4 Analysis in relation to international cooperation 
In relation to the fore-going chapters and sections, we can conclude that some of the 
policies to be undertaken by China and India need international support in specific areas. 
This is summed up in the third column of the tables below.  
Table 10.1.  Identifying policy goals and the domestic and international instruments needed to facili-
tate implementation: China 
Options Policies to improve feasibility of 
the option 
International instruments 
1. Rationalise pricing - Support for rational pricing 
combined with price support/ 
ration system for the poorest 
sectors of society; 
 
2. Improve legitimacy 
of decision-making and 
reduce the implementa-
tion deficit 
- To develop a step-by-step ap-
proach to decentralisation in 
which good relations between 
the centre and state are fos-
tered;  
- To develop a step-by step ap-
proach to involve stakeholders 
and provinces so that tailor-
made, not uniform policies for 
different regions can be made; 
- To develop a step-by-step ap-
proach to monitor and enforce 
legislation; 
- To translate this into guide-
lines for CDM projects in elec-
tricity; 
3. Improving the transi-
tion from state owned 
to corporatised bodies 
and privatisation 
- Separate generators from dis-
tributors; 
- Create power ‘purchasing 
pools’ and support existing 
experiments in the field;  
- Develop a framework for the 
privatisation process on the 
basis of the existing challenges 
faced; 
- Reduce the red tape and the 
need for many licenses (sim-
plified investment procedures), 
instead encourage transpar-
ency and the public and press 
can monitor developments; 
- Make simple rules for loans to 
starting companies 
No foreign assistance for capacity 
building in these areas are recom-
mended keeping in mind the advice of 
the stakeholders that Chinese authori-
ties prefer advice to be technical and 
technological and less political.  
4. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
k. Cement 
l. Iron and steel 
m. Aluminium 
n. Households and 
4 
For all options: 
- rules for participation in CDM 
and technology transfer;  
- guidelines to support small-
scale projects; plants and 
- The GEF can play an important 
role in relation to household 
equipment and motors and drives 
and for supporting technical opti-
misation of small-scale production 
units;  
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Options Policies to improve feasibility of 
the option 
International instruments 
commercial 
equipment; 
o. Motors and drives  
products via subsidies/ 
GEF/CDM 
- Need for rules for CDM to pro-
mote small projects can also be 
developed; 
- CDM can play a role in relation to 
large-scale cement, iron and steel, 
aluminium and other end-use sec-
tors; 
6. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
m. Large hydro 
n. Small hydro 
o. Wind 
p. Gas 
q. Nuclear 
r. Biomass 
 
 
o. Explore options for small hy-
dro in large hydro regions in 
anticipation of major potential 
social problems in the future; 
p. Develop start subsidies for 
small hydro; 
q. “ 
r. Explore opportunities to re-
place coal by available gas 
s. Explore opportunities (to take 
into account nuclear waste and 
risks) 
t. Make focused biomass policies 
For all options: 
- Develop rules for inclusion 
and exclusion for GEF/ CDM 
projects on the basis of above 
discussion; 
- The GEF and other bilateral fund-
ing can play an important role in 
relation to small renewables; 
- CDM, ADB and the World Bank 
can play a role with large power 
plants;  
- The private sector is encouraged to 
play a role with large power 
plants; but within the priority sec-
tors of the government. 
 
7. Efficiency Im-
provement in coal 
plants (EFF) 
e. Existing plants 
f. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boil-
ers) 
- Develop rules for CDM and 
for existing investments of the 
World Bank, ADB and make 
different baselines for the two 
options; 
- CDM, ADB and the World Bank 
can play a role with large power 
plants; with super critical boilers 
and IGCC; 
- The private sector is encouraged to 
play a role with large power 
plants; but within the priority sec-
tors of the government. 
8. Increasing Cogene-
ration (COG) 
 
- Simple rules for power pur-
chase agreements; 
- Recommendations for CDM/ 
GEF. 
- CDM/ ADB/ The World Bank/ 
private sector invited to invest in 
cogeneration 
9. Reduction of techni-
cal losses in transmis-
sion and distribution 
(T&D)  
- Recommendations for GEF 
and technology cooperation; 
- Explore non-central grid op-
tions; 
- CDM/GEF support for ogenera-
tion; 
 
  343 
Table 10.2  Identifying policy goals and the domestic and international instruments needed to facili-
tate implementation: India  
Options Domestic policies to improve feasibility 
of the option 
International instruments 
1. Decrease economic 
distribution losses 
(theft): Billing, meter-
ing, and collection 
 
- Tamper-proof meters to profit mak-
ing local distribution centres; and/or 
- Remote metering in combination 
with demanding accountability from 
the distribution centres; 
- Implementing existing policy deci-
sion of the Ministers Meeting 2001 
(March 3); 
- Support for financing tamper 
proof/remote meters from 
GEF or other bilateral funds;  
2. Rationalise power 
pricing 
- Support for rational pricing com-
bined with price support/ ration sys-
tem for the poorest sectors of soci-
ety 
- Public relations policy to convince 
agriculture and households that the 
quality of supply will improve and 
they will save on voltage stabilisers, 
diesel generators, mechanical fail-
ure and loss of income and comfort 
because of power shortage.  
-  
3. Improving economic 
efficiency in govern-
ment spending 
- Government makes list of priority 
projects for CDM and other forms 
of concessional funding including: 
(a) Retrofit existing plants; (b) state 
of the art technologies; (c) small 
hydro and wind. 
- To translate this into guidelines for 
CDM projects in electricity; 
- To demand transparency in making 
and contracts with large companies; 
- International community ac-
cepts government priorities 
with respect to CDM. 
- CDM contracts are made 
open to scrutiny of the Ex-
ecutive Board and other 
NGOs. 
4. Reducing other bot-
tlenecks in investing in 
energy efficient 
technologies: 
improving the financial 
health of the SEBs, 
accountability in 
government, and 
through corporatisa-
tion, privatisation, and 
other means; cheaper 
loans; 
- By developing rules for evaluating a 
formally bankrupt company and for 
the bidding process; or send a dedi-
cated team to rebuild the organisa-
tion on commercial terms combined 
with rules of accountability; 
- Simplify the power purchase rules 
but do not go out of the way to get 
the electricity; For example, wind 
power investors should invest in 
lines to the grid and not the other 
way around. 
- Make Code of Conduct for Private 
Investors; 
- Reform initiatives of the 
World Bank 
6. End-use efficiency 
improvement (EEI) 
m. Cement 
n. Iron and steel 
o. Aluminium 
p. Water pumps 
q. Households and 
commercial 
equipment; 
r. Motors and drives  
6. 
- Simplify rules and revisit the poli-
cies for the small-scale sectors and 
encourage energy efficiency 
through incentives; 
- rules for participation in CDM and 
technology transfer;  
- guidelines to support small-scale 
projects; plants and products via 
subsidies/ GEF/CDM 
- The GEF can play an impor-
tant role in relation to water-
pumps; household equipment 
and motors and drives and for 
supporting technical optimi-
sation of small-scale produc-
tion units;  
- Need for rules for CDM to 
promote small projects can 
also be developed; 
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Options Domestic policies to improve feasibility 
of the option 
International instruments 
- CDM can play a role in rela-
tion to large-scale cement, 
iron and steel, aluminium and 
other end-use sectors; 
7. Fuel switch (REN, 
NUC, GAS) 
o. Large hydro 
p. Small hydro 
q. Wind 
r. Gas 
s. Nuclear 
t. Biomass 
u. Solar 
 
 
o. Explore options for small hydro in 
large hydro regions; 
p. Develop start subsidies for small 
hydro; 
q. Link subsidies to generation not ca-
pacity and then phase out subsidies; 
r. Explore opportunities to import re-
gionally available gas 
s. Examine the safety and waste issue 
carefully; 
t. Increase incentives; 
 
For all options 
9 Develop rules for inclusion and ex-
clusion for GEF/ CDM projects on 
the basis of above discussion; 
- The government can include on the 
CDM list of priorities – small hy-
dro, wind, and sustainable use of 
biomass; 
Subsidies for renewables need to be re-
vised 
- The GEF and other bilateral 
funding can play an impor-
tant role in relation to small 
renewables via the new Na-
tional Renewable Energy 
Fund or IREDA; 
- CDM, ADB and the World 
Bank can play a role with 
large power plants;  
- The private sector is encour-
aged to play a role with large 
power plants; but within the 
priority sectors of the gov-
ernment. 
 
8. Efficiency Im-
provement in coal 
plants (EFF) 
e. Existing plants 
f. New plants (IGCC, 
super critical boil-
ers) 
- Develop rules for CDM and for ex-
isting investments of the World 
Bank, ADB and make different 
baselines for the two options;  
- Domestic private companies invited 
to participate; 
- Existing multilateral funds can sup-
port state of the art power plants; 
- CDM, ADB and the World 
Bank can play a role with 
large power plants; with su-
per critical boilers and IGCC; 
- The private sector is encour-
aged to play a role with large 
power plants; but within the 
priority sectors of the gov-
ernment. 
9. Increasing Cogene-
ration (COG) 
 
- Simple rules for PPA; and regular 
payments by SEBs;  
- Recommendations for CDM/ GEF  
- CDM/GEF support for Cogenera-
tion; 
- Make SEBs viable. 
- CDM/ ADB/ The World 
Bank/ private sector invited 
to invest in cogeneration 
 
10. Reduction of tech-
nical losses in trans-
mission and distribu-
tion (T&D)  
- Liberalise the banking sector to re-
duce interest rates (also necessary 
for other options); 
- Recommendations for GEF and 
technology cooperation.  
- CDM/GEF support for Co-
generation; 
- Make SEBs viable 
 
Part of the support needs to come from the private sector. The research indicates that al-
though both countries are encouraging foreign investors to enter the country, foreign in-
vestors are being extremely cautious because of the numbers of licenses and bureaucratic 
clearances needed, the complicated legal framework and the relative political instability. 
Certain policies are needed in addition to encourage foreign investors in the two coun-
tries. These are indicated in the following table.  
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Table 10.3 Policies needed to encourage foreign investors in the country 
Problem  Policy 
No. of licenses and formalities Single window; reduced red tape (China, India) 
Legal framework Coherent and simple legal framework 
Political instability Foreign investment code that contracts will be honoured as long 
as there is no corruption involved and procedures are followed, a 
fair system of repatriation of funds, exchange convertibility 
 
At the same time, the government may need to protect itself from the investment risks 
associated with foreign investors. In evaluating foreign technologies, the governments of 
China and India may wish to take into account (a) the capital investment implications for 
financing foreign imports (Mongia et 1994); (b) the issue of interest rate competition in 
which each donor reduces the price of the loan in order to facilitate the sale of its own 
products. This may pervert the types of product bought (Barnett 1992); (c) the need to 
screen the technologies and to ensure that all costs are met (Foley 1994);647 (d) the need 
to be careful about seeking aid since multilateral banks just do not have the resources 
needed to support the power sector developments in the developing countries and this is 
going to lead to small project type approaches and undue attention to the project cycle 
(Barnett 1993); (e) the possibility of foreign debt. Barnett (1992) cites figures for 1975 
when the total developing country debt on account of the power sector was 57.7 billion 
dollars. (f) the need to check the following - the costs and benefits for the host 
government, for the host party, for the user; the compatibility with locally available 
resources, customs, and national laws; the consequences for the consequences for the 
local environment; the need for auxillary tools and skills. 
Table 10.4 Policies needed to protect the host government from investment risks 
Problem Policy 
Foreign debt resulting from such in-
vestments 
Examine the foreign debt potential and the capital investment 
implications for financing foreign imports as a criteria in ad-
vance 
Interest rate competition, where each 
donor tries to sell his own product at 
lower interest rates 
Prepare a national technology transfer policy in advance and 
buy only those products that are needed 
Lack of benefits for host government Need to check the costs and benefits for host government and 
allow public scrutiny of projects 
Lack of local skills and knowledge Need to check the skills needed for operating the technology 
and whether it is available in the country or is part of the in-
vestment package 
Lack of compatibility with local re-
sources and customs 
Need to check that the projects are compatible with local re-
sources and customs. 
Project failure in terms of efficiency Need to check the degree of maintenance and operation 
needed and whether this is possible under the circumstances 
                                                   
647  Foley 1992 argues that aid programmes in renewable energy has been very poor because of the poor techni-
cal screening of the technologies and their relevance to the circumstances in which they were to be placed. 
He said that the laboratory for these technologies should be rural villages instead of the laboratory in the first 
place. Besides the issue of maintenance was ignored. Thus although pv needs less maintenance than diesel 
generators, if these batteries are excessively charged or undercharged or if they are not topped up with dis-
tilled water will lead to failure. Especially when car batteries are used to charge solar cells, the life will be 
reduced to about one year. Lack of components are also a key problem. Many of these schemes are also very 
expensive especially when they are to be developed in remote areas. Furthermore, as in the case of solar 
cells, the cost of the cells is only one part. The costs of wires, switches, batteries, ballasts, control systems, 
special low power lights, refrigerators and other system usually make up about 50% of the costs and are ne-
glected in the cost estimates. Can the money then be better spent? 
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While Tables 10.1 and 10.2 indicated that there were many areas in which cooperation is 
necessary, the governments may wish to separate the kinds of project support that is 
needed via: 
- foreign direct investment which is normally at commercial rates; 
- assistance from the large development banks which may have the resources to sup-
port large-scale development projects; 
- assistance via the Global Environment Facility which is for capacity building and 
demonstration projects and less so for direct greenhouse reduction projects; 
- assistance via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
The key issue here is: what sort of projects need support via the CDM? Some of the sup-
port needed is more suitable for GEF type funding, technology transfer per se and/or 
CDM type funding. In relation to whether the governments decide to accept CDM pro-
jects we present some information for their review. The first question is what sort of pro-
jects should be eligible for CDM funding. The World Wide Fund for Nature argues in 
favour of a positive list which would include renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects (WWF 2000). They believe that CDM should not support nuclear energy and 
coal fired plants which are likely to continue in the business-as-usual scenario. The 
European Union supported this position in the recent negotiations of the climate regime. 
A recent report also supports this position arguing that if CDM is allowed for all types of 
projects, this will lead to crediting of even business-as-usual projects since it will be dif-
ficult to differentiate between the two. They calculate that even at $100 t C, 94% of 
the CDM electricity generation activity will be identical with the business-as-usual 
scenario as projected by IEA because of the problem of counter-factuality (Bernow 
et al 2001). At the same time, Canada, the USA and business is opposed to any restric-
tion on the eligibility of projects arguing that this will hinder the process of investment.  
We argue on the basis of the interviews, literature and workshops that it is more in India 
and China’s interests to identify areas in which they would see CDM projects as eligible. 
In doing so both countries may wish to keep the following items in mind: 
a) that desirable technologies should be those that in the long-term contribute to a 
reduction of GHG emissions and do not lead to technological lock-in for the country; 
b) that desirable technologies should not create large local wastes at the cost of 
improving the global atmosphere (e.g. nuclear energy); 
c) that desirable technologies should be those that are at present out of financial reach 
of the different sectors; and become viable because of the CDM; and 
d) the technology transfer should not enhance the potential of leakage in the system, or 
technological and financial dependency but should in fact lead to leap frogging 
where appropriate; 
The following table summarises key aspects of the various technologies for the benefit of 
the reviewer.  
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Table 10.5  Risks and advantages of including certain types of projects in CDM funding for host 
countries (assuming that additional costs are borne by investors) 
Project Advantages Term 
 1 2 3 4 Short Long 
End-use effi-
ciency (EEI):  
- in cement; iron 
and steel; alu-
minium etc. 
- in households 
and commercial 
equipment and 
motors and 
drives 
 
 
 
Yes; 
 
 
Yes, 
 
 
 
Depends; 
 
 
Depends 
 
 
 
Yes, 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes, 
 
 
Yes, 
 
 
 
+?++ 
 
 
+?++ 
 
 
 
+?++ 
 
 
+?++ 
Fuel switch 
Large hydro Yes In the short-term 
huge environ-
mental and so-
cial damage; 
Yes Yes +?++ ++++ 
Small hydro Yes Yes Yes Yes ++++ ++++ 
Wind Yes Yes; except for 
landscape pollu-
tion 
Yes Yes ++++ ++++ 
Gas In the long-
term, it is a 
lock-in tech-
nology 
Partially Yes Perhaps + + + ? - + + ? 
Nuclear Yes High local risk 
and issue of nu-
clear waste 
Yes Perhaps +-+? +-+? 
Biomass Yes Yes Yes Yes ++++ ++++ 
Efficiency im-
provement in 
coal plants 
retrofit 
new plants 
 
 
Yes 
Lock-in the 
long-term 
 
 
Yes 
Lock-in in the 
long-term 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
++++ 
++++ 
 
 
++++ 
- - ++ 
Increasing co-
gen 
Yes Yes Yes Yes ++++ ++++ 
T&D Yes Yes Yes Yes ++++ ++++ 
 
Depending on the choice of criteria used, different countries may make different evalua-
tions of the risks and advantages of developing these options as CDM projects.  
In evaluating the various criteria in relation to CDM, the stakeholders argued in favour 
of paying attention to the following criteria: 
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Table 10.6. Criteria for CDM projects (from Chinese and Indian stakeholders) 
Criteria Description 
For large projects 
- nature of contract joint ventures not sale of technology (China); allowing for indigenisa-
tion of the technology over time (India); Reason: should not lead to 
technological independence; 
- baselines and additionality for retrofitting the actual base line of the industry; 
for new plants, the best technology available in the country in that sec-
tor so that the best and most appropriate technologies are sold via 
CDM;  
- impacts should not create new local environmental impacts (China) 
- cost of project should be for non-commercial rates (China and India) 
- appropriateness should be appropriate for the context (China and India) 
- emission reductions based on actual reductions from the project 
- liability648 seller or joint buyer-seller 
For small projects, small products, etc. (only for India and only for some stakeholders) 
- nature of contract loans at low rates 
- baselines and additionality baselines should be a fixed rate per project or product 
- impacts should not create new local impacts 
- cost of project lower interest rate than normal 
- appropriateness should be appropriate for the context 
- institutional framework should be developed along with an institutional framework to support 
the dissemination of the technology and relevant knowledge 
 
Some technologies are available within the country, and it is more financial and institu-
tional support that may be necessary. This is especially the case for: 
- small-items such as efficient motors and drives that can deal with voltage 
fluctuation; energy efficient light bulbs; energy efficient household and commercial 
appliances, and remote control metering (for India only); efficient technologies for 
water pumps (for India only);  
- for tailor made technical advise on how the small scale sectors can increase their 
efficiency (for India; but we believe this will be necessary in China as well); 
- for institutional support measures needed to provide the conditions within which the 
above small-scale projects can function. 
It would be wise to keep in mind that however large the resources in CDM may be they 
are unlikely to be large enough to support large-scale power plants. Barnett (1992: 332) 
concludes: “On balance it is unlikely that the market mechanism can supply what is 
needed. Future financial trends imply the increasing use of funds that are inherently 
unsuitable for the power sector: terms that involve grace periods that are shorter than the 
time required to construct projects; pay-back periods that are considerably shorter than 
the assets effective life; and rates of interest that heavily discount the future and favour 
technologies with relatively lower capital costs and higher running costs (principally 
using higher cost fuels). But this is not a new problem. It is worth remembering that one 
of the main reasons for creating the World Bank was to compensate for the inadequacies 
of commercial financial markets to provide such infrastructural loans”. 
                                                   
648  Another issue to keep in mind is how to deal with the issue of liability. If the projects are based on buyer li-
ability, the buyer is responsible for failed projects. If the projects are based on seller liability, the seller is re-
sponsible for failed projects and can be held contractually liable. In the negotiations we would believe that if 
the liability is seller liability or shared buyer seller liability, then the countries need to set up a compulsory 
insurance system to insure against the risk of project failure. 
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10.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has thus shown that although China and India takes a defensive position in 
relation to taking on quantitative commitments in relation to the international climate 
change negotiations, a large number of no-regrets measures have been taken in the 
domestic context to rationalise the electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
sectors and many steps have been taken to liberalise the end-use market. Many of these 
measures are so far-reaching that in many ways they even meet the commitments of 
developed countries under article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol (see Box 10.1). Both countries 
are engaged in a number of reforms in the relevant sectors, phasing out of market 
imperfections and enhancement of energy efficiency, etc.  
 
Box 10.1 Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Each Party included in Annex I in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commit-
ments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall:  
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circum 
stances, such as: 
 (i)  Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy; 
 (ii)  Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under relevant international envi-
ronmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation 
and reforestation; 
 (iii)  Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change considerations; 
 (iv)  Promotion, research, development and increased use of new and renewable forms of energy, 
of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative environmen-
tally sound technologies; 
 (v)  Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty 
exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objec-
tive of the Convention and apply market instruments; 
 (vi)  Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and 
measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol; 
 (vii)  Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Mont-
real Protocol in the transport sector; 
 (viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane through recovery and use in waste management, as 
well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy; 
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness of their 
policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2(e)(i), of the 
Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and exchange in-
formation on such policies and measures, including developing ways of improving their compara-
bility, transparency and effectiveness. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways 
to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant information. 
… 
Note: the underlined text emphasises certain aspects being implemented in developing countries. 
 
It is expected that all these steps will lead to an increase in energy efficiency and this, in 
itself, will lead to a reduced rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions, in relation to 
the period prior to the liberalisation of the economy. Thus, it argues that although de jure 
China and India are not willing to take on obligations, de facto China and India are 
seriously engaged in searching for ways to achieve sustainable development within the 
context of domestic interpretations of sustainable development. This search is however 
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problematic, because although the jargon of sustainable development has been adopted, 
it has as yet limited content. 
At the same time, the defensive attitude of China and India towards quantitative targets 
tends to foster suspicions of people the world over that these countries are not doing 
anything and are unwilling to make a meaningful contribution to climate change. 
Furthermore, this defensive attitude will reduce China and India’s role in international 
negotiations to merely ‘damage control’. We would argue that it is time for both 
countries to invest in a competent team with critical mass that participates in 
international negotiations not just with a view to monitor the progress and protect their 
rights, but to present the combined energy, vision and thoughts of the experts and 
stakeholders in a proactive and constructive strategy. They could make use of side-
events during the negotiations to present the de facto domestic developments and 
policies, while they resist de jure developments.  
Having said that, it must be remembered that China and India are relatively poor and 
have huge economies and this means that progress tends to be slow as the society 
gradually internalises the major structural changes and accepts the consequences. There 
are clearly winners and losers in the domestic market and the losers will resist all 
changes especially in India; but the risk is also present in China. But the path seems to be 
irrevocably set towards liberalisation of the economy. In such a situation of transition 
making predictions about the business-as-usual growth rates and changes in relation to 
these growth rates are more speculation than reasoned prognoses. Besides, the 
governments may have instruments to change the framework within which policies are 
undertaken, but do not have a substantial monitoring and implementation framework, as 
a number of priorities compete for scarce resources. This is also very much the case for 
China where non-governmental actors, the judiciary and the press are not independent 
and cannot signal implementation failure. At the same time, China and India have to 
balance the critical issues of energy security, self-dependence and be wise with their use 
of foreign exchange and this limits the potential for reducing its dependence on coal. 
Under these circumstances, it may not be wise for the international community to 
persuade the governments to take on quantitative obligations that it is in no position to 
actually implement. Instead it makes more sense for the international community to push 
the issue of policies and measures especially in relation to developing countries.  
Fourth, both countries need foreign investment and support in order to make the 
transition to a greenhouse friendly world. This means that they need to take measures: 
- to invite foreign investment through a simple legal framework requiring limited li-
censes and a Foreign Investment Code that guarantees that contracts will be hon-
oured as long as there is no corruption involved and procedures are followed, a fair 
system of repatriation of funds, exchange convertibility, and 
- to protect themselves from foreign investment by (a) examining the foreign debt po-
tential and the capital investment implications for financing foreign imports as a cri-
teria in advance; (b) preparing a national technology cooperation policy so that the 
technologies bought fit in within the long-term development plans of the country; (c) 
scrutinising the costs and benefits for host government/investor and allowing public 
scrutiny of projects, (d) checking the skills needed for operating the technology and 
whether it is available in the country or is part of the investment package, (e) check-
ing that the projects are compatible with local resources and customs and (f) check-
ing the degree of maintenance and operation needed and whether this is possible un-
der the circumstances.  
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Fifth, stakeholders in both countries indicate that the following criteria are critical for the 
acceptance of CDM projects: (a) that the projects are joint ventures and/or allow for 
indigenisation of the technology over time; (b) that baselines in relation to retrofit 
projects are actual baselines and for new plants, the best technology available in the 
country in that sector so that the best and most appropriate technologies are sold via 
CDM; (c) that the projects should be non-commercial; (d) that there should be no new 
local environmental and social impact; (e) that the project should be appropriate for the 
context, and (f) that there should be seller or joint seller-buyer liability. To the extent that 
CDM is permitted for small projects and products that are locally available, the credits 
should be fixed in relation to each project or product and should be at lower than normal 
interest rates.  
Sixth, stakeholders in both countries have identified the technologies they need (see 
Chapters 6, 7, 8; see also Table 10.1 and 10.2). We believe for the reasons presented in 
this Chapter that a strong case can be made for limiting CDM funds for energy efficiency 
projects and renewable energy projects. GEF funds could be used for capacity building 
and institutional support in relation to the small-scale projects and sectors; and should 
China and India decide to go for clean coal and nuclear technologies, that these can be 
promoted within existing cooperation programmes and through development funds.  
10.6 Summary 
This chapter has tried to explain the other element of the Asian Dilemma – the 
perspective of China and India in relation to the climate change issue. It presents the 
evolution of the national foreign policy on climate change and then tries to analyse the 
reasons underlying the policy. It concludes that although the two countries are 
implementing their current commitments under the regime, they take a defensive 
approach in relation to quantitative commitments. Nevertheless, de facto both countries 
are implementing many of the elements of Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol which 
contains policies and measures for the developed countries. 
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11. An Asian Dilemma: Conclusions and Recommendations  
Authors: Joyeeta Gupta, Jaklien Vlasblom and Carolien Kroeze649 
11.1 The research question revisited 
In light of the growing scientific evidence of the problem of climate change, this book 
has examined the question: What are the feasible policy options to modernise the elec-
tricity sector in China and India taking into account the supply and demand for electric-
ity and given the conflict between the need for economic growth and the need to antici-
pate future developments in relation to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions?  
As Chapter 2 has explained, this book has taken a multidisciplinary approach towards 
examining the conflict between the need for economic growth and increased electricity 
supply and the need to reduce the rate of growth of greenhouse gas emissions. The 
methodology allowed for an assessment of the broad political and legal context, the 
overall macro trends and also the sector specific technological options. The methodology 
was innovative and complicated and an assessment of the methodology is provided in 
Section 2.4. We feel, that the methodology has enabled us to reach fairly robust conclu-
sions and recommendations. The following conclusions attempt at presenting an inte-
grated picture of the information collected, collated and analysed in this project.  
11.2 Conclusions 
China and India share some features in common. They are large, highly populated, 
booming economies with multiple contexts ranging from very rich urban areas to impov-
erished rural areas. They both are in need of growing electricity supplies, even though 
China is presently experiencing excess supply. The prime source of electricity in both 
countries is coal and they are rich in coal reserves. They have large industries that com-
pete globally such as the iron and steel, and aluminium sectors. In both countries owner-
ship of power generation and distribution and large-scale end-use industries were con-
centrated in government hands. Both countries have complex systems of pricing and 
cross subsidies. And both countries are in a state of transition to a market economy. 
China is in a state of bloodless, but not entirely painless, transition from a centrally 
planned economy towards a market economy, from an autocratic system to a democratic 
system, from a command and control system to a system of command and market-based 
instruments, from government ownership to privatisation. This transition is affected by 
institutional inertia on the one hand and the hunger for controlled change on the other. 
India is trying desperately to gradually superimpose the mantras of liberalisation on a 
mixed and protected market, but has had very little information on whether this will be 
useful for India in the long-term. In the meanwhile, although liberalisation has been set 
in motion, it is difficult to predict whether after some initial hitches, the process will be a 
smooth one, or whether there will be major backlashes from society after the first few 
crises and the process will be halted and perhaps even reversed. Hence to then take on 
quantitative commitments in relation to a business-as-usual scenario that does not exist 
would be difficult if not impossible to defend domestically.  
                                                   
649  With comments from Kornelis Blok. 
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However, there are also key differences between the countries. While the transition in 
China is political and economic, the transition in India is primarily focused on the devel-
opment of a market system and liberalisation. While electricity is essentially a federally 
controlled subject in China, in India both the federal and state governments have author-
ity on the subject. While the public is a passive observer in the transition process in 
China, in India the public, press, industry and NGOs are active participants.  
India is a democratic country where every person has an opinion and these often differ. It 
is more than likely that to the extent the process of liberalisation is accompanied by mar-
ginalisation of rural and poor communities or environmental degradation or even finan-
cial risk, the society will respond to halt and even reverse such measures. This can hap-
pen through social movement (the Narmada Dam case), and/or through pressure from the 
judiciary (India has a proactive judiciary) and the press (India has a free and vocal 
press). This makes it very risky to make predictions about the future in relation to India, 
in comparison to China, where society is still very regulated, and social movements are 
uncommon and the press and judiciary are still very much under government control. 
Thus decisions taken in China are, in theory, more likely to be implemented than those in 
India. However, interviewees argue that the arm of Beijing is not that long and perhaps 
more change is underway than as yet can be envisaged.  
Another key present difference between China and India is the attitude towards the 
small-scale sector. In China, the central government has urged the closure of the small-
scale sector in several fields (mines, iron and steel, etc). While this is policy, state gov-
ernments do not always support it because of the implications for job losses. India pro-
tects the sector and measures are taken to support them, despite any inefficiencies. The 
small-scale sector remains a major challenge.  
Nevertheless we can draw some conclusions for both countries. 
First, climate change is not seen as a critical priority in China nor in India. Both coun-
tries are not just facing a broad range of problems ranging from poverty alleviation to 
health issues, but also a series of national disasters (flooding in the rivers in China, cy-
clones and earthquakes in India). While climate change per se is not seen as an urgent 
priority in China nor India, energy policy is seen as urgent; while sustainable develop-
ment as a concept has been adopted by policymakers, the content of this concept is still 
vague and unclear. China gives priority to local and regional environmental problems 
and to the complicated issue of transition politics. Although considerable climate change 
research work has been undertaken in China and India, the research is not adequate nor 
complete enough to help the two governments determine well-structured negotiating 
strategies based on a thorough understanding of national emissions and sinks and scenar-
ios for future growth. This implies that the governments are only able to negotiate in 
terms of an ideological standpoint and to use the climate change issue to discuss North-
South issues and to attempt at damage control in the climate change regime. In doing so, 
diplomats have in general had constructive positions in relation to crosscutting interna-
tional issues (such as aid, and technology transfer), but tend to be defensive in relation to 
climate change specific issues. This is the only way for the governments to guarantee 
some degree of legitimacy for their position, since the position is based on precedent. 
The two countries do not consult much with each other and are fairly isolated in their 
negotiating strategy because they do not have (or commit) the resources to collect and 
collate domestic information, coordinate or cooperate with the neighbouring countries, 
initiate and support a regional position, nor do they aim for a leadership position with re-
spect to the G-77 countries. China has a special situation in all this, because unlike India, 
it is a member of the security council and sees itself as slightly different from the other 
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developing countries but not in the context of climate change. China aspires to be a ma-
jor global power, while at the same time hangs on to its status as a developing country, 
and this leads to ambiguous positions being taken in the international process. However, 
this very ambiguity indicates that if Chinese leaders could themselves see a short-cut to 
sustainable development; they would not hesitate to reach out to such a short-cut. There 
are already indications that Chinese leaders are well on their way to seek international 
advice and assistance to define such a process. It appears that in this period of transition, 
issues seen as technical issues are likely to receive greater government attention, than 
those seen as political issues. Thus environmental and energy related issues are likely to 
be given considerable attention, but only to the extent that they are seen as technical and 
not as social or political issues. For example, hydro power and nuclear energy will be 
evaluated more on their technical rather than social aspects. To the extent that social and 
political issues can be depoliticised and made into technical arguments, these may have a 
significant impact on government policies, provided they can be communicated through 
yet to be defined appropriate domestic and international channels (see Chapter 10).  
Second, until both governments have an accurate quantitative picture of their own emis-
sions and sinks, they are unlikely to even wish to discuss quantitative commitments for 
the future. This is because the governments cannot promise what they do not know and 
what they probably cannot enforce in their extremely large countries. Furthermore, both 
countries are in the process of transition and this makes speculation about the future very 
difficult, since extrapolation is not a very straightforward exercise (see Chapter 10). 
Third, since 1990, the base year for the climate change regime, the Chinese government 
has been restructuring the energy sector. The Chinese electricity market too has suffered 
from lack of clarity between the generation, transmission and distribution tasks; cross 
subsidies and controlled pricing, relatively inefficient power plants and inefficiency in 
the end-use sectors. However, the Government has taken a number of measures to mod-
ernise the sector. These include policies to liberalise the electricity generation and distri-
bution sector and the end-use sectors such as the cement, iron and steel, and aluminium 
sectors. There have been policies to close down small inefficient coal mines, electricity 
generators and end-use industries in for example the cement and iron and steel sectors. 
The government has established energy conservation goals for some industries and de-
veloped standards and labels for products for the residential, commercial and agricultural 
sectors (see Chapter 3).  
India had a protected, mixed economy prior to 1990, with many tasks focused in the 
hands of the government. This led, inter alia, to a controlled pricing system based on a 
number of cross-subsides, resulting financial losses in the generation sector, leading to 
reduced investments in repair, maintenance, and renovation. The billing and collection 
system was subject to a number of problems (theft), the quality of electricity generated 
was poor and insufficient and the economy as a whole was suffering. On the other hand, 
the subsidies did lead to an enormous growth in rural electricity consumption. We have 
shown that India has taken a large number of measures in the electricity supply sector 
and in the electricity demand side since 1990. These include in the supply sector: the 
1991 amendments to the Indian electricity Act to permit private sector participation; the 
establishment of an Investment Promotion cell in 1991; the evolution of the department 
into a separate Ministry for Non-Conventional Energy Sources in 1992 with the express 
purpose of developing and promoting renewable energy in India (excluding large hydro); 
and which has surpassed expectations in the Eighth Five Year Plan Period (1992-1997); 
the promulgation of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Ordinance in 1998 to allow 
for an independent body to approve, inter alia, the pricing system; the adoption of the 
power sector reform bill in 2000 to allow for the unbundling of the State Electricity 
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Boards into generation, transmission and distribution utilities, and then to enable the 
process of corporatisation and, if necessary, privatisation. Many states are already in the 
process of unbundling and corporatisation (Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, New 
Delhi); the decision to link the regional grids and to allow for inter-grid sharing of elec-
tricity; the decision to encourage cogeneration in the 9th five year plan and to allow for 
power purchase agreements. In the demand sector, these include the liberalisation of the 
cement sector, iron and steel, and aluminium in 1991 and a number of sector specific 
measures that have been taken since then; the encouragement of efficiency in water 
pumps in the 9th Five Year Plan; the adoption of rules regarding mandatory environ-
mental auditing; the adoption of the Energy Conservation Bill in 2001. To promote en-
ergy conservation in the energy intensive sectors; the liberalisation of the banking sector 
which will lead to reduced rates of interest on commercial loans in the future and which 
already lead to reduced rates for energy efficient investments (see Chapter 4).  
These developments lead us to conclude that there are a large number of measures that 
have been taken in China and India and these are likely to lead to a substantial improve-
ment in the efficiency of the electricity sector and in increased investment in renewable 
energy. This will also lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, China has since 1980 decoupled its emissions from its out-
put; for India this was not the case since there was considerable concentrated growth in 
the energy intensive sectors in this period. However, our study shows that for both coun-
tries, in fact, the energy (but not necessarily electricity) consumption per tonne of prod-
uct in the end-use sectors has reduced significantly between 1990 and 2000. The Busi-
ness-as-usual (BAU) (2000) scenarios used in this project are also lower than earlier pro-
jections made by researchers about the future. Although these downwards revisions may 
have other reasons, they are in line with the adoption of these policies (see Chapter 5). 
However, the BAU scenario may be, on the one hand, overly optimistic given the policy 
implementation record of both countries (see Chapters 3, 4, 8) and, on the other hand, 
may be way off-mark, given that both countries are in a state of structural change which 
by its very nature is unpredictable. The current driving force for change in the electricity 
producing and using sectors is the drive towards liberalisation (the increasing demand 
for quality electricity, the need to make the electricity producers and distributors viable 
and functional, the need to use limited energy resources efficiently and the pressure to 
deal with local and regional pollutants). However, the governments of both countries are 
unlikely to present this upheaval and all the changes as a contribution to the climate 
change problem. This is so, because, in principle, they do not believe that it is their turn 
to take action, and because they are not entirely sure where all this structural change will 
lead to, and whether such scenarios are reliable.  
Fourth, our interpretation of the RAINS Asia BAU (2000) indicates the following.  
For China, the BAU scenario assumes a 30% growth of population and a 7.5-fold in-
crease in GDP, while total primary energy demand is expected to increase by 125%. As a 
result of this, energy-related emissions of CO2 are by 2020 calculated to be more than 
twice the 1990 level. Emissions from the power sector contribute by about 30% to total 
greenhouse gas emissions. The total greenhouse gas emissions from electricity produc-
tion are calculated to increase from 510 Mton CO2-equivalents in 1990 to 1554 CO2-
equivalents in 2020. More than 90% of these emissions are CO2 emissions, while CH4 
and N2O contribute less than 10%.For India, the BAU scenario assumes a more than 
50% growth of population and a 5.8-fold increase in GDP, while total primary energy 
demand is expected to increase by 150%. As a result of this energy-related emissions of 
CO2 are by 2020 calculated to be more than three times the 1990 level. Emissions from 
the power sector contribute by about 40% to total greenhouse gas emissions. The total 
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greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are calculated to increase from 256 
Mton CO2-equivalents to 978 Mton CO2-equivalents. More than 90% of these emissions 
are CO2 emissions, while CH4 and N2O contribute less than 10%. Emissions of green-
house gases from the power sector in China and India are calculated to increase by 
a factor of three to four respectively between 1990 and 2020 in the BAU scenario, 
while total electricity production increases by a factor of five, illustrating that total 
emissions per unit of electricity are expected to decrease considerably over time. 
Fifth, there are clusters of options for the end-use sectors in both countries, which in-
clude closing down plants with old technologies, or retrofitting them if closure is not 
possible for institutional reasons, to use the newest technologies when capacity construc-
tion takes place, to increase the use of energy efficient lighting and appliances and, 
cross-cutting, to improve electrical pumps and motors and drives and increase the share 
of cogeneration. To a limited extent, these options are expected to be adopted under the 
BAU scenario, since India has shown significant progress in the period before 2000. The 
maximum potential energy savings on top of the energy savings already included in 
the BAU scenario is around 30% for the two countries in 2020. This implies a re-
duction in the rate of growth of demand for electricity which means that a total re-
duction of up to 45% of greenhouse gas and sulphur dioxide emissions relative to 
the BAU scenario is possible by making maximum use of the possibilities to im-
prove energy efficiency in the end-use sector.  
Sixth, our analysis of the potential effect of a number of strategies to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and sulphur dioxide from the power sector in 
China and India indicates that (see Table 11.1): 
- For China, the reduction options for the supply side include the replacement of coal 
by renewables (23%) and natural gas (11%). Reducing electricity losses during 
transmission and distribution would reduce emissions by 7% and efficiency im-
provement of power plants by 9%. Closing small power plants has a small effect on 
emissions (1%), as does replacement of coal by nuclear power (2%). For increased 
cogeneration we calculate an emission reduction of 2%, but it should be noted that 
this estimate may underestimate the total potential for cogeneration. 
- For India, the reduction options for the supply side include replacement of coal by 
renewables (14% reduction relative to 2020 BAU) and natural gas (14%) and effi-
ciency improvement of power plants (9%). Emission reductions are also calculated 
for improved transmission and distribution of electricity (6%), and replacing coal by 
nuclear power (6%). Increased cogeneration is calculated to have a moderate effects 
on emissions from the electricity sector (4%) but it should be noted that this estimate 
may underestimate the total potential for cogeneration. 
Seventh, we formulated three scenarios (BPT1, BPT2 and BPT3) with a technical poten-
tial to reduce emissions to about half the 2020 BAU level. These three scenarios are very 
different in their assumptions on reduction options, indicating that there are different 
strategies possible for realising relatively large emission reductions in China and India. 
Our analysis of the effect of combinations of reduction technologies in “Best Practice 
Technology” scenarios indicates the following: (a) Large emission reductions may be 
technically possible to achieve by 2020, but given that such transitions are considered 
unaffordable in the developed countries, they can be seen as impossible to achieve in the 
developing economies of China and India; having said that we would argue that such a 
possibility could become probable if the developed countries themselves adopted such a 
transition towards renewable energy. (b) End-use efficiency improvement may be one of 
the most effective ways to reduce emissions in China and India. However, this item in-
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cludes a large number of organised and unorganised sectors, and is actually a combina-
tion of a number of options and mobilising all sectors can be challenging. (c) We find 
that even in scenarios reflecting ambitious assumptions on efficiency improvement and 
fuel switch, part of the electricity in China and India used in 2020 is from coal fired 
power plants. Although it may be technically possible to meet the 2020 need for fuels 
without coal, this must be considered unrealistic, especially in a world where fossil fuels 
dominate in the developed countries. Feasible options for energy efficiency improvement 
combined with feasible fuel switch options are not sufficient to avoid building of new 
coal-fired power plants after the year 2000. (d) Of the scenarios analysed, the Mixed Pol-
icy Scenario (BPT1) may include the most promising combination of options. This sce-
nario combines the options that have relatively large technical potentials to reduce emis-
sions and are also seen as feasible and/or non-controversial by the stakeholders (this 
means that we have excluded large hydro and nuclear also partly because some stake-
holders in the countries saw these as highly controversial). The analysis illustrates that a 
wide variety of promising options to reduce emissions, that are in line with the views of 
local stakeholders, is available. These scenarios do not explicitly take the costs of tech-
nologies into account. 
Table 11.1 The potential to reduce emissions CO2, CH4 and N2O (GHG) from the power sector in 
China and India in 2020, by selected Best Practice Technology options relative to the 
Business-as-Usual scenario. 
Reduction in 2020 GHG emis-
sions (% relative to BAU) 
Best Practice Technology Option 
China India 
End-use efficiency improvement (EEI) in   
- cement, iron & steel, aluminium industry 4 3 
- other industrial sectors 25 14 
- residential sector 8 12 
- commerce 5 11 
- agriculture 1 5 
Total EEI 43 45 
Replacement of coal by renewables (REN) 23 14 
Replacement of coal by natural gas (GAS low, no cogen) 11 14 
Replacement of coal by nuclear power (NUC) 2 6 
Closing Small power plants (CSP) 1 - 
Efficiency improvement in power plants (EFF) 9 9 
Increased use of cogeneration (COG-coal) 2 4 
Reduction of losses during transmission and distribution (T&D) 7 6 
[Note that the effects of the various options cannot be added in a straightforward way.] 
 
 
Eighth, although some measures have a high technical potential for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in both countries, these are not seen as particularly feasible by the stake-
holders (see Table 11.2).  
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Table 11.2 Feasibility of options.  
Options Technical  
potential to reduce emis-
sions 
Stakeholder  
priority China 
Stakeholder priority 
India 
Rationalise pricing Indirectly high, since this 
helps to yield savings that 
can be used for reinvesting 
in energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment 
High for government, 
industry and com-
merce 
Improve legitimacy of de-
cision-making and reduce 
the implementation deficit 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing the implementation of 
government policy 
High for stake-
holders; but to be 
implemented step 
by step 
Although important, 
not a key issue from 
this research 
Improving the transition 
from state owned to corpo-
ratised bodies and privati-
sation; improving account-
ability and the financial 
health of utilities 
Indirect high, by improv-
ing accountability and 
profits and increasing re-
sources for investment in 
energy efficiency 
High for govern-
ment and industry 
High 
Decrease distribution 
losses from theft 
Indirect high, by increas-
ing the revenues that can 
be reinvested in energy ef-
ficient technologies 
N/A High  
Improve economic effi-
ciency in government 
spending 
Indirect high, by focusing 
resources in an economic 
way on electricity sectors 
N/A; possibly an 
important issue; 
but did not 
emerge as such 
High; hence the need 
to focus on retrofit-
ting 
End-use efficiency im-
provement (EEI) 
Very high Low Low in small scale 
sectors 
Replacement of coal by  
renewables (REN) 
High Large hydro high, 
other  
renewables low 
Large hydro  
controversial, other 
renewables high 
Replacement of coal by 
natural gas (GAS low, no 
cogen) 
High High Low 
Replacement of coal by 
nuclear power (NUC) 
Low For government 
high 
Controversial 
Closing Small power plants 
(CSP) 
Low For government 
high 
Low 
Efficiency improvement in 
power plants (EFF) 
High Low High 
Increased use of cogenera-
tion (COG-coal) 
Low Low Although seen as im-
portant, policies are 
slow 
Reduction of losses during  
transmission and distribu-
tion (T&D) 
Medium Low High 
Note: The technical potential evaluated as high, low, etc. are derived from the quantitative analysis 
done in Chapter 7. 
 
Ninth, the implementation of policy options depends to a large extent on foreign invest-
ment and help. However, in the last decade both countries have had only partial success 
in accessing foreign assistance and investment and foreign companies claim that they 
have had to cope with bureaucratic problems and political risks. Both countries are also 
not very satisfied with the extent of technology cooperation offered under the climate 
change regime. Thus far very few climate change projects have been developed in both 
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countries and the experiences are limited though stakeholders have not been able to for-
mulate conditions for accepting projects. 
Strategic Issues:   
For the National Governments 
The governments of China and India may wish to take the following strategic issues into 
account, especially if they wish to take a proactive approach in relation to the 
international climate change negotiations and to the enormous pressure on them to 
demonstrate their willingness to participate meaningfully in international negotiations.  
- Public relations: First, if they wish to relieve the pressure on themselves, they may 
want to develop an international public awareness campaign of how much de facto is 
being undertaken within their countries, and to explain why de jure, it is not a re-
sponsible undertaking to accept quantitative commitments during the period of trans-
formation.  
- Stakeholder consultation on industrial transformation: Second, if the govern-
ments wish to proactively carve out a sustainable development trajectory for them-
selves, they may consider engaging in discussions with domestic and foreign experts 
from ENGOs, business, government and international organisations who are willing 
to openly discuss, without being dogmatic about ideological concerns, what steps 
can lead to industrial and institutional transformation that is compatible with finan-
cial, economic, ecologic and social gain for the society. This means that at an ab-
stract level, the governments may wish to revisit the modernisation processes in their 
countries and see if that will lead to the changes needed. Our research shows that 
there are significant opportunities for modernisation that can yield a number of side-
benefits. The best practice technology scenarios indicates that emissions can techni-
cally be reduced by more than 50% of the BAU scenario. This calls for more active 
discussion on how feasible these options are and whether the two countries are in a 
position to leap-frog to modern technologies or not and under what conditions. We 
have made an attempt at analysing the key bottlenecks and opportunities for each of 
these options, and broad based social discussions of such options may increase their 
political and practical feasibility. Our research concludes that the end-use options 
are for the coming twenty years as important as the supply side options. This 
implies that both governments may need to establish strong, empowered institu-
tional structure to provide sector specific policies, standards and incentives to 
encourage the adoption of appropriate energy efficient technologies. This also 
implies, that both governments may benefit from engaging in and encouraging the 
development of scenarios in relation to the supply and demand side for the future and 
how the countries could develop in relation to different conditions. Such scenarios 
could be based on visions of sustainable development and the way these countries 
perceive themselves in the context of the global environment. They could also be the 
result of back casting from a desirable future to analyse what kinds of steps need to 
be taken now in order to reach the desirable future.  
- Domestic policy: Third, at a more specific level, our analysis shows that if China 
and India would like to accelerate development in the electricity sector, they may 
wish to adopt the following measures:  
- For China, this includes (a) support for rational pricing system and gradual removal 
of subsidies coupled with price support for the poorest people; (b) developing a step-
by-step approach to decentralisation, involvement of provinces and stakeholders in 
decision-making to develop tailor made policies for each province as opposed to uni-
form policies with a system for monitoring and enforcement. In relation to increasing 
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the accountability of generators, transmitors and distributors, this means that the 
government needs to (c) separate power generators from distributors and make sim-
ple rules for power purchase agreements; (d) develop simple rules for companies ex-
perimenting with corporatisation and privatisation; and encourage transparency so 
that the press and public can monitor developments. In relation to fuel-switch, (e) 
policies to promote short-term start subsidies for small-scale renewables need to be 
promoted. (f) There is need to examine the natural gas alternative in greater detail 
but taking into account the long-term technological lock-in aspects. (g) Taking into 
account the risk issues and the nuclear waste issue, the government may wish to re-
examine the feasibility of nuclear power. (h) It may also be important to explore the 
potential for small hydro in place of large hydro as a way to anticipate and prevent 
future problems with respect to large hydro. (i) The government may wish to prepare 
a list of priority areas for technology cooperation. Our research indicates that stake-
holders have identified the following technologies as critical in the following sectors: 
cement (pre-calciner, preheater cement plants, roller press and roller grinders), iron 
and steel (improved steel casting), aluminium (pre-baked anodes), motors and drives 
(large-scale high efficiency motors and drives, variable speed drives), renewables 
(wind turbines), gas (modern gas technologies), nuclear (safe and advanced tech-
nologies),650 biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass gasification; combined hybrid 
systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency improvement in coal plants (retrofitting tech-
nologies, coal gasification, IGCC, super critical boilers), cogeneration technologies, 
transmission and distribution and desulphurisation technologies (technologies for 
coal washing). A previous list submitted by China to the second Conference of the 
Parties may wish to take these items into account.  
- For India, the range of policy measures includes: (a) Promotion of tamper-proof/ re-
mote control power metering along with accountable/ profit making local power dis-
tribution centres to guarantee collection of accurate electricity dues; (b) spport for ra-
tional power pricing combined with price support for the poorest in society and sub-
sidies for renewable energy; (c) a public relations campaign to convince agriculture 
and households that the price increase in power will be accompanied with better 
quality of services making voltage stabilisers, inverters, diesel generators, loss of in-
come and comfort a problem of the past. (d) The government may wish to make 
guidelines as to when the privatisation process is really necessary and economically 
viable such that it does not lead to a devaluation of government resources, to a con-
centration of private projects in lucrative areas leaving government with the non-
economically viable areas, and only when it is necessary to improve the functioning 
of the company. (e) It may also be useful to develop policies to ensure that contracts 
with large investors in critical areas are subject to public scrutiny so that corruption 
in contracts is minimised. In the area of fuel-switching, (f) the government may wish 
to further develop short-term start subsidies for small renewables (in accordance 
with the goals set out in the new renewable energy bill); (g) examine the gas alterna-
tive in greater detail but taking into account the long-term technological lock-in as-
pects; (h) take into account the risk issues and the nuclear waste issue in revisiting 
the feasibility of nuclear power, (i) explore the potential for small hydro in place of 
large hydro as a way to anticipate and prevent future problems with respect to large 
hydro.  
                                                   
650  This does not mean that this research promotes nuclear technologies; we are merely reflecting what the 
stakeholders communicated to us during the interviews. 
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- Technologies needed: Fourth, if the governments of China and India wish to access 
new and modern technologies, they may wish to develop a menu of choices for the 
projects that need priority in technology transfer accompanied with concessions 
(GEF/CDM/bilateral aid/ technology transfer at concessional terms). Interviewees 
and the research indicate that the following technologies could be of use in the fol-
lowing sectors: cement (technologies for the small-scale sector), iron and steel (im-
proved steel casting, EAF), aluminium, motors and drives (large-scale high effi-
ciency motors and variable speed drives), renewables (wind turbines), gas (modern 
gas technologies), biomass (cheap and appropriate biomass gasification; combined 
hybrid systems), solar (cells, etc.), efficiency improvement in coal plants (retrofitting 
technologies, IGCC, super critical boilers; high conversion efficiency technologies; 
better combustion technologies for high ash content coal), cogeneration technolo-
gies, transmission and distribution and desulphurisation technologies (technologies 
for coal washing).  
- Encouraging foreign investments: Although both countries are already exploring a 
number of policy options, many of these options may remain merely on paper since 
the resources are limited. If both countries believe that they need financial support 
and investment in order to make the transition to a greenhouse friendly world, they 
can invite foreign investment through a simple legal framework requiring limited li-
cense and a foreign investment code that states that contracts will be honoured as 
long as there is no corruption involved and procedures are followed and a fair system 
of repatriation of funds. They may wish to protect themselves from foreign invest-
ment by (a) examining the foreign debt potential and the capital investment implica-
tions for financing foreign imports as a criteria in advance; (b) preparing a national 
technology cooperation policy so that the technologies bought fit in within the long-
term development plans of the country; (c) scrutinising the costs and benefits for 
host government/investor and allowing public scrutiny of projects, (d) checking the 
skills needed for operating the technology and whether it is available in the country 
or is part of the investment package, (e) checking that the projects are compatible 
with local resources and customs and (f) checking the degree of maintenance and 
operation needed and whether this is possible under the circumstances.  
- Low stakeholder priority but high technical feasibility options: If both countries 
wish to optimise electricity generation and consumption, they may wish to re-
examine the following relatively non-controversial options for their high GHG emis-
sion reduction potential and also because these options can be relatively cheap. 
China tends to focus on fuel switch rather than on energy efficiency improvement. 
However, efficiency improvement may have a large potential to reduce emissions in 
China. It may be relevant for China to re-consider the importance of the energy effi-
ciency improvement in end-use sectors, energy efficiency improvement in existing 
coal-fired plants and reducing technical losses in transmission and distribution. Our 
calculations indicate that a combination of these three options for China could poten-
tially reduce emission to about 50% of their 2020 BAU level. In India, energy effi-
ciency in existing plants and transmission and distribution are presently being given 
as much political importance as the limited resources permit. There is, however, op-
portunity for a much more focused policy on energy efficiency improvement in end-
use sectors (notably industry), which may potentially reduce emissions by 45% rela-
tive to the BAU level. Some stakeholders seem to focus more on efficiency im-
provement than on fuel switch in India, while the latter may potentially reduce emis-
sions to a considerable extent. Therefore, exploring fuel switch options including the 
potential for gas can offer short-term relief to Indian energy policies. The options for 
  363 
importing gas to the mutual satisfaction of India and Bangladesh needs to be more 
actively explored.  
- Criteria for CDM projects: Stakeholders in both countries indicate that the follow-
ing criteria are critical for the acceptance of CDM projects: (a) that the projects are 
joint ventures and/or allow for indigenisation of the technology over time; (b) that 
baselines in relation to retrofit projects are actual baselines and for new plants, the 
best technology available in the country in that sector so that the best and most ap-
propriate technologies are sold via CDM; (c) that the projects should be non-
commercial; (d) that there should be no new local environmental and social impact; 
(e) that the project should be appropriate for the context; and (f) that there should be 
seller or joint seller-buyer liability. To the extent that CDM is permitted for small 
projects and products that are locally available, the credits should be fixed in relation 
to each project or product and should be at lower than normal interest rates. CDM 
could be used to promote any of the technologies listed above. This report thus ad-
vises caution in relation to the development of nuclear and coal powered plants 
within CDM. There are indications that existing technology transfers may be re-
named as CDM projects which will not benefit the host country. It makes more sense 
to use CDM for long-term GHG friendly projects; that do not have negative local 
side effects. This may also reduce the risk of liability from problems in project im-
plementation arising from social unrest. 
- From reactive to proactive negotiating strategy: Finally, if both governments wish 
to take on a proactive role in the international negotiations, they need to develop 
concepts and policies for the implementation of the regime. Our research shows that 
both countries are seriously engaging in structural change and that they are 
attempting at developing long-term sustainable development policies in the energy 
sector. A proactive strategy that would state the specific kinds of assistance needed 
by the countries to make certain energy transitions possible in their countries and in 
specific time-frames could not only indicate the seriousness of the domestic 
governments on the issues, but could also put pressure on the developed world to 
assist them accordingly. This means a clear identification of the sorts of technologies 
and financial assistance needed, a clear specification of the criteria and conditions 
under which the country is willing to participate in the cooperative process, a clear 
identification of what types of projects need to be supported by the GEF, bilateral 
help, development bank lending and the CDM, and a series of domestic targets and 
timetables within which the foreign assistance can be planned so as to have optimal 
results in the next twelve years. If the ground work done by the Clinton 
administration in at least India is not followed up by the new Bush regime, there is 
an opportunity to further develop the ties with the European Union within the 
framework of the EU-India summit.  
Foreign investors may wish to draw insights for themselves from the above strategic is-
sues, especially those in relation to technologies needed, the role of foreign investments 
and criteria for CDM projects. 
 
For developed country governments:  
First, if the purpose of the developed countries is to encourage China and India to 
seriously take part in the negotiation (rather than assume that they are not implementing 
their obligations to avoid taking measures themselves), they could consider taking 
cognisance of what is actually happening in the countries (i.e. the de facto 
implementation). They may also wish to understand the reasons for defensive strategies 
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(i.e. the need to avoid de jure quantitative obligations) and the sustainability dilemmas 
faced by both countries. 
Second, we believe that it would make more sense for the developed countries – the 
USA in particular and for those who implicitly support it - to encourage the development 
of a menu of options by developing countries from which they could adopt some; and 
consider the measures taken from 1990 onwards as a meaningful contribution to the 
climate change discussions. This would make more sense than to try and impose legally 
binding quantitative restrictions linked to incomplete data on existing emissions and 
speculations about the future, which would have very little basis for countries in 
transformation.  
Third, if the developed countries would like the developing countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions, this inevitably implies that the developed countries too have 
to adopt drastic measures domestically. This would make the cost of renewable energy 
cheaper and hence affordable for everybody. 
Fourth, if the developed countries would like the developing countries to reduce their 
emissions substantially, this calls for increased cooperation between countries in terms 
of technical and financial assistance.  
Fifth, we would recommend that developed country governments be careful about what 
is exported to developing countries and whether this will lock not just the develop-
ing country into a technological trajectory, but the world into an emission trajectory. By 
encouraging industry to participate actively in the regime, it is not ruled out that such in-
dustry will wish to please its share holders in the short-term rather than meet the long-
term environmental goals. This means that the rules for export need to be clearly de-
vised. Lessons from the Ozone Layer Protection regime have shown that exports of 
HCFCs, a greenhouse gas, financed by the Global Environment Facility or otherwise, did 
not serve the cause of the environment or the developing countries, although it did bene-
fit the exporting companies. The adoption of renewable energy in the developing coun-
tries is at present less affordable that the adoption of the same path by the developed 
countries. Large-scale adoption of renewable energy in the first world, coupled by re-
stricting the use of the flexible mechanisms to supporting renewable energy and end-use 
efficiency could set the ball rolling towards a greenhouse friendly world. However, in 
this the developed countries need to set an example themselves. 
11.3 Epilogue 
The above sections have demonstrated that although de jure China and India are not 
willing to take on quantitative obligations in relation to climate change, de facto China 
and India are seriously engaged in searching for ways to achieve sustainable develop-
ment within the context of democratic decision making and for de-linking the growth of 
greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants from their output.  
However, our Best Practice Technology scenario shows that there is considerable poten-
tial in China and India to reduce emissions by more than 50% relative to the BAU sce-
nario by 2020. A number of policy measures need to be taken to accelerate the adoption 
of such technical measures. Since the governments of both countries are thinking along 
these lines, it is not unimaginable that such policies can be developed and that a part of 
the emission reductions can be achieved, partly with the help of technology transfer, the 
Clean Development Mechanism and the Global Environment Facility.  
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While, the defensive attitude of both China and India in international negotiations is jus-
tified, on the other hand, the developing countries face a major problem. The world is 
not going to wait for them. Many interviewees were concerned that if they are constantly 
going to be defensive in their strategy, they will always be at the losing end of interna-
tional deals. As an interviewee put it: “How many rounds of loops can you get behind? 
Developing countries have to get their act together. Are governments going to govern or 
are they going to keep responding?” We would plead for the need of major investment in 
a group with a critical mass to research, read, delegate, collate and integrate positions in 
relation to a number of different conventions; and to try to capitalise on existing re-
sources to develop constructive and proactive positions based on well-reasoned and re-
searched documentation and public support. The Governments of China and India cannot 
afford to use rhetorical and ideological positions if they wish to make substantive pro-
gress in international negotiations.  
Finally, we believe that international pressure on countries that do not yet have the insti-
tutional structure and the statistical data, that are going through economic, political and 
social transformations to take on quantitative commitments will not lead to productive 
negotiations or effective implementation. Instead it may lead to increasing cases of non-
compliance, which is already a serious problem for developing countries in international 
environmental treaties. Instead, the international community would be more likely to 
succeed in encouraging developing countries to develop policies out of a menu of poli-
cies and measures.  
Although, so much is underway in both countries, we believe that there remain some 
critical reservations. The large-scale adoption of liberalisation, as a concept, might lead 
to an indigenised replication of western life-styles. This, in itself, may not be compatible 
with the climate change problem or with the notion of industrial transformation in that it 
may lead to increasing consumption, wasteful lifestyles and the devouring of natural re-
sources (cf. Gorz 1994). Although liberalisation may have an impact on electricity 
prices, it will also have an impact on incomes and lifestyles. The liberalisation of the 
electricity sector, may in itself be problematic. Recent reports indicate that the liberalisa-
tion of the sector in many western countries has not necessarily led to desired results. 
The story of Enron’ experience in India reveals that developing country governments 
may not yet be in a position to deal with large multinationals and they need to be able to 
develop the capacity to make such contracts in the best financial, political, economic and 
environmental interests of the nation.  
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KVA  
gce Gram coal equivalent GW  
kgce Kilogram coal equivalent  
tC Ton of carbon 
tce Ton coal equivalent  
g Gram 
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Codes in Model 
COG  Increased use of cogeneration 
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